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Abstract 
The social profiles seen in Williams syndrome (WS) and autism (ASD) have often been 
cited as mirror opposites of one another, with hyper-sociable behaviours seen in 
Williams syndrome and a disinterest in social engagement evidenced in autism.  Studies 
investigating the social-perceptual abilities of individuals with these 
neurodevelopmental disorders have found overlapping profiles, with a tendency towards 
using more featural processing strategies when interpreting information from faces, and 
deficits in recognising and interpreting the various facial cues that provide social 
information. It is therefore likely that differences in social approach behaviours in the 
two groups are driven by a more social-cognitive mechanism.  
The focus of this thesis was on answering the overarching question: What meaning do 
faces and socially relevant stimuli have for children with Williams syndrome and 
autism? Six experiments examined the recognition, attribution, description and 
understanding of emotions and social cues from faces and socially relevant scenes, 
amongst WS and ASD individuals relative to their typically developing peers. It was 
found that the social-perceptual profiles of individuals with the neurodevelopmental 
disorders were markedly similar, with accuracy for identifying emotions being at non-
verbal mental (but not chronological) age level. A tendency towards differences 
emerged in terms of the types of attribution and descriptions that individuals made, with 
those with ASD focusing more on physical aspects of social and non-social stimuli 
whilst individuals with WS showed more of an atypicality in the understanding of 
emotions and social contexts. 
The lack of any clear differentiation between individuals with ASD and WS in both the 
social-perceptual and social-cognitive domains is in line with recent research pointing to 
the extreme heterogeneity seen in these groups. The issue of overlaps and dissociations 
within such heterogeneous groups provides the theoretical framework for this thesis. 
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Introduction 
 Recognising our friends and family, understanding when they’re feeling happy 
or sad, and knowing how to react to those emotions is something that the majority of us 
take for granted. Rarely might we question how we know: What it is we actually see 
and, perhaps more importantly, understand when we look at a face? However, in certain 
disorders of neuro-development such as Williams syndrome (WS) and the autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD), the meaning that faces hold and the cues that may be salient 
appear to be atypical. Therefore the focus of the present thesis is aimed at answering the 
questions: What atypical meanings do faces have for individuals with these two neuro-
developmental disorders, and from where is this meaning derived? In what ways might 
the very different social behaviours seen in ASD and WS be underpinned by social-
perception and/or social-cognition? Finally, how do divides and overlaps in these 
domains manifest themselves between the two groups, and explain their respective 
social behaviours? 
ASD and WS make particularly interesting points of comparison because of their 
simultaneously divergent and overlapping profiles. Individuals in both clinical groups 
appear to be relatively competent at identifying people from faces (Fletcher-Watson, 
Leekam, Benson, Frank, & Findlay, 2009; Tager-Flusberg, Boshart & Baron-Cohen, 
1998 ) but struggle more in the recognition of emotional expressions (Da Fonseca et al., 
2009; García-Villamisar, Rojahn, Zaja, & Jodra, 2010a). However, whilst individuals 
with ASD appear to be indifferent or nonchalant towards making eye contact and do not 
actively engage in social interactions (Golarai, Grill-Spector, & Reiss, 2006), those with 
WS have been labelled as ‘hyper-sociable’ (Jones et al., 2000) and tend to seek out 
social relationships whilst showing prolonged fixations on the face area (Riby & 
Hancock, 2008). Despite the apparently ‘friendly’ nature of those with WS, they face 
the same high levels of social anxiety and difficulties in forming social relationships as 
do those with ASD (Dodd, Schniering, & Porter, 2009; Dykens, 2003). Therefore the 
pivotal question of the present PhD research is on why the profiles manifest so 
differently in the social communication domain? What underlying mechanisms may be 
responsible for this divergence?  
The research field of ‘face processing’ is an incredibly large one, riddled with mixed 
terminologies, methodologies and conclusions. However, with the development of 
neurological models has come a clearer framework for understanding how all the 
different aspects of face processing (from features to spatial relations, taking into 
account gaze cues and the role of specific emotions) might fit together. This, in turn, 
allows us to consider where the dissociations and overlaps within models of face 
processing might exist in terms of reading the emotional significance of faces, which in 
turn may inform us of where the fundamental differences might lie in 
neurodevelopmental groups. Further, the dissociations we need to explore may not only 
be at the perceptual level but more in terms of the conceptual understanding that those 
with ASD and WS have of faces. The question will therefore be posed here of whether 
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the deficits found in disorders such as WS and ASD are a product of problems with 
social perception (such as an ability to analyse expressions from faces) or more of a 
struggle with social cognition (such as the ability to actively think about the meaning 
behind the expression). This issue of what interactions take place, how one component 
is modulated by another, and where there are dissociations and overlaps is an important 
area to explore given the heterogeneity seen in these disorders; exploration of the 
possible divides and overlaps in these areas may shed more light on the core difficulties 
of individuals with disorders such as WS and ASD. 
The following two chapters will provide a summary of the face processing literature in 
typical development, followed by an examination of the social, cognitive, and 
behavioural profiles of those with ASD and WS. Chapter 1 will provide a broad 
overview of the face research literature, with a focus on the development of face 
processing; this emphasis on the role of age and experience in face processing is an 
essential one when considering whether the difficulties seen in WS and ASD are driven 
by delay or deficit. Literature on the terminologies, paradigms and models of face 
processing will first be given, with an overview of both neurological and behavioural 
evidence. 
Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the models and theories of WS and ASD as well 
as a broad summary of the neurological and behavioural profiles observed in these 
neuro-developmental disorders in the social and cognitive domains. It will ultimately be 
argued that, rather than looking to separate components of the face processing system to 
explain the social difficulties seen in WS and ASD, we should be asking questions 
about the links and gaps between percepts and concepts and how these underlie, both 
neurologically and behaviourally, the social cognitive deficits that may be at the core of 
the divergent phenomenologies of ASD and WS. 
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Chapter 1: Face Processing in Typical Development 
 
1.1 Fields, terminologies and paradigms 
Adult humans have a seemingly expert ability in glancing at a face and 
immediately knowing whether it’s familiar or not and, if it is, who that face belongs to: 
Their name, how we know them, how they’re feeling, etc. But what enables us to do 
this and at what age does this ability become expert? The face research literature is 
somewhat mixed in its dissection of the different aspects involved in face processing, 
and the different types of processing that occur. It is therefore important to elucidate 
precisely what is meant by each of the key fields, terms and paradigms employed within 
this literature.  
 
1.1.1 Fields of research 
Neurological research has shown that there is something unique about the face that 
triggers specialised patterns of neural activation in localised areas of the brain (Tong, 
Nakayama, Moscovitch, Weinrib, & Kanwisher, 2000). The debate in the literature has 
therefore not been whether faces are processed in a specific way neurologically, but how 
they are processed. There are, for example, different levels at which a face can be 
acknowledged: Simply, if it is familiar or not; what identity it possesses; the role of eye 
gaze, and what emotional affect is displayed. Evidence of neuropsychological 
dissociations has been observed from brain imaging investigations between 
neurodevelopmental groups and typically developing individuals. Different models of 
face processing (See section 1.4) have typically attempted to pull apart the ways in 
which one aspect of face processing depends on or is influenced by other components. 
Spangler, Schwarzer, Korell, and Maier-Karius, (2010) have used behavioural studies to 
show, for example, that children and adults alike struggle to ignore facial identity when 
asked to categorise faces by emotional expression, but are able to selectively focus on 
identity whilst ignoring expressions. Further, gaze direction in no way interfered with 
the sorting of facial identity, suggesting complex relationships and dissociations 
between these components. Gaze has, however, been shown to modulate the recognition 
of emotional facial expressions (Itier & Batty, 2009), and this relationship appears to be 
reciprocal; in a study by Lobmaier, Tiddeman, and Perrett (2008), adults were found to 
be likely to state that happy faces depicted direct gaze, compared to more negative 
expressions.  
The interplay between gaze direction, emotion and identity is an interesting area of 
research that may lend itself to a better understanding of where possible deficits in 
neural connectivity might exist in neuro-developmental groups. However, for the 
purposes of the present PhD study, the emphasis was on the recognition, interpretation 
and understanding of emotions from faces and non-social stimuli. The rationale for an 
emphasis on the emotional content of faces was that this is the area that causes the most 
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difficulties in individuals with ASD and WS (Falkmer, Bjällmark, Larsson, & Falkmer, 
2011; Järvinen-Pasley, Adolphs, et al., 2010; Rump, Giovannelli, Minshew, & Strauss, 
2009), possibly governing the different social approach behaviours in these neuro-
developmental groups (Jawaid et al., 2010). 
 
1.1.2 Terminologies 
Within the face processing literature, certain terminologies are typically used 
interchangeably with synonymous meanings. Similarly, certain paradigms designed to 
tap into these processes may be somewhat confused as to precisely which mechanisms 
they are cited as being evidence of.  
‘Holistic’ processing is a term typically used to refer to the gestalt processing of a face: 
Rather than decomposing a face into any respective relations between features, holistic 
processing operates by taking the face as a whole (Tanaka & Farah, 1995). The term 
‘configural processing’ is concerned with the organisation of facial features and has 
been broken down in various studies into two levels: 1st order configuration is the 
simple location of features in relation to one another; the mouth lies below the nose and 
the eyes are positioned above the mouth and nose. Detection of such first order 
configurations tells us little about the identity of a person but enables us to acknowledge 
that a face is a face, as evidenced by early ERP activity in the Fusiform Face Area 
[FFA] (Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, 2002a). That 1st order relations are involved in the 
recognition of a face as a face rather than any identification of that face is generally 
agreed upon.  
It is the role of 2nd order relations that have caused much debate. These are defined as 
the spatial relations between features: How far apart the eyes are, the distance between 
the tip of the nose and upper lip, etc. (Maurer et al., 2002a). These cues may play a role 
in both identification of a face (differences in these subtle relations are one of the 
differentiating factors in telling one face from another) but also reading facial 
expressions: It is the change in these relations that denotes an upturned mouth as being 
a smile, or furrowed eyes as making a frown. It is worth noting that ‘configural’ and 
‘holistic’ tend to be terms that are used interchangeably in the literature, therefore some 
studies claiming the presence of face processing using one specific term might actually 
be referring to the same processes referred to using another term by a different research 
group. The experiments comprising this PhD research will use the term holistic 
processing, to mean the piecing together of parts into a whole. None of the experiments 
cited here manipulated any spatial relations between features therefore any examination 
of ‘configural processing’ per se was not empirically tested.  
Another term frequently used in the literature is ‘featural processing’, which refers to 
the use of individual features in order to identify a face. Some researchers (Gilad, Meng, 
& Sinha, 2008) have argued that it is the features themselves that are important when 
identifying a face, in terms of what each feature looks like (shape, colour, size, etc.) 
whereas others have argued that features are only important in that they provide 
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reference ‘landmarks’ for the processing of relations between features (McKone & 
Yovel, 2009). It has been argued by a number of researchers (Annaz, Karmiloff-Smith, 
Johnson, & Thomas, 2009; Golarai et al., 2006; Happé, 1999) that those with ASD and 
WS use a more featural style of processing when identifying faces, and this may be 
indicative of a developmental delay. For example, Mondloch, Grand and Maurer, 
(2002) have shown that configural processing develops more slowly than featural 
processing in children; much debate exists across studies, however, as to precisely at 
what age configural processing becomes the dominant method, being fully developed. 
Studies examining this issue are discussed in this chapter.  
McKone and Yovel (2009) have, in their review of 17 inversion and 5 part-whole 
paradigm studies of face processing in the adult typically developing (TD) population 
(see section below on ‘paradigms’ for a summary of these methods) argued that the 
features of a face are not as unimportant as recent literature has claimed. In this 
stringent review of the literature, McKone and Yovel, (2009) concluded that whilst the 
inversion effect (defined in section 1.1.3) is clearly robust across studies, so is the 
observation that changes in the shape of a feature disrupt the recognition of faces. 
Specifically they found that, in 5 of the 17 inversion studies, an inversion effect as great 
as that seen for disruption of spatial relations was found when a feature was changed, 
and that only 35% of the 22 studies found no effect of feature at all. In a more detailed 
analysis, they concluded that changing feature colour, especially in extreme forms, 
removed any inversion effects whereas shape changes did have a significant impact on 
face recognition. This finding does not necessarily refute the idea that the identity of a 
face is assessed based on spatial relations but instead suggests a more encompassing 
holistic view in that the features themselves may dictate where the ‘landmark’ reference 
points are. Indeed, McKone and Yovel (2009) suggest a model in which many different 
aspects of the face are classed as features, from which reference points can be formed so 
that a richer variety of spatial relations are encoded. They go on to suggest that it may 
also sometimes not be beneficial to encode all of this spatial information and that, 
sometimes, such as in the case of an extreme colour change, features themselves may be 
sufficient as a point of recognition. 
Neurological evidence for the importance of features in face processing comes from  
Mercure, Dick and Johnson, (2008) who have found that early ERP activity occurred in 
response to features, with brain responses to configural information occurring later at 
N170 (consistently found to be an electrophysiological response to faces, and especially 
the eyes). They therefore suggest that the processing of features operates as an initial 
point of identification and then more complex processing of configural information 
follows; differentiating that something is a face and what face it is. This offers strong 
neurological support for McKone and Yovel’s (2009) model in that specific facial 
features may act as ‘landmark’ reference points for then processing the more spatially 
related changes. Which features are crucial in encoding faces, what aspects of those 
features play a key role and to what extent the spatial relations between these features 
matter, is very much still a topic of debate. 
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1.1.3 Paradigms 
Because of the motivation to pinpoint precisely which processing styles play the critical 
role in face identification, studies have employed differing paradigms in an effort to 
isolate and explore the exact processes involved. The inversion paradigm has long been 
cited as evidence for configural processing: When a face is turned upside down, the 
spatial organisation of features becomes disrupted, and performance for identification 
drops disproportionately compared to the effect of inverting a non-face object. The 
premise of the face inversion effect is therefore that disruption of configurations affects 
accuracy for recognising that face, indicating that configural information must be 
important (Leder & Bruce, 2000). By systematically manipulating spatial relations and 
features separately when inverting a face, it is therefore possible to establish which 
information is sensitive to the inversion effect (Leder & Bruce, 2000). One issue with 
the inversion paradigm is that, as Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, (2002b) highlight, it is 
not clear as to whether 1st or 2nd order configurations are being disrupted. For example, 
inverting an image of a face so that the mouth appears above the eyes may make the 
distances between features appear differently. On a similar note, in experiments where 
the features are manipulated (a different set of eyes may be inserted, for example), one 
might argue that in altering the shape/size of a feature, the spatial relations between this 
and neighbouring features may also be changed by default. Therefore it is very difficult 
to pull apart these subtle aspects. 
Two other paradigms that have been claimed (Tanaka & Farah, 1993) to tap into 
evidence of holistic rather than featural processing are the composite paradigm and the 
part-whole paradigm. Originally devised by Young, Hellawell and Hay (1987), the 
former method makes use of the alignment of face parts in order to establish whether 
participants are able to ignore irrelevant information in a face or if holistic processing 
dominates. The identities of two faces (one top half with one bottom half, typically split 
through the bridge of the nose) are merged together (See Figure 1.1), either in perfect 
alignment to form a new face, or with one half offset so that the divide is made explicit. 
The hypothesis is that, if holistic processing occurs, aligned faces will be much harder 
to identify from either top or bottom parts because of interference from the rest of the 
face. This has been consistently found to be the case(Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 
2000; Durand, Gallay, Seigneuric, Robichon, & Baudouin, 2007). This paradigm has 
also been used in various studies of expression recognition as an argument for holistic 
processing in this domain as well (Calder et al., 2000a; Durand et al., 2007). However, 
it should be noted that this paradigm, whilst it can offer support for a holistic view, 
cannot refute the configural view because spatial relations are still disrupted when two 
different face parts are merged. 
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Figure 1.1: Examples of composite faces (Calder et al. 2000a) 
 
The part-whole paradigm, introduced by Tanaka and Farah (1993) is perhaps a more 
robust test designed to systematically manipulate the presence of features versus 
configurations in the encoding of faces. Participants are typically presented with an 
image of a whole face, which they are asked to learn. They are then asked to identify a 
specific feature of that face (usually the eyes or mouth) when presented either in 
isolation, in the same whole face configuration, or in a novel configuration. Tanaka and 
Farah (1993) argue that if holistic processing occurs, it should be the case that 
identification of isolated features is most difficult, as a gestalt type of face processing 
requires full face information due to the individual features only being encoded as part 
of the whole.  
In a study using the part-whole paradigm, Tanaka and Sengco (1997) found, as 
hypothesised, that performance was poorest for isolated features, followed by features 
presented in new configurations, with the identification of the original configurations 
showing the most accurate performance. Tanaka and Sengco (1997) posit this as 
evidence for holistic processing as it shows that whole-face information is most 
beneficial for the identification of features. This forms a strong argument against the 
possibility that features may be encoded separately in face processing. However, one 
may question this interpretation in that, if processing is not at all featural, participants 
should not be able to identify a face from a feature alone at all. Tanaka and Sengco 
(1997) also found that original configurations were best recognised in upright faces in 
an inversion paradigm version of the same task, with no differences between the 
original or new configurations in the inverted condition, suggesting a lack of sensitivity 
to configural information when faces are inverted. The same effects were found for non-
face (house) images. It is worth noting that when spatial relations are disrupted in 
neutral faces (as were used in Tanaka and Sengco’s study), it is more disturbing as there 
is no context, whereas we might expect changes in spatial relations between features 
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that denote a smile or a frown. This could partially explain the detrimental effect of 
disrupting configurations in this study and it is also worth considering that this might be 
part of the problem in clinical groups: Do individuals with neuro-developmental 
disorders struggle to recognise emotions in others because they have no conceptual 
understanding of why spatial relations between facial cues should change? 
It is clear that there may be overlap in the methodologies used to pull apart holistic and 
configural processing, with spatial relations being so difficult to isolate without 
implicating the appearance of features (or vice versa) that a ‘pure’ measure of one or the 
other may not be possible. Perhaps use of these terms therefore becomes somewhat 
academic, if changes to one are so entwined with changes in the other? McKone and 
Yovel (2009) have highlighted the fact that ‘spatial relations’ in itself is a somewhat 
unhelpful term in that the particular relations that most studies have explored are 
somewhat ambiguous, focusing on interocular distances and nose-mouth relations 
simply because these are the most prominent facial features, and disregarding other 
possible spatial combinations. For the purposes of the present set of experiments, no 
manipulations of spatial relations were made; attention to individual features was 
examined through an analysis of the types of descriptive information that participants 
gave. The focus of this research was therefore not on what types of processing were 
employed but what information from faces participants utilised the most. 
 
1.2 Face Processing in Typical Development 
 One of the big questions when examining areas of difficulty in 
neurodevelopmental groups is how their profiles compare to typical children of the 
same chronological and mental age: Is there evidence of a fundamental deficit or more 
of a delay? In order to answer this question, it is important to establish what ‘typical’ 
development within a certain domain looks like. This section will therefore offer a 
summary of literature examining the development of face processing throughout 
childhood. 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, there is a great deal of debate in the 
face  processing field as to exactly what age the ability to use competent configural 
processing is achieved. McKone, Crookes and Kanwisher (2008) have suggested that, 
from age 4 onwards, the qualitative aspects of face processing may not change, with 
children from this age onwards showing evidence of configural processing across a 
wide range of studies; however, the quantitative aspects might continue to develop, with 
improvements in accuracy for identifying faces and speed of response seen linearly with 
age. Specifically, in their review of the literature, McKone et al. (2008) note that no 
single study has found a type of processing seen in adults that cannot be evidenced in 
infants as young as 4 years. This may suggest that, at 4, typically developing infants do 
utilise a configural processing strategy when presented with an image of a face. 
However, Mondloch et al., (2002) have concluded from their study of featural versus 
spacing changes that there is a developmental trend in the types of processing that are 
evident throughout childhood. 
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Mondloch et al. (2002) tested adults and children aged 6, 8 and 10 years (36 participants 
in each group) on a same/different judgement task. Participants were presented with 
images of faces in which either the shapes of the eyes/mouth were changed, the spacing 
between the eyes and mouth were changed, or the shape of the external contour was 
altered. Examining accuracy for whether or not participants could deduce if two faces 
differed therefore allowed Mondloch et al. (2002) to establish at what ages children 
would be able to detect the different types of changes. Whilst adults were not at 100% 
accuracy on any of the trials, a significant difference was found between the 
performance of adults and children of all ages when detecting spacing changes. The 
largest inversion effects were also seen for adults. 10 year olds were as accurate as 
adults at detecting feature changes, and those aged 6 and above were as accurate for 
detecting changes in the external contours. Taken together, these findings paint a picture 
of development occurring across age as to the types of facial information that children 
are sensitive to: Children as young as 6 can make use of broad, external contours, 
whereas 10 year olds are more sensitive to changes in specific features. Sensitivity to 
more subtle spacing changes perhaps occurs later and, based on the findings of 
Mondloch et al. (2002) is not at 100% accuracy even in adulthood.  
Further support that configural processing is not developed early on in childhood is 
offered by Mondloch and Thomson (2008); they designed three tasks in which the 
spacing features of faces were manipulated and children were asked to match identities, 
rate distinctiveness, or recognise a previously shown face. Eighteen children aged 4 
years to 4 years 9 months took part. It was found that the children performed only at 
chance level or below on all of the tasks, with the exception of the matching task. On 
this, eight of the 18 children still performed at chance level. Mondloch and Thomson 
(2008) claim this as evidence that infants aged 4 are not sensitive to spacing changes. 
Unfortunately, no other types of change were manipulated in this study, and it would 
have been useful to have further examined the possible manipulations that children at 
this age might be sensitive to. Similarly, it could be the case, as McKone et al. (2008) 
have noted, that other more general cognitive domains might be underpinning some of 
the patterns of performance seen in children this age. If attention or memory is poor, 
that and not necessarily difficulties in detecting spacing changes might still result in 
performance at chance level. The only way to establish the specificity of the underlying 
mechanisms would be to manipulate a variety of different types of change. 
McKone and Boyer (2006) have examined sensitivity to spacing changes in young 
children. In their experiment, 20 adults and 20 four year old infants were asked to 
“choose the most distinctive face” from face pairs. These faces had been manipulated in 
terms of the appearance of features (such as bushier eyebrows) or in the spacing of 
features (such as eyes closer together). McKone and Boyer (2006) found that 4 year 
olds’ choices about which faces were the most distinctive were overall in line with those 
of adults, and they appeared to be sensitive to both feature and spacing changes. 
McKone and Boyer (2006) therefore cite this as evidence for a sensitivity to spatial 
relations that governs judgements about the face in children as young as four years.  
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The fact that general accuracy in McKone and Boyer’s (2006) study was not at adult-
level amongst the four year olds on either the feature or spacing change conditions may 
be indicative of a relationship between a more general cognitive domain (such as 
attention or memory) that may improve with age. McKone and Boyer (2006) argue the 
case that this, and not under-developed sensitivity to configural information, might 
underpin differences between children and adults, supported by the fact that overall 
ratings of distinctiveness correlated significantly with those given by adults and 
performance was always above chance level, despite the difficulty of the task. However, 
it is worth considering that any changes might make a face appear more novel, and this 
could perhaps be confounded with ‘distinctiveness’ per se. How well the results of a 
study such as McKone and Boyer’s (2006) might then generalise to the processes 
underpinning broader facial identification might then be debated. 
Going against the argument that the configural processing of faces is something that 
develops gradually throughout infancy and even into adulthood, Schwarzer and Zauner 
(2003) have shown that babies as young as 8 months old appear to be able to detect 
spacing changes in faces. Using a classic habituation paradigm in which babies’ (n=97) 
looking times to two faces were recorded, they then showed the babies either the same 
habituation face, a completely novel face, or a face in which only the features (and not 
spatial relations) were changed. There were two conditions in this experiment: Real 
faces and schematic faces. Interestingly, Schwarzer and Zauner (2003) found that there 
was an interaction between the type of face presented and the type of change detected 
(assessed by longer looking times to the changed item). Infants had longer looking 
times towards the real faces when spatial relations were manipulated, compared to 
longer looking times towards schematic faces in which features were altered. Given that 
the real faces were colour photographs, this may be evidence for the fact that only real 
faces facilitate configural processing; any other type of image is treated as separate 
featural parts. However, this would go against the findings of Johnson, Dziurawiec, 
Ellis, and Morton (1991) and their observation that babies will attend to and detect 
changes in anything with the overall configuration of a face. This issue of the interplay 
between processing style and image type is one that will be discussed further in Chapter 
4. 
Following on from Schwarzer and Zauner (2003), Zieber et al. (2013) used a 
familiarisation looking paradigm, in which 9 month old infants (different groups 
recruited to three different experiments) were familiarised to a face until they attended 
to it for 30 seconds; preferences to new faces were then recorded. In two experiments, 
spacing changes were manipulated on human faces and monkey faces in both upright 
and inverted conditions. A third experiment presented infants with images of houses 
matched to the spatial relations and configurations seen in the real faces.  
Zieber et al’s. (2013) results showed that infants showed preferential looking to both 
human and monkey faces in the upright conditions but not when inverted. Infants did 
not show any evidence of detection of spacing changes in the house stimuli. Zieber et al. 
(2013) conclude that their findings suggest that infants as young as 9 months process 
configural information, both detecting spacing changes and showing inversion effects, 
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but this is not finely tuned to be specific to human faces, (although is specific to faces 
and not objects). It is worth noting, however, that monkey and human faces are 
configurally very similar, therefore it is perhaps not surprising that infants are not 
sensitive to different types of information from two such similar stimuli. That infants 
are able to detect spacing changes in monkey faces, to which they may have had very 
little exposure, does point to the possibility that experience is not a requirement for 
configural processing to develop. On the other hand, it is possible that infants may 
simply use a blanket strategy when presented with any faces (but not objects). This is an 
important consideration when examining neurodevelopmental groups. 
One theory of face processing which takes experience into account is that of  Valentine 
(1991), who devised a prototype theory of face perception. In his model, an ‘average’ 
face exists as a prototype and every time a new face is encountered, the prototype is 
altered accordingly. The more experience with faces one has, the more refined the 
prototype becomes so that making discriminations between judgements on the identity 
of race, gender, etc. becomes more effortless with experience. The classic paradigm 
designed to test for evidence of this involves familiarising participants with faces that 
vary in elements of features. For example, presenting face stimuli in which the 
nose/eyes/mouth might have 4 different widths, each manipulated in turn. During the 
test phase, participants are then shown a previously unseen prototype face (consisting of 
the average of all the manipulated features), or a face with familiar features, and are 
asked to choose which one they have seen previously. The logic is that, if we process 
faces according to a prototype, we will think that we have seen the prototype face before 
because we have already made a representation of that face ourselves. If this is not the 
case, then we will simply recognise the previously presented features. 
The above research points to the fact that findings are incredibly mixed as to at what age 
infants are able to detect, and appear to use, spatial and configural changes/cues. One 
reason for such heterogeneity across different studies may be the types of manipulations 
that are being made. Baudouin, Gallay, Durand, and Robichon (2010) wanted to 
examine precisely at what point spacing changes become detectable by children of 
different ages. In their experiment, between 25 and 28 children were recruited into three 
different age-groups (8, 10 and 12 years) and compared to 28 adults on a task where 
participants were asked to state whether the eyes of two faces were the same distance 
apart or not. Faces were presented in both upright and inverted conditions and inter-
ocular distances were manipulated in order to establish at what point changes would be 
detected in the different age-groups.  
The results showed that the spacing needed to detect changes fell in each age-group, 
from 20 pixels in the youngest children to only 8 pixels in the adult group. Only in 
adults were there any significant differences in accuracy between upright and inverted 
faces, indicative of less configural processing in children, teamed with poorer ability to 
detect more subtle spacing changes. Of most interest was the fact that those individuals 
who were most sensitive to spacing changes also showed the greatest inversion effects; 
Baudoin et al. (2010) cite this as evidence of the fact that configural processing governs 
sensitivity to spatial relations. Whilst the clear linear trend with age in this study points 
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to a steady ‘fine-tuning’ of configural processing through childhood, it is possible that 
the results were driven by other cognitive mechanisms, such as improvements in 
attention. As the only manipulations made were for inter-ocular distances, it is also not 
possible to deduce whether the same fine-tuning would be seen for other spatial 
relations. These findings do, however, highlight the importance of considering precisely 
which manipulations are made in paradigms concerned with examining configural 
processing. 
The literature on the typical development of face processing offers no ultimate 
consensus as to when configural processing develops. That the detection of spatial 
changes becomes more fine-tuned with age (both in terms of how subtle the changes can 
be and in how specific to human faces they are) seems generally accepted, but to what 
extent featural processing might give way to configural processing, and at what age, is 
yet to be concluded. It is therefore important to bear this heterogeneity across typical 
development in mind when using typical benchmarks as a comparison for 
neurodevelopmental groups. 
  
1.3 Recognising Emotions 
Research into the processing of emotional expressions from the face is a much murkier 
field than that of the processing of facial identity, in that even defining what constitutes 
a ‘happy’ or ‘sad’ face has been endlessly debated; even when the six basic emotions 
(Happy/Sad/Angry/Fearful/Disgusted/Surprised [Ekman & Oster, 1979]) have been 
clearly defined in terms of very specific muscular configurations. There is a wealth of 
research (Farran, Branson, & King, 2011) claiming that positive or negative emotions 
may be processed in different ways, using different cues, depending on different stimuli. 
The specificity of emotions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The next section 
will briefly summarise some of the literature focussing on emotion recognition in 
typical adults, again returning to the issue of whether holistic, configural or featural 
processing seems to be dominant. 
The debate as to whether processing of expressions occurs holistically, configurally or 
featurally is equally active in this field, with Tanaka and Farah (1993) being proponents 
of the holistic view. Intuitively, it seems unlikely that features alone can determine the 
recognition of facial expressions: Bob’s eyes may squint when he is angry and be wide 
open if he’s surprised or scared but they will not change colour or size therefore it must 
be these subtle spatial changes that differentiate between the emotions. Further, it is 
logical to state that these spatial changes may not always be enough: The fact that wide 
open eyes could be scared or surprised (or delighted or excited or any number of other 
emotions) means that some other cues must come into play, such as the mouth. This 
would then mean that a more holistic appraisal of the entire face is required: What 
shape do the eyes and mouth form in conjunction with one another? This points to the 
fact that perhaps different emotions might be processed in different ways, depending on 
what cues are available. 
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Calder et al. (2000a) set out to explore this very question of what type of processing 
seems to dominate in the recognition of facial emotions, as well as revisiting the issue 
of how dissociable identity and expression recognition are. They designed four 
experiments to test these issues. Using the composite paradigm across all four tasks, 
they varied the stimuli to tap into the different processes: A classic composite paradigm 
with facial expressions depicting the six basic emotions (Experiment 1); an inversion 
task using the same stimuli (Experiment 2); a composite paradigm in which identities 
but not expressions (both face halves depicted the same expression but comprised of 
two different identities) were incongruent (Experiment 3) and, finally, manipulation of 
both expression and identities separately (Experiment 4), as well as a condition in which 
face halves depicted both a different identity and different expression from one another 
(always presented in alignment). Calder et al.’s (2000a) hypotheses were that, if facial 
expressions are processed configurally, the typical composite effect would be found in 
that reaction times and accuracy to misaligned faces would be faster than those 
presented in alignment; further, this difference was expected to disappear in inverted 
faces. Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to dissect whether facial identity and 
expression are processed separately: If emotional expressions are processed 
configurally, there should not be any differences between aligned and misaligned faces 
depicting the same emotion but different identities, as the configurations of each 
emotion should be consistent. Experiment 4, and the manipulation of both identity and 
expression (separately as well as at the same time, under 3 different conditions), was 
designed to examine precisely which processes are used for both and how 
interconnected they might be.  
Calder et al. (2000a) hypothesised that reaction times would be fastest for congruent 
conditions; therefore, when participants were asked to name the identities of faces, this 
would be fastest when the top and bottom half were the same identity, regardless of 
incongruence in expression, and vice versa for expression recognition. In other words, 
the incongruence of the attended to dimension would produce slower reaction times, if 
identity and expression are processed separately. As a further control to explore whether 
the same types of processes were at play, reaction times to the bottom halves of faces 
with incongruent identities and expressions were compared to those that had been 
manipulated separately; it was predicted that, if the same underlying processes were 
involved, reaction times on these measures would be comparable. 
As Calder et al. (2000a) expected, the aligned faces were harder to identify in 
experiment 1, with slower reaction times and poorer accuracy, suggesting that holistic 
processing might take place. Interestingly, they found that, when participants were 
asked to identify emotions from the bottom halves of faces, they were faster and more 
accurate at this overall, suggesting that mouth cues might be the most helpful in 
emotion recognition. By introducing the inversion task, Calder et al. (2000a) were able 
to tease apart configural and holistic processing: Whilst the aligned composites were 
more difficult to recognise overall, an interaction was found whereby there were no 
longer differences between aligned and misaligned faces in the inverted condition, as 
predicted. This shows how configural relations are being encoded and, in disrupting 
these, the classic composite effect disappears. In experiment 3, as predicted, a 
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composite effect (better performance for misaligned faces) was not found, which Calder 
et al. (2000a) claimed to be due to the lack of any disruption of configurations between 
features due to the consistency of the emotional expressions on an emotion judgement 
task. Experiment 4 also revealed the expected pattern of results: When the face half in 
which participants were asked to make the judgement on was congruent with the other 
half (same identities when asked to name the identity, for example), reaction times were 
found to be faster. Reaction times for identity judgements made when both dimensions 
were incongruent were comparable to those made when identities were incongruent; the 
same pattern was seen for expressions, as predicted.  
Ultimately, the work of Calder et al. (2000a) shows that we are able to selectively attend 
to identity or expression when asked to focus on one or the other, and that interference 
of configural relations does affect the processing of both these dimensions. Specifically 
which configural relations are used in the encoding of identity versus expressions is still 
under debate but their findings do offer strong evidence for the dissociability of 
expression and identity processing. 
Durand et al. (2007)  have entered into this debate with their cross-sectional study of 
development in processing of facial emotions. They make the point that very little has 
been done to explore developmental change in expression recognition, therefore their 
design focused on children split into 4 age groups, from 5-12 years (between 24 and 26 
children aged 5-6; 7-8; 9-10, and 11-12), as well as an adult group (mean age 22 years, 
5 months). Durand et al. (2007) make the claim that the inversion and composite 
paradigms allow for an examination of what types of changes children may be sensitive 
to: Is performance affected by disruptions to configural information, as seen when 
inverting a face, or might more holistic information be used, evidenced by a detriment 
of alignment on performance in the composite task? 
Participants were presented with faces depicting happiness, sadness, anger, disgust and 
fear, as well as a neutral state in classic inversion and composite paradigms. 
Performance was assessed using a method employing signal detection theory, in which 
discriminability ratings were calculated in order to factor out false alarms in which 
participants might default to a specific emotion in cases of uncertainty. This is an 
important point to note in that it means that poorer performance is indicative of 
difficulty on certainty when given a choice, rather than lower ability in recognising 
emotions. 
 On the inversion task, all emotions and all age groups demonstrated the classic 
inversion effect, suggesting that configural relations are encoded, even in the youngest 
groups. This is in line with work by McKone and Boyer (2006), and Ziedler et al. 
(2013), who have shown that children, and even infants as young as 9 months, are 
sensitive to spacing changes when processing the identities of faces.  In terms of 
specific emotions, identification of happy and sad showed improvements with age but 
not to such a great extent that there were significant differences between the age groups 
overall. Interestingly, the youngest group were poorer at identifying fear, anger and 
disgust. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste and Plumb (2001) have suggested that 
recognising more complex emotions requiring more of a ‘theory of mind’ is something 
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that develops with age and experience, therefore these findings are in line with this 
assertion. No interaction was found between emotion type and inversion, suggesting the 
same strategies employed across all emotions.  
In the composite paradigm, all groups performed best for misaligned faces, and this 
effect disappeared when the stimuli were inverted. Overall, the youngest group were 
significantly poorer than all other groups on emotion recognition, and differences in 
performance were also found between those aged 7-8 and 9-10 and those aged 11-12, as 
well as adults. However, children aged 7-8 were not any less accurate than those aged 9-
10; this might be suggestive of a peak and plateau between 7-10 years with further 
development (perhaps based on more social knowledge) later on.  
Durand et al’s. (2007) research is interesting in that it highlights that children as young 
as 5 do use configural information when processing facial affect (as evidenced by 
inversion and composite effects) and yet they are less accurate at identifying those 
emotions. This might then suggest that something else is at play beyond configural 
information. It must be reiterated, however, that the use of discriminability ratings does 
not suggest that younger children cannot identify emotions per se, but that they find 
differentiating between certain emotions more difficult. These issues of emotion 
specificity will be addressed in Chapter 5. It is also worth noting that no correlations in 
performance were found between the two tasks in Durand et al.’s (2007) study, which 
they suggest may be indicative of different underlying processes facilitated by the two 
paradigms.  
One interesting study to hint that certain emotions are differentially processed even into 
adulthood is that of Calder et al. (2003). Their participants were split into five age 
groups ranging from 20 to 75 years, tested on an emotion labelling task and a face 
morph task. On the face morph task, participants were asked to make judgements as to 
which of the six basic emotions (happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise and disgust) a face 
resembled (morphed from two different expressions). The results showed that there was 
a linear decrease in the recognition of fear from age 40 onwards. This contrasted with 
improvements in the recognition of disgust, with there being a clear significant 
difference between those aged 20 and 70 years. Recognition of happy remained stable 
across all age groups, with no significant differences at any stage, consistently 
demonstrating the best performance. 
 Because Calder et al.’s (2003) study only required participants to label emotions, little 
can be concluded as to whether or not different emotions might be processed in different 
ways. However, neurological research (Adolphs & Tranel, 2003) has implicated the 
amygdala in the detection of fear, whereas the basal ganglia are reputed to be concerned 
with disgust responses. Could it therefore be that the responsiveness of the amygdala 
deteriorates with age? It is perhaps unlikely that disgust responses would neurologically 
improve with age, however, so there may need to be a more social explanation for this. 
Calder et al. (2003) do note that older people are less likely to express negative 
emotions themselves, so it could be that this offers a partial explanation for why they 
may also recognise them less, especially if theories (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 
2000) regarding the role of mirror neurons and the somatosensory system prove to be 
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true (discussed in section 1.4). Such questions translate well into the clinical field: 
Might there be a link, even in neurological terms, between the expression of emotion 
and the recognition of expressions in others? The possible link between neurology and 
experience in the recognition of emotions is a very important one to consider, especially 
when thinking about neurodevelopmental groups who have atypical exposure to social 
interactions.   
The literature reviewed thus far enables one to draw several conclusions: The 
processing of spatial relations between features probably underlies both recognition of 
facial identity as well as facial expressions in typical adults, and may well be developed 
as early as 4 years of age. Precisely which configural relations are used, and their role in 
a more holistic use of facial information across different ages and at different time 
points in development, is still debated; it may be that divides in this area are the basis of 
dissociability between identity and expression processing. Whether or not these two 
domains are dissociable is also a topic of ongoing debate, with mixed behavioural and 
neurological findings. In the field of expression identity, it may also be the case that 
different emotions are processed in different ways, utilising different cues, and this may 
be something that further improves or deteriorates with age. The role that experience 
plays in this may be critical, especially in neurodevelopmental groups. Such a mixed 
backdrop in the literature pertaining to typical development makes teasing apart trends 
within the clinical literature even more difficult. The following section outlines models 
of face processing which frame the issue of how interconnected or dissociable the 
processing of emotion and identity are. 
 
1.4 Models of Face Processing 
 As outlined above, face processing involves attention to and encoding of the 
parts that make up a face to deduce identity, the possible expressions depicted on that 
face, and the interplay of and modulation on eye gaze direction in both of these 
dimensions. Debate is ongoing as to precisely to what extent the processing of identity 
and expression can be pulled apart. Models of face processing have typically attempted 
to postulate the possible ways in which these different dimensions fit together or 
separate out, supported in recent years by a wealth of neurological research. This 
section outlines the key models, framing the debate as to how dissociable or 
interconnected facial identity and emotion processing might be. 
The Bruce and Young (1986) model of face processing was the first to formally outline 
that different routes are used to deduce facial identity and emotion. Claiming an overall 
dissociation between the processes involved in identifying a face and recognising the 
expression of a face, they proposed that face processing occurs via structural nodes, 
some of which interconnect and others which work in isolation. The early processing of 
a face as being a face is shared by both routes, and more complex attributions (such as 
the contextual familiarity of the face) may also involve some interplay between the 
routes at a later stage of the cognitive process, with separate processes operating in 
between these points.  
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The Bruce and Young (1986) model proposed a system of weighted nodes in which the 
recognition of familiar versus unfamiliar faces depends upon different types of 
‘structural codes’. An unfamiliar face must be processed using ‘directed visual 
processing’ (Bruce and Young, 1986) that structurally encodes key defining features, 
whereas a familiar face can be identified through a variety of visual and/or semantic 
routes. ‘Expression codes’ (Bruce and Young, 1986) operate as distinct units so that, 
regardless of the expression on a person’s face and the corresponding configural 
changes that accompany it, we are still able to recognise Bob as Bob. However, 
identifying a face may involve a variety of interconnected nodes, such as the visual 
aspects (features and/or configurations) as well as the retrieval of more semantic 
information, such as where we know Bob from or what Bob looks like when he’s angry. 
This model of face processing has stood the test of time and it is still generally accepted 
that there are at least aspects of identity and expression processing that must operate 
along different routes, recently supported by neurological research.  
The Haxby et al. (2000) model builds on the work of Bruce and Young (1986) in stating 
that the processing of identity and affect are neurologically dissociable. Their argument 
follows that, if the same mechanisms were involved in identifying faces and recognising 
emotions, we would think somebody was a different person every time they showed a 
change in expression! They cite the example of prosopagnosia as further evidence for 
the selectivity of brain regions in face identification: Patients with this disorder are 
unable to identify faces but have no problem in naming emotional expressions. Haxby 
et al. (2000) therefore agree with Bruce and Young (1986) in that there must be one 
system for invariant features and another for processing the cues that denote 
expressions.  
Based on fMRI studies in which participants were asked to state whether either the 
identity or expression of a person matched a previously shown target, Haxby et al. 
(2000) found very distinct patterns of brain activation, with activity predominantly in 
the frontal gyrus (FG) when judging identities compared to more activation in the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) for expression judgements. Schultz (2005) have 
observed similar findings in that the STS does seem to be more responsible for the 
processing of movement or changes in spatial relations. McKone and Yovel (2009) have 
noted, however, that emotions can also be identified on distinguishing features. For 
example, we might not necessarily need to analyse spatial relations between the eyes if 
we know that an upturned mouth is a smile, provided we understand what that smile 
represents. Indeed, Haxby et al. (2000) stress that more ‘peripheral’ areas, such as the 
limbic system and amygdala, integrate with those mechanisms responsible for detecting 
spatial changes and these are where meaning is attached to those configurations. 
Specifically, Haxby et al. (2000) suggest that the role of the amygdala is to ‘bias 
cognition’ (p.230), such that it responds to any salient stimuli, especially stimuli 
requiring an urgent fight or flight response. Haxby et al. (2000) have further made the 
intriguing suggestion that, in understanding complex emotions, the somatosensory 
system comes into play so that we can experience for ourselves the emotion that we are 
viewing. Such an assertion is more in the realm of theory of mind and conceptual, rather 
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than perceptual, processing of emotions; this issue of percepts versus concepts is 
addressed in the following section. 
The role that the amygdala plays in the processing of emotional expressions has been 
hotly debated (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000a; Adolphs and Tranel, 2003) and research is 
ongoing as to whether it plays a role in general emotion processing or more ‘quick and 
dirty’ (Johnson, 2005) negative emotion expressions, such as the detection of fear 
and/or anger. Whilst Haxby et al. (2000) credit the amygdala with a more periphery role 
in expression recognition, citing it to be involved in ‘biasing cognition’ based on 
already encoded visual aspects, Johnson’s (2005) model puts the amygdala in a more 
central role. He states that the amygdala plays a more modulatory part in the 
identification of facial expressions, as evidenced by early event related potential (ERP) 
activity stemming from the amygdala and spreading to other cortical regions. He puts 
forward a model in which there is a three way feedback between cortical and subcortical 
routes whereby the amygdala is implicated in both the early detection and emotional 
attribution of emotions, mediated by the cortex. Johnson (2005) notes how the 
‘extreme’ emotions that require a fast response tend to consist of low spatial 
frequencies, and it is these that appear to trigger amygdala activation. One very 
interesting assertion made by Johnson (2005) is that children do not show any greater 
amygdala activation to fear than what is seen in other brain regions, whereas adults do. 
He cites this as evidence for later connectivity between cortical and subcortical regions, 
perhaps mediated by the role of experience. This neurological evidence offers support 
for behavioural studies showing poorer recognition of fear in younger compared to 
older typically developing children (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and highlights the fact 
that the recognition of different emotions may depend upon separate neurological 
processes. It is also supported by Calder et al.’s (2003) assertion that recognition of fear 
declines in older adults, who typically show less amygdala response. 
Not all researchers agree that dissociable processes underlie face identification and 
expression. The possibility that there may, in fact, be some neurological overlap 
between the processing of face identity and expression has been suggested by Ganel, 
Valyear, Goshen-Gottstein and Goodale (2005). Arguing against the Haxby et al. (2000) 
model, they suggest that the frontal gyrus (FG), typically referred to in the face 
processing literature as the Fusiform Face Area (FFA), is not exclusively activated in 
response to the identities of faces but also when processing emotional expressions. The 
inferior frontal gyrus has also been implicated (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) in the 
mirror neuron system when both observing and imitating the actions of others; this may 
point to a neurological link between both the perception and experience of emotions. 
Ganel et al. (2005) used a similar design and premise (but different paradigm) to that 
used by Calder et al. (2000a) in that they wanted to create both congruent and 
incongruent expressions and identities to establish whether or not the processing of both 
are treated separately in neurological terms. Participants (11 typical adults) were 
presented with a face (Person A or person B) depicting either happiness or anger and 
were then asked to state the identity or expression of a test face. The test face was 
manipulated to be either congruent or incongruent with the original image on the 
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unattended to dimension (See Figure 1.2). This design allowed for the analysis of the 
effect of implicit processing of either dimension and its neural underpinnings.  
 
Figure 1.2: Stimuli used in Ganel et al. (2005), p.1646, reproduced with permission 
 
Ganel et al. (2005) found activation in the FG, STS and amygdala when identifying 
emotions but also when identifying identities when emotions were incongruent, 
suggesting an implicit neurological processing of facial expressions, activating the FFA. 
They posit this as evidence for more of a network involved in both facial identity and 
facial expression processing and not the two dissociable systems that the Haxby et al. 
(2000) model argues. Ganel et al. (2005) explain this finding in that, in order to identify 
an emotion, we need to have the identity of the face as a reference point at the 
minimum. A similar idea of the referential value of featural cues has been made by 
McKone and Yovel (2009), although their review confined this theory to the processing 
of identities rather than affect. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that activation of 
the FG may purely be in response to the fact that faces are presented, regardless of the 
type of cue or dimension that participants were asked to attend to. Unfortunately, Ganel 
et al. (2005) did not examine accuracy on their task, which would have better 
highlighted possible relationships or interference between the recognition of identities 
versus expressions.      
Very little research to date has examined the dissociability of expression and identity in 
children. Spangler et al. (2010) used a sorting task paradigm with children aged 5-11 
years (n=72) in which they were asked to sort photos of faces according to either 
identity (ignoring gaze direction, emotional expression and facial speech) or one of 
those other dimensions, ignoring facial identity. It was hypothesised that reaction times 
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across the different conditions would be comparable if the underlying processes were 
separate, therefore not causing any interference that would be seen in differing reaction 
times.  
The results showed that there was evidence of a clear dissociability between eye gaze 
and identity, with children of all ages able to ignore identity when asked to categorise 
based on gaze direction, and vice versa. However, interference effects were seen when 
participants were asked to ignore identities whilst categorising facial speech and 
emotional expression, with reaction times in this condition significantly slowed. 
Interestingly, this was an asymmetrical pattern in that participants were able to ignore 
the other dimensions when asked to categorise identities. Bruce and Young (2012) have 
cited examples across the literature in which this asymmetrical pattern is also observed 
in typical adult populations. No interactions were seen in the analysis to suggest 
different patterns of processing between the different age-groups, with only overall 
poorer accuracy seen with age. However, the participants recruited to the different 
conditions (ignoring identities or another dimensions) were different cohorts therefore it 
is impossible to state that these findings are indicative of actual dissociability between 
processes rather than caused by some other between-subject differences. Future studies 
should examine this dissociation between the different aspects of faces across childhood 
more systematically in future, as it may be that there is a developmental change in the 
inter-relatedness of these dimensions and their role in effectively interpreting faces and 
the meaning they afford, or it might simply be the case that children of a certain age are 
showing the types of asymmetries also seen in adulthood. 
To summarise the literature reviewed thus far, the processing of faces in typical 
development and into adulthood is comprised of many aspects: Recognition of the 
identity of faces appears to operate separately from that of gaze, although there may be 
some interplay between the specific emotions being processed and gaze direction, as 
well as some overlap between identity and expression recognition. To what extent these 
different aspects are underpinned by featural, holistic or configural processing may 
depend on the age of the child as well as which specific emotions are being processed. 
Findings are mixed as to at what age sensitivity to spatial changes is fully developed, 
and this may depend on the extent of the spatial change and the salience of other cues 
available.  
Whilst all of the above research has focussed on perceptual aspects of face processing, 
it is important to consider the conceptual understanding of emotions from faces. As 
Haxby et al. (2000) have suggested, the limbic system may play a peripheral role in the 
interpretation of emotions; examination of the divide or overlap between perceptual and 
conceptual processing of emotions may build a framework for better understanding of 
from where difficulties might stem in neurodevelopmental groups. 
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1.5 Social Perception versus Social Cognition 
 There is clearly a great deal of variation across studies as to precisely what 
perceptual processes are at play when examining a face. There has been far less 
research conducted as to what conceptual meaning faces have: Once a face has been 
identified as ‘angry’, for example, how do we then know what to do with that 
information or how to act on it? What do we understand about the term ‘angry’? It has 
been postulated by Haxby et al. (2000) that the limbic system takes a peripheral role in 
this type of interpretation of emotions, but very few behavioural studies have 
systematically examined the relationship between perceiving the emotion shown on a 
face and mapping this on to an understanding of that emotion. The focus of the current 
PhD research will be on exploring the ways in which the accurate identification of 
emotions and an understanding of them may be related or dissociable, in both typical 
development and in neurodevelopmental groups. 
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) have suggested that the perceptual and cognitive 
components of “social knowledge” (p.60) are underpinned by separate neurological 
routes and, in order to have a full awareness of the social environment, one needs to be 
able to integrate social-perceptual and social-cognitive information. For example, 
understanding why Jayne might be crying at a wedding requires us not only to perceive 
the configurations of the face to deduce that she is crying from happiness (rather than 
sadness), but to then understand the social context and why she might be happy and not 
sad. Chapter 6 offers a comprehensive account of the literature in this field, with a 
particular focus on how divides between social-perception and social-cognition may 
underpin the behavioural profiles seen in neurodevelopmental groups. 
Pineda and Hecht (2009) have built on the theoretical model proposed by Tager-
Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) in highlighting how different patterns of neural activity 
underpin tasks requiring social perception versus social cognition. The premise behind 
their experiment was that mu rhythms (electrical brain activity in the somatosensory 
cortices when at rest) are found to be suppressed when observing the motor action of 
another. This pattern of brain activity has been dubbed the ‘mirror neuron system’ and 
is reputed to be evidence of the ability to experience what is being observed in another. 
Their hypothesis was that mirror neurons would be active during social-perceptual tasks 
because these are a more automatic type of process not requiring any declarative 
reasoning, unlike social-cognition, which takes place in largely dorsal areas. However, 
they found some overlap in brain activity between tasks that were designed to be 
perceptual versus cognitive; whether this points to the interconnectivity of the two 
systems or discrepancies in task design remains to be seen. 
Studies such as that of Pineda and Hecht (2010) are critical for beginning to unravel the 
interconnections between recognising emotion, understanding intent and pinpointing 
what processes may lie beneath. However, as brain imaging studies are expensive and 
reliant on usually small sample sizes, and the validity of the mirror neuron system itself 
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is much debated, behavioural measures using well designed tasks may be a better way 
forward in the short-term.  
1.6 Summary 
 Models of face processing and neurological evidence all point to the fact that 
social perception and social cognition, similarly to the recognition of identities versus 
expressions, may be underpinned by largely separate processes. Precisely what these 
processes are may well depend upon the facial expression, other cues available (such as 
gaze direction) and the age and/or experience of the person making the judgement. 
However, in order to make attributions to derive ‘social knowledge’ (Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 2000), there may need to be some level of connectivity between these systems, 
with certain aspects being modulated by or dependent on others. The above literature 
has focussed specifically on these processes in typical development; the key question is 
how deviant or delayed these processes may be in neurodevelopmental groups and to 
what extent such differences might explain the behavioural profiles seen in these 
disorders? That social perception and social cognition may be dissociable will be the 
governing framework of the current argument that the social behaviours seen in 
Williams syndrome and autism may stem from different difficulties within these 
domains. Chapter 2 will outline the genetic, cognitive and social profiles of individuals 
with these two neurodevelopmental disorders.       
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Chapter 2: Social and Cognitive Profiles of Autism and Williams 
syndrome 
  
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the face processing literature in typical development 
and briefly summarised models of face processing as well as outlining the important 
distinctions between social perception and social cognition. The focus of Chapter 2 will 
be on outlining the cognitive and social profiles of individuals with Williams syndrome 
(WS) and autism (ASD). In order to pinpoint where the difficulties in social 
communication might lie and what might specifically underpin them, it is important to 
have an overview of the broader profiles of these disorders. The following sections 
review evidence from studies with individuals with WS and ASD as to where their 
strengths and weaknesses are in the cognitive and social domains: How much 
uniformity or heterogeneity is there both within and between these neurodevelopmental 
disorders?  
 
2.1 Williams syndrome 
 Williams syndrome (WS) is named after Williams et al. (1961, cited by Skwerer 
& Tager-flusberg, 2002) who noted a similar and distinct profile of mainly 
developmental and physical problems in a small group of patients which later led to the 
recognition and classification of the disorder. The problems observed included growth 
delay, cardiac and gastrointestinal problems and a very specific ‘elvin’ face shape. 
Advances in medicine since then have now attributed WS to a specific genetic deletion 
on chromosome 7, affecting up to 28 genes (Korenberg et al., 2000) one of which is the 
elastin gene. WS is diagnosed using a method of fluorescent in situ hybridization 
(FISH). This procedure highlights the absence of one copy of the elastin gene on 
chromosome 7 and is used as the genetic marker for diagnosis. Many of the medical 
problems associated with WS, such as delayed growth, aortic stenosis and poor 
muscular control, are considered to be related to the absence of the elastin gene. The 
social and cognitive profiles associated with WS, however, are highly likely to be due to 
the interplay between several genetic abnormalities on chromosome 7 as well as 
neurological and environmental factors. 
As with other genetic disorders, such as Fragile X or Down syndrome (DS), prevalence 
rates vary from study to study but the most cited statistic is that WS occurs in 
approximately 1 in 20,000 live births (although Stromme, Bjomstad, & Ramstad  (2002)  
have found prevalence rates as high as 1 in 7,500 births). Because of the nature of the 
cardiac problems present in the disorder, the prognosis has not been very positive but 
advances in medicine mean that the cardiac and gastrointestinal issues are manageable 
and do not need to greatly reduce life expectancy. The implications of this are that there 
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is now an older generation of people with the condition but very little research has taken 
place to explore the developmental trajectory of WS.   
Howlin, Davies, & Udwin (1998) have examined cognitive skills in 61 WS adults 
(mean age 26 years) and have shown that there appears to be very little improvement in 
any of the subtest domains typically tested on standardised IQ tests between child and 
adulthood. Differences between verbal and performance IQ were slightly less 
pronounced in adults but other skills (such as reading, arithmetic and general social 
adaptation) were comparable to those of children with WS. Further, Davies, Udwin, and 
Howlin, (1998) have reported (from interviews conducted with the parents/care-givers 
of adults with WS) that the emotional and social difficulties seen in childhood remain to 
be prevalent in adulthood and become more problematic, with others tending to be less 
understanding of those behaviours in an adult than they might be a child and adults with 
WS having a higher rate of mental health disorders than are seen in the TD population 
(Stinton, Tomlinson, & Estes, 2012) 
Given the relatively stable cognitive and social profile seen in WS with age, this chapter 
will now review these domains in turn. The majority of studies have been carried out 
with children, therefore drawing a definite developmental picture of how WS might 
manifest across age is, at this point, difficult. Future studies may address this issue by 
studying a wider age range or, ideally, adopting a longitudinal design. 
 
2.2 The Cognitive Domain in WS 
Individuals with WS have a consistently mild-moderate intellectual impairment, 
reported to be in the 50-60 region on standardised IQ tasks (Searcy et al., 2004). Low 
intellectual functioning therefore has an impact across a wide range of other cognitive 
skills, such as memory and attention.  However, it is this typically low IQ that makes 
the areas of strength seen in WS so striking: There are typically very large divides seen 
between verbal and performance IQ on standardised tasks (Howlin et al., 1998) and 
individuals with WS are frequently cited, both anecdotally and on empirical behavioural 
tasks, as having relatively strong and varied language skills in relation to their low full 
scale IQ. Santos and Deruelle (2009) have termed the strengths and deficits found 
within the WS profile as ‘verbal peaks and visual valleys’ as a way of describing 
discrepancies in performance between language and visual-spatial domains. They state 
how language abilities tend to be far better than what would be expected relative to poor 
visuo-spatial skills in individuals with the disorder.  
The early work of Bellugi, Wang and Jernigan (1994) comprehensively tested this 
pattern of strengths and deficits across a cohort of more than 50 individuals with WS 
(aged between 10 and 20 years old). Specific groups of individuals took part in various 
experiments comprising a battery of tasks aimed at examining the different domains of 
language and cognition. Participants were compared to individuals with Down 
syndrome (DS) matched on age, sex and IQ, some of the findings of which are reported 
below. 
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2.2.1 Visuo-Spatial 
Typically classed as one of the ‘hallmark’ deficits in WS, problems with visuo-spatial 
processing have been widely and consistently reported (Farran, Jarrold, & Gathercole, 
2003; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005a). Anecdotal evidence comes from parents who 
report that those with WS struggle to navigate or follow simple directions, even having 
difficulty in negotiating flights of stairs. On tasks such as the block design task, in 
which participants are asked to recreate formations of blocks from a 2-d pattern, those 
with WS particularly struggle (Hoffman, Landau, & Pagani, (2003). Studies designed to 
elucidate precisely where the problem might lie on tasks such as these have typically 
concluded that those with WS utilise a featural style of processing, whereby attention is 
paid to individual parts rather than the wider image. Hoffman et al. (2003) conclude that 
the crux of the deficit is in putting together and representing spatial relationships. Given 
the wealth of literature on how faces are processed configurally (discussed in Chapter 3) 
depending upon the processing of these very spatial relations that those with WS appear 
to struggle with, it is therefore essential to consider processing style in this domain.  
Farran and Jarrold (2011), like Bellugi, Wang and Jernigan (1994), have shown that 
individuals with WS perform consistently poorly on block design tasks but struggle 
more on tasks specifically asking them to construct the designs, rather than perceiving 
(choosing from various pictorial options) which arrangements of blocks form a 
particular pattern. Further, Farran and Jarrold (2003) have noted how segmenting blocks 
does aid performance in those with WS in much the same way it does TD individuals, 
perhaps suggesting that when the task is broken down into manageable steps, 
individuals with WS are able to integrate parts into a whole. This could be suggestive of 
more of a memory or attention problem, more than likely driven by low IQ. Subtle 
differences also emerge on the classic Navon task (Navon, 1977) when participants are 
asked to draw versus perceive global configurations: A local bias is shown on drawing 
tasks that disappears when individuals are provided with instructions and are asked to 
choose rather than recreate configurations. Farran and Jarrold (2011) have therefore 
suggested this might be more of a planning and execution difficulty.  
In support of this is a study by Atkinson et al., (2001), who administered a combination 
of questionnaires and assessments to examine early sensory difficulties, spatial skills 
and language ability in 108 children with WS (mean age 7 years, 3 months). They found 
that, whilst children with WS had a higher incidence of visual sensory perception 
problems than seen in the typical population, these in no way correlated with visuo-
spatial difficulties on standardised tasks; this may suggest, as Farran and Jarrold (2011) 
have done, that the underlying issue is not with perception per se. This study also 
highlighted the fact that language development appears less delayed in WS: 
Improvements with age were far greater for language tasks than those testing visual-
spatial skills, although they never reached CA level, showing how the strengths of 
language seen in WS are relative to deficits in other domains, rather than being 
competent at an age-appropriate level. The studies reviewed above do suggest that there 
are clear visual-spatial deficits seen in WS, but heterogeneity within this domain makes 
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it difficult to establish precisely where the underlying difficulties are. A similar profile 
of heterogeneity can be seen in the language domain also (Porter & Coltheart, 2010) 
 
2.2.2 Language in WS 
One of the language tasks developed by Reilly, Bellugi and Klima (1990) involved 
participants being asked to narrate the ‘Frog, Where are you’? story (Reilly et al., 1990). 
Individuals with WS were found to be more likely than those with DS to give emotional 
affect to their stories, employing prosody and referring more to the emotions of 
characters. They used grammar and syntax appropriately and had a much higher 
incidence of using uncommon and often stereotyped language, more akin to that 
typically seen in autism. Perhaps the most striking example of the divide between 
language and visuo-spatial abilities is seen in Figure 2.1 (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Mills, 
Galaburda, & Korenberg, 1999) and is suggestive of a very specific deficit in the visuo-
spatial domain, not underpinned by any difficulties of an understanding of what an 
elephant is. Bellugi et al. (1999) have suggested that there may be a neurological basis 
for this divide, with anatomical atypicalities in the dorsal stream. They also note a 
relationship between increased volume in the frontal cerebral brain region and increased 
language abilities.  
 
Figure 2.1: Example of a WS drawing and description of an elephant (Bellugi et al., 
1999) 
  However, even within the language domain, discrepancies have been shown. For 
example, Brock et al., (2007) note that children with WS perform above mental age 
(MA) level on language tasks measuring receptive vocabulary but are unable to perform 
at MA level on tests of expressive language. Stojanovik (2006) has also shown that 
children with WS (mean age 9 years, 6 months) tend to show qualitative differences in 
the types of difficulties they have with language, compared to those (matched on 
language ability) with a specific language impairment (SLI). When asked to have a 
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conversation about a picture (such as a birthday party scene), they found that children 
with WS made more pragmatic errors and tended to give more inappropriate statements 
than those with an SLI, with less evidence of inferencing. Despite the same overall 
language ability as children with SLI, Stojanovik’s (2006) study therefore showed that 
the types of error seen in WS appear to be more concerned with an understanding of 
social content, such as inferring the meaning of a social situation. This mirrors the types 
of difficulties that they face in everyday social exchanges. 
Jones et al.(2000) have also examined the narratives and responses to interview in 
children with WS relative to TD controls and children with DS. They observed that 
children with WS used far more ‘audience capture’ techniques, such as exclamations or 
questions, and gave complex social narratives with many emotion terms (evaluative 
devices).  This contrasted with the very short, non-expressive stories given by those 
with DS. There was a high presence of grammatical mistakes throughout the narratives, 
compared to controls, and those with WS were also found to use significantly fewer 
cognitive inferences such as explaining why a character felt a certain way or what they 
were thinking. This study suggests how language may very closely mirror behaviour; 
children with WS have a propensity for approaching and engaging with others, yet show 
deficits in understanding the needs and beliefs of others. An interesting observation 
made by Jones et al. (2000) was that, during the interviews, children with WS tended to 
turn questions back onto the examiner. For example, one child, when stating he had a 
dog then asked the experimenter “Do you have a dog? What kind of dog?” (Jones et al., 
(2000),  p.36). This type of building on social statements and reciprocity of social 
conversation is distinctly lacking in autism, and therefore highlights the contrast 
between the social profiles of the two disorders. Whether this is evidence for a hyper-
sociable profile or of a dislike of talking about oneself is an intriguing question.  
The link between language and other domains is an important one and it is essential to 
consider heterogeneity of strengths and deficits within as well as across domains. 
Landau and Zukowski (2003) observed in their study in which children with WS (mean 
age 9 years, 7 months) were asked to describe events seen in video clips, that their 
descriptive language was at chronological age (CA) level yet they were very poor at 
describing anything concerned with spatial relations or locations. Given the problems 
that those with WS have in actually carrying out tasks requiring visuo-spatial skills, it is 
perhaps not surprising that weaknesses appear in language terms in this domain. The 
fact that the areas of language and visuo-spatial skills are in some way linked lends 
support to the argument that experience may play a key role in the interplay between 
cognitive domains. 
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2.3 The Social Domain in WS 
2.3.1 Social Approach 
One of the defining characteristics of WS is the description of a ‘hyper-sociable’ 
behavioural profile (Jones et al., 2000). Parental reports often state that individuals with 
WS will approach strangers and initiate conversations with them; similarly, amongst 
their peers, those with WS excessively seek out social exchanges, also engaging in more 
eye contact and hugging behaviours than is seen in typically developing individuals of 
the same age (Järvinen-Pasley, Vines, et al., 2010). Despite such a ‘friendly’ 
characteristic, those with WS tend to become socially isolated with increased age  and 
report high levels of social anxiety (Davies et al., 1998),  finding it very difficult to form 
and maintain satisfying social relationships (Frigerio et al., 2006) It is therefore 
essential to question where this need to approach others so excessively stems from. 
One suggestion is that, given their seemingly poor ability to process the emotional 
content of faces (discussed in Chapter 3), perhaps those with WS approach others due to 
a misunderstanding of their friendliness? If they do not know, for example, that a frown 
might suggest somebody is angry and not safe to approach, there is no reason not to 
approach them. However, Karmiloff-Smith et al. (2004) have noted how on face identity 
tasks, those with WS are able to differentiate between people, therefore regardless of 
expression, they should at least know who is familiar to them or not. So it might 
therefore be an understanding of why it is not appropriate to approach strangers that is 
lacking.   
Jones et al. (2000) were the first to systematically explore the over friendly nature of 
individuals with WS. They conducted various measures as part of a large-scale study 
focussing on language, social anxiety and social approach in toddlers, school-age 
children and adults with WS, compared to individuals with DS (for the language tasks) 
and typically developing controls. Two experiments were designed to measure social 
approach and anxiety, respectively. In a classic approachability task, 26 individuals with 
WS (mean age 23.6 years) were matched to TD individuals of the same CA and a 
separate group of children (mean age 8.3 years) matched on IQ. Participants were 
shown photographs of unfamiliar faces depicting positive or negative facial expressions 
and were asked to rate, using a Likert scale, how much they would “like to go up to 
each person and begin a conversation with them” (Jones et al., 2000, p.40). Analysis of 
participants’ responses showed that the individuals with WS gave significantly higher 
(more likely to approach) ratings than CA or MA peers towards both positive and 
negative faces. Jones et al. (2000) cited this as evidence for a general drive to approach 
others, regardless of facial affect; whether or not this is due to the perceptual 
interpretations of the emotions or a deeper understanding was not systematically 
examined, although anecdotal evidence points to the possibility that the difficulties lie 
within interpreting the more subtle aspects of facial expressions. For example, one 
participant with WS described what was termed a ‘mischievous-looking smirk’ by a TD 
individual, as “… happy, because he’s smiling” (Jones et al., 2000, p.41).   
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Approachability ratings on this task were corroborated by real-life approachability 
measures taken from a parent-report questionnaire, in which it was evident that those 
with WS were far more likely than individuals with DS or TD controls to approach 
strangers in everyday life. Even anecdotally, the researchers observed during a warm up 
task that the WS children were so keen for social interactions that they would stare at 
the experimenter’s face rather than focusing on the task at hand and would seek out 
conversational exchanges when it was not appropriate (Jones et al., 2000).  
Jones et al. (2000) have also measured social anxiety in a classic separation task: 
Twenty two toddlers (mean age 18 months) were matched on CA and gender to 14 TD 
controls, and responses to their caregiver leaving them alone in a room were analysed in 
terms of vocal and facial affect (frequency and intensity). It was found that the infants 
with WS showed fewer and less intense negative facial emotions, teamed with less 
intense vocal emotions, compared to controls. These children also needed less consoling 
upon the caregiver’s return. No differences were found between the groups in terms of 
positive emotions. These findings can be interpreted in a variety of ways: The infant 
with WS may not have been as distressed because they did not understand the 
implications of their parent leaving; there may be something about expressing negative 
emotions that individuals with WS have difficulty with, or it may, as Jones et al. (2000) 
claimed, be evidence for a more friendly disposition in even young infants. Pinpointing 
precisely what level or mechanism is driving such social behaviours is the focus of the 
present research. 
Frigerio et al. (2006) showed pictures of basic emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, 
anger, disgust) to 21 individuals with WS (mean age 16.5) matched on CA and MA to 
TD controls in an approachability task. Participants were shown photos of unfamiliar 
faces depicting the various emotions and were asked to rate how much they would want 
to play/talk to those people; they were then asked to state, on a scale of 1-4, how much 
they would either approach or not approach them (definitely/definitely not, etc.). 
Frigerio et al. (2006) found that WS participants tended to rate the faces using the 
extremes: Happy faces were rated as more approachable than controls typically stated 
whereas ‘negative’ faces were given significantly lower ratings than those given by 
controls. Frigerio et al. (2006) conclude this is evidence for, firstly, the fact that WS 
individuals are clearly able to distinguish between different emotional expressions and, 
secondly, understand which emotional expressions would warrant them to approach or 
avoid. However, this is not in accord with the behavioural profile of WS individuals’ 
tendencies to approach and engage with strangers. One might then question whether the 
stimuli used in this particular experiment (with ‘extreme’ facial expressions) could have 
elicited responses not found in day-to-day life or if the problem in WS is not with face 
perception at all but with a higher-level cognitive skill. It could also be the case that 
individuals with WS use a blanket strategy when using rating scales, in that they always 
default to the extremes in cases of uncertainty.  
Porter, Coltheart, and Langdon (2007) have also observed that individuals with WS do 
seem able to accurately judge which facial expressions warrant avoidance or approach, 
supporting the findings of Frigerio et al. (2006). They compared individuals with WS to 
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both CA and MA matched typically developing controls as well as a group with DS, on 
a task in which they had to label the emotion (happy/sad/angry/scared) and then rate the 
approachability of faces, voices and body gestures. Porter, Coltheart and Langdon 
(2007) found that WS participants gave similar responses to CA peers on measures of 
approachability and performed at the level of MA-matched controls when identifying 
the emotions, suggesting an ability in line with what would be expected from IQ in 
perceiving emotional affect. Both individuals with WS and their MA peers tended to 
mislabel negative emotions as positive. Most importantly however, no particular bias 
(above that seen in TD CA matches) towards approaching positive faces was found in 
the WS group when correct responses to emotion labelling were taken into account.  
It may be the case that the over-friendly social approach behaviours seen in WS are 
present from early in infancy. Doyle, Bellugi, Korenberg, & Graham (2004) posed the 
question of whether there would be any evidence of developmental change in the social 
profile of individuals with WS. They recruited 64 individuals diagnosed with WS, split 
into three age-groups (under 4 years; 4-7 years and 7-13 years), compared to children of 
the same ages with DS, and a TD control group. The parents of participants were asked 
to fill out the Salk Institute Sociability Questionnaire (SISQ): A measure designed to 
assess the intensity and frequency of everyday social behaviours. Analysis of the parent 
reports revealed that individuals with WS were overall more sociable than any of the 
other individuals in the study; high sociability was seen in the WS cohort from the 
youngest age, and was greater than individuals with DS at every age point. Doyle et al. 
(2004) therefore conclude that the highly sociable nature of WS appears not to be 
mediated by experience, but is seen early on in development and remains relatively 
stable throughout. This type of consistency stands in marked contrast to the broad and 
changeable pattern of social behaviours seen in ASD (Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006). 
Together, these studies point to the fact that it is not the perception of emotions or the 
awareness of knowing when to approach somebody that might be the problem in WS. 
There does appear to be a tendency for individuals with WS, like their TD peers of the 
same MA, to mislabel faces as positive, and this may be concerned with difficulties in 
analysing and interpreting more subtle facial cues (such as knowing when a smile is 
more of a smirk). However, the studies reviewed above do suggest that individuals with 
WS are able to understand that faces depicting negative affect are best avoided. This 
does not, however, map onto everyday social behaviours seen outside of the laboratory. 
Porter et al. (2007) have suggested that the tendency of those with WS to approach 
strangers may therefore be driven by an inability to inhibit social responses, despite 
knowing that it is not appropriate to approach. Dodd, Porter, Peters, and Rapee (2010) 
add further weight to this argument with their finding that pre-school children 
diagnosed with WS will approach strangers even when their faces are covered; this 
suggests that there is more of a compulsion to approach others in WS, rather than any 
difficulty in reading facial expressions. However, the motivation for what drives an 
individual with WS to approach others may vary from person to person, with 
heterogeneity also seen in this social domain (Little et al., 2013). 
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2.3.2 Social Cognition and Theory of Mind (ToM) 
Theory of Mind is the ability to form an understanding of how other people represent 
the world; what beliefs and mental representations another person might possess that do 
not necessarily match our own. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) designed the 
Sally-Anne task, which has since become the classic measure of testing both first and 
second-order false beliefs (See Figure 2.2). The premise of this task is that it requires 
the participant to make a distinction between the knowledge that he/she possesses, and 
the knowledge that somebody they are viewing possesses. Further, in second-order 
tasks, participants are required to understand what a character thinks that somebody else 
is thinking. Studies have shown that children as young as 5 years are able to pass 
second-order belief tasks; when the verbal and memory demands of the tasks are 
simplified, children as young as 4 years are able to explain and understand second-order 
beliefs (Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The Sally-Anne first-order belief task. Second –order belief tasks pose the 
Q: “Where does Anne think that Sally will look for the marble?” (Taken from Baron-
Cohen et al. 1985) 
Difficulties in forming a theory of mind about other people have long been cited 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) as part of the underlying problem in autism but less research 
has been conducted with individuals with WS. Karmiloff-Smith et al., (1995) were one 
of the first to examine theory of mind abilities in WS. In two experiments, they adapted 
the classic second-order false belief tasks to revolve around more complex verbal stories 
in which, rather than there being a false belief of the world, false beliefs about the 
beliefs of another were represented (Both characters in the story knew that an ice-cream 
seller had moved his van to the park, but one character does not know the other 
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character has been informed about this). 31% of the 18 WS participants tested were able 
to pass this task. However, when the term ‘believe’ was swapped for ‘knows’ in a 
similar second-order type story, 88% of participants were able to pass the task. 
Karmiloff-Smith et al. (1995) have claimed these results as evidence for a relatively 
spared theory of mind in WS (relative to low IQ and visuo-spatial perceptual abilities); 
teamed with other findings from a battery of experiments conducted amongst their WS 
cohort showing good performance in inferring emotional states from eye gaze and an 
understanding of sarcasm, they conclude that social cognition in WS is a strength, 
although there does seem to be a discrepancy between an understanding of one’s 
knowledge versus beliefs.  
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000), however, have compared children with WS to IQ, 
age and language matched participants with Prader-Willi syndrome (PWS), as well as a 
group with non-specified developmental delay (NSDD) and found that they were only 
comparable when asked to label basic facial emotions; individuals with WS were below 
the performance of all other groups on a classic second-order false belief task. Tager-
Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) posit this as evidence for both the importance of theory of 
mind in interpreting emotions as well as the fact that individuals with WS do have 
difficulties in this area. Previous to this, Sullivan and Tager-Flusberg (1999) had also 
found that, on false belief tasks, the area posing the greatest problem for those with WS 
was in understanding the beliefs of others; when tested on what knowledge another 
person had, they were relatively spared, in line with the findings of Karmiloff-Smith et 
al., (1995). In their experiment, Sullivan and Tager-Flusberg (1999) compared 22 
children (mean age 11.5) to individuals (as above) with PWS and NSDD. The task was 
a verbal story (supported by either being acted out with dolls for children under 10, or a 
comic-style animation for older children) in which two characters hold different beliefs 
about the knowledge of a third person. Participants were initially asked a first-order 
question and provided with feedback in cases of errors; they were then asked a second-
order question about what beliefs and knowledge one of the characters had about 
another. Participants were also asked to justify their responses in order to gain an insight 
into their understanding.  
Sullivan and Tager-Flusberg (1999) found that there were no differences between the 
groups on the first order tasks; individuals with WS were comparable to those with 
PWS on second-order tasks, and did better than those in the NSDD group. It is worth 
noting, however, that all groups had at least a 70% pass rate. Analysis of the types of 
justifications that individuals gave revealed the most difficulties in understanding the 
beliefs of another, with all participants doing better on second-order knowledge 
questions.  These results do suggest that there is something beyond IQ that drives an 
understanding of social knowledge in WS, with a possible divide between the 
understanding of another’s knowledge versus beliefs. However, the absence of any TD 
control group in these studies means that it is impossible to state how atypical the 
profiles of WS are in relation to the typically developing population. The ways in which 
individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders make sense of social information, and 
the types of cues they find most useful and how these differ from TD peers, will be 
explored as part of the current research.  
 33 
 
 
2.3.3 Theories of social behaviours 
There have been two main theories put forward to explain the social behaviours seen in 
WS: The frontal lobe hypothesis and the amygdala explanation, which will now be 
discussed in turn. The frontal lobe hypothesis (Galaburda & Bellugi, 2000) takes 
evidence of abnormalities in the frontal lobes seen in individuals in WS (Meyer-
Lindenberg et al., 2005b), and a propensity for being poor at controlling responses on 
classic inhibition tasks to be suggestive of more of a control problem in social approach 
behaviours. This may also be teamed with a lack of social understanding.  
Rhodes, Riby, Park, Fraser and Campbell (2010) have examined the link between social 
behaviours and executive functioning: They compared individuals with WS (mean age 
18 years) to CA and verbal-IQ matched TD controls on a battery of neuropsychological 
assessments tapping into attention, planning and memory, and also took parent report 
measures of everyday social behaviours. They found a strong correlation in the WS 
group between poor attention shifting/planning and higher social approach in real life. 
Overall, individuals with WS were significantly poorer on neuropsychological tasks 
than their TD peers, lending further support to the frontal lobe hypothesis. Direct tests 
of these brain regions and real-life approachability behaviours have yet to be explored, 
however. Similarly, the question of why individuals with WS are so drawn to social 
interactions as a manifestation of inhibition problems, rather than being drawn to 
animals or objects, has not been empirically examined. Jawaid et al. (2010) note in a 
review of the area how individuals with WS suffer from levels of hypo-arousal, which 
appear to be increased when attending to human faces. This may suggest some kind of 
‘comforting’ aspect that is gained from attending to others, but the mechanisms behind 
this are so far undisclosed. However, a recent hypothesis put forward by Kemp and 
Guastella (2011) suggests that oxytocin levels may modulate and influence positive and 
negative social behaviours.  
One final neurological explanation of the hyper-sociable profile seen in WS is the 
amygdala theory. Because of the important role the amygdala has been attributed with 
in models such as Johnson’s (2005) in emotion processing and perhaps even 
understanding, it is of great interest to note that neurological studies have shown 
increased amygdala volume in individuals with WS (Martens, Wilson, Dudgeon, & 
Reutens, 2009) teamed with heightened activation in response to faces. Haas et al. 
(2010) have shown, however, that there may be some interplay between the types of 
facial expressions being processed and amygdala activation. They found that reduced 
activation in the right amygdala is seen in adults with WS (n=12) in response to fearful 
versus neutral facial expressions; further, significant correlations were found between 
this reduced activation and evidence of real-life social fearlessness, as measured by 
parent-report questionnaires. Haas et al. (2010) suggest that these results provide a 
neurological explanation for the over-friendly approach behaviours seen in WS.  
Järvinen and Bellugi (2013) offer a review of the literature focussed on hypoarousal in 
WS and conclude that baseline autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity tends to be 
low compared to controls, but is increased above and beyond that seen in TD peers in 
response to faces. Further, behaviourally, individuals with WS do not become so easily 
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habituated to faces. Given that individuals with WS typically have various cardiac 
defects, the role of oxytocin regulation in governing social behaviours may be 
particularly important.  
 To sum up, despite a clear genetic root, the profile of WS is still very complex, 
encompassing a range of skills and deficits in the visual and language domains. 
However, even apparently spared abilities may involve underlying atypical mechanisms 
and patterns of heterogeneity. The social profile of those with WS is particularly 
intriguing, raising questions about the link between brain and behaviour and where 
areas of dissociation or overlap might lie. The core question that the present research 
will set out to address is ‘what precisely governs this behaviour’? 
 
2.4 Profiles: Autism 
 Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder that, unlike WS, is currently not 
attributed to any single or clear-cut genetic cause. Betancur (2011) has highlighted how 
more than 100 genes may be implicated in the different facets of the autistic profile but 
there is, to date, no hard and fast diagnostic genetic cause. Indeed it is most likely that 
autism is a multifactorial disorder of complex origin. Prevalence rates also vary widely 
across the literature, perhaps because of the more subjective methods of diagnoses that 
depend on observations of behaviours and parent report; the most commonly cited 
statistic is that autism occurs (in the UK) in approximately 1% of the population (Baird 
et al., 2006) and is four times as common in males than females. 
 Defining ‘a’ profile of autism is virtually impossible given that autism itself has been 
considered to be one node on an entire spectrum of affiliated disorders (DSM-IV). 
Autism was previously diagnosed using DSM-IV depending on evidence of behaviours 
under a ‘triad of impairments’ (Wing & Gould, 1979) falling under the categories of 
communication, social interaction and restricted/repetitive interests. Observational 
schedules such as the ADOS (Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule) are designed to 
specifically measure incidences of behaviours as listed under DSM criteria. For 
example, a lack of eye contact/joint attention; difficulties in maintaining reciprocal 
conversation; excessive repetitive behaviours; stereotyped language, etc. DSM 5 no 
longer identifies separate disorders on this spectrum, however, but considers different 
clusters of behaviour, categorised by their impact on everyday functioning so that a 
diagnosis of ‘autism spectrum disorder (ASD)’ is now given, with a rating of severity. 
 Two main areas of impairment are considered for DSM 5 diagnosis, rather than a triad: 
Social communication and interactions, and restrictive/repetitive behaviours, interests or 
activities. Sensory issues are now incorporated into this category and an additional 
disorder labelled ‘social communication disorder’ has been created for those individuals 
not scoring up on this latter domain. These changes reflect the heterogeneous nature of 
ASDs and the fact that any number of combinations of difficulties within the two 
domains can manifest very differently in terms of the severity and impact that they 
might have on everyday functioning. 
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For clarity, ‘autism’ (ASD) here refers to the severest end of the spectrum although, 
even then, the majority of studies cited will have involved samples of a mixture of high 
and low functioning ability. IQ ranges tend to be hugely varied across individuals with 
autism; consequently, language and everyday functioning is also extremely 
heterogeneous. Here lies the crux of the problem when trying to pinpoint ‘the autistic 
profile’: There is so much variation across the spectrum, with such a range of IQs and 
abilities, that no one individual diagnosed with the disorder may appear in any way 
similar to the next. Of course, there are some relatively stable core hallmarks of ASD, 
used on observational schedules such as the ADOS to determine an official diagnosis; 
such schedules are used in the absence of any genetic markers. Similarly, unlike in WS, 
there are no particular physical or medical characteristics that may flag up a diagnosis of 
ASD although early milestones, such as potty training and walking, may be 
significantly delayed and young infants may demonstrate atypical sensitivities to 
sensory stimuli and/or heightened aggression (Chawarska et al., 2007). The autistic 
profile is therefore largely determined purely by particular atypical behavioural markers 
throughout infancy, such as the presence of repetitive behaviours, inattention to social 
cues (such as pointing or joint attention) and inappropriate social exchange.  
Because there is no distinct genetic or anatomical cause of autism, several cognitive and 
social theories have been put forward to explain the core pattern of symptoms seen in 
the disorder. These are reviewed here in tandem with a summary of the behavioural 
evidence highlighting the core areas of atypicality seen in the different domains. 
 
2.5 Cognitive Theories of autism 
2.5.1 Weak Central Coherence  
Weak central coherence theory (WCC) (Frith, 1989) has predominantly and robustly 
been cited as an explanation for the atypicalities and perceptual style typically seen in 
ASD. Based on the consistent and frequent observation across studies that individuals 
with ASD process stimuli featurally rather than globally, and initially confined to the 
realms of visuo-spatial processing, this theory has since been expanded to account for a 
variety of the cognitive trends seen throughout the ASD profile.  
Frith (1989) reported examples such as heightened performance on the embedded 
figures (Shah & Frith, 1983) and local aspects of Navon tasks (Navon, 1977) in ASD. 
The embedded figures task requires participants to find a shape hidden within a larger 
scene, whilst the Navon task involves participants naming the letter depicted at either a 
local or global level; in this task, the local and global letters may be either congruent or 
incongruent, so that interference for local versus global processing can be examined 
(Figure 2.3). For example, if participants’ response times to naming the global letter 
when it is incongruent are slower than when asked to name the local incongruent letter, 
it would be evidence of a more featural processing style. Frith (1989) has shown that 
individuals with autism are more prone to interference from the local features of Navon 
figures, whilst this is not seen in TD controls. 
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Figure 2.3: Examples of a Navon figure and Embedded figures image (Taken from 
Happé (1999) 
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, (1997) compared high functioning adults (n=17) with ASD to 
CA matched TD adults as well as a group of individuals diagnosed with Asperger’s 
syndrome (AS) on their reaction time and accuracy on the embedded figures task. 
Individuals with both ASD and AS were significantly faster and more accurate than TD 
controls, suggesting a local processing bias: They were able to more rapidly pick out the 
hidden isolated feature rather than being distracted by the global image. Happé (1999) 
has since noted how those with ASD are less susceptible to illusions that depend upon a 
global style of processing, lending further support to a lack of global processing in 
individuals with ASD. 
The block design task (Figure 2.4) is another test on which individuals with ASD have 
been found to excel (Shah & Frith, 1983), regardless of whether or not the blocks are 
pre-segmented into their constituent parts. Whilst TD individuals benefit from this pre-
segmentation, as it encourages them to focus on the ways in which individual blocks 
might fit together rather than being distracted by the Gestalt, those with ASD 
demonstrate far less difference in performance times between segmented and un-
segmented conditions (Shah & Frith, 1989). This is further evidence for a local 
processing bias, although it might be questioned why there is any advantage of 
segmentation at all, if the problem in ASD is weak central coherence? It is also difficult 
to explain high levels of accuracy on the block design task, if individuals with ASD fail 
to process the global whole initially? How do they self-correct and know that the image 
is satisfactorily complete without being able to see the Gestalt? 
 
Figure 2.4: Example of a typical block design task, in un-segmented and pre-segmented 
conditions (Happé, 1999) 
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Whereas, in the WS population, little has been done to link deficits in global processing 
to higher level cognitive processes, the work of Frith (1989) and Happé (1999) goes 
some way to drawing together the impact of weak central coherence on the wider ASD 
phenotype. Happé (1997) asked participants with high functioning (HF) autism to read 
sentences consisting of homophones and observed that, compared to TD controls, they 
did not utilise preceding words in the sentence in order to determine the correct 
pronunciation. This suggests that, in language, a lack of global processing can have a 
direct effect. Indeed, the everyday language of those with ASD tends to be sporadic and 
disconnected (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999) suggesting an inability to link together 
ideas. Similarly, some of the repetitive behaviours seen in ASD, such as repeatedly 
flicking one small part of a toy rather than playing with it functionally, might be 
attributed to getting ‘stuck’ on the small details of things due to a more feature by 
feature type of processing. 
Language in ASD is an extremely heterogeneous area, with individuals’ language skills 
varying from non-verbal to competent, although usually marked in some way with 
incidences of pedantic, echolalic or stereotyped speech (Whitehouse, Barry, & Bishop, 
2008). The variation is such that it is not possible to describe one characteristic 
language profile; it is clear, however, that an inability to join together concepts and 
ideas may be an underlying cause of the sporadic nature of speech in the disorder. In 
turn, inappropriate or fragmented language will inevitably have an impact on everyday 
social exchanges. The WCC account of autism therefore goes some way to explaining 
the wide range of difficulties seen in the disorder. 
 
2.5.2 Executive Function Deficits 
Whilst the WCC does seem to account for a wide variety of issues seen in ASD, it does 
little to explain the abundance of repetitive behaviours that are a core characteristic in 
this population. Individuals with ASD tend to get ‘stuck’ on activities, and parental 
reports consistently point to the fact that those with ASD carry out very rigid routines 
and rituals in their day to day lives. These routines are typically accompanied by high 
levels of anxiety if they become disrupted. As in WS, where problems in inhibiting 
approach behaviours may be due to frontal lobe abnormalities, the same brain regions 
may be implicated in ASD (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999) in terms of their perseverative 
behaviours. Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers (1991) have proposed that deficits in 
executive function (EF) may be the cause of these types of behaviours seen in ASD. 
They compared 23 adolescents (mean age 12.3 years) with HF autism to TD peers 
matched on age, sex and IQ on a battery of tasks tapping into executive function, ToM, 
emotion processing and verbal memory. They found that individuals with ASD were 
significantly poorer than the controls on all of these measures and it was only in the 
group of autistic individuals that correlations were found between composite scores on 
ToM and EF tasks. Ozonoff et al. (1991), based on their results, have claimed that 
difficulties in directing and inhibiting attention therefore explain the repetitive 
behaviours seen in ASD, and these in some way underpin difficulties in also 
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understanding the beliefs of others. Precisely how the two areas are related was not, 
however, clarified by Ozonoff et al. (1991).  
 Ozonoff and Jensen (1999) have gone on to examine specifically which aspects of 
executive functioning are implicated in the problems seen in ASD. They administered 
three tasks to individuals with ASD, compared to individuals with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and Tourette’s syndrome, known for their characteristic 
deficits in lack of perseveration and inhibition, respectively. These tasks were the 
classic Wisconsin task, Tower of Hanoi task and Stroop task, shown to measure 
perseveration, planning and inhibition, respectively. Their results showed that those 
with ASD had the poorest performance overall, with the worst deficits on the Wisconsin 
and Tower tasks. Those with ADHD performed worst on the Stroop, showing the lack 
of inhibition as expected. Ozonoff and Jensen (1999) concluded from these results that 
perseveration and planning are problematic in those with ASD, as is inhibition to a 
lesser extent; abilities that are believed to be underpinned by frontal lobe activity. What 
is interesting here is the divergence in social profiles between those with WS and ASD, 
despite seemingly similar problems in inhibition: Why is it that a lack of inhibition in 
WS seems to manifest as a desire to approach people, whilst, in ASD, it manifests itself 
in ritualised and repetitive behaviours? It may be the case that there are specialised and 
dissociable brain regions involved in the manifestation of these types of behaviour.  
 
2.5.3 Theory of Mind 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) were the first to suggest that the social deficits seen in ASD 
(such as a lack of social conversation and a lack of empathy) might be driven by an 
inability to understand the mind-set of another. Based on their Sally-Anne task 
(described in section 2.3.2), they showed that children (mean age 11 years, 11 months) 
with autism were less able than TD children of a lower IQ to pass a first order false 
belief task. They therefore proposed that a specific deficit exists in autism whereby 
individuals are unable to put themselves in the position of another to deduce their 
internal mental state; this might concern beliefs, knowledge or emotions. A 
misunderstanding of the mental states of another would therefore explain some of the 
inappropriate social behaviours manifest in autism.  
Since the seminal research of Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), an abundance of studies have 
been carried out to explore the exact nature of the possible ToM deficits in autism. 
Findings have been mixed, with some research firmly concluding a clear deficit in even 
first-order ToM tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000b) whilst others have suggested that task 
design might be influencing and/or masking real abilities. Baron-Cohen et al. (2000) 
have reported consistently poor success rates amongst individuals with ASD in passing 
second-order false belief tasks. Frith, Happé and Siddons (1994) have, however, shown 
a more mixed pattern: They compared 24 individuals (mean age 15 years) with ASD to 
TD and mentally delayed (MD) controls matched on verbal IQ. These two control 
groups were significantly younger than those with ASD (4.8 and 8.9 years, 
respectively). Participants were given a classic second-order false belief task and were 
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then divided into those who did and did not pass. Within the ASD group, 16 participants 
failed the ToM tasks, suggesting that the majority of individuals with ASD do struggle 
with second-order beliefs. Participants’ teachers were given the Vineland Adaptive 
Behaviour Scale (VABS) to complete; this measures a child's everyday living skills and 
social functioning. Regardless of their performance on ToM tasks, individuals with both 
MD and those in the TD group were found to evidence an awareness of ToM and an 
ability to adapt socially in everyday life (as measured by the VABS). Such an ability 
was seen to a lesser degree amongst those with ASD, although correlations were found 
between their performance on the standardised tasks and real-life behaviours. 
Frith et al. (1994) claim that their research points to not only heterogeneity within the 
autistic profile in terms of their ability to demonstrate a ToM, but also that there may be 
more of a link between second-order belief and everyday social behaviours than is seen 
in TD peers, or those with other types of developmental delay. This could be 
underpinned by a lack of utilising other available social information as a compensatory 
mechanism. The role of experience in developing such compensatory strategies is 
important. One study to focus on the development of ToM was that of Steele, Joseph 
and Tager-Flusberg (2003). They conducted a longitudinal study over the course of one 
year, with 4-14 year old individuals with a diagnosis of ASD to examine if there would 
be any improvement on ToM tasks. They, in fact, saw improvements in performance in 
70% of the sample, although none of the participants reached ceiling on the more 
complex ToM tasks. There was also no control group to compare this increase in 
performance to.  
Steele et al.’s (2003) study suggests that social understanding may develop in those with 
ASD, just perhaps at a delayed rate compared to TDs. It may be that, with time, 
individuals with ASD are able to develop compensatory strategies to help them deal 
with social situations. Happé  (1999) is an advocate of focusing on the strengths, rather 
than deficits of the ASD profile and suggests that, neurologically, the focus on featural 
cues demonstrated by these individuals might be concerned with denser concentrations 
of neurons in specific brain areas that result in “an embarrassment of riches at the neural 
level” (Happé (1999), p.222).  
 
2.6 Neurological Theories of autism 
2.6.1 Amygdala theory 
Baron-Cohen et al's. (2000b) amygdala theory of ASD states that much of the atypical 
social profile seen in this group, from avoidance of social interactions to difficulties in 
interpreting and responding to emotions, are due to a lack of amygdala activation. 
Baron-Cohen et al. (2000b) conducted an fMRI study of six participants with ASD 
matched to typically developing controls in which participants were asked to judge 
either the gender or mental states of images based on the eye area only. Not only were 
those with ASD much less accurate on the mental state judgements but the imaging data 
showed that there was no activation in the amygdala upon presentation of the mental 
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state stimuli. Rather, relative to controls, there was heightened activation in the superior 
temporal gyrus; a brain region reputed to be involved in verbal labelling of complex 
visual stimuli (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000b). Baron-Cohen et al. (2000b) therefore 
concluded that the social deficits seen in the ASD population must be due to the atypical 
functionality of the amygdala. Bearing in mind the small sample on which these 
findings were based, however, and the lack of any systematic elimination that other 
brain regions might be involved, it is wise to question the robustness of this theory. 
Whilst studies like that of Adolphs and Tranel (2003) have found in their examination 
of patients with amygdala lesions, a direct relationship between amygdala function and 
performance in identifying emotions from faces, they note that the more encompassing 
social abilities of those with amygdala lesions tend to be less affected than those with 
ASD, perhaps because of the use of compensatory strategies. For example, those with 
amygdala lesions are aware that they have deficits in reading facial emotions and 
therefore utilise other social cues. However, those with ASD seem unable to do this, 
which suggests that something beyond the amygdala might be involved. 
Kleinhans et al. (2010) have noted that there is a lack of replication of Baron-Cohen et 
al.’s (2000b) findings throughout the literature, with various studies finding both hyper 
and hypo-activation in the amygdala in response to judgements of facial expression. 
They instead claim that there might be some interaction in those with ASD between 
anxiety levels, emotion reading and the underlying brain mechanisms. In their study, 
participants with HF ASD matched to TDs were asked to complete a questionnaire 
measuring their social anxiety, as well as performing an emotion matching task whilst 
in an fMRI scanner. They found that there were no significant differences in terms of 
task performance between the groups but they did find different patterns of neural 
activation whereby those with ASD showed greater activation in the occipital lobes and 
reduced activation (compared to controls) in the fusiform face area (FFA) region. When 
participants were split into those with higher levels of social anxiety, it was found that 
there was a positive correlation between anxiety scores and left amygdala activation in 
the ASD group.  
Taking these findings together, Kleinhans et al. (2010) conclude that the indifference to 
faces generally seen in the ASD population is due to heightened sensitivity, and 
subsequent anxiety, caused by hyper (rather than reduced) activation of the amygdala. 
Teamed with a reduction in FFA activity, it is plausible that this heightened amygdala 
activation is a compensatory mechanism. However, whether the high levels of anxiety 
reported by those in this study were causing or caused by the amygdala activation 
cannot be deduced. Given the heterogeneity seen in ASD as to how much individuals 
can tolerate looking at faces (with some anecdotal reports from individuals stating that 
“it hurts” to look at a face), it may be that variations in amygdala activity between 
individuals govern anxiety levels and subsequent face gaze behaviours. Indeed, findings 
across the literature are very mixed as to whether hypo or hyper-arousal is seen in 
response to faces in ASD. Similarly, anxiety measures were based on self-report rather 
than actual tests of anxiety (such as galvanic skin response [GSR]) and therefore it 
could be that the relationship between these and the amygdala is mediated by some 
other, more social, factor.  
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Research within both the clinical groups considered here and in typically developing 
individuals points to the fact that the amygdala appears to play a key role in the 
interpretation of emotions (Adolphs & Tranel, 2003; Schultz, 2005). It seems likely that 
its role may be closely related to levels of anxiety and arousal that may underlie the 
atypical profiles seen in WS and ASD (Dodd et al., 2010; Kleinhans et al., 2010). 
However, because the ASD profile is so broad in its characteristics, it may be that a 
more encompassing theory is also required. Deficits in possessing a theory of mind 
(ToM) have been proposed as an explanation for many of the social behaviours seen in 
ASD. 
 
2.6.2 The ‘extreme male brain’ theory of Autism 
Moving on from the amygdala theory of ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000b), Baron-
Cohen (2002) set out to explain the wider ASD social phenotype based on the fact that 
the majority of those diagnosed with the disorder are male. He stated that the male brain 
is typically more geared towards ‘systemising’ whilst the female brain is tuned towards 
‘empathising’ and that the manifestation of autism is simply an extreme of the male 
brain type. He cites examples from the literature such as girls being more likely to share 
and take turns, less likely to engage in rough play and more likely to talk about their 
emotions, whilst boys are better at ‘systematic’ subjects such as maths and engineering, 
play more with toys such as Lego and show good attention to detail. However, it is 
worth considering that activities such as these can be interpreted in more than one way 
and ‘systemising’ and ‘empathising’ may not be as dissociable as Baron-Cohen (2002) 
suggests. For example, playing with Lego may be evidence of a systematic approach to 
play but it may also be evidence for empathy, in that children often invent stories about 
what the characters are doing and create a whole world for them. Similarly, turn-taking 
in girls’ play could denote awareness of the feelings of others but is also evidence of 
following a system and understanding the rules of interactions.  
Whilst the evidence cited by Baron-Cohen (2002) is somewhat subjective in its 
interpretation, the overarching argument is a promising one but may be better framed as 
an issue of internal versus external. For example, ‘systemising’ is concerned solely with 
external inputs: Observing a variety of factors, noting how they affect one another and 
predicting an output. Empathising, on the other hand, is about applying internal prompts 
to an external source. For example: I know when I receive a present it makes me feel 
happy, therefore this person I see receiving a present must be happy. This is more in 
line with possessing a ToM. Might it then be that the split between those with ASD and 
WS is in their use of external versus internal cues? Perhaps those with WS have a 
propensity towards social contact because they use internal cues (How I am feeling) 
without considering other external cues (such as an aggressive face) whilst those with 
ASD do not use internal cues at all and instead prefer to follow sources that enable 
straightforward systemising with no need for rule changes (such as objects)?  
To draw together the research reviewed above, autism is such a heterogeneous disorder 
that no one encompassing theory can explain the varied symptoms. That individuals 
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perceive things at a local or featural level, and have difficulty in piecing individual 
aspects into a global whole seems to be fairly consistent; the extent to which this goes 
beyond the perceptual domain into language and more social skills remains to be seen. 
Individuals with autism also, generally, show difficulties in taking on the beliefs or 
knowledge of another in standardised tasks; in everyday functioning, this may underpin 
social behaviours, but functioning may also determine the types of compensatory 
strategy that individuals are able to put into place. 
 
2.7 Heterogeneity and Overlap in Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
When comparing the cognitive and social profiles of individuals with ASD and 
WS, the most striking difference is in the uniformity versus heterogeneity of IQ and 
language: Individuals with WS have consistently low IQs, standing in stark contrast to 
relatively spared language abilities. Conversely, those with ASD demonstrate very 
mixed levels of functioning paired with levels of verbal ability generally in line with IQ, 
and varying from non-verbal to pedantic speech. Both individuals with WS and ASD 
display a bias towards local processing, although this may be more in the construction 
than perception domain amongst those with WS. Individuals with both 
neurodevelopmental disorders also appear to have difficulties in forming a ToM; 
differences might emerge in this domain, however, with individuals with WS showing 
some understanding of knowing rather than believing, compared to an overall difficulty 
of those with ASD to put themselves in the mindset of another. Heterogeneity within 
both ASD and WS must be considered when attempting to pinpoint underlying causes 
of the social behaviours manifest in each disorder; similarly, the heterogeneous nature 
of these disorders means that there are points at which there may, in fact, be 
considerable overlap in the phenotypes of ASD and WS.  
Little et al. (2013) have suggested, given the debate in the literature as to whether the 
social behaviours seen in WS are underpinned by frontal lobe (and inhibition) problems 
or more amygdala (emotion accuracy) atypicalities, that there might be different 
subtypes of WS. They therefore examined this possibility in 25 children and adolescents 
with WS (mean age 9.5 years). Participants were administered a forced choice emotion 
labelling task, an approachability rating task, and a modified Stroop task designed for 
pre-literate children (Archibald & Kerns, 1999). These tasks therefore measured 
emotion accuracy, social approach and response inhibition, respectively.  
Little et al. (2013) used a method of cluster analysis in order to examine whether 
subgroups might emerge in which a tendency towards social approach could be 
differentiated by a particular aspect; examination of possible clusters within the WS 
profile revealed a striking example of how heterogeneous the disorder is: From a sample 
of only 25 participants, 4 clusters emerged, not correlated to age or IQ. Age and IQ also 
varied greatly within clusters. Further, it was found that response inhibition but not 
emotion accuracy could be used to separate out those individuals with high versus lower 
approach ratings on the standardised task. It is worth noting, however, that no self-
report measures of social approach were included in this study, therefore it is not 
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possible to state that difficulties in inhibition response might underlie real life social 
behaviours. However, the mean approach ratings given were very high (3.05/4), 
suggesting a consistent tendency in WS to be likely to approach strangers. Participants 
in this study also performed consistently poorly in accurately labelling complex 
emotions (disgust/surprise/fear) as well as neutral faces, but these difficulties were not 
predictive of approach ratings. Plesa Skwerer et al. (2009) have reported a divide 
between accuracy in identifying emotions and physiological responses to emotional 
faces, perhaps suggesting that there is some intermediary mechanism governing the 
perception of and a propensity to act on the emotional expressions of others.  
Little et al.’s (2013) research highlights the fact that, when analysing specific 
combinations of behaviours seen in WS, a heterogeneous pattern emerges, not 
necessarily driven by age or IQ. However, in line with the frontal lobe hypothesis, it 
may be that difficulties in inhibiting responses, rather than difficulties in accurately 
identifying emotions, are a consistent factor in approach behaviours. Searcy et al. 
(2004) have also raised the issue of to what extent IQ might determine the social profile 
seen in WS when IQ itself might not be constant. They employed a cross-sectional 
design of 80 adults with WS (aged 17-52 years) in which they conducted the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) at different age points in order to examine 
relationships between performance (PIQ) and verbal IQ (VIQ) scores with age. Using a 
standardised task such as this also allowed an examination of how the trajectory seen in 
WS might differ to those of a large normed TD sample. 
Searcy et al. (2004) found that age was only related to PIQ and not VIQ or full-scale IQ, 
although 19 of the participants with WS had significantly higher VIQ than PIQ scores. 
This finding was corroborated by a longitudinal aspect of the design in which four 
participants who had previously been recruited (9.2 years earlier) also showed 
improvements in only PIQ. Normative TD data revealed a general trend towards a 
decline in PIQ after age 34, but this was not seen in the WS group. These findings 
demonstrate, again, a picture of heterogeneity in WS in which only some of those 
recruited were better on VIQ. It also suggests that WS has a very different 
developmental trajectory to that seen in the typical population. Of course, given the 
cross-sectional design of Searcy et al.’s (2004) study, it is not possible to confirm that 
changes seen with age were not concerned with some other, between-participant factors.  
In an earlier study, Jarrold, Baddeley, Hewes, & Phillips (2001) did employ a 
longitudinal design in order to examine the relationship between age and IQ in WS. 
Jarrold et al. (2001) tested 15 individuals with WS (aged 6 years, 11 months to 28 
years) every 8 months at six different time points using the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scales (BPVS) and the Wechsler Children’s Intelligence Scales (WISC) block design 
subtest as a measure of visuo-spatial ability. They conducted a complex statistical 
analysis of the developmental trajectories seen over the course of the study and found 
that both measures improved with age, but the increase was greatest for vocabulary. 
There was a significant linear trend seen between vocabulary and VS measures, such 
that the magnitude of the difference between them increased with age; Jarrold et al. 
(2001) suggest this is indicative of a divergence between the two domains as a product 
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of age and experience. This also raises the issue of deficits versus delay in WS: Both 
skills did improve with time but at very different rates. This slower development of VS 
skills could be masked by studies that have not taken a developmental approach. 
If there are definite improvements across development in WS, but operating at different 
rates depending on the domain being examined, it may be that comparisons that have 
been made between individuals with ASD and those with WS are not entirely accurate, 
especially if the developmental trajectories seen in ASD are quite different (Karmiloff-
Smith et al., 2004). Lincoln, Searcy, Jones and Lord (2007) have claimed that there are 
aspects of the WS and ASD profiles that do show some overlap; they therefore 
examined which behaviours typically associated with autism (according to scores on the 
ADOS) might be seen in WS, and which symptoms might differentiate between groups. 
Lincoln et al. (2007) examined 20 infants (mean age 41.6 months) with WS matched on 
age and IQ to children with a diagnosis of ASD. They administered the ADOS with all 
children and also conducted an analysis using specific measures on the ADOS to 
establish whether participants would meet DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of autism. 
Fifty-five percent of the individuals with WS met criteria on communication measures 
for a diagnosis of a pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-
NOS) whilst only 10% scored high enough to meet criteria when looking solely at the 
social domain. Two of the WS children met full criteria for a classification of autism.  
Those with WS and ASD were comparable on their scores for gestures, showing, joint 
attention and pointing; however, those with WS could be differentiated from children 
with ASD by their levels of shared enjoyment, eye contact, facial expressions and social 
overtures/reciprocity. It is worth noting, however, that only a lack of these aspects of 
behaviour is coded by the ADOS schedule, therefore the atypically excessive behaviours 
seen in WS would not necessarily be captured by this type of measure. What these 
results do show, however, is that there may well be some overlap between the more 
physical traits in autism and WS (such as pointing and gaze following), perhaps 
underpinned by difficulties in the VS domain. It is this question of whether or not 
overlaps stem from the same cause that will be explored in the present research. 
Klein-Tasman, Phillips, Lord, Mervis and Gallo (2009) have also compared children 
with WS (n=30) to MA and CA (ranging from 2.5-5.5 years) matched individuals with 
diagnoses of autism, PDD-NOS and disorders of a mixed aetiology, on ADOS 
measures. They divided their WS group according to ADOS scores and then conducted 
direct comparisons with members of the other groups in order to see if, within autism-
type clusters, differences might still emerge. Klein-Tasman et al. (2009) found that, 
even in the group of WS participants where scores on the ADOS were very low and not 
suggestive of autistic traits, individuals with WS had more socio-communicative 
difficulties than did those in the mixed aetiology group. Individuals with WS, overall, 
showed fewer atypical behaviours across the ADOS than those with ASD and were 
most comparable to the infants with a PDD-NOS. Those with WS did, in all groups, 
show more reciprocal smiling than PDD-NOS participants, and had similar scores on 
measures of sharing and modulating eye contact as did those with ASD. Taken together, 
these findings point to the fact that there are overlaps between some of the social 
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behaviours seen in WS and ASD; however, again, subtle differences (such as limited 
versus excessive eye contact) would not be picked up by the ADOS, and it is these 
differences that might be modulating social behaviours. 
One neurological model that attempts to explain the heterogeneity seen in ASD might 
also be helpful in elucidating the divides or overlaps between ASD and WS. 
Bachevalier and Loveland (2006) have proposed a neurological model of ASD in which 
the heterogeneous traits seen in the disorder are underpinned by an interplay between 
neurology and experience. They claim that the ventral stream (involving the amygdala 
and orbitofrontal cortex [OFC]) is concerned with the regulation of emotions and that 
connectivity dysfunctions in this region may be to blame for the social profile in ASD. 
They describe the amygdala and OFC as a ‘detector’ and ‘responder’ of and to emotions 
in which the amygdala weights the valence of emotional stimuli, coding for emotion, 
whilst the OFC is more concerned with the expression of emotion and anticipating 
reward. It could therefore be the case that problems with one or the other result in 
different patterns of social behaviour seen both within ASD and between ASD and WS. 
This offers a neat neurological explanation for the Little et al. (2013) study, in which 
response inhibition but not emotion accuracy appeared to be related to social 
behaviours. 
Bachevalier and Loveland (2006) also note how the amygdala and OFC tend to develop 
at different points: The amygdala is typically fully developed at birth but the OFC 
begins maturing around 2 years of age and has been found to continue developing even 
into adulthood (Overman, 2004). It may therefore be that different social behaviours are 
a product of which brain region is affected in an individual, as connectivity with other 
regions and ‘cascade effects’ (Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006) may manifest very 
differently. It may also be the case that atypical behaviours might lie dormant for some 
time; this would explain the types of divergence reported by Jarrold et al. (2001) in the 
rates at which different cognitive skills might develop. 
It is clear that, within both WS and ASD, there is great heterogeneity as to precisely 
which behaviours are manifest and the rate at which these develop. Some of the social 
behaviours seen in ASD can also be seen in WS, but the underlying mechanisms of 
these may be different. Individuals with ASD and WS both show a tendency to process 
things at a local level, teamed with social cognitive difficulties in understanding the 
thoughts and beliefs of another; the role that faces play becomes pivotal in how these 
two things relate in forming social interactions. Chapter 3 will summarise the literature 
on face processing in WS and ASD, drawing together evidence from studies that have 
directly compared individuals with these neurodevelopmental disorders. The 
experimental chapters that follow will focus on specific aspects of face processing in 
turn; therefore Chapter 3 provides an overview of behavioural evidence as to how 
individuals with ASD and WS process identities and emotions from faces.  
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Chapter 3: Face Processing in Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
To begin to understand the mechanisms that drive the social profiles associated with 
WS and ASD, it is necessary to examine the purely perceptual strengths, weaknesses 
and atypicalities of face processing in these neurodevelopmental disorders. Can the 
atypical social exchange behaviours seen in WS and ASD be attributed purely to 
deficits interpreting facial identities or expressions, or does there appear to be 
something more ‘cognitive’ behind these profiles? This chapter will explore the 
literature on face processing in WS and ASD.  
Researchers in the field have typically examined two different aspects of face 
perception associated with these neurodevelopmental disorders: Their overall abilities in 
terms of identifying faces and other social signals such as expressions (what they do); 
the ways in which they process faces (how they do it). This chapter will review the face 
processing literature in these domains. 
 
3.1 Face Processing in Williams syndrome 
 Evidence from a variety of studies (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai & St 
George, 2000; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995; Tager-Flusberg, Plesa Skwerer, Faja & 
Joseph, 2003) have suggested that individuals with WS are able to identify and 
differentiate between faces. The classic task that has been used to assess face 
recognition ability has been the Benton face task (Benton, Hamsher, Varney & Spreen, 
1983). In that task, participants are shown a target face and are asked to detect the target 
face within a selection of distractor faces presented below it. Bellugi et al., (2000) 
reported that individuals with WS were able to perform as accurately as age-matched 
TD controls on this task. It must be noted, however, that the Benton task fails to pull 
apart which types of processing style may be used, and it could be the case that 
individuals were matching identities based purely on a feature, such as the eyes. Indeed, 
Duchaine and Nakayama (2004) found that patients with prosopagnosia (a condition in 
which patients with brain damage to the frontal gyrus are unable to recognise faces) 
were able to accurately match faces on the Benton task. As these patients have a definite 
deficit in the identification of faces, this suggests that it is possible to use more 
piecemeal strategies, focussing on specific cues perhaps, to perform well on this 
particular task.  
Golarai et al. (2010) have also found in their sample of 16 adults with WS (mean age 19 
years, matched to CA TD controls) that performance on the Benton task was 
comparable to TD adults, despite large differences in IQ. Participants in their study 
were, in addition to completing the Benton task, asked to passively view images of 
neutral faces, objects, landscape scenes and textures whilst in an fMRI scanner. The 
brain imaging revealed an FFA volume in individuals with WS that was on average two 
times the size of the FFA in TD controls. Moreover, it was only in the WS group that 
performance on the Benton task correlated with activation in the FFA region, although 
overall comparable levels of activation in the FFA in response to faces were shown 
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between both groups. Activity in the FFA was also enhanced in response to faces over 
any other type of image, in both individuals with WS and their TD matches. Golarai et 
al. (2010) suggest that the enlarged FFA in WS may, therefore, be responsible for 
accuracy on face identity tasks. As no heightened activation in the amygdala was seen 
in response to faces, which Haxby et al. (2000) have attributed more to the 
interpretation of emotions, they suggest that it is in this domain that more difficulties 
might lie in WS (Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, & Tranel, 2002). As no correlation was found 
between FFA activation and performance on the Benton task in the TD group, this 
might point to the possibility that different processing strategies might be employed by 
those with WS compared to TD adults. 
In order to further pull apart the types of processing that individuals might be using 
when identifying a face, Tager-Flusberg et al. (2003)  administered a part-whole 
paradigm to 47 adolescents and adults with WS (mean age 20 years, 10 months) using 
upright and inverted faces. This was precisely the measure later employed by Annaz et 
al. (2009) in which they found a more featural processing style in both WS and ASD. 
The logic behind such a paradigm is that, if faces are processed configurally, inverting 
the faces should disrupt the configurations so that the whole face advantage disappears. 
Tager-Flusberg et al. (2003) found that, whilst those with WS did have an overall 
poorer level of performance across the conditions, they did, however, show the same 
trends in performance. As predicted, the differences between part and whole matching 
disappeared in both groups when faces were inverted, and performance for upright 
whole faces was better than for those which were inverted. In both groups, performance 
on the Benton task predicted performance on the part/whole paradigm, although 
performance on this task was significantly poorer in the WS group. The authors of this 
study cite this as being evidence for configural processing in WS. However, their 
findings still point to inefficiencies in this system and the question remains as to why 
those with WS, despite apparently using configural processing, are unable to perform as 
effectively as their TD counterparts. It could be that the role of specific features comes 
into play: TD participants were found to be more accurate when the changed stimuli 
were eye (rather than mouth) cues; an effect that was not found in the WS group. 
Whilst the findings of Tager-Flusberg et al.’s. (2003) study does suggest typical 
processing patterns in those with WS, they do not show a sparing of abilities: Those 
with WS performed significantly worse than their CA matches overall. This points to 
the fact that perhaps configural processing needs to be in some way supported by other 
strategies in order for individuals with WS to accurately identify faces. Isaac and 
Lincoln (2011) have reported very similar findings to Tager-Flusberg et al. (2003) in 
that those with WS appear to demonstrate typical patterns of face processing but not to 
the same level of ability as their TD peers. In their study, they compared 10 WS adults 
to developmentally delayed (DD) MA and TD CA matched controls using a 
thatcherised faces paradigm. This paradigm involves the manipulation of eye and mouth 
features such that they are rotated, giving the face an unnatural appearance. Stimuli are 
presented in both upright and inverted conditions, the logic being that if processing is 
featural, performance for the thatcherised (versus non-thatcherised) faces in the inverted 
condition will improve because the features are restored to their natural appearance. 
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However, if faces are processed configurally, this advantage would not exist because the 
configurations are still disrupted. Participants in the Isaac and Lincoln (2011) study 
were shown pictures of a target face with two choices, one of which matched perfectly 
and the other with some dimension changed. The targets were a combination of 
happy/neutral expressions in upright/inverted orientation with thatcherised/un-
thatcherised faces. Participants were asked to choose the face which matched the target. 
Isaac and Lincoln (2011) found that all groups were more accurate on correctly 
matching the upright face targets overall and no differences were found between happy 
and neutral emotions overall. In all groups, accuracy was best for the upright rather than 
inverted thatcherised faces with no differences between the thatcherised and non-
thatcherised faces in the inverted condition, suggesting intact configural processing. 
Despite the same trends across tasks, however, those with WS performed significantly 
worse than the TDs in overall accuracy, again suggesting that some factor other than 
processing style may be at play. They were, however, significantly more accurate than 
the DD group, which suggests that there is something beyond IQ driving task 
performance.  
Whilst the findings of Isaac and Lincoln (2011) do support those of Tager-Flusberg et 
al. (2003), this study was lacking in that it failed to report any data regarding 
interactions between group and condition. As well as providing no information as to 
precisely which features and configurations were manipulated in the foil stimuli, no data 
were provided as to the effects of different combinations of the stimuli on accuracy. It 
might be that the WS participants excelled in one particular area, perhaps masking 
deficits in others, or that certain profiles that were atypical may have emerged as a 
consequence of such an analysis. Future researchers must be sure to explore and report 
the full wealth of information that they have available. These types of interactions will 
be analysed in the present research. 
The above studies suggest that individuals with WS may be competent in identifying 
faces, using typical configural strategies, although not to the same efficiency as seen in 
TD individuals. Adolphs et al. (2002) have shown that patients with brain damage to the 
amygdala are far less competent in recognising emotional expressions; given that there 
may also be dysfunction in the amygdalae of individuals with WS (reviewed in section 
2.3.3) it then follows that they may also be expected to show difficulties in the 
recognition of emotions. 
In their study comparing WS participants to both CA matched TDs and a MA/CA 
matched DD sample, Skwerer, Verbalis, Schofield, Faja and Tager-Flusberg (2006) 
observed a mixture of findings, depending on the task employed and comparisons made. 
For their first experiment, Skwerer et al. (2006) gave participants (43 adolescents and 
adults with WS, mean age 20 years, 8 months) a version of the classic eyes task (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001) in which they were presented with stimuli of only the eye section of 
faces and were asked to choose from two labels of complex emotions which one best 
matched. Each image was presented twice and only those correctly identified both times 
were credited as a correct response, in order to reduce correct responses by chance. It 
was found that those with WS performed significantly less accurately than the TD 
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sample and were comparable to the DD group, suggesting that those with WS are not 
spared in emotion identification. However, it may well be the case that, if given the 
same task with whole face information, performance might have increased and this 
possibility cannot be ruled out. Similarly, rather than having the strict criteria of two 
correct responses to the same stimuli (whereby participants might change their answers 
the second time because they thought this would increase their chances of a correct 
response), it might have been more useful to provide more than two labels instead, 
elucidating precisely which emotions are more difficult or tend to be defaulted to in 
cases of uncertainty. It is also worth noting that one third of Skwerer et al.’s. (2006) WS 
sample did perform as well as the TD controls; given the high variability within the 
clinical groups, it would be worth looking at the differences between the high and low 
performing groups on the standardised tasks. This is especially important given the fact 
that, on the Benton task of face identity that was administered to participants, those with 
WS were only found to perform significantly worse than the TD matches at a borderline 
level, whereas those with developmental delay were clearly significantly poorer than 
both other groups. 
In their 2nd experiment, Skwerer et al. (2006) wanted to examine if differences might 
appear when the stimuli were of a more real-life and dynamic nature. The same clinical 
participants alongside a new cohort of TD participants were asked to freely state what 
emotions they felt to be depicted in moving expressions. These expressions had 
previously been labelled by consensus by TD adults and a response was deemed 
‘correct’ provided that it didn’t conflict with these labels. For example, a response of 
excited or surprised or enthusiastic, etc. would be classed as correct for a face labelled 
‘happy’ but a response of nervous, scared, etc. would not. This method of scoring is 
worthy of note because it may be slightly subjective. Nevertheless, a similar pattern of 
results to experiment 1 was found in that the two clinical groups did not differ from one 
another, and both performed significantly worse than the TD matches. However, when 
analysing a break-down of performance for the different emotions, those with WS did 
perform as well as their TD matches for the emotions labelled ‘happy’, ‘sad’ and 
‘angry’ and were only differentiated by the more complex emotions of fear, surprise and 
disgust, as well as the neutral faces. Skwerer et al. (2006) explain the fact that more 
mistakes were made on the neutral faces in that perhaps those with WS felt they had to 
find a label, whereas TD participants might have better understood that a face can be 
emotionless. 
Skwerer et al. (2006) also note that scores from experiment 1 and 2 correlated in those 
with WS but not the DD group, perhaps suggesting more of a fundamental issue with 
the interpretation of emotions in this population, rather than some artefact of task 
demand. However, because both the animism of the emotions as well as the type of 
paradigm were changed (explicit choice versus free labelling), it is not possible to 
pinpoint precisely what factors might underpin this link. Interestingly, in both 
experiments, the scores of those with WS on the experimental tasks only ever correlated 
with their standardised face identity scores, whereas the DD group’s performance only 
correlated with IQ measures. This may suggest that there is something about ‘the face’ 
driving problems in interpreting emotions in the WS group, rather than IQ. The ultimate 
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finding from this study does seem to be that those with WS are not as competent as their 
TD counterparts in interpreting facial emotions, especially those that are more complex 
and demand more cognitive appraisal. 
Addressing several of the issues raised by the Skwerer et al. (2006) study, Riby and 
Back (2010) have also explored how individuals with WS interpret complex emotions 
from dynamic faces. They matched 18 WS participants (mean age 13 years, 8 months) 
to both CA and MA controls and asked them to watch dynamic faces depicting one of 
eight complex emotions (such as relieved, disapproving, etc.) in which whole face 
information was available or the eyes/mouth were frozen and neutral. Participants had 
to choose the label that best matched from a choice of four possibilities. It was found 
that, over all conditions, those with WS had the significantly lowest performance 
although they did show the same trend as both other groups in that interpreting 
emotions from whole faces was the most accurate, even reaching levels comparable to 
CA matches in this condition. However, the main differentiating factor of interest was 
the observation that only the WS group’s scores dropped significantly as a consequence 
of the eye cues being frozen. No differences were found on performance for particular 
emotions in any of the groups. This pattern of results observed by Riby and Back (2010) 
is intriguing because it suggests that, when dynamic whole face information is 
available, those with WS can identify emotions as accurately as their CA matched peers. 
This might appear as evidence that those with WS do process emotions using a holistic 
style; however, the fact that performance dropped in the WS group when eye cues were 
frozen points to an over-reliance on individual features, and the eyes specifically, in 
interpreting facial expressions. It is difficult to ally these findings with those of Skwerer 
et al. (2006), however, who found that those with WS were very poor in identifying 
emotions from eye cues alone.  
To sum up the overall face processing profile of individuals with WS, it looks to be the 
case that they are better able to identify faces but struggle more with the recognition of 
facial expressions. This would explain some of their approach behaviours in everyday 
life, although does not necessarily explain why they do not appear to differentiate 
between strangers and people familiar to them, when choosing who to approach 
(Frigerio et al., 2006). Plesa Skwerer et al., (2009) have proposed that social approach 
in WS might be underpinned by the fact that individuals fail to habituate to faces, 
promoting a renewed interest in approaching others. Using the premise that heart 
deceleration is a signpost for habituation to faces, they examined heart rate changes in 
29 adolescents and young adults (mean age 19 years) matched on CA to TD controls 
and both CA and MA to a group of individuals with learning disabilities (LD) shown 
dynamic clips of facial expressions. Participants were asked to watch three 5 minute 
clips of the 6 basic facial expressions (happiness / sadness / surprise / fear / anger / 
disgust) and neutral faces; depictions of the emotions were muddled up throughout the 
clips, and interspersed by a neutral scene of a landscape. Participants were also given a 
free labelling task of the emotions depicted. 
Plesa Skwerer et al.’s. (2009) results showed that individuals with WS were comparable 
to LDs but significantly worse than TDs on the free labelling task, with all groups being 
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the least accurate in identifying fear, and best in identifying happy faces. Those with 
WS and LDs also tended to misattribute negative emotions to neutral faces. No 
correlations between physiological arousal and performance were found in any of the 
groups. However, compared to both controls, individuals with WS had significantly 
reduced arousal during the movie clips; specifically, when watching movies of angry 
and surprised faces, individuals showed reduced heart deceleration compared to 
controls, suggesting less habituation and more interest in those types of faces. This was 
teamed with lower levels of arousal measured by skin responses when viewing negative 
(angry and sad) faces. It is worth noting, however, that different emotions were 
displayed in quick succession, with only a short clip of a neutral scene, therefore it is 
perhaps not possible to accurately deduce precisely which depictions of emotions 
triggered which physiological responses. 
Plesa Skwerer et al.’s. (2009) study does point to the fact that individuals with WS do 
not habituate to faces in the same way that typical individuals might, and fail to show 
the typical pattern of autonomic arousal in response to negative faces. However, the 
lack of any correlation between accuracy for identifying emotions and atypical patterns 
of physiological arousal suggests that something else may be driving social approach 
behaviours. It is therefore important to examine not only the perception of faces in 
neurodevelopmental disorders, but a broader cognitive understanding as well.  
 
3.2 Face Processing in autism 
 One of the hallmark characteristics of ASD is their general avoidance of, or 
nonchalance towards, social interactions and a lack of attention to faces (Riby & 
Hancock, 2008). Such a profile stands in stark contrast to that of  individuals with WS, 
who appear to seek out and thoroughly enjoy social interactions (Doyle et al, 2004). 
Where and why these profiles are so different, given seemingly similar visuo-spatial 
processing deficits, may therefore be concerned with attention to faces specifically.  
Given the heterogeneity seen in ASD, it is not surprising that findings across studies as 
to how effectively individuals can identify and recognise emotions from faces, are 
mixed (Behrmann et al., 2006a). Golarai et al. (2006) report in their review of the 
literature how individuals with ASD show poor memory for faces (recognising whether 
or not a face has been seen previously), but appear to be competent on tasks that are 
more concerned with matching facial identities. Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) also note that 
individuals with ASD are able to perform as accurately as their TD peers of the same 
age on the Benton task, but show clear deficits when asked to recognise emotions from 
faces. Like in WS, it may be the case that there is a divide between these domains, 
perhaps underpinned neurologically. 
Behrmann et al. (2006b) have explored the relationships between processing style and 
face recognition in individuals with ASD. Fourteen adults with a diagnosis of ASD 
were compared to two TD adults of the same CA and MA; the first experiment 
compared participants in their response times in discriminating between faces and 
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objects whilst two other experiments examined evidence of global versus local 
processing of non-face stimuli.  The results suggested that individuals with ASD were 
significantly slower than TD peers in distinguishing between both faces and objects, and 
this correlated with a tendency towards adopting a local processing bias in those with 
ASD. Behrmann et al. (2006b) therefore conclude that the bias towards attending to 
local features seen in ASD underpins and is detrimental to their ability to discriminate 
between faces. 
An eye tracking study by McPartland, Webb, Keehn & Dawson (2011) offers some 
compelling evidence that those with ASD may, however, process faces in a typical 
manner using configural information but also goes on to pinpoint where the underlying 
problems might be that drive poor face identification in ASD. In their study, 15 HF 
individuals with ASD (mean age 12 years) were matched to TD controls of the same 
CA and MA. A battery of standardised face and pattern recognition tasks were 
administered and participants were also asked to simply look at stimuli whilst being eye 
tracked. These stimuli were comprised of upright and inverted human faces, monkey 
faces, two-dimensional geometric patterns and Greebles (objects composed of different 
‘nodes’ arranged in specific configurations). Additionally, participants were asked to 
complete a questionnaire to assess social adaptation. 
 The standardised tasks revealed that those with ASD were significantly less accurate in 
identifying faces compared to controls, but no difference was found on the recognition 
of patterns, indicating that any deficits in processing might be specific to faces. This 
goes against the findings of Behrmann et al. (2006b), however, who showed similar 
patterns of performance when discriminating faces and objects in individuals with ASD. 
In terms of gaze patterns in the ASD group, analysis of the eye tracking data revealed 
relatively typical patterns when compared to controls. For example, both groups tended 
to pay more attention to the upper areas of human and monkey faces, indicating that 
they realised the importance of cues in this area. Similarly, for inverted human faces, 
both groups showed reduced attention to the eyes, perhaps because they were presented 
at the bottom of the stimuli and this is typically a less useful region to look at. This may 
also be evidence of configural processing in that it shows disruption of those parts of the 
face that would be attended to in an upright condition. Both groups spent more time 
attending to the upper regions of faces than objects; however, the only differentiating 
factor in eye gaze patterns was the fact that those with ASD spent significantly more 
time attending to this region of objects compared to controls. This might indicate that 
those with ASD were not aware that this region of objects would provide less social 
information than in faces, or it might be that individuals with ASD have a tendency to 
employ one blanket strategy that typically works and are unable to adjust this 
accordingly. This is a plausible explanation given the correlation also reported, only in 
the ASD group, between social adaptation scores and performance on the face 
recognition tasks. It may therefore be that a ‘strength’ in ASD is the ability to make 
judgements based on appropriate cues, but transferring the knowledge of what entails an 
appropriate cue is more of a difficulty, as is interpreting what the combined cues mean. 
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Another factor worth considering, aside from which specific cues might be most 
beneficial to those with ASD, is how the familiarity of the face might play a part. In 
WS, the familiarity of a face clearly has no bearing on whether or not individuals 
choose to approach that person in real life (Frigerio et al., 2006) but less research has 
been conducted to explore the effect of familiarity on processing in ASD. Pierce and 
Redcay (2008) compared 11 children (mean age 9 years, 9 months) with HF ASD to CA 
TD children on a task in which they had to press a button when shown two consecutive 
faces depicting the same identity. The faces were either photos of friends and family of 
the children, or photos of strangers and also objects. fMRI brain imaging was conducted 
whilst participants performed this task. Analyses of brain activity revealed comparable 
patterns of activation in the FFA between those with ASD and their TD peers in 
response to familiar faces. However, when presented with unfamiliar faces, only 25% of 
the activation was seen amongst individuals in the ASD group; this was teamed with 
poorer accuracy and slower response times for face matching.  
Pierce and Redcay (2008) suggest that their findings point to a divide between 
neurological activity when processing familiar and unfamiliar faces in ASD, not seen in 
TD peers. It may be that familiar faces are processed in a different way because 
individuals with ASD have learnt to attend to specific cues that they know on those 
people; when presented with a novel face, they struggle more to process unfamiliar 
features and/or configurations. However, Pierce and Redcay (2008) do not state whether 
any of the images used in their study depicted emotional expressions, and this may have 
been determining some of the patterns of results seen. 
 The role that experience plays in shaping neural architecture has been discussed by 
Gastgeb, Wilkinson, Minshew and Strauss (2011): The amount of time that a person 
spends attending to faces will have some impact upon how the brain processes those 
faces in future and the level of ‘expertise’ that is developed. Whilst the majority of 
researchers have posited a more bottom-up theory of deficit in ASD (Riby, Doherty-
Sneddon, & Bruce, 2009) whereby configural processing is at the heart of the problem, 
Gastgeb et al. (2011) suggest that a top-down, experience driven approach is more in 
line with the neurological evidence. Using the prototype paradigm employed by 
Valentine (1991), they used eye-tracking on a group of 20 HF ASD adults matched on 
CA/MA to TD controls. They hypothesised that the ASD group would not be more 
likely to choose prototypical faces over faces containing previously seen features, as  
familiar, unlike TDs; this inability to form prototypes, they claimed, is from where the 
deficits in ASD stem. 
 As predicted, Gastgeb et al. (2011) observed that those with ASD chose the prototype 
faces significantly less often than their TD peers, with only 40% of the sample choosing 
the prototypes on at least 4/6 trials, compared to 75% of the TD sample. With this 
criteria (selection of prototype on 4/6 trials) set as a measure of ‘good’ versus ‘poor’ 
performers, Gastgeb et al. (2011) further analysed the relationship between ADOS 
scores and task performance and found a correlation between those ASD individuals 
who scored high on incidences of stereotyped/restricted interests/behaviour and poorly 
on the experimental task. Whilst this link was not explored further, it may be suggestive 
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of a more social aspect to face processing in that those who are more likely to stick to 
rituals (that perhaps do not involve interacting with faces) are the least likely to use a 
prototypical method. Further, if more configural problems exist in ASD, they may have 
simply struggled to differentiate between the two faces initially rather than having 
difficulty in forming the prototypes. However, this looks less likely when considering 
the eye tracking data collected by Gastgeb et al. (2011): The results were unexpected in 
that those with ASD spent the same amount of time looking at faces as did the TDs, and 
paid equal attention to the relevant aspects of faces. Similarly, there were no differences 
within the groups in attention to specific facial features, although those with ASD did 
spend significantly longer than TDs in looking at mouths, and this was marginally less 
time than was spent looking at the eye region.  
Whether or not a prototype model of face processing is more fitting than the configural 
model for explaining some of the difficulties seen in ASD remains to be seen, but the 
fact that experience may differentially drive the face processing abilities of those with 
ASD is a compelling idea that is supported by the neurological data (Golarai et al., 
2006). The eye-tracking aspect of Gastgeb et al.’s. (2011) study also hints at the 
possibility that eye cues are not used as effectively as they are in the TD population; 
interestingly, an over-reliance on eye cues may also be detrimental in the WS 
population.  
Evidence for the fact that those with ASD do attend to faces in a typical manner comes 
from Fletcher-Watson et al. (2009). They argue the case that many studies claiming 
abnormal processing of faces in ASD are based on static, isolated faces in which no 
social or contextual information is available; this in no way reflects the real-life 
scenarios in which social interactions take place. They therefore designed a task in 
which participants (12 HF adolescents and adults with ASD compared to CA matched 
TD controls) were asked to either simply look at a screen split into one social and one 
non-social scene, or were asked to make a judgement as to whether the person in the 
social scene was male or female. The scenes were carefully divided into specific 
portions for the purpose of the eye-tracking component of the analysis, in order to 
pinpoint even small differences as to where those with ASD, compared to TDs, might 
look.  
When analysing the areas on which participants focused, the perhaps surprising finding 
was that no differentiating patterns emerged between those with ASD and their typical 
controls: As would be expected in typical development, more attention was paid to the 
person when identifying gender, and both groups looked more at the person than the 
background in this condition. Interestingly, both groups looked more at other parts of 
the face than the eyes specifically when identifying gender. Even in the free view 
condition, in which those with ASD had no explicit reason to examine the face of the 
person, no differences were found between face gaze time between TDs and ASDs. 
These findings not only suggest that those with ASD, who are relatively high 
functioning on the autism spectrum, understand which cues to utilise when asked to 
make gender judgements, but also fail to show a lack of attention to social scenes. 
However, it must be considered that there was no emotional face content in this 
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experiment: All faces were of a neutral expression. Therefore it may be that a lack of 
attention to the eyes was driven by different reasons between the two groups: Perhaps 
those with TD acknowledged that the eye region of a neutral face would not assist in 
identifying gender, whereas those with ASD simply avoided looking at the eye region 
because they didn’t want to make eye contact. 
Accuracy for identifying emotions in ASD has been explored by Rump, Giovannelli, 
Minshew, and Strauss (2009). They showed 19 HF ASD children (aged between 5 and 7 
years) compared to CA matched TD children, dynamic images of emotional expressions 
(happy, sad, angry and fearful), which they were asked to label. The same experiment 
was then repeated with a much larger sample of ASD participants (matched to CA TD 
controls), to examine possible developmental changes. Participants were grouped 
according to age into 8-12, 13-17 and adult categories. Rump et al. (2009) found overall 
poorer accuracy for the identification of all emotions in ASD compared to TD groups, 
regardless of age. In the TD cohort, improvements in performance were found with age; 
such improvements were not found between the age-groups amongst those with ASD. 
These findings are strong evidence for the fact that individuals with ASD do struggle to 
accurately identify emotions and this appears to be a deficit that does not improve with 
age/experience. Precisely which mechanisms may not develop to underpin this 
stagnation in performance is yet to be deduced. 
Kleinhans et al. (2010) have suggested that there is a complex relationship between the 
recognition of emotions, the physiological response to emotions, and social anxiety in 
ASD. They compared 31 HF adults with ASD to TD peers of the same CA and MA on a 
matching task featuring images of faces depicting anger and fear, as well as round 
shapes. Participants performed the task whilst in an fMRI scanner, and were also asked 
to fill out self-report measures to assess their levels of everyday social anxiety. 
Kleinhans et al. (2010) found that individuals with ASD performed comparably to TD 
adults in terms of their task accuracy; neurologically, individuals with ASD showed 
greater levels of activation in the occipital lobes for faces versus shapes than was seen 
in TD controls; Kleinhans et al. (2010) suggest this may be indicative of the fact that 
individuals with autism process faces more like objects. Further, less activation in the 
FFA was seen for faces amongst those with ASD than in the TD group, compared to 
increased amygdala activation; this pattern of neural activation correlated with higher 
measures of social anxiety in the ASD group. It therefore may be the case that more 
socially anxious individuals with ASD have a heightened sensitivity to faces; whether 
this is a cause of or caused by atypical activation in the FFA and amygdala remains to 
be seen. Given that performance in recognising emotions was similar between those 
with ASD and TD peers, however, it cannot be concluded that social anxiety is a result 
of being unsure about facial expressions. Similarly, it would be interesting to examine 
whether the same patterns emerged for fear and anger separately. 
In a direct comparison of the recognition of emotional and non-emotional faces in adults 
with intellectual disability as well as those with a comorbid diagnosis of ASD, García-
Villamisar, Rojahn, Zaja and Jodra (2010b) observed that those with the additional ASD 
diagnosis were poorer than controls on both types of task, although better on the non-
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emotion conditions. The tasks were comprised of an identity discrimination paradigm, 
emotion matching/labelling tasks, and an age labelling/identity matching task. Social 
adaptation measures (using the VABS) were also taken. When correlating performance 
with measures of social adaptation, only the expression measures showed a significant 
correlation and only in the comorbid group. These findings mirror those of Kleinhans et 
al. (2010). Garcia-Villamisar et al. (2010b) claim this as being evidence for the fact that 
some of the social deficits seen in ASD may stem directly from problems in processing 
emotions from faces, rather than any difficulties in identifying the face initially. This is 
an important distinction when one considers the social behaviours seen in 
neurodevelopmental groups.  
One study to explore divides between emotion and identity processing in ASD is that of 
Kirchner, Hatri, Heekeren and Dziobek (2011). In their study, Kirchner et al. (2011) 
recruited 20 HF adults with ASD and compared them to a sample of TD adults matched 
on CA/MA. Participants were given a standardised eyes task (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2010) and a face memory task and were also asked to complete two 
experimental tasks in which they were asked to make judgements about the sex/age of 
faces and identify 1 / 2 emotions from faces (always negative). Participants were eye-
tracked during the tasks. On both the face memory and eyes task, those with ASD were 
found to perform significantly worse than controls. Those with ASD were comparable 
in identifying emotions but were significantly worse than controls on measures of face 
identity. The eye tracking data revealed less fixation to the face areas of interest in the 
ASD group, with no differences reported between the groups for attention to the eyes or 
mouth, supporting the suggestion of Riby and Hancock (2008) and Riby et al., (2009) 
that those with ASD show a general inattention to faces generally. 
Just as Gastgeb et al. (2011) found a correlation between ADOS measures and 
performance in their task, Kirchner et al. (2011) also found a borderline significant 
negative relationship between social scores on the ADI-R and eye fixations in the ASD 
group. Eye fixations and task performance for emotion recognition also correlated 
positively in the ASD but not TD group. This lack of a relationship in the TD 
population is interesting and may highlight the fact that TD individuals utilise a variety 
of cues and other, perhaps more social cognitive factors, may be involved. This is 
corroborated by the apparent link between atypical social behaviour scores and deviant 
eye fixation patterns. The most robust finding to come out of the results was that, in the 
ASD group only, a negative predictive (regression) relationship was found between 
mouth fixations and performance in both conditions. Therefore, even though those with 
ASD do not appear to look at the eyes less than controls overall, they do use mouth cues 
disproportionately more, and this impacts upon both the recognition of identities and 
expressions. Those participants with ASD who did fixate on the eyes more tended to 
have better performance, although this was not a predictive relationship seen for the 
emotion condition in any of the groups. It therefore might be that, in ASD, over-reliance 
on mouth cues, rather than inattention to eyes, poses the greatest problem.  
In summary, it would appear that those with ASD employ atypical processing 
mechanisms when interpreting both emotions and identities of faces. Like in WS, this 
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deviance may be due to an over-reliance on certain, inappropriate, cues. Whether this 
deviance is due to problems in perceptually processing certain aspects of features or in 
understanding when and why certain features are most useful, remains to be seen. 
Interestingly, the abilities of those with ASD to recognise facial identities and emotions 
seem to relate to their levels of social dysfunction as measured by schedules such as the 
ADI-R (Kirchner et al., 2011) and ADOS (Gastgeb et al., 2011), therefore it is looking 
more likely that there is some degree of social cognitive deficit involved. 
 
3.3 Comparisons between WS and ASD 
 The above studies review the face processing literature in which cohorts of 
individuals with ASD and WS have been examined separately on different tasks, often 
compared to individuals who are developing typically. This makes it difficult to draw 
any firm conclusions as to the divergent / similar strengths and deficits individuals with 
these neurodevelopmental disorders might have. Given the markedly low IQ seen in 
WS, it is not reliable to run direct comparisons of individuals with WS and ASD 
without factoring out IQ. However, examining and comparing the types of trends and 
patterns seen in face processing strategies employed by those with WS and ASD can be 
very informative. A brief summary of studies that have conducted such comparisons is 
now detailed below. 
Annaz et al. (2009) employed a part-whole paradigm and a trajectory analysis method, 
in order to pull apart the types of processing seen in ASD and WS, as well as the 
importance of eye versus mouth cues, and how these compared with the TD population 
at different stages of development. Testing a sample comprised of individuals with ASD 
(split into high and low functioning groups to explore within disorder heterogeneity), 
WS and DS, compared to a range of TD children using developmental trajectory 
mapping, they administered a task to participants using the classic part-whole paradigm 
(but with the memory demands removed) in order to assess whether participants in the 
clinical groups would use holistic or featural styles of processing. Further, whether there 
would be different patterns between the groups in terms of how eye versus mouth cues 
were utilised. 
Annaz et al. (2009) found evidence for a more feature-based style of processing in the 
WS and ASD groups alike, in that performance for the part condition was consistently 
better than for the whole. This stood in contrast to what was seen in the TD 
comparisons. Unlike in the TD population, the inversion effect for parts did not 
disappear in the WS group, whilst it did for the whole faces; again suggesting a more 
featural style of processing in WS and a lack of using configural cues. This effect was 
found to be greater for manipulated eye versus mouth cues in WS but such a pattern was 
not observed in those with ASD. Annaz et al. (2009) conclude from their study that, in 
both ASD and WS, there does appear to be an atypical style of processing faces, with 
more reliance on features than in holistic analysis of configurations. In WS, this 
attention to features seems to be most prominent for the eyes; a finding that Riby and 
Back (2010) have also noted in the processing of facial emotions. It therefore may be 
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that the deficit in WS is not necessarily in an inability to process faces using 
configurations but in an excessive attention to eye cues when they are made available. 
The question remains as to why this might be. 
It has been hinted that perhaps an over-reliance on eye cues may be involved in 
deficient face processing. Riby and Hancock (2008) have shown in their eye-tracking 
study comparing those with WS and ASD to both CA and MA TD counterparts that, 
indeed, individuals with WS do tend to spontaneously fixate on the eye region of faces. 
In their study, participants were asked to look at natural social scenes containing both 
objects and people whilst in an eye tracker. No particular extremes of emotion were 
used and none of the scenes had any negative content. The results showed a clear 
difference between the groups, in that TD children appraised the entire scene, shifting 
their gaze to all aspects that could give information, whereas those with ASD generally 
did not focus on the face areas of the scenes at all; those with WS paid excessive 
attention to faces, especially the eye region. Riby and Hancock (2008) therefore 
conclude that the preferences of children with WS and ASD in terms of attention to 
faces seem to differ greatly and the reasons behind these atypicalities could also be very 
different. It may be, for example, that those with WS have problems in disinhibiting 
gaze from the socially salient aspects of scenes, or perhaps they do not realise that other 
areas of a scene beyond the face can provide valuable information. Those with ASD, 
conversely, may find looking at faces uncomfortable, or perhaps find they can better 
interpret more ‘clear-cut’ cues that objects may afford. Attention to faces is a different 
mechanism than the processing of faces, and the ways in which social motivation plays 
a role in the ways that these two aspects are related is relatively unexplored. 
One comprehensive study to explore the face processing profiles of those with ASD and 
WS is that of Lacroix, Guidetti, Rogé and Reilly (2009). They compared each clinical 
group to MA matched TD controls on a battery of five experimental tasks aimed to 
assess both emotion and identity processing of faces. For the identity measures, 
participants had to state whether faces were male/female or had their eyes open or 
closed. For the emotion tasks, they either had to state how a face was feeling (free 
labelling), were asked to match one of three faces to a target who ‘felt the same’ 
(matching) or had to point to the face who was feeling a specified emotion (identifying). 
Only basic emotions were used in these tasks as well as some neutral faces. The 
researchers found that participants with ASD were comparable to their matches on all of 
the emotion tasks but were not as accurate in identifying the female faces. Conversely, 
those with WS performed as well as controls on the face identity tasks but were 
significantly less accurate on the identity measure of emotion. 
The findings of Lacroix et al. (2009) might initially suggest that individuals with ASD 
are able to interpret emotions from faces, even when asked to freely label them and not 
given an explicit choice, although they struggle with identifying faces. This stands in 
contrast to the WS group in this study, who had difficulty in matching faces to a given 
label rather than the other way around; a result that may be indicative of an inability to 
understand the relevant face cues. However, one very large confound, which the authors 
fail to adequately address, is the fact that those with ASD in this cohort had taken part 
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in an intervention program focused on interpreting social signals, therefore it is more 
than likely that these same results would not be replicated with a different sample. 
Indeed, Riby, Doherty-Sneddon and Bruce (2008) have noted an opposite pattern of 
results. It is therefore important to look at other studies which might offer some 
corroboration that this is a genuine pattern in those with ASD. 
Riby et al. (2008) have noted that a lot of the inconsistency throughout the literature 
may be due to the fact that different studies have explored one area of face processing 
without using the same methods or even investigating the same domain as other studies 
from which they are trying to draw a consensus. In their study, they therefore compared 
the same WS and ASD individuals across a variety of face processing domains, 
matched to a developmentally delayed (DD) MA sample. Their aim was to establish 
whether the model of face processing initially proposed by Bruce and Young (1986) and 
developed by Haxby et al. (2000) could be applied to those with WS and ASD. In other 
words, would there appear to be a dissociation between the processing of identities 
versus the processing of emotions, and in what ways would these profiles differ 
between the groups? 
 In order to test this, Riby et al. (2008) gave participants four tasks to complete whereby 
each task had a recognition aspect (‘tell me which face is happy/looking at you/saying 
“boo”,’ etc.) and a matching component. The expression task required participants to 
identify a facial expression; the identity task required them to identify a face; a gaze 
task involved participants having to process the gaze direction of a face and the lip 
reading task required participants to process the sound that the lips would make. In 
having such a comprehensive test battery, Riby et al. (2008) ensured that they were able 
to pull apart the differences and overlaps both within and between the groups in terms 
of their strengths and weaknesses in different face processing domains. 
One general trend that emerged across all groups in this study was that the recognition 
aspects of each task resulted in higher accuracy than those utilising a matching strategy. 
This may be because it places fewer demands on appraisals of the faces in that it only 
requires the participant to make a choice rather than having to compare the details of 
each face to one another. Muñoz et al. (2010) however, have noted in their fMRI study 
that patterns of neural activation between labelling and matching tasks did not differ in 
their WS sample. Similarly, on the identity task, all groups’ performance dropped when 
the external features of the faces were removed, suggesting reliance on peripheral cues 
in these populations. However, those with WS were the least affected, therefore it may 
be that they do employ a more typical pattern in using central face cues. Interestingly, 
those with WS performed better than their matches on the expression and gaze tasks 
whereas those with ASD had the strongest performance on identity and lip reading.  
Another difference to emerge between those with WS and ASD was in their accuracy 
for specific emotions: Whilst those with WS were comparable to their matches in that 
identity of happy/sad was comparable and better than angry/surprised, those with ASD 
showed a clear drop in performance when identifying surprise, being significantly 
worse than their matches. Baron-Cohen, Spitz and Cross (1993) have observed a similar 
difficulty in identifying complex emotions such as surprise, amongst children with 
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autism. Furthermore, there was no advantage for sad emotions over angry emotions 
amongst those with ASD, as seen in the WS group. This highlights the fact that different 
emotions may either be processed in different ways or may hold a different cognitive 
salience to those with WS and ASD. 
In order to further corroborate their results, Riby et al. (2008) ran a direct comparison of 
the WS and ASD group, with those participants who were not matched on MA excluded 
from the analysis. A significant interaction between group and domain was found, with 
those with WS being significantly better on expression and gaze tasks. A particularly 
important differentiating factor between the groups was the finding that, in the ASD 
group only, correlations were found for performance on the identity and gaze expression 
tasks. The Haxby et al. (2000) model would not predict any relationship between these 
two domains, which are believed to be underpinned by entirely separate neural 
processes. This may therefore suggest that either atypical brain regions are involved in 
the processing of faces in ASD or that some other strategies are put into place that mean 
similar strategies in emotion and identity processing emerge. The fact that CARS scores 
(a measure of autistic symptomatology) were found to negatively correlate with overall 
performance (more severe autism=poorer performance) lends further support to the 
argument that the nature of autism may be causing atypical processing strategies. 
In terms of drawing conclusions from the Riby et al. (2008) study as to what strengths 
and deficits those with WS have, it appears as though they have problems in identifying 
faces but are relatively competent in interpreting emotions. This may be suggestive of a 
configural problem that is somehow compensated for by the socially salient aspects of 
emotional content. The opposite pattern is seen in ASD, although this group were still 
no better than their MA matches on lip and identity performance; these were just 
relatively good in comparison to the deficits found on gaze and expression. The fact that 
there may be a link between identity and expression processing in ASD may be to 
blame for deficits in both. The fact that it is the socially relevant aspects of face cues 
that seem to be the differentiating factor between the groups is most of interest and will 
be a core consideration of the present research. 
 
3.4 Overlaps and Dissociations: A Framework 
The evidence reviewed thus far has highlighted similarities and differences in 
the face processing abilities of individuals with WS and ASD, but what might be 
driving these? If, as is looking to be the case from both behavioural and neurological 
studies, the social interaction deficits in ASD and WS stem from the same biological 
root (involving the amygdala, FFA and OFC) but do not neatly map onto any specific 
issue with any one particular emotion, then it must be that the divergence lies on the 
more cognitive level. When viewing an emotional expression, how do those with ASD 
and WS appraise their own subjective experiences of that emotion and to what extent 
are they able to interpret these feelings in terms of what that other person might be 
feeling? Any atypical appraisals at any point along this route might lead to the 
branching of behaviours seen in WS and ASD.  
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The emotional significance that we attach to a face is absolutely key in both how well 
we will attend to that face and how we will interpret it. Very little research has 
attempted to explore the subjective experience of emotion in ASD and WS, mainly 
because of the constrains of attempting to quantify such a concept in populations with 
low cognitive and verbal ability.  
Schultz (2005), in his review of the role of the amygdala and FFA in autism, states that 
early dysfunctions in limbic brain regions will result in less attention to the detection of 
faces, corroborated by the diagnostic criteria for ASD that children look at faces less. 
This then means that faces do not hold any particular salience for individuals with ASD 
and so no expertise is ever achieved. This issue of ‘expertise’ is an important one, as 
one of the criticisms on the body of FFA research is that no single study can 
unequivocally show that it is the face itself, rather than the familiar configuration, that 
promotes activation in this brain region (Ganel et al., 2005; Tong et al., 2000) Is 
expertise purely about the rapid identification of features? Or does it require some 
affective investment? If it can be established that the social deficits seen in ASD and 
WS stem from early, subcortical abnormalities in the amygdala which may be purely 
perceptual, the divergence in the behavioural profiles of these two groups is then likely 
to be more concerned with the social salience they give to their interactions. 
Perceptually, it would appear that neither group can be an ‘expert’ but, in WS, there 
appears to be something else driving a desire for social engagement that is lacking in 
ASD. 
 
3.5 Overview of Research 
 The literature outlined here has offered a broad overview of face perception in 
typical development and where the core strengths and deficits in those with ASD and 
WS lie, as well as the neural mechanisms that may underpin them. A summary of 
theories of how face identity and emotion are processed has been offered to begin to 
map those areas of atypicality in the clinical groups onto a theoretical framework. The 
one consistent finding across the clinical literature is that both individuals with ASD 
and WS have difficulties in processing the spatial relations of stimuli (Behrmann et al., 
2006a; Isaac & Lincoln, 2011) and it could be hypothesised that this may impact upon 
their ability to interpret emotions (although not identity) from faces. That emotions pose 
such a problem suggests something beyond the purely perceptual. The amygdala has 
also been heavily implicated in the role of emotion processing in typical development, 
therefore hyper and hypo-activation in this region in ASD and WS is of particular 
interest. Could it be that faces hold a particular and divergent salience in these groups?  
Recent research (Klein-Tasman et al., 2009; Lincoln et al., 2007) has pointed to the 
possibility that there may be more overlap between some of the social behaviours seen 
in WS and ASD than was initially suggested by earlier literature. The extreme 
heterogeneity within both neurodevelopmental disorders means that there may be 
clusters or subgroups of individuals with very different patterns of social behaviour and 
this may be where overlaps between the two disorders occur.  The purpose of the 
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present research is therefore to elucidate how similar or different the social-perceptual 
and social-cognitive profiles of individuals with WS and ASD are; further, to examine 
the possible overlaps or divides in the underlying mechanisms driving social 
behaviours. The following questions therefore guided a set of six experiments that 
comprised this PhD research: Can individuals with ASD and WS identify emotions 
from faces? Are any particular emotions or types of cue beneficial to individuals with 
ASD and WS when interpreting emotions? What social inferences and attributions do 
they make and, ultimately, do individuals with these neurodevelopmental disorders 
process and interpret social information in different ways? 
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Chapter 4: Processing of Faces 
4.1 Introduction 
 One of the key questions governing the current research is whether deficits seen 
in social exchange in those with clinical disorders are underpinned by atypical processes 
at the perceptual or cognitive level. It is therefore important to establish whether those 
with Williams syndrome (WS) and autism (ASD) appear to process faces in a way that 
is different to those who are developing typically (TD). For example, when shown 
images of ambiguous images comprised of separate components in  face-like 
configurations, will individuals with ASD and WS piece together parts to deduce a 
‘face’ in the same ways that TD children might? Will the human nature of a face 
determine the types of aspect that children focus on, and how might these patterns differ 
in different neurodevelopmental groups? 
In order to answer these questions, the current experiment presented individuals in WS, 
ASD and TD groups with images of four categories of images: Real human faces, real 
animal faces, ambiguous shapes comprised of lines, and shapes comprised of fruit parts; 
the individual features of the latter two categories were configured to resemble the 
structure of a face (See Figure 4.1). The premise behind this experiment was that 
configural processing would be necessary in order to piece together the ambiguous 
items to deduce the presence of a ‘face’ or the presentation of an emotion. Therefore 
spontaneous responses to these images were analysed for the presence of ‘face’ and/or 
emotion terms. It was further hoped that possible divides between fruit and line images 
might be indicative of different processing strategies across groups. For example, 
images comprised of fruit parts might naturally elicit a more featural type of processing, 
in which each local item could be perceived separately. Incidences in which participants 
spontaneously deduced a ‘face’ upon presentation of fruit images might suggest that the 
piecing together of configurations therefore in some way overrides more local features.  
The types of response that participants gave would therefore highlight the ways that real 
and non-face images were appraised across groups. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Examples of line (top row) and fruit images used in the Wii task. 
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4.1.1 The Development of Configural Processing of Faces in Typical 
Development  
 In order to fully examine the face processing profiles seen in clinical groups in 
terms of whether there is evidence for a deficit or delay, it is important to establish the 
typical developmental trends in face processing. Specifically, at what point do children 
demonstrate configural processing ability akin to that of fully developed adult 
processing? If the skill of piecing together the spatial relations of a face into a coherent 
whole underpins the act of interpreting facial cues, then it is important to understand 
precisely when this emerges in typical development.  
In their seminal paper, Carey and Diamond (1977) proposed that an ‘encoding switch’ 
occurs around 8 years of age, whereby children progress from a piecemeal processing 
style to a more holistic form. If this is the case, it might be expected that participants in 
the present study would also show a shift upon presentation of ambiguous images 
whereby ‘face’ or ‘emotion’ responses would increase at around this age. However,  
Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell and Stansfield (1998) have proposed that even children as young 
as six years are capable of holistic processing. In their three experiments, Tanaka et al. 
(1998) compared 6, 8 and 10 year olds using a part-whole paradigm; short and long-
term face recognition was tested, as well as a condition in which faces were inverted. In 
their first two experiments, Tanaka et al. (1998) found strikingly similar patterns of 
results across all three age groups, in that performance was significantly increased for 
recognition of parts presented in a whole-face, rather than isolated context. Whilst the 
older children did show higher levels of accuracy than those in the younger groups, 
there was no interaction between condition and age, suggesting the same processes were 
being utilised.  
Tanaka et al. (1998) also included an inversion condition in order to examine whether or 
not younger children might show more featural strategies when processing inverted, 
compared to upright faces. Typically, parts of faces are recognised best when presented 
in the context of the full facial configurations in which they were initially presented. In 
Experiment 1 of the present thesis, it could be the case that the fruit images are treated 
more like inverted faces because of their novelty, and because they invite more of a 
focus on the component parts. This would be evidenced by fewer face/emotion 
responses to these images. Of interest was Tanaka et al.’s (1998) finding that there was 
a significant interaction between age and condition, in which the oldest group more 
accurately recognised upright faces. This may suggest improvements with age in which 
the size of the inversion effect becomes greater across development, despite the early 
establishment of holistic processing. Improvements across age groups in piecing 
together parts to deduce the presence of a ‘face’ will be explored in the present study. 
The specific strategies that might change and/or improve with age will be explored in 
Experiment 1 in an analysis of the types of response given by participants to the four 
different image categories. 
De Heering, Rossion and Maurer (2012) have also examined the developmental 
trajectory of face identity abilities in their study: They split 108 children into three age 
brackets covering 6 years to 12 years 6 months, along with 36 undergraduate students 
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(mean age 19 years). The specific age-groups were 6 years-8 years 4 months; 8.4-10 
years 3 months, and 10.3-12 years 6 months. Participants were asked to take part in a 
digitised version of a modified Benton task comprised of both upright and inverted face 
images. The premise behind such a paradigm is to establish at what point children may 
progress from a featural to configural processing style: Typical adults are consistently 
found to show a more piecemeal approach when identifying inverted faces, evidenced 
by low accuracy in identifying such images. It was found that there were accuracy 
improvements with age for both upright and inverted faces overall. Significant 
differences in accuracy were found between upright and inverted faces, with an 
interaction with age, suggesting that face-specific processes that develop gradually 
through childhood may be involved. The biggest difference between upright and 
inverted faces was noted between 6-8.3 year olds, later plateau-ing somewhat. This may 
suggest stabilisation of underlying abilities around this age, offering support for the 
possibility that a coding switch may occur at around this point, although to draw any 
firm conclusions a longitudinal design involving the same individuals at different age 
points would be more reliable.   
Mondloch et al. (2007) have emphasised the importance of experience in the 
development of face processing in their previous studies showing that early visual 
disruption has negative consequences for processes that develop later on and only those 
processes: Earlier processes, such as the development of featural processing, appear 
unaffected by early visual complications such as cataracts. Specifically, they stress that 
it is essential to examine the processing of unfamiliar faces in order to answer the 
question of whether holistic processing is the only mechanism necessary for face 
expertise. For example, if it can be shown that young children show evidence of holistic 
processing, this fails to explain general improvements in accuracy with age and 
presumably experience, and therefore it must be the case that some further 
developments are necessary. This has clear implications for clinical groups, who may 
have different patterns of experience/exposure to faces as well as possible early deficits 
to neurological visual mechanisms. 
Mondloch et al. (2007) tested 24 six year olds on a composite face paradigm in which 
they were asked to make same/different judgements about the top halves of faces. Faces 
were presented in aligned/misaligned conditions and the bottom halves were always 
different to each other; it was found that, as in a previous adult sample, accuracy for the 
misaligned faces was 26% (compared to 23% in the adult group) better than for aligned 
faces for judgements where the top halves were the same as the target presented. 
Mondloch et al. (2007) cite this as evidence for holistic processing in children as young 
as six years, further supported by a similar pattern in terms of response speeds as well as 
accuracy. However, worthy of note is the fact that, for faces where the top halves were 
different to the target, accuracy amongst children was improved for aligned faces; this 
was not a trend seen amongst adults. It may be the case that, given that the bottom 
halves of faces were consistently different to one another, only ‘same’ judgements were 
affected by the alignment of two face halves; the fact that this was only a factor amongst 
children might point to the precedence of attention to the bottom halves of faces not 
seen in adults. This was not explored by Mondloch et al. (2007) and will be examined in 
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Chapter 5. Mondloch et al. (2007) suggest their findings point to the fact that holistic 
processing is “not sufficient…but it may be necessary” (Mondloch et al. (2007), p.573) 
for later expertise in face recognition, such as the superiority of identification of same 
versus other-race faces. If holistic processing is fully developed by six years of age, 
some further processes must be operating to account for later improvements in accuracy 
repeatedly seen with age.  
It would seem that there is no definite consensus in the literature, as yet, as to at what 
age configural processing abilities are fully developed. McKone et al. (2008) have made 
the point that, rather than configural processing developing across age, a perceptual 
narrowing occurs, in which the individuation of certain differences in face images (such 
as between the features of monkey faces or other-race faces) becomes obsolete. 
Therefore the faces to which a person is exposed will play a part in the types of 
processing that develop. It should then be the case that typically developing individuals 
will piece together the individual features of human faces more often than they might 
animal faces, but will show evidence of configural processing when presented with 
face-like images. Whether or not this is found to be the case will be addressed in the 
present experiment. 
 
4.1.2 Configural Processing of Faces in autism 
 Featural processing strategies have been frequently reported amongst those with ASD 
(Happé, 1999 ) with consistent reports across the literature on their inability to complete 
global Navon figure tasks but excelling on block design and the Embedded Figures test 
(See section 2.5.1). Over-reliance on featural face cues has often been cited (see Chapter 
3) as a reason as to why those with ASD appear not to demonstrate accurate face 
identity perception, but can they employ configural processing strategies at all? The 
implication of this question in terms of face processing, specifically, has been less 
consistently researched, with different methodologies leading to very mixed findings. 
Behrmann et al. (2006b) aimed to test the relationship between general global 
processing and face/object discrimination. They compared 12 adults (age range 19-53 
years) with ASD to TD peers matched for education level as well as CA on a battery of 
tasks tapping into the different domains. Specifically, participants were asked to 
perform a same/different judgement task for the identity and gender of faces; completed 
a classic Navon figures task, as well as a more complex primed matching task to 
examine more fine-tuned local processing, and completed a discrimination task with 
objects.  
In summarising the results, Behrmann et al. (2006b) highlight how, on both face and 
object discrimination tasks, individuals with ASD were slower but as accurate in their 
responses compared to controls. This was especially true of items requiring more fine-
tuned discriminations. Further, they showed a significantly greater bias towards the 
processing of local, rather than global details of images, being “primed by the local 
elements” (Behrmann et al., (2006b), p.123) and performing faster when asked to detect 
local details rather than their global product on the Navon task. Perhaps of most 
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importance was the significant positive correlation found in the ASD group between 
response times on discrimination tasks and incidence of local processing, suggesting 
that the featural approach may be in some way responsible for slower appraisal of both 
faces and objects; this effect was, however, reduced in the cases of objects. 
If it is the case that individuals with ASD employ a blanket featural strategy when 
processing both face and non-face objects, it might be expected that no differences will 
be found between the fruit/line categories in the present study; further, that participants 
with ASD might be more inclined to comment on the individual features of all image 
types. One important issue is how the separate processes of featural versus configural 
processing relate and if different types of image might elicit different processing styles 
in different neurodevelopmental groups? One interesting question raised by Behrmann 
et al. (2006b) is whether individuals with ASD show a local bias or a configural 
problem; this is a difficult issue to pull apart but possible patterns of response type 
between line and fruit images in the present study may begin to shed some light on this 
issue.  
 
4.1.3 Configural Processing of Faces in Williams syndrome 
Far less research has been carried out into the face processing abilities of 
individuals with WS but the same question must be addressed: Is there a delay or 
deviance in the strategies employed in this population when identifying a face? Tager-
Flusberg et al. (2003) have argued the case that it makes very little sense for those with 
WS to be poor at configural processing when they are consistently cited as being 
comparable to TD matches on standardised face identity tasks. A discussion of their 
experiment is detailed in section 3.1, their main conclusion being that individuals with 
WS do appear to use holistic processing when identifying faces, although not as 
effectively as their TD peers. Isaac and Lincoln (2011) support Tager-Flusberg et al. 
(2003) in their study also suggesting the use of holistic strategies in individuals with 
WS but to a poorer degree of accuracy than seen in TD groups. 
Deruelle, Mancini, Livet, Cassé-Perrot and de Schonen (1999) have previously raised 
the issue of whether there might be an intact ‘face’ module in individuals with WS that 
apparently preserves their relatively spared face skills, or whether it might be more the 
case that efficient local processing strategies support face identification. Whilst more 
recent research (Karmiloff-Smith, 2007) has moved away from the claim that there are 
discrete and dissociable ‘modules’ underlying the patterns of strength and deficit seen in 
neurodevelopmental disorders, early studies examining divides between skills in the 
different domains have been useful for exploring the types of process that might be 
involved in response to different types of images. Deruelle et al. (1999) compared 12 
participants aged 7-23 years (mean age 11.9 years) to two groups of TD participants 
matched on CA and MA (using the WISC III). Their premise was that performance on 
face tasks at CA level would be evidence for an intact face module, whereas performing 
only at MA level would be suggestive of general delay in face processing, in line with 
general cognitive functioning. In their initial experiment, Deruelle et al. (1999) gave 
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participants a task in which they were asked to choose which one of two faces matched 
a target on identity, expression, eye gaze, age, sex or lip movement. Overall, they found 
that participants with WS performed at MA level but with significantly poorer accuracy 
than their CA peers; this was true of all conditions except for lip movement, where all 
groups were comparable. A correlation with age was found in the TD group only, 
despite a large age range in the WS group, although a sample size of 12 may be too 
small to draw any firm conclusions from this. It is also important to note that the 
heterogeneity seen within WS makes comparisons across age fairly uninformative, in 
which an older child might well have a much lower MA than someone younger. It is 
difficult to draw any conclusions across such a range of measures as to what can be 
deduced regarding configural processing specifically; these findings highlight the 
difficulty in establishing where the profiles seen in neurodevelopmental groups might 
be developmental or more concerned with heterogeneity. 
 In their second experiment, Deruelle et al. (1999) aimed to investigate the underlying 
processes that might differentiate WS from TD groups, specifically. Participants were 
this time shown houses and faces, in both inverted and upright orientations, and were 
asked to make same/different judgements between two images and a target. Individuals 
with WS showed similar levels of accuracy for upright faces (~85%) to their MA peers 
but significantly reduced accuracy compared to CA matches. Perhaps of more 
importance regarding the question of differentiating processes, however, it was shown 
that individuals with WS did not show a main effect of orientation seen in the other TD 
groups. Further, whilst a significant orientation by condition interaction was seen in the 
TD CA group in which no inversion effect was found for houses, this interaction was 
not seen in the WS group: These individuals were unaffected by the inversion of both 
houses and faces. 
Deruelle et al. (1999) suggest that their findings point to the fact that individuals with 
WS, whilst as able to accurately identify faces as their MA peers, must employ a more 
featural strategy in doing so, evidenced by the lack of an inversion effect. They also 
note that there appears to be no ‘preferential’ treatment of the face that facilitates the 
inversion effect in this population.  This issue of the importance of faces versus non-
faces will be examined in the present experiment: If faces are processed much in the 
same way as objects in WS groups, it might be expected that no differences in 
performance will emerge between real and non-face images in the present experiment. 
A more featural style of processing might also lend itself better to the identification of 
objects versus faces overall; might it therefore be the case that individuals with WS 
attend better to the individual features of objects, compared to TD peers, in the present 
study? 
Standing in direct contrast to the work of Deruelle et al. (1999) is a recent study by 
Cashon, Ha, DeNicola and Mervis (2013) in which they have shown an inversion effect 
in toddlers with WS. The authors of this study claim that the heightened attention to 
faces seen in WS should facilitate an expert style of face processing, given that 
exposure to faces underpins the development of configural processing. The question of 
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familiarity and experience with faces will be tested in the present experiment in a 
comparison of different image types. 
Cashon et al. (2013) employed a habituation switch paradigm: Fourteen toddlers (mean 
age 25.7 months) were familiarised with pairs of faces and were then shown one of 
three target images of either a familiar face, a ‘switch’ face, in which the 
internal/external features of the face pairs were switched to form a new configuration 
with familiar features, or an entirely novel face. Faces were shown in both upright and 
inverted orientations at both habituation and test phases. Cashon et al. (2013) 
hypothesised that their participants would display longer looking times to the switch 
than familiar face in the upright, but not inverted condition, and that looking times 
towards the novel face would be longer than for the familiar face in both orientations. 
This was what was found in statistical analysis, with no correlations observed between 
age or Mullen scores and looking times.  
The results of Cashon et al. (2013) seem to suggest that even toddlers with WS can 
detect changes in facial configurations for upright faces, and employ a featural strategy 
for inverted faces, akin to that seen in 7 month TD infants (Cashon & Cohen, 2004). 
This may be indicative of a delay in young infants with WS; it is therefore important to 
further explore later developmental patterns to establish how they may change, and 
subsequently underpin everyday social interactions. For the purposes of the present 
study, if it is the case that very young infants, both TD and with a diagnosis of WS, 
display holistic processing of upright faces, it might be expected that group differences 
for the different images would not emerge between individuals with WS and their MA 
matches (mean age 4 years 7 months, in the present experiment). However, it must be 
noted that Cashon et al. (2013) did not have a direct comparison group in their study 
and it is possible that TD toddlers may have shown a very different pattern of results. 
 
4.1.4 Summary and Aims 
 The What Is It task (Wii) aimed to establish which images might elicit featural 
versus a more holistic type of processing in both TD and clinical groups: Would 
individuals piece together ambiguous features to deduce the presence of a ‘face’ (or 
emotion) and in what ways might these patterns differ? Further, would, as Carey and 
Diamond (1977) suggest, there be evidence of a shift in featural to holistic encoding at 
around 8 years of age?  The literature reviewed above suggests a possible local 
processing bias in ASD, compared to very mixed findings concerning individuals with 
WS.  The impact that a featural style of processing might have on the accuracy of 
piecing together features in a face might operate differently in these two groups, 
depending on the parts of the images that are utilised by individuals or what 
interpretations are drawn from them. Also of importance is the question of discrepancies 
between overall accuracy and underlying strategies. The Wii task therefore aimed to 
explore these issues by examining how often TD and individuals with ASD/WS piece 
together individual features of real and face-like images and the types of response that 
they would spontaneously give in appraising these images.  
 70 
 
 
The inclusion of fruit and line faces in the Wii task allowed for an analysis of whether 
participants would see a ‘face’ by combining the features together or whether they 
would only identify separate items of fruit/lines. In having both fruit and line faces, it 
was intended that the meaning attached to face-like objects could be analysed. For 
example, ‘faces’ should only be seen in line images if individuals piece together the 
individual, ambiguous, parts, to deduce a whole configuration that could be likened to 
that of a ‘face’. An over-reliance on local processing, conversely, would result in fewer 
‘face’ attributions in response to fruit images, in which the features can be processed 
locally as individual items of fruit. It was expected that all participants would not have 
any difficulty in stating that the human/animal faces were faces, therefore the critical 
responses to these items were in the types of response given (see Data Analysis) and 
whether or not participants would piece together facial features to deduce an emotion. 
As this was a novel design, not employed in any known studies to date, no predictions 
were made regarding the types of response that individuals gave; possible implications, 
however, are outlined in the discussion. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses and Predictions 
4.2.1 Typical Development 
There will be a significant increase in the number of ‘face’/ ‘emotion’ responses 
to line images with age across the TD groups, with a clear jump in number of responses 
to both fruit and line images between those aged under and over 6 years. There will be 
fewer ‘face’/’emotion’ responses to fruit compared to line images in those aged under 6 
years, where a featural strategy is more likely to be used than seen in older children.  
 
4.2.2 ASD and TD Comparisons 
A featural processing bias in the ASD group will be evidenced by significantly 
fewer face responses to line or fruit images than seen in TD groups, and no significant 
differences between responses to these categories. Emotion attributions to fruit/line 
images will be lower in the ASD group than seen in TD peers.  
 
4.2.3 WS and TD Comparisons 
A significant difference will be found in the WS group between face responses 
to fruit/line images, with more responses being given to line image types, indicative of a 
more featural strategy. Individuals with WS will be less likely than CA or MA peers to 
make spontaneous face or emotion attributions overall, underpinned by a less accurate 
ability to piece together ambiguous parts to form a face-like configuration. Based on 
anecdotal evidence regarding the hyper-sociable nature of those with WS, it is 
tentatively predicted that individuals with WS may refer more than TD peers to the 
emotions of real face images. 
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4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants 
Three groups of participants were recruited to this study: Those with a diagnosis 
of ASD, those with a genetic diagnosis of WS, and TD children matched to each clinical 
sample on both chronological age (CA) and non-verbal mental age (MA). The Ravens 
Coloured Progressive Matrices ([RCPM]; Raven, Court & Raven., 1990) was used as 
the standardised test. This measure has been reported (Riby & Back, 2010) to be 
suitable as a matching measure for non-verbal MA and has been used across a wide 
range of studies in which neurotypical participants are compared to those with 
developmental disorders. The test asks participants to choose, from six options, which 
section of pattern completes a larger picture (see Figure 4.2); there are three sets within 
the test, each comprised of 12 items, becoming progressively harder within each set. 
The maximum raw score is therefore 36.  
 
Figure 4.2: An example of item 1, Set A, on the RCPM (Raven et al., 1990). 
 
4.3.1.1       ASD participants 
Twenty-three participants with a previous clinical diagnosis of autism were recruited 
from two specialist schools. Diagnoses were confirmed by teachers’ responses to the 
current version of the Social Communication Questionnaire ([SCQ] Rutter, Bailey, 
Berument, Lord & Pickles, 2003). Scores on this measure ranged from 7 to 23 (whereby 
higher scores indicate a higher number of autistic symptoms), with a mean of 14. Four 
children subsequently had to be excluded from the study due to scores indicative of 
being below the cut-off (a score of 12) for ASD diagnosis. One child was later excluded 
from the analyses as it was clear he did not understand the requirements of the task and 
he refused to complete the RCPM. Therefore a total of 18 children (16 males and two 
females), aged 8 years 1 month to 14 years 9 months (mean age 10 years, 10 months) 
comprised the final sample. Non-verbal ability scores for this group ranged from 9 to 33 
(out of 36), with a mean score of 27. 
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4.3.1.2      WS participants 
Fifteen participants with a previous behavioural diagnosis of Williams Syndrome 
corroborated by positive genetic testing on the FISH test were recruited through the 
Williams Syndrome Foundation. One participant was subsequently excluded from the 
analysis as she did not wish to participate in the full test battery and no RCPM score 
was obtained for this participant. The age range of the final 14 participants (eight males 
and six females) was 6 years 9 months to 16 years 5 months with a mean age of 10 
years 10 months. Non-verbal ability scores for this group ranged from 8 to 21 with a 
mean score of 15. 
 
4.3.1.3 TD participants 
Seventy-three typically developing individuals were originally invited to take part in 
Experiment 1. Children were recruited through an early years centre and two primary 
schools in the North East of England; one secondary school in the same region and at a 
science museum. Teachers (where children were recruited through schools) and parents 
(for those recruited through the science museum), were asked to fill out the Strength and 
Difficulties Questionnaire ([SDQ] Goodman, 1997) to establish that the child did not 
have any potential emotional or behavioural issues. Some teachers were unable to 
complete these questionnaires for 15 of the children but did verbally confirm that the 
children in question appeared to have no issues at school. Overall scores on the SDQ 
ranged from 0 to 21, with lower scores representing ‘normal’ behaviours; the mean 
score was 7.  
Due to ‘abnormal’ scores (17 and above for parent-completed questionnaires and 16 and 
above for those completed by teachers) on the SDQ, seven of the participants’ data had 
to be discarded; one was additionally excluded due to his mother revealing he had a 
diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome and a further two were not included in the analyses 
due to not being a suitable CA or MA match for any of the clinical participants. 
Therefore a final sample of 63 TD participants was recruited, as detailed in Table 4.1. 
For each clinical participant, an individual match from the TD population was found for 
both CA and MA in order to ensure equal variances across the groups. t-tests revealed 
no significant differences between the mean ages of each clinical group and their CA 
matches (ASD: t (33) = .09, p=.93; WS: t (26) = .01, p=.99), nor between non-verbal 
ability scores of clinical groups and their MA matches (ASD: t (34) = .17, p=.87; WS: t 
(26) = .44, p=.67). 
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Table 4.1: Age and MA demographics for TD matches to ASD and WS groups 
 Chronological Age RCPM Raw Score  
ASD (n=18) Range                         Mean Range             Mean          
CA Matches* 8.0-15.0                    10.11 (2.4) 22-36              30 (4.56) 
MA Matches 4.5-13.11                      9.8 (2.8) 10-35              27 (5.95) 
WS (n=14)   
CA Matches 6.8-16.6                     10.10 (3.2) 22-36              30 (3.39) 
MA Matches 3.7-8.4                       4.8 (0.9) 9-22                16 (4.13) 
*Due to time constraints, one CA match for an ASD participant (10 years, 4 months) was missing. 
 
4.3.1.4 TD Age 
A crucial question when examining clinical groups is how their performance maps onto 
that of those in the TD population. The same 63 TD participants as detailed above were 
additionally divided into four age groups. These groups were based on developmental 
phases according to broad educational key stages. 
 
Table 4.2: Age and RCPM data for TD groups split by age. 
    Chronological Age 
Range              Mean 
  RCPM Raw Score 
Range             Mean 
Up to 6 years (n=14) 3.7-5.9            4.6 (0.6) 9-22               15 (4.06) 
6-8 .5 (n=14) 6.7-8.4            7.5 (0.7) 21-32             27 (3.86) 
8.6-11.5 (n=17) 8.8-11.4          9.7 (0.11) 21-35             28 (4.28) 
11.6 and above (n=18) 11.6-16.6       13.5 (1.5) 28-36             32 (2.85) 
 
4.3.1.5     TD Gender 
Due to recruitment constraints, it was not possible to match the WS and ASD groups on 
sex as well as CA and MA. An analysis of males (28) versus females (35) across the 
whole TD group revealed no significant differences in performance based on total task 
score, calculated by the sum of the number of face and emotion responses (t (61) =1.34, 
p=.19). The mean age for males was 9 years 11 months compared to 8 years 5 months 
for females. The mean scores on the RCPM were 27 for males and 25 for females. 
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Based on these findings, sex is not taken to be a confound when comparing the clinical 
participants to their TD matches.  
Ethical permission was granted for Experiment 1 and all subsequent experiments to be 
conducted with all children recruited (See Appendix E for copies of consent 
forms/information sheets and ethical approval). Parental and teacher consent was 
obtained for all participants recruited through schools with parent/guardian consent 
being obtained for those children recruited through the science museum. Parents and 
children were provided with copies of an information sheet detailing what the study 
involved and it was made clear to each child that they did not have to take part and 
could withdraw at any time if they wished. Those children whose parents deemed them 
able to give their own assent also gave written permission. 
 
4.3.2 Materials and Design 
Experiment 1 was a free response task intended to elicit spontaneous responses 
to real face or face-like images (Figure 4.3). Images were comprised of human faces 
(men and women), animal faces (cats and dogs), face-like shapes comprised of items of 
fruit (fruit) as features and face-like shapes comprised of simple lines (line). All images 
were chosen/made to express an emotion (happy/angry/surprised) as clearly as possible 
in order to allow for spontaneous labelling of an emotion. A larger set of images were 
piloted on 40 TD adults in order to gauge a consensus of which emotions were depicted. 
Images were only retained if there was 80% agreement. Given the difficulty of sourcing 
natural expressions in animals, there was no item for ‘surprised’ as TD participants 
failed to reach consensus on those items initially included. Four of each real-face and 
three of each configural face category were included in the task interspersed with eight 
pictures of everyday objects as a control measure, equalling a total of 22 trials. These 
objects were included in order to prevent participants from getting into the habit of 
giving ‘face’ responses as a matter of course, and also to ensure there were no general 
difficulties in identifying the items depicted. The order of presentation was the same for 
each child and had originally been randomised.  
 
Figure 4.3: Examples of animal, human, line, fruit and object images on the Wii task 
 
4.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested in their school or home with a guardian/teacher in the 
vicinity. Testing took place in a quiet space with the child seated at a table. All images 
were viewed on a DEL E5500 laptop (screen size 32 cm x 21 cm), displayed full-screen 
in Powerpoint. The same laptop was used for all participants in all experiments.  In 
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Experiment 1, the participant was told that they were going to see some items one at a 
time and simply had to state what they could see in response to the question “what is 
it?". It was stressed that there was no right or wrong answer and they could say as much 
as they wanted. Once participants had given their initial answers they were prompted 
with “What else can you tell me”?  Each item remained on screen until the participants 
had finished giving their answer and then the next item was presented immediately. All 
participants viewed the images in the same order and the original order of presentation 
was randomised.  Responses were recorded on an audio-recorder and coded for analysis 
(See below). 
 
4.3.4 Data Analysis 
Because the objective of Experiment 1 was to establish how often participants would 
spontaneously attribute social meaning to a given item, 1 point was awarded for each 
item if they stated that an item was a face and 1 point was awarded for each item if they 
referred to an emotion before any further prompting. For example, if a participant stated 
that a line stimulus looked like “a sad boy”, it would be credited with 1 point for both 
face and emotion. These response types were therefore analysed separately in two one-
way ANOVAs. These types of spontaneous responses were only analysed for fruit/line 
images as it was decided that labelling a human or animal face as a ‘face’ would not be 
particularly indicative of evidence of combining features together to form a whole, 
given the lack of ambiguity in these types of image. 
Three separate types of answer were subsequently coded, with 1 or 0 being given as to 
whether or not a particular term was mentioned for each item. These terms were: 
Reference to a facial feature (such as referring to the watermelon as a ‘mouth’), 
reference to an emotion term (describing an image as happy/surprised, etc.), and 
reference to an explanation for conceptually why a particular image might look that way 
(For example ‘He’s smiling because it’s his birthday and he knows he’ll get lots of 
presents’). Answers both before and after the prompt were included in this score and 
totalled for each of the four categories of images. All responses were double coded by 
an individual blind to group membership or the hypotheses of the experiment and 
reliability was found to be 100%. Due to an imbalance of the number of items in each 
category (4 of each human and animal faces and 3 of line and fruit), analysis in which 
direct comparisons were made was carried out on percentages of raw scores. 
Scores for objects were given based on the same point system whereby 1 or 0 would be 
credited depending on whether or not any of the following three terms were mentioned: 
Correct identification of an object; reference to object features; functions of the object. 
Percentages for each term were therefore compared for the object condition. 
No data was missing for any participant in experiment 1. When examining total task 
score (the total number of face/emotion responses across all categories), only two cases 
presented as outliers in the up to 6 years and 6-8.5 years groups. There were no outliers 
 76 
 
 
found in the ASD or WS groups on this measure. Games-Howell post-hoc comparisons 
were used to examine all within participant main effects.  
  
4.4.  Results 
4.4.1 TD Groups 
4.4.1.1      What Is It task: Spontaneous responses 
Initial ‘face’ responses to the open-ended question ‘what is it?’ upon presentation of 
images from the two categories (line and fruit) were analysed for each of the TD age-
groups. A mixed design 4 x 2 (age-group x image category) ANOVA for ‘face’ 
responses did not reveal any significant main effect of category type or age (p>.05; 
F<1), nor any significant interaction with age-group.  
A mixed design ANOVA to examine ‘emotion’ responses did reveal a main effect of 
image category, F (1, 59)=70.24, p<.01, whereby significantly fewer emotion responses 
to fruit than line images were found overall. The descriptive statistics for the number of  
face/emotion responses given to each category are stated in Table 4.3.  A main effect of 
age-group was also observed, F (3,59)=6.18, p<.01, whereby both the oldest group and 
those aged 8.6-11.5 years gave significantly (p<.01 in Games-Howell posthoc 
comparisons) more emotion responses overall than the youngest group. There was no 
significant interaction between age-group and image category for ‘emotion’ responses 
(p>.05; F<1). 
 
Table 4.3: Mean number of face/emotion responses for fruit and line images, across TD 
age groups (standard deviations shown in parentheses; maximum number=3). 
 Line ‘Face’ Line ‘Emotion Fruit ‘Face’ Fruit ‘Emotion’ 
Up to 6 years (n=14) .71 (1.07) .93 (.83) .64 (.93) 0 (0) 
6-8.5 (n=14) .93 (1.14) 1.21 (.70) 1.29 (1.11) .36 (.93) 
8.6-11.5 (n=17) 1.76 (1.15) 1.71 (.67) 1.29 (1.11) .29 (.47) 
11.6+ (n=18) 1.50 (1.30) 1.72 (.96) 1.50 (1.2) 1.06 (1.0) 
 
 
4.4.1.2      What Is It task: ‘Feature’ responses 
A mixed design ANOVA (age-group x image category [line/fruit/human/animal]) for 
feature responses was run on the percentages of the total number of each response given 
with age-group as between subjects factor. Analyses were run on percentages rather 
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than raw scores due to an imbalance of the number of items in each category. Mean 
number of responses (standard deviations in parentheses) for each age-group are 
reported in Table 4.4. A main effect of image category was found (F (3, 177) =5.64, 
p<.01), whereby there were a significantly higher percentage of responses to human and 
line images than for animal. A main effect of age-group was also found, F (3, 59) =4.53, 
p<.01; those aged 6 years and under gave significantly fewer feature responses over all 
categories than those in the oldest group (p<.05 in Games-Howell posthoc 
comparisons). There were no significant differences between any of the other age 
groups. No significant interaction (p>.05; F<1) was found between age-group and 
image category, as is evident from Figure 4.4. 
 
 
  
 
7
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Table 4.4: Mean number of each response type (Features/Emotion/Why) for each image category (Line/Fruit/Human/Animal) across TD 
age groups (Standard deviations in parentheses). Maximum number of responses for line/fruit images=3; maximum number for 
human/animal images=4. 
 
Response 
Type 
Feature     Emotion     Why     
Image 
Category 
Line Fruit Human 
 
Animal Line Fruit Human Animal Line Fruit Human Animal 
Up to 6 
years 
2.36 (.93) 1.93 (1.27) 3.07 (1.07) 2.14 (1.41) 1.50 (1.09) .07 (.27) 1.14 (.77) 1.29 (.83) .29 (.47) 0 (0) .86 (1.17) .29 (.83) 
6-8.5 2.43 (.85) 2.50 (.94) 3.43 (.65) 2.79 (1.12) 1.43 (.85) .57 (1.09) 2.50 (1.02) 1.93 (1.54) .07 (.27) 0 (0) .21 (.80) .14 (.54) 
8.6-11.5 2.76 (.69) 2.65 (.79) 3.24 (.83) 3.06 (97) 1.71 (.69) .71 (.85) 2.47 (1.01) 1.59 (1.0) .24 (.44) 0 (0) .24 (.44) .24 (.44) 
11.6+ 2.72 (.58) 2.78 (.73) 3.50 (.71) 3.11 (.76) 2.06 (.80) 1.83 (1.1) 3.22 (.81) 2.94 (1.21) .17 (.38) .11 (.32) .78 (1.4) 1.06 (1.11) 
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Figure 4.4: Mean percentages of ‘feature’ responses to each image category, across TD 
age-groups  
 
4.4.1.3      What Is It task: ‘Emotion’ responses 
Percentages of emotion responses to images were analysed in a mixed design 4 x 4 
(image category x age-group) ANOVA. A main effect of image category was found, F 
(3, 177) =22.02, p<.01, whereby a significantly lower percentage of emotion responses 
to fruit images were given than for any other category (p<.01). A main effect of age was 
shown (F (3, 59) =15.24, p<.01) in which the oldest group gave significantly higher 
proportions of emotion responses than all other age groups, as well as a significant 
interaction between image category and age-group, F (9, 177) =2.22, p<.05. Figure 4.5 
shows this pattern of results.  
In order to explore this interaction further, univariate ANOVAs were run for each image 
category separately. No significant differences were seen between age-groups for line 
images (p=.17). For fruit images, the oldest group gave significantly more responses (F 
(3, 63) =11.11, p<.01) than all other groups, with the youngest group giving 
significantly fewer than the oldest two groups. This pattern was slightly different for 
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human images, in which the youngest group gave significantly fewer emotion responses 
than all other groups, F (3, 63) =13.98, p<.01. Less clear age differences were seen for 
animal images, in which the oldest group gave significantly more emotion responses 
than those aged 6 years and under and those aged 8 years 6 months-11 years 5 months, 
but not the intermediate age group, F (3, 63)=6.36, p<.01. 
 
Figure 4.5: Mean percentage of ‘emotion’ responses to each image category, across TD 
age-groups  
 
4.4.1.4      What Is It task: ‘Why’ responses 
A 4 x 4 mixed design ANOVA (image category x age-group factor) was conducted for 
percentages of ‘why’ responses to images. Participants were credited as having given 
this type of response if they provided an explanation for why an emotion would be felt. 
For example “The man is excited because it’s his birthday.” Again, a main effect of 
stimulus type was noted, F (3, 177) =7.03, p<.01. This main effect was driven by a 
significantly lower percentage of why responses to fruit images than for line (p<.05), 
human or animal images (p<.01). A main effect of age was also found (F (3, 59) =3.12, 
p<.05) in which the oldest group gave higher proportions of this type of response than 
those aged 6-8 years 6 months; no other differences were found between the age groups. 
An interaction between the two factors was also found, F (9,177) =2.21, p<.05. 
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Further univariate ANOVAs were run for each category type separately in order to 
explore where this interaction occurred: There were no significant differences found 
between the age-groups on the line, fruit or human images; only on the animal images 
was there a main effect of age, F (3, 63) = 18.54, p<.01, in which the oldest group gave 
significantly more of this type of response than the two intermediate groups but, 
interestingly, not the youngest (p<.05 in Games-Howell post hoc comparisons). Figure 
4.6 depicts this interaction. 
 
Figure 4.6: Mean percentage of ‘why’ responses to each image category, across TD 
age-groups  
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4.4.1.5      What Is It task: Responses to objects 
The types of responses that participants in the different age-groups gave to object 
images were analysed in three separate univariate ANOVAs, for each response type 
(Correct identity/naming features/describing function). The mean numbers of responses 
are given in Table 4.5.  No significant main effect of age was found for responses 
providing the identity of an object (p>.05; F<1). However, age main effects were found 
for feature and function responses, F (3, 63) =12.02, p<.01 and F (3, 63) =6.18, p<.01, 
respectively. The youngest group gave significantly fewer feature responses than all 
other groups (p<.05 in Games-Howell posthoc comparisons); for the function condition, 
they gave significantly more of this response type than those aged 6-8.5 years and 8.6-
11.5 years (p<.01). 
 
Table 4.5: Mean number of each response type to object images, across TD age groups 
(maximum=8; standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Identity Features Function 
Up to 6 years 7.43 (.76) 4.29 (3.22) 4.43 (2.31) 
6-8.5 7.43 (.65) 7.50 (1.35) 1.50 (1.91) 
8.6-11.5 7.59 (1.23) 7.71 (.47) 1.06 (1.85) 
11.6+ 8 (0) 7.28 (1.18) 2 (2.91) 
 
 
4.4.2 ASD with TD comparisons 
4.4.2.1    What Is It task: Spontaneous responses in ASD groups1 
The same analyses as with the TD trajectories was performed on the face/emotion 
responses of participants in the ASD group, compared to their CA and MA matches. 
Table 4.6 shows the mean number of face/emotion responses that the ASD group, 
compared to their TD matches, gave for the line and fruit categories (standard 
deviations given in parentheses). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 ‘ASD groups’ and ‘WS groups’ in all results sections refer to the clinical groups and their TD 
peer comparisons. 
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Table 4.6: Mean number of face/emotion responses for fruit and line images, for ASD 
participants and TD matches (standard deviations shown in parentheses; maximum 
number=3). 
 Line 
‘Face’ 
Line 
‘Emotion 
Fruit 
‘Face’ 
Fruit 
‘Emotion’ 
ASD (n=18) 1.11 (1.13) .83 (.77) .72 (.96) .17 (.38) 
TD CA Matches 
(n=17) 
1.71 (1.16) 1.76 (.75) 1.59 (1.23) .59 (.87) 
TD MA Matches 
(n=18) 
1.33 (1.33) 1.44 (.71) 1.11 (1.13) .39 (.78) 
 
Two separate mixed design ANOVAs were conducted for face and emotion responses, 
with image category (line/fruit) as a within subjects factor and group (3) as the between 
subjects factor. No significant main effect of image category or group was found 
(p>.05; F<1). For emotion responses, a main effect of  image category was found (F (1, 
50)=78.70, p<.01) whereby significantly fewer responses were given to fruit than line 
images overall (p<.01 in pairwise comparisons).  A main effect of group was found, F 
(2, 50)=5.50, p<.01. Participants in the TD CA group gave significantly more emotion 
responses across both images types than individuals with ASD (p<.01 in Games-Howell 
posthoc comparisons). No significant differences were found between the ASD and TD 
MA group (p=.07). Main effects of image category and group were not underpined by 
any interaction between them (p>.05; F<1).  
 
4.4.2.2     What Is It task: Feature responses in ASD groups 
A 4 x 3 (image category x group) mixed design ANOVA for percentages of feature 
responses was conducted; no significant main effect (p=.60) was found for image 
category. A main effect of group was evident, F (2, 50) =41.63, p<.01, with those in the 
ASD group giving significantly fewer feature responses than either of their TD matches 
(p<.01). Overall fewer responses is indicative of individuals with ASD saying less when 
giving references to facial feature terms: Responses might have been categorised under 
one of the other response types or may not have been coded under any category (such as 
‘don’t know’ or talking about an aspect of the faces not under consideration). No 
significant interaction between group and image category was found (p>.05, F<1).
  
 
8
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7: Mean number of each response type for each image category for ASD participants and TD matches (Standard deviations in 
parentheses). Maximum number of responses for line/fruit images=3; maximum number for human/animal images=4. 
 
Response 
Type 
Feature     Emotion     Why     
Image 
Category 
Line Fruit Human 
 
Animal Line Fruit Human Animal Line Fruit Human Animal 
ASD  1.28 (1.07) 1.33 (.97) 1.78 (1.11) 1.89 (1.23) 1.06 (.87) .22 (.55) 2.0 (1.09) 1.50 (1.1) .11 (.47) 0 (0) .22 (.65) .11 (.32) 
TD CA  2.82 (.39) 2.59 (1.0) 2.71 (1.16) 3.22 (.75) 1.94 (.75) 1.12 (1.22) 2.71 (1.16) 2.41 (1.37) .35 (.49) .06 (.24) .53 (1.0) .65 (.93) 
TD MA  2.44 (.78) 2.67 (.77) 3.39 (.70) 2.94 (1.06) 1.72 (.83) .78 (1.06) 2.56 (.98) 1.78 (1.35) .17 (.38) .06 (.24) .39 (1.04) .50 (.92) 
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4.4.2.3      What Is It task: Emotion responses in ASD groups 
A 4 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was conducted for percentages of emotion responses to 
images. A main effect of image category was found, F (3, 150) =21.60 p<.01. The 
fewest responses (see Table 4.7) were given to fruit images, with significantly fewer 
emotion responses being given to this image type than for any other image category 
(p<.01). These patterns were the same in all groups, as no significant interaction 
between group and image category was found (p>.05; F<1). A main effect of group was 
found, F (2, 50) =6.57, p<.01, whereby those with ASD gave significantly fewer 
responses overall than CA (p<.01) as well as MA matches (p<.05). 
 
4.4.2.4      What Is It task: Why responses in ASD groups 
A 4 x 3 mixed design ANOVA for percentages of ‘why’ responses to images found a 
main effect of image category, F (3, 150) =3.61, p<.05. There were significantly fewer 
‘why’ responses given to fruit images than animal (p<.01) overall but no significant 
differences, unlike with other response types, between line images and other categories. 
No significant main effect was found for group (p=.09) nor for the interaction between 
group and image category (p>.05; F<1)
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4.4.2.5      What Is It task: Responses to objects in ASD groups 
The types of responses that participants across groups gave to object images were 
analysed in three separate univariate ANOVAs, for each response type (correct 
identity/features/function). Table 4.8 states the mean number of each type of response 
for the ASD group and their TD matches. 
 
Table 4.8: Mean number of each response type to object images, in ASD groups and TD 
matches (maximum=8; standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Identity Features Function 
ASD 7.72 (.46) 3.67 (2.77) 4.33 (3.01) 
TD CA 7.65 (1.22) 7.47 (.87) 1.88 (2.93) 
TD MA 7.78 (.43) 7.22 (2.05) 2.11 (2.49) 
 
 No main effect of group was found for responses identifying objects (p>.05; F<1). For 
feature responses, a main effect of group was found, F (2, 53) =18.89, p<.01; those with 
ASD gave significantly fewer feature responses than TD CA and TD MA matches (p< 
.01), as is evident in Figure 4.7. A main effect of group was also found for function 
responses, F (2, 53) =4.10, p<.05, in which participants with ASD gave significantly 
more of this type of response than their CA peers (p<.05). It is worth noting that 
individuals with ASD showed the same pattern of results (fewer feature responses and 
more function) as did the children aged under 6 years in the TD analysis. 
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Figure 4.7: Response types to object images in ASD groups and TD matches on the Wii 
task2 
 
4.4.3 WS with TD Comparisons 
4.4.3.1     What Is It task: Spontaneous responses in WS groups 
Table 4.9 shows the mean number of face/emotion responses that the WS group, 
compared to their TD matches, gave for the line and fruit categories (standard 
deviations are given in parentheses). Two separate mixed design ANOVAs, with image 
category (line/fruit) as within subjects factor and group (3) as between subjects factor 
were conducted for face and emotion responses separately. No main effects were found 
for image category or group for face responses to images (p>.05; F<1) nor was any 
significant interaction found between these factors.  
For emotion responses, however, a main effect of image category was found, (F(1, 
39)=26.84, p<.01) and there was a main effect of group, F (2, 39)=7.22, p<.01. Overall, 
participants gave significantly (p<.01 in posthoc pairwise comparisons) more emotion 
responses to line than fruit images. Individuals with WS gave significantly fewer 
emotion responses overall than their CA matches (p<.05). No significant differences 
were observed between the WS group and their TD MA matches. No significant 
interaction (p>.05; F<1) was found between image category and group. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Error bars on all graphs throughout this thesis denote the standard error of the sample 
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Table 4.9: Mean number of face/emotion responses for fruit and line images, for WS 
participants and TD matches (standard deviations shown in parentheses; maximum 
number=3). 
 Line 
‘Face’ 
Line 
‘Emotion 
Fruit 
‘Face’ 
Fruit 
‘Emotion’ 
WS (n=14) .57 (.85) .86 (.86) .36 (.63) .14 (.36) 
TD CA Matches 
(n=14) 
1.07 (1.07) 1.57 (.94) 1.21 (1.12) .86 (.86) 
TD MA Matches 
(n=14) 
.86 (1.23) .86 (.86) .86 (1.10) .86 (.86) 
 
 
4.4.3.2      What Is It task: Feature responses in WS groups 
A 4 x 3 (image category x group) mixed design ANOVA was conducted for percentages 
of feature responses. The descriptive statistics for each different response type for the 
four image categories are given in Table 4.10. A significant main effect of image 
category was observed, F (3, 117) =3.94, p<.01 in which there was a significantly 
higher percentage (p<.05) of feature responses to human versus fruit or line images. No 
other comparisons revealed any significant differences. A significant main effect of 
group was found (F (2, 39) =9.96, p<.01), with a further significant interaction between 
image category and group, F (6, 117) =3.88, p<.01. 
Univariate ANOVAS were run on each image category separately in order to explore 
the interaction between image category and group. The only images to show 
differentiations between the groups were the fruit/line categories. Main effects of group 
were found for fruit and line respectively, F (2, 42) =13.42, p<.01; F (2, 42) =8.64, 
p<.01, with those participants with WS giving significantly fewer feature responses than 
TD CA (p<.01) and TD MA (p<.05) matches, in both cases. 
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Table 4.10: Mean number of each response type for each image category across for WS participants and TD matches (Standard deviations 
in parentheses). Maximum number of responses for line/fruit images=3; maximum number for human/animal images=4. 
Response 
Type 
Feature     Emotion     Why     
Image 
Category 
Line Fruit Human 
 
Animal Line Fruit Human Animal Line Fruit Human Animal 
WS 1.29 (1.20) .64 (1.08) 2.64 (1.08) 2.21 (1.58) 1.0 (.88) .21 (.43) 1.79 (1.31) 1.57 (1.40) .21 (.43) 0 (0) .21 (.43) .29 (.61) 
TD CA  2.71 (.61) 2.64 (.63) 3.29 (.73) 2.29 (1.49) 1.64 (.75) 1.43 (1.16) 3.0 (.88) 2.29 (1.49) 0 (0) 0 (0) .50 (1.09) .36 (.75) 
TD MA  2.36 (.93) 2.0 (1.3) 3.07 (1.07) 2.21 (1.37) 1.43 (1.16) .07 (.27) 1.21 (.80) 1.43 (.76) .21 (.43) 0 (0) .71 (1.14) .29 (.83) 
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4.4.3.3      What Is It task: Emotion responses in WS groups 
A main effect of image category was found for percentages of emotion responses, F (2, 
117) =13.88, p<.01. Mean numbers of responses can be found in Table 
4.10.Significantly lower percentages of responses were given to fruit images than for 
any other category (p<.01). A main effect of group was found (F (2, 39) =10.50, p<.05) 
with individuals with WS giving significantly lower percentages of emotion responses 
overall compared to CA (but not MA) matches (p<.01). A significant interaction 
between group and image category was also found, F (3, 117) =2.35, p<.05 
Further univariate ANOVAs of each stimulus type separately revealed main effects of 
group for the fruit and human categories, F (2, 42)=14.66, p<.01 and F (2, 42)=11.15, 
p<.01, respectively. In both cases, those in the CA TD group gave significantly more 
responses than their MA peers or those with WS (p<.01). Individuals with WS gave 
largely comparable numbers of emotion responses to all types of image category as did 
their MA matches. 
 
4.4.3.4      What Is It task: ‘Why’ responses in WS groups 
A 4 x 3 (image category x group) mixed design ANOVA was conducted for percentages 
of ‘why’ responses to images. Whilst no significant main effect was found for group 
(p=.71), one was revealed for image category, F (3, 117) =5.57, p<.01, whereby overall, 
all participants gave significantly more ‘why’ responses to human versus fruit faces 
(p<.01). There was no significant interaction found between the two factors (p>.05; 
F<1).  
 
4.4.3.5      What Is It task: Responses to objects in WS groups 
Three separate univariate ANOVAs were conducted for each response type to objects. 
The mean numbers of responses of each type are given in Table 4.11. 
 
Table 4.11: Mean number of each response type to object images, in WS groups and TD 
matches (maximum=8; standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Identity Features Function 
WS 7.29 (1.14) 4.43 (2.24) 1.71 (2.34) 
TD CA 7.71 (.61) 7.29 (1.33) .86 (1.70) 
TD MA 7.36 (.75) 4.86 (3.11) 3.93 (2.24) 
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No main effect of group was found for responses identifying objects. A main effect of 
group was found for the use of feature terms, F (2, 42) =6.06, p<.01, whereby (as is 
evident in Figure 4.8), those in the TD CA group gave significantly more responses of 
this type than their MA peers (p<.01 in Games-Howell posthoc comparisons) or those 
with WS (p<.01). For function responses, a significant main effect was also shown, F 
(2, 42) =7.91, p<.01; this was underpinned by those in the TD MA group providing 
more of this response type than those in the WS (p<.05) group or CA peers (p<.01). It is 
worth noting that the participants in this group were particularly young (mean age 4 
years 8 months) and therefore this pattern of results can be compared to those aged 
under 6 years in the TD age analysis. 
 
Figure 4.8: Types of response to object images for the WS group on the Wii task 
 
4.4.4 Summary of Results 
 Analysis of initial responses to non-face images (line and fruit) revealed 
different patterns depending on whether ‘face’ or ‘emotion’ responses were given: No 
group differences emerged in any of the comparisons when analysing the number of 
times that participants spontaneously described images as a ‘face’. Similarly, no 
differences were found in any of the groups as to how many times participants gave a 
‘face’ label to line versus fruit images. For ‘emotion’ responses, however, all 
participants were significantly less likely to give this type of response to fruit (versus 
line) images. Individuals with ASD and WS also did this less often than their CA, but 
not MA peers. TD children aged under 6 years failed to ever give an ‘emotion’ label to 
fruit images, with children in the oldest two groups doing this significantly more than 
the youngest children.  
Analysis of the types of response that individuals gave to all four image categories 
(line/fruit/human/animal) showed that, overall, all participants gave higher percentages 
of feature responses to human faces than fruit images. It was also found in the TD 
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analysis that participants of all ages gave a higher proportion of feature responses to 
human versus animal faces. The youngest TD group gave significantly fewer of this 
response type overall than did the oldest group. Individuals with ASD also gave a lower 
percentage of feature responses over all image categories than either CA or MA 
matches; however, the pattern of results was the same, in that all participants gave a 
higher percentage of feature responses to human versus fruit images. In the WS cohort, 
an interaction emerged in which, only on fruit and line images did individuals with WS 
give fewer feature responses than both CA and MA peers; for real face images, those 
with WS were comparable to TD peers. 
When considering ‘emotion’ responses to images, all participants overall gave the 
lowest percentage of this type of response to fruit images. TD children of different ages 
showed different patterns of results: Whilst there were no significant differences 
between the age-groups for line images, individuals in the youngest group gave a 
significantly lower percentage of emotion responses to human faces than any other age-
group. For fruit faces, children aged under 6 years gave significantly lower percentages 
of emotion responses than children in the oldest two groups. Individuals with ASD gave 
significantly lower percentages of emotion responses overall than their CA and MA 
peers; the same patterns were seen in those with ASD and TD peers, however. An 
interaction was again found for those with WS compared to TD peers, in which 
differences were only found between the groups in the numbers of emotion responses 
that were given to fruit and human images: Individuals with WS gave significantly 
fewer emotion responses to these images than did their CA matches. 
Across the TD analysis, significantly fewer ‘why’ responses were given to fruit images 
than for any other category; in the clinical analyses, over all groups, there were no 
significant differences between the number of responses given to fruit versus line faces.  
In the ASD analysis, a significantly higher percentage of ‘why’ responses were given to 
animal versus fruit faces; in the WS comparisons, this difference emerged between fruit 
and human faces only. No differences emerged between individuals with ASD or WS 
and their TD peers in the number of responses given to any category for ‘why’ 
responses. An interaction emerged in the TD age comparisons, in which the youngest 
and oldest groups did not significantly differ as to how many ‘why’ responses they gave 
to animal faces, with the oldest group giving significantly more than those aged 6-8.5 
years and 8.6-11.5 years. 
Regarding object images, all participants very consistently labelled an object with the 
correct identity: The mean number of responses did not fall below 7 (out of 8) in any 
participant groups.  Therefore no differences emerged between any of the age-groups or 
between those with ASD/WS and their TD peers for this type of response. For ‘feature’ 
responses, in which participants described various parts of the object shown, children 
aged under 6 years gave significantly fewer of this type of response than all other age 
groups. Individuals with ASD also gave significantly fewer of this response type than 
both CA and MA peers; those with WS gave significantly fewer responses than CA 
peers but were comparable to TD MA matches. An analysis of ‘function’ responses (in 
which participants spontaneously talked about what an object was used for) revealed 
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that the youngest children in the age analysis gave more of this response type than those 
aged 6-8.5 years and 8.6-11.5 years. Individuals with ASD gave significantly more of 
this type of response than did either CA or MA peers. Those with WS gave significantly 
fewer function responses overall than their MA matches, but no differences were found 
between these individuals and TD CA peers. 
  
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 TD Age Groups 
4.5.1.1      Spontaneous responses to images 
When examining differences between the TD age groups, the prediction that an age by 
stimulus type interaction would be seen was not borne out: All participants showed the 
same trend with comparable number of face responses to fruit/line images, and 
significantly more emotion terms given in response to line versus fruit images. This 
divide between the types of ‘emotion’ responses that TD participants gave to line versus 
fruit images is an important one that adds support to the fact that the images used in the 
present study do tap into the use of strategies in which parts are pieced together to form 
an impression of the whole. Given that the line images were ambiguous and not 
comprised of shapes that might denote eyes or a mouth, spontaneously labelling these 
images as an emotion suggests the piecing together of the component parts, not only to 
deduce a ‘face’ but to label it with a specific emotion. Incidences of this type of 
labelling were very low for fruit faces, perhaps because the presence of specific fruit 
items detracted from the piecing together of parts which were clearly not facial features. 
If we make the assumption that to process these images as faces and infer emotion to 
them then the participant needs to use configural processing, the findings go against the 
work of Carey and Diamond (1977) and their assertion that children may switch from a 
featural to holistic form of processing at around 8 years. However, under the same 
assumption, the findings of the present study are very much in line with those of Tanaka 
et al. (2007) in that the same patterns emerged across all age-groups. It may well be the 
case that the age divides in the present study did not fully capture the point at which a 
possible coding ‘switch’ might occur (if indeed it does occur). 
The fact that there was a divide between the number of responses given to fruit versus 
line images for ‘emotion’ and not ‘face’ responses may be indicative of different types 
of processing, as suggested by Haxby et al.(2000). Whilst individuals did spontaneously 
piece together the component parts of both types of image equally as often to deduce a 
‘face’, this happened far less for fruit images than line. Fruit images were designed to 
allow for the appraisal of specific features, rather than line images, in which the features 
were all very similar, simply comprised of straight lines at different orientations, rather 
than varied in size or shape. It could therefore be the case that a more featural 
processing style was used for fruit images, insufficient to deduce an emotion, whereas it 
was enough to label items as a ‘face’. 
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The role of exposure to and experience with faces should not be neglected when 
considering the similar patterns in the data here: None of the participants would be 
particularly familiar with images of the nature used in the present experiment, therefore 
items might be treated as more novel objects, eliciting a featural processing style. 
Mondloch et al. (2007) have stressed the importance of early experience in the 
development of later visual processes: They have tentatively suggested, on the back of 
their findings, that holistic processing may facilitate attunement to more spatial relations 
and their use in the identification of familiar faces. The precise nature of these processes 
was not examined in the present experiment, as the focus was more concerned with how 
participants would piece together parts to form a whole. Interestingly, differences were 
only found for number of emotion responses between the youngest and oldest groups 
for fruit images. This difference might suggest an interplay between strategy use and the 
salience of images until configural processing is fully developed: Local, feature cues 
might dominate processing until around 11 years of age for items of a more ambiguous 
nature. 
 
4.5.1.2      Types of response 
In order to more deeply analyse possible differences between the groups in the present 
study, the types of response that individuals gave were examined. These were broadly 
categorised as references to facial features, emotion terms and reasons for an emotion. It 
was intended that evaluation of these would provide preliminary ideas as to precisely 
where those with ASD and WS would focus and how these patterns would map onto TD 
groups.  
Depending on the response types being analysed, different patterns within the TD age 
groups emerged. For facial feature responses, the lowest percentage of this type of 
response was given towards animal faces versus human and line. Interestingly, there 
was no advantage of the human face over ambiguous images in eliciting facial feature 
responses. One critical point to note was the fact that differences did not emerge 
between percentages of responses given to line versus human image categories overall 
for any type of response, whereas differences were typically found between fruit and 
line images. This points to the fact that images configured to form a face in which there 
is a greater level of ambiguity (with only lines being used to represent parts) elicit more 
responses using ‘facial’ terms and social descriptions than images in which the 
individual features are clearly treated as separate fruit items. Similar types of response 
were given for line and human images, perhaps suggesting that they are treated and 
processed in the same way. In order to deduce emotions from the individual lines, this 
must involve some processing at the global level. That TD individuals do show a clear 
divide in their interpretation of line versus fruit images provides a robust point of 
comparison when examining the performance in individuals with ASD and WS. 
For emotion responses, very different age trends emerged depending on the image 
presented: The youngest group gave significantly fewer emotion responses to human 
faces than all other groups, but were comparable to those children aged 6-8 years 5 
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months (who also provided very few of this type of description) when giving responses 
to fruit faces. It is difficult to accurately interpret this finding, given that deducing an 
emotion from fruit parts should be less intuitive than doing so from human facial 
features; this finding becomes more complex when considering the fact that there were 
no age differences in the number of emotion responses given to line images. One 
possible explanation of this unexpected finding is offered by Freitag and Schwarzer 
(2011) who have noted in their examination of how individuals identify a face based on 
changeable expressions, that emotions may be more facilitatory in younger children on 
the ability to identify a face. They state that, until configural processing develops 
(which they suggest occurs after age 5), individuals rely more on semantic, internal 
representations. This is borne out by the finding within the age trajectories that the 
youngest group gave the least number of emotion responses to human faces, whilst the 
oldest group gave significantly more emotion responses to fruit faces.  
This pattern of results is critical for offering a framework as to where the profiles of 
those with ASD and WS may separate: As is discussed below, individuals with ASD 
showed lower proportions in giving emotion responses to all types of images overall 
compared to both CA and MA peers; those with WS showed no differences with MA 
peers for line images specifically. If developmental age does not appear to be 
consistently predictive of the ability to draw together ambiguous line cues to deduce an 
emotion, this lack of a difference in the WS and not ASD group may indicate syndrome 
specific deficits in the ASD group not seen amongst those with WS.  
That differences emerged in the percentages of types of response given to human versus 
animal images for emotion and ‘why’ responses in the TD cohort may suggest that there 
is some specificity of the human face that drives processing style. This difference was 
not seen for facial feature responses. In terms of spontaneously describing facial 
features, this is perhaps not surprising, given that the cues were explicit. Once 
participants had stated an image was, for example, “A man/a dog”, it might then make 
sense, on being prompted ‘what else can you tell me?’ to then go on to describe what 
that man/dog looked like. If experience plays an important role (as Mondloch et al., 
2007 suggest) in the development of and expertise in face processing, one might expect 
differences to emerge when interpreting emotions from human versus animal faces, as 
was found. It therefore seems that age/experience might underpin how likely children 
are to spontaneously talk about emotions and why an emotion might be felt in response 
to animal faces. This might suggest that different factors operate as to what children of 
different ages focus on or think about when viewing human versus animal faces. 
  
4.5.2 Clinical Groups 
4.5.2.1      Spontaneous responses to images 
The findings of Experiment 1 reveal that those with ASD and WS are able to piece 
together individual features to deduce that an item is a ‘face’. However, they do this 
significantly less frequently than their TD CA counterparts, with generally fewer 
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responses referring to either ‘faces’ or ‘emotions’ when presented with either line or 
fruit faces. Individuals with both WS and ASD did provide face and emotion responses 
to fruit and line images as often as their MA peers, suggesting that difficulties might be 
more age/experience driven, indicative of a delay, rather than in any core deficits. 
Further, if mental age underpins the likelihood of individuals with both ASD and WS 
interpreting these types of images as a ‘face’ or an ‘emotion’, it suggests that similar 
processing strategies might be utilised, that are not as developed as those seen in peers 
of the same CA. The reduced number of face/emotion responses given by those with 
ASD/WS in comparison to their TD CA counterparts may be suggestive of less 
competent or less likelihood, of configural processing. Indeed, as Karmiloff-Smith et al. 
(2004) have noted, similar trends between clinical and TD individuals are not 
necessarily indicative of similar underlying processes. This could be the case in the 
present study: The low number of ‘face’/ ‘emotion’ responses towards fruit images in 
all groups could be mediated by different factors. For example, perhaps those in the TD 
group are less likely to state that ‘fruit’ images are an emotion because it makes little 
sense to do so when the individual parts are clearly fruit, whereas those in the clinical 
groups simply might not have pieced together any parts to deduce a face-like 
configuration. Analysis of the types of response that individuals with WS and ASD 
(compared to TD peers) gave did reveal more syndrome specific differences. These are 
discussed in section 4.5.2.2 and 3. 
It was hypothesised that different trends would emerge in the WS and ASD groups in 
terms of divides between fruit/line images, whereby those with ASD would employ a 
more blanket featural strategy. It was predicted that this would manifest as no 
differences between face responses to these images amongst ASDs, whereas those with 
WS would be more inclined to use a featural strategy for fruit but a more configural 
process for line images, evidenced by significant differences between the two. In fact, 
no significant differences were found between ‘face’ responses to fruit/line images in 
any groups. For emotion responses, all groups also demonstrated significantly more 
emotion terms in response to line rather than fruit faces, although those in the clinical 
groups did this significantly less often than did peers of the same age. This finding 
points to the possibility that individuals with both ASD and WS are processing images 
in a similar manner to younger individuals, again suggestive of a developmental delay. 
It may be worth considering that the use of ambiguous images in the present experiment 
elicited a style of processing that might have masked potential differences between the 
clinical groups compared to their peers: Objects have been found to be processed in a 
different way to faces in a wealth of studies, with neuroimaging data supporting 
behavioural research. Might it therefore be that, in all cases, the fruit and line images 
were treated more like inverted faces or objects?  
One should bear in mind that the paradigm used in the present study was not designed 
to test hard and fast configural processing but set out to examine, preliminarily, whether 
or not those with WS and ASD would piece together non-facial features to deduce a 
‘face’ (or an emotion). The precise nature of what factors might be involved will be 
further explored in later chapters. 
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Deruelle et al. (1999) noted but failed to explain the reasons behind a lack of an 
inversion effect in individuals with WS. Is it due to their failure to use configural 
processing, or because they use a blanket featural strategy, regardless of orientation, that 
is not as efficient as in the TD population, demonstrated by poorer performance in these 
groups for inverted faces? In light of the present experiment, however, if featural 
strategies were a ‘buffering’ factor in WS, it might be expected that responses to fruit 
images would be heightened; this was not the case. In fact, as with all other groups, 
responses to fruit images were the most diminished. 
 
4.5.2.2      Types of response: ASD 
Although no direct comparisons between the types of responses given could be 
conducted in the present study, due to the dependence of response types on one another 
(derived from the same answer, such as ‘it’s a cat and he looks excited because he’s just 
been fed’), it is worth noting that the commonest response type across all four images 
categories in all groups was in referring to the facial features of items. However, it was 
on this measure that the most marked difference appeared between those with ASD and 
both matched groups. Those with ASD gave significantly fewer facial feature references 
than both TD matches overall, although no main effect of image category was noted in 
the ASD group or TD matches in that analysis. That individuals with ASD gave any 
descriptions of facial features to non-face images is, however, telling in that it suggests 
that, even without explicit cues to comment on, individuals with ASD will draw 
analogies between real faces and ambiguous images. However, it is worth noting that 
there may have been practice effects in the present experiment; whilst the experimenter 
did not give feedback to participants, instead giving neutral statements such as ‘Uh huh, 
let’s move on to the next one’, individuals may have assumed that the lack of any 
corrections indicated ‘right’ answers, and therefore adopted the same types of 
descriptions throughout the experiment. Object images were inserted to avoid such 
practice effects but it may be worth considering. 
The fact that those with ASD gave far fewer facial feature responses than CA or MA 
matches might be indicative of their not attaching any social significance to individual 
facial features, or a more general inattention to particular face parts. Were a divide 
found between use of facial features to real versus ambiguous images, it could be 
deduced that a more featural process was at play in the ASD group. Given that this was 
the case across all image types, however, with no significant differences being found in 
the percentages of responses given to any of the image categories, it may simply be that 
individuals with ASD were not making any attempt to label features at all. The present 
experiment, whilst pointing to possible ways in which the different groups may or may 
not be using featural cues, cannot answer the question of whether or not a blanket 
featural strategy is being utilised, or how effective this is. An inversion paradigm, like 
the one used by Cashon et al. (2013) would better speak to the issue of the role of 
novelty and orientation in determining processing strategies.  Similarly, a replication of 
the Wii task in the future, perhaps with a more detailed break-down of categories that 
might tap into the types of cues specifically being used, might be more informative. 
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Examining incidences in which participants described the physical properties of 
features, for example, might provide an insight into where attention is being given when 
appraising face versus non-face images. A formal examination of holistic processing 
will, however, be addressed in Chapter 5. 
When examining emotion, individuals with ASD gave a lower proportion of responses 
compared to both CA and MA peers, as hypothesised. The same patterns also emerged 
in that all participants gave the fewest of this type of response to fruit images, with no 
notable differences found in the number of responses given to human versus line images 
in any of the groups. This suggests that individuals with ASD, whilst they may not be as 
likely to label emotions as their TD peers, do process the different categories of image 
in a similar way.  Differences between individuals with ASD and MA matches for 
emotion responses were less clear than compared to those in the CA group and those 
seen when examining feature responses: This may indicate a particular type of cue use 
in ASD. In the present study, mouth cues were always particularly expressive and 
unambiguous therefore it might be that those with ASD were able to use those above 
and beyond the cues available for the other image categories. McPartland, Webb, Keehn 
and Dawson (2011) found that those with ASD tended to stick to using one over-
arching strategy when attending to features of objects and faces, and this may go some 
way to explaining this pattern of results in the current ASD group: Human face cues are 
useful in interpreting expressions but different judgements might have to be made 
(using a more configural process) in the case of fruit faces. 
Interestingly, no differences were found between the percentages of ‘why’ responses 
that participants in each group gave for any of the images, with the only significant 
difference being seen in that more ‘why’ responses were given to animal versus fruit 
images. In the TD age analysis, the oldest group gave higher percentages of this 
response type to animal faces compared to the middle two age groups (but not the 
youngest). This suggests that a tendency towards providing explanations for emotions in 
animals is not necessarily age driven but may be due more to experience with animals, 
which may differ greatly between participants. Anecdotally, many of the children in the 
ASD group did report having pets, therefore it might have been that this made such 
responses more salient for animal images. A formal examination of this would be 
informative in future.  
 
4.5.2.3       Types of response: WS 
 A different pattern of response types appeared in the WS group in this experiment. For 
responses involving a facial feature, individuals with WS performed comparably to both 
CA and MA matches for the real (human and animal) images. However, they gave 
significantly fewer responses towards fruit/line images than either CA or MA peers. 
This divide may highlight the salience of real faces in drawing attention to facial cues 
and/or of particular difficulties those with WS face when asked to make attributions to 
ambiguous face parts. This pattern of results is extremely important when considering 
differences between individuals with WS and those with ASD: Individuals with ASD 
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gave fewer feature responses over all image categories than their CA or MA peers, 
suggesting a general lack of attention to, or inclination to describing, facial features 
when both real and explicit or ambiguous. That individuals with WS were as likely as 
even CA peers to describe the facial features of real faces suggests more of an interest 
in, or attention to, these types of cue than was evident amongst those with ASD. 
However, whether this divide between the appraisal of real versus non-face images in 
WS was due to difficulties in interpreting ambiguous images or more confidence in 
doing so with real face images, remains to be tested. 
It was tentatively hypothesised that those with WS would be able to deduce emotional 
meanings from human faces, given their heightened exposure to this type of image in 
everyday interactions, and yet they were not found to provide emotion terms in response 
to human faces as often as their CA counterparts did; they were only comparable at the 
MA level. This might suggest that cognitive factors, rather than experience, are more 
important in how faces are interpreted in WS. This was also found to be the case for 
fruit faces. 
 Given the very young age of the MA matches in the WS cohort (mean age=4 years, 7 
months), it is important to consider what the comparable performance of those with WS 
to this group tells us. Macchi Cassia, Turati and Schwarzer (2011) have suggested that 
children around 4 years of age have poorly tuned sensitivity to configural information; 
in the present study, this implies that performing at a comparable level to their MA 
matches in the WS group is indicative of developmentally delayed processing strategies. 
Indeed, this is one of the difficulties of employing a matched groups design in clinical 
research, in which individuals matched on MA tend to be very different ages, and it is 
difficult to draw conclusions across groups covering such a wide age range. However, 
the analysis between age groups across the TD cohort was informative in the present 
study: No age effects, for example, were found for ‘emotion’ responses to animal/line 
images and these were also the images to which no differences were found between 
those with WS and their TD peers of either CA or MA. This therefore indicates that, if 
age is a less important factor in the types of ‘emotion’ responses that individuals give to 
these types of images, differences between the WS and TD groups would not 
necessarily be found. More specific types of code in the present experiment might have 
better pulled apart more subtle differences between the groups. 
It is difficult to fully explain the finding that individuals with WS were as likely to 
make emotional attributions in response to line images, given their lack of references to 
facial features compared to even MA peers on this measure. In order to deduce an 
emotion from such ambiguous images, one might expect that configural processing 
would need to occur, and yet analysis of the spontaneous responses to fruit/line images 
might suggest that individuals with neither ASD nor WS were as likely as TD peers to 
piece parts together to deduce a ‘face’. Both Tanaka et al. (1998) and Mondloch et al. 
(2007) have highlighted the importance of carefully pulling apart divides when testing 
clinical groups between patterns in the ways in which a task is approached and ultimate 
accuracy. Whilst the present experiment was not concerned with ‘correct’ responses per 
se, it might be possible that different use of cues for different images might still 
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manifest in similar patterns of response type between groups for certain items. The 
salience and utility of particular cues will be further explored in Chapter 6. One possible 
limitation of the present experiment was the lack of any response time data; Behrmann 
et al. (2006b) have shown that individuals with ASD, whilst performing as accurately as 
their TD peers, do so much more slowly when asked to discriminate between faces or 
objects. A lack of different patterns in response types in the present experiment might 
be underpinned by different processing speeds, and possible deviant strategies not 
elucidated here. 
 
4.5.3 Responses to objects 
The inclusion of objects in the present experiment was intended purely as a 
baseline measure to insure that participants understood the task demands and did not 
have any problems in accurately identifying images. Objects were also included to 
break up the possible routine of participants getting into a habit of continually stating 
that items were a ‘face’. However, an interesting result emerged in that those with ASD 
talked significantly more about the functions of objects than their CA TD matches, 
whilst they labelled features significantly less than both groups of TD peers. An 
examination of the age groups revealed that this same inclination was found between 
the youngest group and the older ones. Individuals with WS talked about object features 
less than CA matches and functions less than MA matches; however, this MA group 
were very young (mean age 4 years, 7 months), therefore were the group who, in the TD 
age analysis gave significantly more function terms than any other children. 
 Two questions arise: Is this propensity towards talking about the functions of objects in 
ASD evidence of a developmental delay whereby perhaps object use is most salient to 
younger children who are exploring by doing all the time? Or is it driven by a 
heightened salience towards objects? Loth, Gómez, Happé and Carlos (2010) found in 
their study examining top-down priming effects of faces versus objects in individuals 
with ASD that only prior knowledge of objects appeared to facilitate the recognition of 
degraded images. This priming effect was not found for face images. This might add 
weight to the salience argument of why those with ASD provided more responses to 
object functions in the present study. However, the design of the present study must be 
considered in that it encouraged participants to think about ‘alternative’ responses to 
images: Once participants had given their initial response (which was predominantly to 
simply name the item shown, as would be expected when asked ‘what is it?’), they were 
asked ‘Can you tell me anything else about it’? It is therefore perhaps logical that 
individuals would go on to talk about the use of an item. It would be useful to therefore 
examine only the initial responses to object images in future analyses. However, that 
individuals with ASD chose to talk about functions rather than describing features, as 
TD children tended to do more often, appears to be specific to the disorder, as this was 
not seen in the WS cohort. This also stands in line with the finding that individuals with 
ASD talked far less about the facial features of items than did their TD peers. 
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The fact that individuals with ASD focus so predominantly on the functions of objects 
suggests that, for this type of image, they are able to employ a more holistic process in 
both recognising what the object is and then referring to its utility. This is further borne 
out by a clear reduction in talking about the individual features of objects amongst ASD 
individuals. This goes against the findings of Behrmann et al. (2006b), who have 
claimed that both face and object processing are underpinned by a more featural 
processing style in ASD. However, it should be noted that the images of objects used in 
the present study (See Appendix A) were not particularly complex, or comprised of 
various parts that needed to be combined into a whole in order to accurately deduce 
identity. This would be worth exploring in future experiments.  
Experiment 1 points to some ways in which those with ASD and WS may differ in what 
they see when they look at a face or face-like images. Both groups show some evidence 
of the ability to piece together parts into a whole, yet there appears to be a possible 
reluctance amongst those with ASD to attribute facial features to ambiguous images or 
particularly focus on facial features in even human faces. Individuals with WS show a 
definite developmental delay in the likelihood of them piecing together individual 
ambiguous features to form a ‘face’. However, individuals with WS are as likely as 
their TD peers of both CA and MA to describe the content of real faces; this may 
suggest either difficulties in interpreting ambiguous cues or more ability in processing 
real faces. 
 
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4 
Based on the findings of Experiment 1, it is not possible to conclude that 
children ‘switch’ from one processing type to another, nor that any particular type of 
cue determines the information that children utilise when drawing interpretations from 
images. In typical development, age does not appear to predict the types of things that 
children focus on when appraising ambiguous or real face images, although the number 
of overall responses does tend to increase with age. 
 Evidence of possible developmental delay is seen in both ASD and WS groups, who 
fail to provide as many responses as do their TD peers. However, similar response 
patterns emerge, perhaps indicating the same but less effective strategies. In WS, 
differences compared to TD peers diminish when the images shown are real faces. The 
fact that differences were not found between line and fruit images for any of the groups 
in their spontaneous responses does not necessarily imply use of the same underlying 
processes: Those with WS and ASD may have been utilising a blanket featural strategy. 
It may therefore be that different cues under different conditions determine the types of 
strategies used or which cues are most useful; amongst participants with ASD, for 
example, the functions of objects appear to be particularly important. This divide 
between object and face cues will be explored in Chapter 6.  
The current experiment in no way attempted to measure the accuracy of the recognition 
of emotions from images. This would be particularly telling in that it may reveal deficits 
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on those images that require more configural types of processing to accurately deduce 
an emotion. Similarly, the question remains as to whether human faces might hold some 
buffering effect for the interpretation of emotions in WS? Therefore, Experiment 2 (The 
emotion task) will test the question of how accurately those with WS and ASD can 
interpret emotions from real and face-like images. Experiment 3 will go on to offer a 
more robust measure of configural processing by testing participants’ recognition of 
emotions in a classic composite face paradigm. 
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Chapter 5: Processing of Emotions 
5.1  Introduction 
 Experiment 1 explored the ways in which children with autism (ASD) and 
Williams syndrome (WS), compared to their typically developing (TD) peers, piece 
together features to deduce social content. It was found that, whilst those with ASD and 
WS were significantly less likely than their peers to spontaneously attribute face or 
emotion terms to ambiguous stimuli, they did show the same patterns of response. For 
example, no participants showed divides between the types of responses given to human 
versus animal faces and all participants generally gave very few spontaneous emotion 
terms to images comprised of fruit. Accuracy for the identification of emotions was not, 
however, examined in Experiment 1 therefore Experiments 2 and 3 explored accuracy 
for the identification of emotions in two tasks: A forced choice emotion identification 
paradigm using the same four categories of stimuli as used in Experiment 1, and a 
classic “composite” face task. The aim of Chapter 5 is therefore to i) Examine how 
accurately individuals in the clinical groups, compared to their peers, are able to identify 
emotions, ii) To explore the extent to which the demands of holistic processing and/or 
the facilitation of the human face may influence emotion identification and iii) To 
investigate whether eye versus mouth cues appear to hold any particular benefit for the 
identification of emotions, and the interplay between cue type and specific emotion. 
Experiment 2, the Emotion Task (ET) is a forced choice task in which participants were 
presented with the same categories of image as used in Experiment 1 (see Figure 5.1 
and Figure 5.2) portraying one of four possible emotions (happy/sad/angry/surprised); 
participants were asked to choose the emotion that best described the face, from a 
choice of three. The purpose of this experiment was to examine whether clinical groups 
would differ in accuracy for identifying specific emotions or would show different 
patterns of performance in response to particular categories of image. Would there, for 
example, be any syndrome specific patterns in accuracy for interpreting emotions from 
ambiguous or real faces? 
 Experiments 3a and 3b, the Parts (PT) and Composite tasks (CT) are based on 
assessments evident in the literature on the development of face skills (Durand et al., 
2007; Singer & Sheinberg, 2006) and set out to examine accuracy for specific face cues 
and whether or not possible interactions would be evident between the use of holistic 
processing and the emotion shown. In the PT, participants were presented with isolated 
eye and mouth cues and were asked to identify (from a choice of happy/scared/angry), 
the emotion shown. This task was similar to that of Baron-Cohen et al. (1993) in which 
they compared performance for isolated eye/mouth cues as well as features presented in 
whole faces. A task such as this therefore allows for an exploration of whether a 
particular cue type would be more facilitatory in the accurate identification of emotions 
and if the utility of cues might be different between those with ASD and WS. 
In the CT task, based on a design originally devised by Young, Hellawell and Hay 
(1987), participants were shown images of real faces with top and bottom halves 
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depicting different emotions (combinations of happy/scared/angry) either in aligned or 
misaligned format. This is a classic assessment of holistic perception (Calder et al., 
2003; Durand et al., 2007).  Participants were asked to attend either to the top or bottom 
halves of each face in order to state which emotion was shown. The purpose of this 
experiment was to elucidate whether misaligning facial features, and therefore reducing 
the demands on the processing of configurations, would be beneficial for specific 
emotions and not others, as well as whether accuracy would be enhanced for eyes 
versus mouths or vice versa; further, whether these patterns might differ between 
clinical and TD groups. Before describing the experiments, a brief review of the 
literature follows which will guide the specific hypotheses and predictions for these 
experiments. 
  
5.1.1 Processing of Cues in Typical Development 
 If, as has been argued (Mondloch et al., 2002; Mondloch & Thomson, 2008) the 
processing of faces using configural information is something that develops across 
childhood, it follows that the utilisation of individual facial features may play a more 
prominent role amongst younger (compared to older) children or adults. Even when 
configural processing is fully developed, it may be the case that particular areas of the 
face are given priority over others and therefore certain facial cues become more 
important for the accurate identification of, especially complex, emotions (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1993). The issue of whether the eyes or the mouths are the most useful cues in 
aiding the identification of emotion is one that has been widely debated throughout the 
literature. 
Many researchers have agreed that eye cues are essential in judging the emotional 
content of faces, with even very young infants showing preferences towards attending to 
the eye regions of faces (Maurer, 1985).  Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright and Jolliffe (1997) 
have shown in their set of three experiments that, whilst whole face information was 
most conducive to the accurate identification of both basic and complex emotions, use 
of eye cues was more helpful than mouth cues in identifying complex mental states. 
Specifically, adult participants in their study were shown either whole faces, mouths 
only or eyes only and were asked to choose from two basic emotions or mental state 
terms which best described the face/face part. For mental states, accurate identification 
from the eyes alone was as high as when participants were presented with whole face 
information. The different trend towards the utility of eye cues depending on the 
complexity of the emotion shown is testament to the fact that there is an interplay 
between emotions and cue use.  
More recently, Blais, Roy, Fiset, Arguin and Gosselin (2012) have argued that the eye 
region may not be the most important area from which to interpret emotional states. 
They used the ‘Bubbles’ technique to compare performance in labelling the six basic 
emotions as well as neutral and “pain” expressions across cues available using dynamic 
and static stimuli. This technique involves presenting participants with various elements 
of faces, assigned by spatial frequency, time point or location in spatial dimension 
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(Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007). Blais et al. (2012) observed that participants 
generally underutilised the eye cues of faces, and were more accurate in labelling 
emotions when presented with information from the mouth region. This advantage of 
the mouth cues became more pronounced in response to dynamic stimuli; the authors 
suggest that this may be because the discrimination between emotions often depends on 
the subtle movements of the mouth, whereas the eyes may provide a more definitive cue 
for the apexes of (static) emotions. Back, Jordan and Thomas, (2009) have shown that 
the emotion being identified will determine the utility of specific cues and whether or 
not the animacy is beneficial to recognition of that emotion. In their study, twenty TD 
adults (aged 18-35) were shown images of both static and dynamic complex mental 
states (such as bemused, flirtatious, doubtful, etc.) and were asked to identify, from a 
list, the emotion they thought was depicted; in a second experiment, specific parts of the 
face images (mouths versus eyes) were frozen whilst other parts remained dynamic.  
Back et al. (2009) found that, overall, participants were more accurate in recognising 
mental states from dynamic versus static faces. However, there were some differences 
depending on the type of mental state presented, with no benefit of animacy found for 
bemused, distrust, smug or thinking. Mouth cues were also found to be as important as 
eye cues in accurately deducing an emotion: Freezing mouth cues was as detrimental as 
freezing eye cues. Taken together, these findings suggest that the animacy of facial 
features is crucial for their interpretation, and there is some interplay between the types 
of cue that are most useful, depending on the emotion depicted. 
The distinction between dynamic and static images of faces is an important one, as it 
may well be the case that different cues play a different role in the changing versus 
stable configurations of faces. Unfortunately, the interplay between emotion type and 
cue use was not examined by Blais et al. (2012); very few studies to date have 
attempted to explore this cross-over, perhaps due to the constraints of experimental 
design in this area. It is, however, possible to examine accuracy for identifying 
emotions as a function of the relationships between face cues (eye versus mouth) and 
the emotion depicted; this will be the focus of Experiment 3. As Back et al. (2009) have 
suggested, different emotions/mental states may be processed in different ways, using 
different cues. It is therefore important to examine differences between emotions as to 
how easily they are processed and in what ways.  
 
5.1.2 Emotion Specificity in Typical Individuals 
 The accuracy with which individuals identify emotions may depend upon the 
emotions themselves. However, across the literature on emotion specificity in the TD 
population, there is very little consensus as to which emotions appear to be given 
priority in how rapidly and accurately they are processed. Hansen and Hansen (1988, 
cited in Farran et al., 2011), based on their studies of angry versus happy face detection 
amongst targets, found that there appears to be what they termed an ‘anger superiority 
effect’ (ASE) whereby angry faces are detected faster, and with fewer false alarms, than 
happy faces. They state that this effect has an evolutionary basis, whereby the detection 
of a threatening face is advantageous for rapid defensive responses. Indeed, a wealth of 
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neuro-imaging studies (Chiang et al., 2007) have found the amygdala, long associated 
with ‘fight or flight’ and affective responses, to be more active in response to 
threatening faces in typical development. However, the findings of Hansen and Hansen 
(1988, cited in Farran et al. [2011]) have not been consistently replicated, and Farran et 
al. (2011) note that several other research groups have also found an advantage for 
happy over angry faces. This therefore begs the question of whether extremes of 
emotion (such as happy and angry) hold a particular salience. It may also be the case 
that perceptual biases might underpin the salience of a face: Teeth in a grimace may 
offer a bright contrast and this, rather than any utility of emotion, might govern the 
faster speed in which an angry face is typically recognised (Santos, Silva, Rosset, & 
Deruelle, 2010). Control over such perceptual differences has been generally lacking 
across studies and it is therefore difficult to draw absolute conclusions about the more 
social aspects of faces that might drive differences between the recognition of emotions. 
Offering neurological evidence, Kret, Pichon, Grèzes and de Gelder (2011) examined 
differences in neurological activation for dynamic emotional versus neutral bodies and 
faces; the aim of their research was to pull apart whether the movement aspects of 
emotions might trigger specific neural processes and whether these would be specific to 
faces. This is an important issue that bridges the gap between emotion recognition and 
the configural processing of facial information: It is the rearrangement of 
configurations that determines emotional content, therefore how this is affected by 
different emotions or cues is of particular interest. This stands in line with Blais et al. 
(2012) and Back et al.’s (2009) suggestions that cues might hold different processing 
weights in static versus dynamic presentation of emotions, depending on what those 
emotions are. 
Kret et al. (2011) showed dynamic clips of bodies and faces depicting either angry (to 
half of the participants) or fearful (the remaining half of participants) faces, as well as 
neutral faces and bodies, whilst in an fMRI scanner. Despite the presentation of 
different emotions, showing faces to participants resulted in heightened amygdala 
activation, with a wider spread of brain regions occurring in response to body gestures. 
No significant differences were found in activations of specific regions between 
emotional and neutral faces. Kret et al. (2011) therefore suggest that the amygdala is 
more of a ‘salience’ module that responds to faces specifically rather than any specific 
emotions. However, whether this activation was in response to emotions per se or more 
general configural changes remains to be seen. Farran et al. (2011) have also suggested 
that the style of the stimuli may play a large part, with the ASE occurring more in 
studies employing schematic stimuli compared to a better performance for detecting 
happy faces when the stimuli are more ecologically valid. This question of the level of 
interplay between emotion, cue use and the animacy of faces is one that will now be 
considered. 
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5.1.3 The Link between Emotions and Processing of Cues in Typical Individuals 
 Green, Williams and Davidson (2003) have suggested that there is a neural basis 
for the types of response shown to different emotions in typical development, and that 
the ways in which particular facial cues are attended to may both be a product of and 
facilitative to emotion processing.  In a passive viewing task using happy, sad, angry, 
fearful and neutral faces, they found significantly more attention and for longer 
durations was spent focussing on the eyes, nose and mouth of threatening versus any 
other type of face. The distribution and priority of attention to different facial cues is an 
important issue and it may be the case that reliance on eye cues is not the default 
strategy in typical development; different cues may be utilised differently depending on 
the emotion. 
  As well as examining attention to cues, the Green et al. (2003) study also observed that 
there were longer distances between fixations for threatening faces, suggesting that the 
appraisal of cues and the ways in which they are perceived also differed for threatening 
faces specifically. Interestingly, these patterns were more pronounced for anger than for 
fear; it could be that appraisal of fear is more cognitive, requiring a higher level theory 
of mind. For example, we must understand why a person is looking fearful; is it because 
threat is near? Whereas an angry face represents the threat itself.  The inclusion of an 
emotion labelling task to also deduce accuracy would have been informative in this case 
in examining the interplay between attention and accuracy for specific emotions. These 
subtle differences are precisely the conceptual issues that may be posing a problem in 
WS and ASD and must be the focus of future empirical investigation. 
 
5.1.4 Processing of Cues in autism 
  It has been well documented (Baron-Cohen et al.,1997; Riby & Hancock, 2008) 
that individuals diagnosed with ASD show less attention to the eye regions of faces than 
do TD peers. However, this lack of attention to the eye cues of faces does not 
necessarily mean that, when specifically instructed to use eye cues, those with ASD are 
not able to utilise the emotional information available from them. Experiment 3 in the 
present set of experiments will explore this question with the use of explicit 
instructions.  Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) have argued that individuals with even high 
functioning autism are not as able as TDs to deduce emotional states from the eye 
regions of a face. In a revised version of their ‘Reading the mind in the eyes’ task 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1997) in which they increased the response options from only two 
to four, they found that 15 high functioning adults with autism performed at 
significantly lower levels of accuracy than was found on normed data for 274 TD adult 
participants. They also found a negative correlation between autism symptom severity 
and accuracy for deducing correct mental states on the eyes task. Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001) have claimed, based on their study, that the utility of the eye region in deducing 
an emotion is so pivotal to the nature of autism that it can be used to differentiate 
between clinical and TD groups. However, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) failed to devise 
any stimuli featuring mouth cues for this set of studies; a direct comparison of 
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performance between the two might be more helpful in elucidating differences between 
the ways in which facial cues are used by those with ASD compared to TDs. Back et al. 
(2009) have shown that mouth cues are as important as eye cues in accurately 
identifying emotions in TD individuals, therefore it is important to establish whether 
this is true in neurodevelopmental groups as well. 
Going against the findings of Baron-Cohen et al. (2001), De Wit, Falck-Ytter and von 
Hofsten (2008) set out to investigate whether atypical scanning patterns for positive 
versus negative emotions could be responsible for deficient emotion perception in ASD. 
They gave 11 children aged 3-6 years with ASD (mean age 5 years, 2 months), matched 
to MA typically developing controls, a passive viewing task comprised of happy, calm, 
angry and fearful faces. Participants were eye-tracked whilst viewing these images. The 
researchers also administered a subsection of the ADI, tapping into social exchange 
behaviours. De Wit et al. (2008) hypothesised that there would be differences in scan 
patterns both between groups and emotions, such that the particular problems found in 
recognising negative emotions in ASD might be explained by abnormal scan 
behaviours. However, this was not borne out by the data. Rather, there were no 
differences in looking time for positive or negative emotions in either group and both 
groups spent longer looking at the eyes for negative emotions. Worthy of note is the fact 
that there was a borderline significant difference (p<.06) whereby children with ASD 
spent ‘marginally less’ time fixating on mouths overall versus eyes. This same trend 
was also found amongst TD children. Perhaps the most informative finding in support 
of a role for autism in these results was the observation of a strong negative correlation 
between severity of autism symptoms (as measured on the ADI-R) and total time spent 
looking at faces. Whilst this may indicate that individuals with ASD were simply not 
engaged with the task, it was found that participants with more deficits reported in the 
social/communication areas of the ADI-R were found to show shorter looking time 
towards the mouths specifically. This finding stands in direct contrast to the work of  
Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar and Cohen (2002) who have shown a positive correlation 
between duration of attention to mouth regions and level of social impairment. 
However, as De Wit et al. (2008) themselves note, the Klin et al. (2002) study employed 
dynamic video clips of emotional conversational exchanges, and a group of participants 
who were severely impaired in the verbal domain. It might therefore be that heightened 
attention to the mouth region was necessary to try and make sense of the verbal content 
of the scenes. However, it should be noted that duration of fixations on specific cues are 
not necessarily indicative of  the ways in which those cues are being used; it could be 
that lower-level aspects of certain cues attract the attention of individuals and looking is 
a passive activity without deriving any specific meaning. 
The difference in the format in which emotions are presented, and the demands of the 
task itself, are an essential issue to which there is no consensus across the literature. De 
Wit et al.’s (2008) study was a passive viewing task, in which participants were not 
asked to make any judgements as to the emotion being shown. An examination of the 
interplay between the cues being used and accuracy for specific emotions might be a 
more informative comparison. Similarly, Klin et al. (2002) failed to question their 
participants on what they had seen happen between the characters in the scenes they 
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were shown. Experiments 2 and 3 here aim to bridge this gap by establishing the 
accuracy in which participants are able to utilise cues to deduce specific emotions. De 
Wit et al. (2008) do note that their finding of similar patterns of gaze between those 
with ASD and TDs could still be explained by different underlying causes. It may be the 
case that individuals with ASD were passively looking at cues without deducing any 
social meaning; including a measure of emotion recognition would have been useful in 
elucidating this. An exploration of the use of certain facial cues could, for example, 
point to differences between the ways that individuals with neurodevelopmental 
disorders use those cues: Whilst it may appear that individuals with ASD and their TD 
peers are both showing similar patterns in attending more to the eye cues of negative 
emotions, for example, it may be that the underlying processes are different. Perhaps 
individuals with ASD use a blanket strategy of focussing on a particular cue type, whilst 
their TD peers selectively choose which cue offers the most socially relevant 
information. Given that different emotions may be better interpreted using different 
facial cues, the interplay between the two therefore becomes especially important. In 
order to examine these types of underlying mechanism, a more robust paradigm is 
required and it is this interplay that will be examined in Experiment 3. 
  
5.1.5 Emotion Specificity in autism 
 Given that, perceptually, the area of face perception weakness seen to be greatest 
in both WS and ASD is in the processing and understanding of emotion, rather than the 
processing of identity recognition (Lacroix et al., 2009) one must explore the role that 
the emotions themselves play in the face perception atypicalities seen in WS and ASD. 
For example, most studies in this field use the six basic emotions as stimuli, assuming 
that they all have equal significance to the people viewing them, but this may not be the 
case. Might it be that certain emotions pose a particular problem or facilitate meaning 
for those with WS and ASD different to that seen in the TD population? In examining 
accuracy for specific emotions in these clinical groups, we can begin to understand 
where perceptual and conceptual deficits might diverge or overlap, building a fuller 
picture of how some of the components of social interactions might operate. 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1993) examined accuracy for the categorisation of emotions in one 
of their seminal papers comparing 15 children with autism (mean age 12.6 years) to 15 
TD children matched on MA (mean age 4.4 years). Participants in their study were 
asked to sort piles of photographs of faces expressing the emotions happy, sad and 
surprised. They found that, whilst the groups were comparable in accurately 
categorising happy and sad faces, individuals with autism failed to recognise surprise to 
the same level as their TD peers, often confusing this with happy. It should be noted 
that the photographs in this study provided whole face information; a comparison of the 
interplay between isolated mouth versus eye cues and the categorisation of emotions 
would have provided interesting insights into the ways in which facial cues might differ 
dependent on emotion. 
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Baron-Cohen et al. (1993) concluded from their experiment that individuals with autism 
had a specific deficit interpreting surprise; they claimed that this was due to it being a 
more complex emotion that requires a higher level of cognitive appraisal, which they 
state individuals with autism to be lacking. It could be the case that, whilst basic 
emotions such as happy can be directly interpreted from a situation, in order to 
understand more complex mental states, one needs to form an understanding of beliefs. 
Beliefs are concerned with being able to appraise and apply one’s internal states to 
others, whereas the understanding of a situation may be purely external, based on the 
percepts available in a scene or image. This divide between the internal and external 
might differentiate between those with ASD and WS; later experiments in the present 
research will aim to explore this idea further. 
Following on from more recent neurological studies such as that of Meyer-Lindenberg 
et al. (2005a), in that people with neurodevelopmental disorders display deviant  
amygdala volume and activation that may be related to the perception of negative 
emotions, Farran et al. (2011) set out to examine if emotion recognition of real faces 
would be poorer when of a threatening or negative nature. The anger superiority effect 
(ASE) has been cited as an evolutionary by-product that enables us to fight or flee when 
required (Santos et al., 2010) In the TD population, many studies have found that, even 
when surrounded by many distractor items, angry faces are rapidly detected above 
happy faces due to their salience in acting as a cue to avoid threat.  Farran et al. (2011) 
were interested in pursuing the idea that the anger superiority effect (ASE) only tends to 
occur with schematic stimuli whilst a superiority effect for happiness is more likely with 
the presentation of real faces (Farran et al., 2011), perhaps accounting for some of the 
inconsistencies fuelling the current amygdala debate. This is an interesting and often 
overlooked point: That the very nature of the stimuli itself might be having large effects 
on processing style, and is an avenue of research that will be explored by the use of both 
schematic and real-face stimuli in Experiment 2.  
In their study, Farran et al. (2011) showed pictures of real faces showing the six basic 
emotions to ASD (low and high functioning) and TD participants matched on CA and 
MA (mean ages 12.3 years and 10.8 years, respectively). Their task was to choose 
which picture out of six (one target item, one distractor item and four neutral items) 
matched a spoken emotional label. They found that reaction times were significantly 
faster within the ASD group for happy faces than for the other emotions and that anger, 
fear and sadness were significantly slower than surprise and disgust. For these latter two 
emotions, performance between the ASD and TD groups was comparable, although one 
may question whether this might have been a product of not separating out high from 
low functioning children within the ASD sample. To sum up the findings of this study, 
it would appear that children in the ASD group did find it easier to quickly respond to 
happy rather than more negative faces. However, no ASE was noted in the TD group in 
this particular study either, again stressing the importance of the types of stimuli used in 
emotion recognition tasks. Whether the difference between the recognition of different 
emotions is driven by different processes at a neural level or is dependent on the social 
complexity of the emotions themselves, remains to be seen.  Of most interest to the 
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current research question, is the ways in which the profiles of those with WS may differ 
to this, especially given their hyper-sociability: This question will now be explored. . 
 
5.1.6 The Link Between Processing of Cues and Emotion Specificity in Williams 
syndrome 
Anecdotally, those with WS are reputed to spend excessive durations of time attending 
to the eye regions of faces when in social situations. The same question as regarding 
those with ASD may therefore be asked: Are these eye cues being utilised in the same 
way as in typical development to interpret emotions? Tager-Flusberg, Boshart and 
Baron-Cohen (1998) have examined the ability of individuals to read emotions from the 
eyes alone on the classic ‘Reading the mind in the eyes’ task (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997). In their study, adult participants (mean age around 26.5 years) were given the 
task in which they were asked to choose from two options which basic emotion and 
mental state terms best described images of eyes alone. Participants with Williams 
syndrome (n=13) were recruited in addition to an IQ matched group of individuals with 
Prader Willi syndrome, and a group of TD adults. They found that individuals with WS 
significantly outperformed their IQ matches and were as capable in accurately 
identifying emotions as almost half of the CA matched group, although there was a 
significant difference between individuals with WS and TD adults whereby those with 
WS were overall less accurate.  No significant interaction was found in any of the 
groups between performance and the type of emotion (basic or more complex) 
presented. Further, no correlations between task performance and language or IQ 
measures were found in any of the groups.  
The Tager-Flusberg et al. (1998) research may point to the fact that there is something 
about eye cues that buffers performance for identifying emotions in individuals with 
WS, above what might be expected for their MA level. However, the fact that half of 
the CA adults did outperform this group may suggest that there is large heterogeneity 
amongst the Williams syndrome population, perhaps underpinned by a wealth of other, 
more cognitive than perceptual, factors. Similarly, it cannot be ruled out that there is 
something unique about the nature of Prader-Willi syndrome in interpreting eye cues 
that caused the lower performance amongst this group. Furthermore, given that Tager-
Flusberg et al. (1998) did not ask participants to perform any similar task using other 
facial cues (such as the mouth or whole face information), it is not possible to ascertain 
whether it is the eyes per se that might aid the interpretation of emotions. Riby et al. 
(2009) have examined this very issue of what role eye and mouth cues play in both WS 
and ASD. They employed a battery utilising the three classic paradigms previously 
discussed throughout this literature (see section 1.1.3): Thatcherised faces, a part-whole 
paradigm and manipulations of configurations in which the relations and features of 
faces were swapped. Children with WS and ASD were matched to both MA and CA 
controls and were asked to take part in all three tasks. On the thatcherised task, either 
the eyes and the mouth or alternate eyes/mouth were flipped and participants were 
asked to judge which of two faces looked the strangest. On the part-whole paradigm, 
participants were asked to match faces for identity and in the configural task, 
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participants were asked to state whether two faces were the same when either the 
features or the relational spaces between them were manipulated. In having tasks such 
as these, the researchers were able to explore not only evidence of processing style but 
also the use of specific facial cues. 
As with other research on WS (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2003; Skwerer et al, 2006), Riby 
et al. (2009) found that this population demonstrated a typical pattern of processing 
style, with evidence of configural processing. As with these other studies, significantly 
more use was made of the eye cues than in the TD groups. Conversely, those with ASD 
used the eye cues significantly less than their TD counterparts (being less affected when 
judgements from the eyes needed to be made) although this was not a trade-off with 
using mouth cues more, perhaps pointing to a general inattention to all face cues. 
Importantly, all groups were susceptible to inversion effects on the tasks, indicating use 
of configural processing, although those with ASD were poorer on the configural task in 
detecting changes to spatial relations than in detecting feature changes. Teamed with the 
fact that those with ASD do not seem to rely on eye or mouth cues in any way, this 
finding is somewhat difficult to explain. Whilst a seeming advantage in detecting spatial 
changes for those with WS may be due to their reliance on eye cues, a lack of this 
attention to features is more difficult to reconcile with apparent relatively typical 
configural processing seen on the part-whole task in the ASD group. What is clear, 
however, is that neither of the clinical groups reached CA level on any of the tasks, and 
both groups showed atypical patterns in their over or under-reliance on the eyes. This 
may well be at the root of face processing difficulties in both groups, but manifesting in 
very different ways. Experiment 3 will therefore make this comparison, additionally 
against those in the TD population as well as with ASD. 
Riby and Hancock (2008) have shown in their eye-tracking study comparing those with 
WS and ASD to both CA and MA TD counterparts that, indeed, individuals with WS do 
tend to initially appraise and fixate on the eye region of faces more than individuals 
with ASD and more than they do to other parts of the face. In the Riby and Hancock 
(2008) study, participants were asked to look at natural social scenes containing both 
objects and people; eye movements towards the scenes were tracked throughout this 
passive viewing task. No particular extremes of emotion were used and none of the 
scenes had any negative content. The results showed a clear difference between the 
groups in that TD children appraised the entire scene, shifting their gaze to all aspects 
that could give information, whereas those with ASD gave little attention to the face 
areas of the scenes at all and those with WS paid excessive attention to faces, especially 
the eye region.  
Riby and Hancock (2008) conclude that the preferences of children with WS and ASD 
in terms of attention to faces seem to differ greatly and the reasons behind these 
atypicalities could also be very different. It may be, for example, that those with WS 
have problems in disinhibiting gaze from the socially salient aspects of scenes, or 
perhaps they do not realise that other areas of a scene beyond the face can provide 
valuable information. Those with ASD, conversely, may find looking at faces 
uncomfortable, or perhaps find they can better interpret more ‘clear-cut’ cues afforded 
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by objects. It should be noted, however, that eye-tracking studies only provide insights 
into the scanning  of faces, rather than the ways in which cues are actually being used. 
This may explain some of the discrepancies between studies in the literature. For 
example, Riby and Back (2009) have shown that individuals with WS struggle to 
identify emotions when eye cues are not available, whilst Skwerer et al. (2006) have 
found that individuals with WS have difficulties (relative to both age and IQ matched 
controls) in accurately interpreting emotions from eye cues alone. Different 
methodologies between studies may be responsible for the facilitation of the ways in 
which cues are used.   
 
5.1.7 Emotion specificity in Williams syndrome 
The question of the specificity and salience of some emotions above others is an 
important one, especially in a population known for being atypically over-friendly in 
nature (Doyle, Bellugi, Korenberg, & Graham, 2004b).  Research into the role of the 
amygdala in WS (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005a) for example, is increasingly showing 
the special nature of fear in this disorder. Meyer-Lindenberg et al. (2005a) have shown 
that, when examining threatening or angry faces compared to threatening scenes, the 
amygdala of WS participants shows hypo-activation relative to controls and hyper-
activation for scenes versus faces, suggesting a reduced fear response to threatening 
faces but not scenes. This of course raises the question of what it is about a face that is 
not threatening or what it is about a scene that is? This role of the human face 
specifically will be addressed in Experiment 4. An examination of these questions in 
ASD also needs to take place to produce potentially interesting comparisons of the two 
profiles. What Meyer-Lindenberg’s (2005a) research also shows is that there may be 
very specific neural responses to different emotions in clinical groups, which may 
underpin and differentiate their everyday behaviours.   
Santos et al. (2010) set out to examine whether hyper-sociability in WS might be 
explained by a missing ASE. They found that the accuracy and speed at which an angry 
target was detected by TD children (mean age 8.8 years) was unaffected by the number 
of distractor items, whereas a higher number of distractor items (8 versus 2 or 5) did 
have a negative effect on response accuracy and speed for identifying the angry target in 
the WS group (mean age 13.5 years). Both groups were detrimentally affected by 
number of distractor items for happy faces.  This study does seem to suggest that those 
with WS do not give such salience to angry faces to the point of being unaffected by 
distractor items. Also worth consideration is if the ASE is specific to angry faces or if it 
might extend to a more general positive versus negative emotion divide. Again, this 
issue of specificity will be explored by a detailed examination of responses to emotions 
in Experiment 3.  
The lack of any exploration of the ways in which emotions and cues interact in 
affording the accurate identification of emotions in clinical groups is one that stands out 
from the above cited studies. One study to fill this gap is that of Porter, Shaw and Marsh 
(2010) who examined both scan paths and emotion recognition in individuals with WS 
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compared to TD controls. Participants (n=16) in their study were eye-tracked during a 
passive viewing task of happy/angry/fearful and neutral faces; subsequently, they were 
asked to identify the emotions presented. The results showed that, whilst initial attention 
to the eye regions of faces was not heightened in the WS group over that of controls, 
fixations once on the eyes tended to be of a longer duration. Further, individuals with 
WS were less able to correctly identify anger than other emotions. This lack of anger as 
a salient emotion in WS stands in line with the work of Santos et al. (2010).  No 
interactions were found between scan path pattern and accuracy for emotions in either 
of the groups. 
Porter et al.(2010) conclude from their research that there may be very specific deficits 
in which emotions individuals with WS can make sense of; whilst this may not 
necessarily be underpinned by their use of facial cues and attention to certain regions of 
the face, deviant strategies in over-attending to the eye regions may not be aiding the 
interpretation of emotions. This interplay between cue use and emotion specificity will 
be examined in Experiment 3. 
   
5.1.8 Summary 
Research points to the fact that there may be certain preferences for specific 
emotions, which differ depending on the format in which those emotions are presented. 
Similarly, the use of eye or mouth cues may differ, depending on the emotion and the 
utility of those cues. In clinical groups, understanding when and how to use these cues 
may deviate from that seen in the typical population.  Research has, however, typically 
looked at emotion specificity or cue use but very little, especially amongst individuals 
with neuro-developmental disorders, has examined the interaction between the two. 
Therefore, Experiment 2 will begin by establishing how capable individuals are in 
identifying basic emotions from both real and schematic faces, whilst Experiment 3 will 
go on to examine the interplay between configuration, cue use and emotion. 
 
5.1.9 Experiment 2: Summary and aims 
 The Emotion task (ET) set out to explore accuracy for the identification of 
emotions when presented in both real (human and animal) and schematic (line and fruit) 
formats. Further, to establish whether any specific emotions (happy, sad, angry and 
surprised) are associated with heightened or reduced accuracy in different ways in the 
clinical groups. 
 
5.2 Experiment 2: Hypotheses and Predictions 
It was hypothesised that the accurate identification of emotions depends upon 
the ability to piece together the configuration of a face and would therefore be affected 
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by the category of image used. It was further hypothesised that the accuracy with which 
different emotions would be processed would vary between the participant groups. 
5.2.1 Typical Development 
 There will be increases in performance with age for line and fruit images only, 
as these are those that require configural processing where developments in this type of 
processing will be apparent with age; accuracy for surprised faces will be lowest 
overall. 
 
5.2.2 ASD and TD Comparisons 
 Those with ASD will perform significantly less accurately than TD peers for all 
categories of image; the same patterns are expected to emerge in ASD and TD groups, 
with poorer accuracy for surprise compared to other emotions.  
 
5.2.3 WS and TD Comparisons 
 Those with WS will also perform significantly less accurately than TD peers on 
line and fruit images but will be comparable on human and animal faces. Those with 
WS will show comparable or increased accuracy relative to controls for happy 
emotions. 
 
5.3 Method: Experiment 2 
5.3.1 Participants 
 The same cohort of participants that took part in Experiment 1 was recruited to 
this task (See section 4.3.1). Because it was not possible to match participants on sex as 
well as age and NVIQ measures (due to practical constraints), an independent samples t-
test was conducted to compare total scores on this task between male and female 
participants; no significant differences were found: t (61) = .08, p=.94, therefore sex 
was not taken to be a confound.  
 
5.3.2 Materials and Design 
This experiment consisted of 16 items, covering the same four categories as in 
Experiment 1. It was designed to measure the accuracy of identifying emotional 
expressions from faces. All images were different to those in Experiment 1 to prevent 
boredom or practice effects. Images were presented in the same order for each child, 
initially randomised. Fruit stimuli were designed so that the individual features were the 
same fruit item each time (see Figure 5.1) in order to prevent cueing effects. 
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Each trial was comprised of a picture of the face or face-like object with three choices 
of emotion word to the left (from a combination of happy, sad, surprised or angry). 
Participants were asked to choose the one emotion that “best describes the face”. The 
options were read aloud to participants as well as being presented on the screen. The 
choices were selected to ensure that the answer was not entirely obvious but not too 
challenging. The level of difficulty was established based on percentages of agreement 
during the piloting of images, as detailed in Experiment 1. Four of each emotion were 
depicted across the 16 trials but were not balanced equally across category due to the 
constraints of the stimuli (See Figure 5.2 for examples). Specifically, within the animal 
category, there were two depictions of sad and none of surprised; for humans, there 
were two surprised emotions and none of sad. 
 
Figure 5.1: Examples of fruit images on the Emotion task: Sad; Surprised; Angry; 
Happy (l-r). 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Examples of stimuli on the Emotion task: Angry; Happy; Surprised; Sad (l-
r) 
 
5.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were told that they were going to see some faces and would be 
asked to choose how the face was feeling. On each trial, the experimenter asked the 
child ‘Does this face feel’ followed by the choice of three emotion terms on the screen. 
Participants were asked to state their answers aloud. Participants were moved onto the 
next item either as soon as they had given a response or if they stated that they did not 
know/wished to move on. Answers were either coded as correct or incorrect resulting in 
 117 
 
 
a total score out of 16. All participants viewed the images in the same order and the 
original order of presentation was randomised.   
 
 
5.3.4 Data Analysis 
Answers were either coded as correct or incorrect (1 or 0) for each item, to give 
a total score for both category and also emotion expressed. For example, a correct 
response for the happy fruit face would receive a score of 1 for each of ‘fruit’ and 
‘happy’. Category and emotion were analysed separately due to an imbalance across the 
items. 
 
5.4 Results: Experiment 2 
5.4.1 TD Groups 
Two separate mixed design ANOVAs were conducted in order to explore the interplay 
between age-group and accuracy of responses to emotions and image category across 
the TD age groups. 
 
5.4.1.1     Emotion task: Category 
 A 4 x 4 (Category (Line/Fruit/Human/Animal) x age-group [<6 years; 6-8.5; 8.6-11.5;  
>11.6]) ANOVA revealed a main effect of category, F (3, 177) =12.42, p<.01 and a 
main effect of age-group, F (3, 59) =5.38, p<.05. The interaction between factors was 
not significant. As is indicated in Table 5.1, participants overall gave fewer correct 
responses to line than human or animal stimuli (significant at p<.05). Correct responses 
to fruit images were lower than for human (p<.01), and there were no significant 
differences between those of human and animal, (p>.05). The youngest group overall 
performed significantly worse than all other age-groups (p<.01) but no significant 
differences in the number of correct responses were found between any other age-
groups (p>.05).  
 
 
 
 
 
 118 
 
 
Table 5.1: Mean number of correct responses (Maximum number = 4) for categories of 
image, across TD age-groups (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Line Fruit Human Animal 
Up to 6 years (n=14) 3.14 (.66) 3.0 (.96) 3.86 (.36) 3.21 (.98) 
6-8.5 (n=14) 3.36 (.63) 3.71 (.47) 4.0 (0) 3.79 (.43) 
8.6-11.5 (n=17) 3.41 (.62) 3.76 (.44) 3.88 (.49) 3.65 (.61) 
11.6+ (n=18) 3.33 (.49) 3.67 (.59) 3.83 (.38) 3.89 (.32) 
Total 3.32 (.59) 3.56 (.69) 3.89 (.36) 3.65 (.65) 
 
 5.4.1.2     Emotion task: Emotion 
A 4 x 4 (Emotion (Happy; sad; angry; surprised) x age-group) ANOVA revealed main 
effects of both emotion and age (F (3, 177) =18.78, p<.01 and F (3, 59) =3.69, p=<.05, 
respectively) but no significant interaction between them. Overall, responses to 
surprised emotions were significantly (p<.05) worse than to all others, as reported in 
Table 5.2. There was also significantly more accurate performance for sad than angry 
faces (p<.05). In terms of age differences, the youngest group performed significantly 
(p<.05) worse than the 6-8 years 5 months group, and the oldest group additionally 
(p<.05).  
 
Table 5.2: Mean number of correct responses (Maximum number = 4) for emotion, 
across TD age-groups (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Happy Sad Angry Surprised 
Up to 6 years 3.36 (.75) 3.79 (.80) 3.36 (.75) 2.71 (1.07) 
6-8.5 3.93 (.27) 3.86 (.36) 3.57 (.51) 3.50 (.65) 
8.6-11.5 3.94 (.24) 3.71 (.59) 3.41 (1.0) 3.41 (.71) 
11.6+ 4.0 (0) 4 (0) 3.78 (.55) 2.89 (.76) 
Total 3.83 (.46) 3.84 (.52) 3.54 (.74) 3.13 (.85) 
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5.4.2  ASD with TD comparisons 
5.4.2.1     Emotion task: Category 
A 4 x 3 (Category x group [ASD; TD CA matches; TD MA matches]) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect for category only, F (3,150) =9.78, p<.01 with no interaction 
between group and category (p=.40). Pairwise comparisons revealed that there were 
significant differences (p<.05) in performance between the line images and every other 
category; as indicated in Table 5.3, performance for the line condition was poorest 
against all other categories. Additionally, there was a significant difference between 
fruit and human images (p<.05) overall, with accuracy for fruit images being lower.  
There was no significant main effect of group (p>.05) as all participants scored highly 
on this task, with accuracy never falling below approximately 80% for any images. 
 
Table 5.3: Mean number of correct responses (Maximum number = 4) for categories of 
image in the ASD group and TD matches (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Line Fruit Human Animal 
ASD (n=18) 3.33 (.69) 3.33 (1.19) 3.61 (.61) 3.67 (.59) 
TD CA (n=17) 3.24 (.56) 3.76 (.44) 4.0 (0) 3.71 (.59) 
TD MA (n=18) 3.28 (.67) 3.5 (.71) 3.89 (.32) 3.72 (.46) 
 
5.4.2.2     Emotion task: Emotion 
Performance for correct responses to which emotion was depicted were separately 
analysed for each group. Due to extreme violations of homogeneity of variance and a 
lack of any variation on some emotions caused by performance at ceiling level, an 
ANOVA could not be performed. A Kruskall-Wallis analysis revealed no significant 
relationships (p>.05) across any of the categories, differentiated by participant group. 
The mean number of correct responses for emotion are reported in Table 5.4: There 
were very few noticeable differences between the groups and only an overall dip in 
performance for the surprised emotion, with accuracy still being high (the lowest was 
approximately70% in the ASD group). There was also a suggestion of those with ASD 
being less able than their CA peers in correctly labelling happy and surprised faces, as 
indicated by borderline significance, Z= -1.76, p=.056 and Z= -1.63, p=.063 in Mann-
Whitney U tests. 
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Table 5.4: Mean number of correct responses (Maximum number = 4) for emotion in 
the ASD group and TD matches (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Happy Sad Angry Surprised 
ASD 3.44 (1.04) 3.61 (.78) 3.67 (.69) 2.83 (.86) 
TD CA 3.94 (.24) 3.71 (.59) 3.53 (1.0) 3.29 (.69) 
TD MA 3.83 (.51) 3.94 (.24) 3.5 (.71) 3.11 (.76) 
 
5.4.3 WS with TD comparisons 
5.4.3.1     Emotion task: Category 
For the WS group, there was a main effect of category, F (3,117) =2.81, p<.05 and a 
significant main effect for group, F (2, 39) =3.81, p<.05 with no significant interaction 
between the two factors. In line with the literature, pairwise comparisons indicated that 
the WS group performed with poorer accuracy than their CA matches overall (p<.05) 
but comparably to MA controls (See Table 5.5). In terms of category differences, there 
were significantly (p<.05) more correct responses to human faces than line or fruit; 
participants overall also gave more correct responses to animal than fruit faces (p<.05). 
Specifically, on the fruit and human faces, individuals with WS performed with 
significantly lower accuracy than their CA peers: t (26)=2.04, p<.05 and t (26)=2.10, 
p<.05, although accuracy in the WS group was consistently above at least 70% . 
Interestingly, even compared to MA peers, individuals with WS were not able to match 
accuracy for human faces, t (26)= 3.04. p<.05, suggesting that the human nature of an 
image does not facilitate emotion identification in the WS group. 
 
Table 5.5: Mean number of correct responses (Maximum number = 4) for categories of 
image in the WS group and TD matches (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Line Fruit Human Animal 
WS (n=14) 3.29 (.47) 3.14 (1.10) 3.36 (.50) 3.64 (.84) 
TD CA (n=14) 3.57 (.51) 3.79 (.43) 3.79 (.58) 3.86 (.36) 
TD MA (n=14) 3.21 (.58) 3.14 (.95) 3.86 (.36) 3.29 (.99) 
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5.4.3.2     Emotion task: Emotion 
Due to extreme violations of homogeneity of variance and a lack of any variation on 
some emotions caused by performance at ceiling level, an ANOVA could not be 
performed. However, the results of a Kruskall-Wallis test found significant group 
differences for the happy emotion, c2 (2) =7.49, p<.05. As can be seen in Table 5.6, 
there was a dip across all groups in correct responses for surprise, with larger 
differences for this emotion between the WS group and CA matches. A Mann-Whitney 
U test for surprised images showed a significant difference between those with WS and 
their CA peers, Z= -2.41, p<.01, whereby individuals with WS were significantly less 
accurate. 
 
Table 5.6: Mean number of correct responses (Maximum number = 4) for emotion in 
the WS group and TD matches (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Happy Sad Angry Surprised 
WS 3.64 (.50) 3.71 (.83) 3.64 (.84) 2.43 (.85) 
TD CA 4.0 (0) 4.0 (0) 3.64 (.50) 3.29 (.83) 
TD MA 3.50 (.65) 3.71 (.83) 3.50 (.65) 2.79 (1.12) 
 
 
5.4.4 Summary of Results: Experiment 2 
 The same patterns emerged in all participant groups, whereby accuracy for line 
and fruit images fell significantly below that of human faces; no differences emerged 
between human and animal images overall. Of particular interest was the finding that, in 
both the ASD and WS analyses, individuals in the neurodevelopmental groups 
performed less accurately than their CA peers (and MA peers in the case of WS) when 
identifying the emotions of human faces. This suggests that the accurate recognition of 
emotions may be improved by the presence of real facial cues in typical development 
but this facilitation is not seen in clinical groups.  
Also seen across all participant groups was a dip in the number of correct responses 
towards the surprised faces overall; the design of this experiment unfortunately did not 
allow for any analysis of how emotion and category might interact. The only differences 
to emerge between those with ASD and WS compared to their TD matches were on the 
happy and surprised emotions, where participants in both ASD and WS groups failed to 
provide as many correct responses for these images as their peers. This may be 
suggestive of a particular issue in processing the types of cues necessary for these 
emotions. However the major issue of ceiling effects across groups (and especially in 
the TD group) means this requires further attention in future studies. 
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5.5 Experiment 3: Hypotheses and Predictions 
Experiment 3 was designed to directly examine how individuals would use the 
upper and lower halves of photos of real human faces to decipher emotions. Experiment 
3a (The Parts task) examined the ability of participants to recognise emotions from 
isolated eye or mouth cues; Experiment 3b used a composite paradigm in which upper 
and lower face halves were incongruent, in order to examine the holistic processing of 
emotions from faces. It was hypothesised that the misalignment of images would disrupt 
holistic processing, aiding the identification of incongruent emotions. This would be 
more evident in older groups, where holistic processing should be more developed, and 
would not be the case in individuals with ASD and WS, where holistic processing is 
reported to be deficient (for example, see Chapter 3). 
 
5.5.1 Typical Development 
 On the parts task, there may be a shift with age from accuracy on mouth to eye 
cues, although research as to which cues are utilised most effectively is mixed. 
Performance overall will be better for misaligned than aligned stimuli in experiment 3b, 
suggestive of holistic processing. This is based on the findings of Calder et al. (2000a) 
and Durand et al. (2007) who have shown that the misalignment of top and bottom face 
parts diminishes the interference from incongruent face cues. Superior performance for 
threatening emotions (angry/scared) will be seen across all groups in the two tasks, 
demonstrative of an anger superiority effect (ASE) (Hansen and Hansen ,1988; cited in 
Farran et al. 2011). 
 
5.5.2 ASD and TD Comparisons 
In experiment 3a those with ASD will give fewer correct responses to eye cues than 
their TD peers. Individuals with ASD will give fewer correct mental state emotions 
(surprised/scared), as suggested by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997). Misalignment of faces in 
Experiment 3b task will be less advantageous in the ASD group compared to TD 
individuals of comparable CA because of  their use of a blanket strategy of attending to 
specific cues rather than employing holistic processing. There may be a clearer 
interaction seen between top/bottom halves and alignment in the ASD group than 
amongst TD matches: Mouths may be better attended to than eyes overall therefore the 
effect of alignment would be less when asked to make judgements on the bottom halves 
of faces. 
 
5.5.3 WS and TD Comparisons 
 In Experiment 3a, those with WS will perform as well as their TD matches when 
presented with only eye cues. In Experiment 3b, interactions between responses to the 
top/bottom halves of faces and alignment will emerge in the WS group but not their TD 
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peers. Given evidence (Riby & Back, 2009) suggesting a heightened utility of the eye 
region amongst individuals with WS, this trend will be in an opposite direction to those 
with ASD in that the effect of alignment will be diminished when making top part 
judgements. Across both tasks, those with WS will show an increased performance, 
relative to peers, in identifying happy above other emotions, as Farran et al. (2011) have 
shown that individuals with WS are most able to accurately identify happy faces 
compared to those depicting threat. A dip in performance for angry faces is predicted to 
be seen in the WS group, relative to controls. 
 
5.6 Method: Experiment 3 
5.6.1 Participants 
It should be noted that some of the participants in the clinical groups (six in the ASD 
cohort and 10 in the WS cohort) were the same as those recruited to Experiments 1 and 
2.  
5.6.1.1     ASD participants 
Seventeen participants with a clinical diagnosis of autism were recruited from three 
specialist schools. Diagnoses were confirmed by teachers’ responses to the Social 
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ). Scores on this measure ranged from 7 to 23 
(Maximum score=40, whereby higher scores indicate a higher number of autistic 
symptoms), with a mean of 14. One child subsequently had to be excluded from the 
study due to a score indicative of being below the cut-off (a score of 12) for ASD 
diagnosis. Six children either could not understand the task instructions or did not wish 
to take part, therefore a total of 10 children (7 males and 3 females), aged 7 years 3 
months to 16 years 6 months (mean age 11 years 8 months) comprised the final sample. 
It is acknowledged that this was a small sample size; possible implications of this will 
be raised in Chapter 8.  
SCQ scores amongst these finally selected participants ranged from 12 to 22, with a 
mean score of 16.5. Non-verbal ability scores on the Ravens Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (RCPM) for this group ranged from 16 to 34 (out of 36), with a mean score of 
26. The RCPM is a consistently used measure of NVIQ amongst groups with 
neurodevelopmental disorders. 
 
5.6.1.2     WS participants 
Fifteen participants with a clinical diagnosis and positive genetic confirmation of 
Williams Syndrome using a FISH test were recruited through the Williams Syndrome 
Foundation. One of these children did not wish to complete all of the tasks, therefore 
was excluded from the analysis. Testing took place in the homes of participants with a 
parent or guardian always present. The age range (eight males and six females) was 8 
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years to 17 years 5 months with a mean age of 13 years 1 month. Non-verbal ability 
scores on the RCPM for this group ranged from 9 to 31 with a mean score of 16. 
 
5.6.1.3     TD participants 
Seventy-four typically developing individuals were originally invited to take part in the 
study. Children were recruited through an early years centre and two primary schools, 
three secondary schools in the same region and at a science museum. Teachers (where 
children were recruited through schools) and parents (for those recruited through the 
science museum), were asked to fill out the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire 
(SDQ) to establish that the child did not have any potential emotional or behavioural 
issues. Some teachers were unable to complete these questionnaires for 20 of the 
children but did verbally confirm that the children in question appeared to have no 
issues at school. Overall scores on the SDQ ranged from 0 to 17, with lower scores 
representing ‘normal’ behaviours; the average score was 5. Due to abnormal scores (17 
and above for parent-completed questionnaires and 16 and above for those completed 
by teachers) on the SDQ, four of the participants’ data had to be discarded. A total of 
nine children recruited did not wish to take part in the task, leaving 61 TD participants 
in total. For comparisons with clinical groups, five were not included due to not being a 
suitable CA or MA match for any of the ASD or WS participants. An additional 6 
children were excluded from the analysis, due to the ASD participants they were 
matched to being unable to complete the task. The final sample for the purposes of 
matching was therefore comprised of 48 TD participants, as detailed in Table 5.7 
For each clinical participant, an individual match from the TD population was found for 
both CA and MA in order to ensure equal variances across the groups. Independent 
samples t-tests revealed no significant differences between the mean ages of the 
participants in the ASD group and their CA matches [t (18) = 03, p=.97]; this was also 
the case between those with WS and their CA matches: t (26) =.72, p=.48. No 
significant difference was found between the ASD or WS groups and their MA matches 
on RCPM raw scores [t (18) = .13, p=.90; t (26) =.00, p=1.0, respectively]. 
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Table 5.7: Age and MA demographics for TD matches to ASD and WS groups for 
Experiments 3a and 3b (Parts and Composite task) 
 Chronological Age RCPM Raw Score  
ASD (n=10) Range                             Mean Range                            Mean 
CA Matches 7.4-16.2                      11.9 (3.1) 21-36                          32 (4.33) 
MA Matches 4.11-9.6                     8.2 (1.10) 15-32                          26 (5.13) 
WS (n=14)   
CA Matches 7.10-17.3                     12.3 (3.4) 23-36                          31 (4.22) 
MA Matches 4.1-14.4                       5.11 (3.3) 9-31                            16 (5.65) 
 
5.6.1.4     TD Age 
Sixty-one of the TD participants as detailed above were additionally divided into four 
age groups based on broad developmental phases in line with educational key stages. 
Because those TD children recruited to Experiment 3 were a different cohort to those 
who took part in Experiments 1 and 2, the age bands are slightly different to those used, 
in order to allow for an equal balance of participants per group. However, in 
developmental and school year terms, the bands used were largely comparable. Those 
11 participants who had been excluded due to their matches not completing the task or 
not being a suitable MA or CA match, were entered into the TD age analysis. Table 5.8 
outlines the mean ages and NVIQs for these groups (standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
Table 5.8: Age and RCPM data for TD participants recruited to Experiments 3a and 3b, 
split by age. 
    Chronological Age 
Range              Mean 
  RCPM Raw Score 
Range                 Mean 
Up to 6.6 years (n=16) 4.1-6.3          4.10 (0.8) 9-25                    16 (4.77) 
6.6-9.0 (n=13) 7.4-9.0          8.6 (0.6) 19-36                  28 (4.82) 
9.1-11.11 (n=13) 9.1-10.8          9.9 (0.7) 21-34                  29 (4.34) 
12 years and above (n=19) 12.6-17.3      14.6 (1.5) 22-36                 32 (3.91) 
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5.6.1.5     TD Gender 
Due to recruitment constraints, it was not possible to match the WS and ASD groups to 
their typical matches on sex as well as CA and MA. An analysis of males (28) versus 
females (33) across the whole TD group revealed no significant difference in 
performance (total number of items correct) for either Experiment 3a or 3b, 
respectively, t (59) =.72, p=.48 and t (59) = .52, p=.61. The mean age for males was 10 
years 11 months compared to 8 years 7 months for females. Despite this difference in 
average age between the sexes, the mean scores on the RCPM were 28 for males and 25 
for females, which was not found to be a significant difference (t (59) = 1.3; p=.12), 
therefore sex is not taken to be a confound when comparing the clinical participants to 
their TD matches.  
Parental and teacher consent was obtained for all participants recruited through schools 
with parent/guardian consent being obtained for those children recruited through the 
science museum. Parents and children were provided with copies of an information 
sheet detailing what the study involved and it was made clear to each child that they did 
not have to take part and could withdraw at any time if they wished. Those children 
whose parents deemed them able to give their own assent also gave written permission. 
 
5.6.2 Overview of experiments 
Experiment 3 comprised of two parts: The Parts task (3a) and the Composite 
task (3b). Both involved Caucasian child face images taken from the Radboud faces 
database (Langner et al., 2010), but there was no duplication of images between the two 
tasks. Both Experiments 3a and 3b were conducted on a laptop using PowerPoint. 
Participants were initially given a training phase, in which they were shown full frontal 
photos of Caucasian child faces (using different images to those in the main experiment) 
depicting happy/scared/angry emotions, and were asked to state what emotion they felt 
was shown. Six items were provided, two of each emotion. Feedback was provided, 
with attention drawn to the specific arrangements of features.  
 
5.6.3 Materials and Design: Experiment 3a 
 Twelve items were created by isolating either the eye or mouth region from full 
frontal face photos of emotionally expressive faces. Eye regions comprised of the area 
just above the eyebrow, to the bridge of the nose; mouth regions were taken directly 
below the nose and to the top of the chin (see Figure 5.3).  Six of the items were of eyes, 
and six of mouths. Within each eye/mouth region, two of each happy/scared/angry 
emotions were depicted. The order of presentation was randomised and all participants 
were presented with the images in the same order. Due to a lack of power, the feature 
presented and the emotion depicted were treated as two separate variables, without any 
exploration of interactions between them. The small number of trials on this task was 
necessary in order to prevent boredom effects in clinical groups, especially those who 
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typically do not enjoy attending to faces. Experiment 3b addressed this lack of power in 
a more comprehensive design focused on these types of interactions. 
 
Figure 5.3: Examples of mouth and eye stimuli on the Parts task 
 
5.6.4 Procedure: Experiment 3a 
Participants were told that they were going to be shown isolated parts of faces, 
and would be asked to state the emotion shown from the same three choices as in the 
practice phase: Happy/scared/angry. It was stressed to participants that these would only 
ever be the three response choices. Additionally, each item had these three emotions 
written underneath it as a reminder, and the experimenter also read the options aloud 
every time. Participants were then shown each item, one by one, and were asked to state 
which emotion was shown. The experimenter moved onto the next item only once the 
participant had made their response or stated that they did not know/wished to move to 
the next item. Responses were scored as correct or incorrect, based on the label assigned 
to that image in the Radboud (Langner et al., 2010) database. Participants therefore 
received a total score out of 4 for each of the emotions, and totals out of 6 for 
eyes/mouths. 
 
5.6.5 Materials & Design: Experiment 3b 
 Images were created by taking full frontal photos of emotional expressions 
(happy/scared/angry) and dividing them horizontally in half through the bridge of the 
nose. New faces were then created by merging the two halves (aligned condition) or by 
presenting them in a split format, whereby the half to be attended to was presented in 
the centre of the screen with the other half off-set to the right, with the ear and nose 
aligned. Emotions depicted in the two halves were always incongruent (see Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Examples of aligned, misaligned top and misaligned bottom images in 
experiment 3b (the Composite task) 
 
There were two conditions in Experiment 3b in which the comparison was ‘top’ versus 
‘bottom’, depending on which half of the face participants were asked to attend to. 
These were counterbalanced across participants so that half of the participants within 
each clinical/match group completed the top/bottom trials first. All items were 
otherwise presented to participants in the same order, having been randomised. The 
images selected for both top and bottom trials were exactly the same, presented in 
different orders within each condition, to prevent familiarity effects and cueing. 
Within each condition, there were 24 items; half of these were presented in aligned 
format, and the remaining half misaligned. Within these clusters of twelve, four of each 
happy/scared/angry of the target feature were depicted. The variables under 
investigation were therefore alignment, half attended to, and emotion depicted.  
 
5.6.6 Procedure: Experiment 3b 
 Participants were told that they would be presented with a set of faces that “will 
not look like faces you would see in real life” and should try to focus only on the 
top/bottom half. It was stressed to participants that they should do their best to ignore 
the half they were not asked to attend to. Participants were then presented with items, 
one at a time, and asked “How does he/she feel?” followed by the choice of the three 
emotions, which were also presented on screen. The experimenter would frequently 
remind the participant to only look at the top/bottom half. The experimenter moved onto 
the next item only once the participant had made their response or stated that they did 
not know/wished to move to the next item. Responses were scored as correct based on 
the Radboud (Langner et al., 2010) labels.  
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5.7 Results: Experiment 3a 
5.7.1 TD Groups 
 Two separate ANOVAs were run to examine accuracy dependent on the 
emotion shown and the type of cue presented (Table 5.9). A 3 x 4 (emotion x age-
group) mixed design ANOVA suggested significant main effects of emotion (F (2, 114) 
=3.29, p<.05) and age (F (3, 57) =2.77, p<.05), but no significant interaction between 
them (p>.05). Posthoc analysis showed that this main effect was driven by the oldest 
group giving significantly more correct responses than the youngest (p <.05) overall. 
The main effect of emotion was related to a borderline significant difference (p=.077) 
whereby, overall, participants gave fewer correct responses to scared than angry images. 
No further differences were found between any other emotions. 
 
Table 5.9: Mean number of correct responses (standard deviations in parentheses) 
across emotions and features for each TD age-group in Experiment 3a (Maximum score 
= 4 for emotions and 6 for features) 
 Happy Scared Angry Eyes Mouths 
Up to 6.6 years (n=16) 3.06 (.77) 2.5 (1.10) 3.0 (.73) 4.56 (.89) 4.38 (1.20) 
6.6-9.0 (n=13) 3.31 (.48) 3.08 (.76) 3.31 (.95) 4.85 (.80) 4.85 (.69) 
9.1-11.11 (n=13) 3.08 (.49) 3.15 (1.21) 3.38 (.87) 4.38 (.77) 5.23 (1.09) 
12 years and above (n=19) 3.42 (.51) 3.05 (1.18) 3.58 (.69) 4.84 (1.12) 5.21 (1.08) 
 
To explore accuracy for deciphering emotions from different face regions a 2 x 4 
(eyes/mouth x age group) mixed design ANOVA was conducted. There was no 
significant main effect of age (F (3, 57)=1.50, p=.23): No performance differences 
between age-groups emerged when considering accuracy dependent on cue types 
shown, unlike in the case of  emotions.  No significant main effect of feature was found 
(p>.05) and there were therefore no notable interactions between age group and the 
facial cue presented, as is evident in Table 5.9.  
 
5.7.2 ASD with TD Comparisons 
A 3 x 3 (emotion x group) mixed design ANOVA showed no significant main 
effect of emotion (p=.06), group (p>.05), or the interaction (p>.05) between them. 
However the trend towards borderline significance for the emotion factor was driven by 
an overall dip in accuracy in recognising ‘scared’ across all participant groups.  Table 
5.10 outlines the mean number of correct responses for each emotion and feature 
presented.  
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Table 5.10: Mean number of correct responses (standard deviations in parentheses) 
across emotions and features for the ASD group and TD matches (Maximum score = 4 
for emotions and 6 for features) 
 Happy Scared Angry Eyes Mouths 
ASD (n=10) 3.2 (.42) 2.6 (.84) 3.10 (.99) 4.60 (.97) 4.30 (.82) 
TD CA (n=10) 3.10 (.57) 2.90 (1.37) 3.60 (.52) 4.60 (.84) 5.0 (.94) 
TD MA (n=10) 3.4 (.70) 3.10 (1.10) 3.50 (.53) 4.70 (1.25) 5.30 (.82) 
 
A 2 x 3 (eyes/mouth x group) mixed design ANOVA failed to find any significant main 
effect of feature, (p>.05) group (p>.05), or any interaction between the two factors 
(p>.05). As is evident in Table 5.10, there was noticeably less accuracy for correctly 
identifying the emotions depicted from mouth cues in ASD compared to both groups of 
TD peers, and individuals with ASD were also poorer in making judgements from this 
cue type versus eye cues; a profile not apparent in TD groups. None of these differences 
were found to be significant however, although this might be the case given a larger 
sample size or more experimental items. 
 
5.7.3 WS with TD Comparisons 
A 3 x 3 (emotion x group) mixed design ANOVA showed no significant main 
effect of emotion (p>.05), group (p>.05), or the interaction between them (p>.05). Table 
5.11 provides the mean number of correct responses for factors for each participant 
group. It may be worth noting that, for the happy emotion, there was a difference in the 
performance of those with WS compared to their TD peers, with fewer correct 
responses in the WS group, although this was not significant.  
 
Table 5.11: Mean number of correct responses (standard deviations in parentheses) 
across emotions and features for the WS group and TD matches (Maximum score = 4 
for emotions and 6 for features) 
 Happy Scared Angry Eyes Mouths 
WS (n=14) 2.79 (.58) 2.64 (1.0) 3.14 (.66) 3.79 (.89) 4.79 (.98) 
TD CA (n=14) 3.29 (.47) 3.21 (.89) 3.14 (1.17) 4.50 (.94) 5.14 (.95) 
TD MA (n=14)  3.07 (.73) 2.36 (1.08) 2.79 (1.19) 4.21 (1.19) 4.0 (1.52) 
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 A 2 x 3 (eyes/mouth x group) mixed design ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of feature (F (1, 39) =4.92, p<.05) but no main effect of group or any interaction 
between them. As can be seen in Table 5.11, the main effect of feature was caused by 
all individuals being more accurate in identifying emotions from mouth versus eye cues. 
 
5.8 Results: Experiment 3b 
5.8.1 TD Groups  
 In order to examine the factor of emotion and its interplay with condition 
(aligned or misaligned) and the face part being interpreted, three separate mixed design 
ANOVAs were run. Separate analyses were carried out due to a lack of power for each 
variable. It was not possible to have a large variety of emotions, due to the fact that 
participants in the clinical groups would not have attended to a large number of items 
per condition.   
5.8.1.1     Half x Alignment 
A 2 x 2 x 4 mixed design ANOVA was conducted for half (top versus bottom) and 
condition (aligned versus misaligned), with age as between subjects factor. A significant 
main effect of half (F (1, 57) =19.93, p<.01) was found, as well as a significant main 
effect of condition, F (1, 57) =39.61, p<.01. Additionally, a main effect of age-group 
was found, F (3, 57) =11.54, p<.01 without any interactions between age and either 
factor (p>.05). The main effect of age was driven by significantly more accurate 
responses overall in the two oldest groups than the youngest (p<.05) and the oldest 
group performing significantly better than the two youngest groups (p<.05). A 
significant interaction was found between half and condition, without any further 
interaction with age (F (1, 57) =5.65, p<.05): In all groups, there were significantly 
more correct responses to the misaligned presentations of both top and bottom face 
halves (t (60) = 6.07, p<.01 and t (60) = 3.57, p<.01, respectively) and this difference 
between alignment conditions was more pronounced for top halves. The mean numbers 
of correct responses for each combination of factors are reported in Table 5.12. 
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Table 5.12: Mean correct responses for combinations of face half and condition across 
TD age groups (standard deviations in parentheses; Maximum score=12) 
 Top 
Aligned 
Top 
Misaligned 
Bottom 
Aligned 
Bottom 
Misaligned 
Up to 6.6 years 4.75 (2.24) 5.63 (3.16) 6.56 (1.83) 7.31 (1.99) 
6.6-9.0 4.77 (2.35) 6.46 (2.70) 7.23 (1.96) 8.08 (1.32) 
9.1-11.11 6.62 (2.18) 8.15 (2.38) 8.84 (2.29) 9.89 (1.20) 
12 years and above 6.42 (2.50) 9.11 (2.49) 8.84 (2.29) 9.89 (1.56) 
Overall Total 7.43 (3.0) 7.43 (3.0) 7.67 (2.03) 8.54 (1.84) 
 
 5.8.1.2     Emotion x half 
A 3 x 2 x 4 ANOVA (emotion x half with age as between subjects factor) found a main 
effect of emotion, F (2, 114) =23.78, p=<.01, caused by significantly fewer correct 
responses to scared faces than for either other emotion (p<.01). A main effect of face 
half was also found, F (1, 57)=25.24, p<.01, whereby participants gave more correct 
responses when asked to attend to the bottom halves of faces. There was a main effect 
of age-group (F (3, 57) =16.15, p<.01) and a three-way interaction between age-group, 
half and emotion, F (6, 114) =2.73, p<.05. The mean numbers of correct responses for 
each combination of factors are reported in Table 5.13. 
 
Table 5.13: Mean correct responses for combinations of face emotion and half across 
TD age groups (standard deviations in parentheses; Maximum score=8) 
 Happy 
Top 
Happy 
Bottom 
Angry Top Angry 
Bottom 
Scared 
Top 
Scared 
Bottom 
Up to 6.6 years 1.50 (1.79) 6.69 (1.30) 4.63 (2.45) 4.38 (2.50) 2.81 (2.54) 2.50 (2.58) 
6.6-9.0 2.38 (1.94) 7.46 (1.13) 4.62 (2.06) 5.92 (1.44) 4.23 (2.05) 1.92 (2.69) 
9.1-11.11 3.46 (1.98) 7.69 (.63) 5.38 (1.61) 5.77 (1.48) 5.92 (1.98) 2.85 (1.21) 
12 and above 4.11 (1.66) 7.84 (.38) 5.53 (1.93) 6.74 (1.20) 5.89 (1.97) 4.16 (2.48) 
Overall Total 2.92 (2.07) 7.43 (1.01) 5.07 (2.04) 5.74 (1.91) 4.74 (2.48) 2.97 (2.95) 
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In order to pull apart the three-way interaction, paired samples t-tests were conducted on 
each age group separately3, comparing performance for each face half per emotion. In 
all but the group aged 9 years 1 month to 11 years 11 months, the only significant 
differences (p<.01 after Bonferroni corrections) in performance between top and bottom 
halves were for happy faces, with more accurate responses when asked to label bottom 
halves. For the youngest group, t (15) = 12.64, p<.01; for those aged 6.6-8.11,  t (15) = 
8.89, p<.01;  in the groups aged 9.1-11.11, t (15) = 6.92, p<.01; and in those aged 12 
years and above, t (15) = 10.22, p<.01. In the 9 years 1 month to 11 years 11 month 
group, an additional significant difference (t (15) = 2.77, p<.01) was observed for scared 
faces, whereby top halves were recognised most accurately.  
 
5.8.1.3     Emotion x Alignment 
A 3 x 2 x 4 mixed design ANOVA was conducted for emotion x condition (aligned 
versus misaligned), with age group as between subjects factor. A main effect of emotion 
was found, as outlined previously, F (2, 114) = 23.78, p<.01. A main effect of condition 
was also found ( F (1, 57) = 57.91, p<.01) in which participants were overall more 
accurate in identifying emotions from misaligned faces. A main effect of age-group was 
shown, as reported above, F (3, 57) =16.15, p<.01. No significant interactions were 
found between either factor and age-group (p<.05). There was, however, a significant 
interaction between emotion and alignment. As is detailed in Table 5.14, accuracy for 
misaligned versus aligned faces was higher overall but this difference was greatest in 
response to happy faces; paired samples t-tests for aligned versus misaligned conditions 
of each emotion revealed only a significant difference ( t (60) = 8.60, p<.01) for happy 
faces, after Bonferonni corrections.
                                                          
3 Paired samples t-tests were conducted to break down all 3-way interactions in Experiment 3b 
in order to precisely pull apart specifically where differences between the groups were seen on 
which individual emotions/conditions. This was especially important in the clinical groups, in 
which specific hypotheses had been made about the direction of the effect of aligning specific 
face halves. A 2-way ANOVA would not have allowed for such an in-depth exploration of 
specific interactions.  
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5.8.2 ASD with TD comparisons 
5.8.2.1     Half x Alignment 
A mixed design 2 x 2 x 3 (half x condition x  group) mixed design ANOVA was run. A 
significant main effect of half, (F (1, 27) =13.82, p<.01) was found, as well as a 
significant main effect of condition, F (1, 27) =44.88, p<.01. As is evident in Table 
5.15, all participants were more accurate in responding to the bottom halves of faces 
(p<.01) and those that were misaligned (p<.01). No significant interaction was found 
between these factors or between either factor and group. There was, however, a main 
effect of group, F (2, 27) =5.92, p=. <.01.  
 
Table 5.15: Mean correct responses for combinations of face half and condition in the 
ASD group and TD matches (standard deviations in parentheses; Maximum score=12) 
 Top Aligned Top 
Misaligned 
Bottom 
Aligned 
Bottom 
Misaligned 
ASD 3.70 (1.25) 5.20 (2.44) 6.20 (1.69) 7.40 (3.2) 
TD CA 5.40 (3.06) 7.50 (2.92) 8.20 (1.99) 9.50 (1.35) 
TD MA 5.90 (2.28) 7.50 (2.95) 7.40 (1.51) 8.20 (1.0) 
Overall Total 5.0 (2.44) 6.73 (2.9) 7.27 (1.87) 8.37 (2.21) 
 
A Games-Howell posthoc analysis showed those with ASD to give significantly fewer 
correct responses than either CA or MA matches overall (significant at p<.05), with no 
significant differences being noted between the TD groups. As Figures 5.5 and 5.6 
show, individuals with ASD only performed at around chance level (33%) for aligned 
and top face halves. 
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Figure 5.5: Correct responses by face half for ASD participants and TD matches in 
Experiment 3b 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Correct responses by condition for ASD participants and TD matches in 
Experiment 3b. 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Top half Bottom half
%
 R
e
sp
o
n
se
s 
co
rr
e
ct
Face half
ASD
ASD CA Matches
ASD MA Matches
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Aligned Misaligned
%
 R
e
sp
o
n
se
s 
co
rr
e
ct
Image type
ASD
ASD CA Matches
ASD MA Matches
 137 
 
1
3
7
 
5.8.2.2     Emotion x Half 
A 3 x 2 x 3 ANOVA (emotion x half x group) found a main effect of emotion, F (2, 54) 
=16.05, p<.01. The main effect of emotion, as can be seen in Table 5.16, was caused by 
significantly fewer accurate responses to scared faces than for either other emotion 
(p<.05). A main effect of half was also found, F (1, 27)=13.89, p<.01, whereby 
participants overall gave more correct responses to the bottom halves of faces than top. 
A main effect of group was found (F (2, 27) =3.32, p<.05), without any significant 
interactions between group and emotion or face half. A significant interaction was, 
however, found between face half and emotion, F (2, 54) =81.54, p<.01. Paired samples 
t-tests showed overall greater numbers of correct responses for the bottom versus top 
halves of all but the scared emotion (p<.01); this difference was most pronounced for 
happy emotions, t (29) = 10.36, p<.01 and was reversed for scared (p<.01), driving the 
interaction. 
 
Table 5.16: Mean correct responses for combinations of face emotion and half in the 
ASD group and TD matches (standard deviations in parentheses; Maximum score=8) 
 Happy Top Happy 
Bottom 
Angry Top Angry 
Bottom 
Scared 
Top 
Scared 
Bottom 
ASD 2.50 (1.27) 6.50 (2.01) 3.70 (1.49) 5.90 (1.73) 3.50 (1.58) 2.30 (1.64) 
TD CA 3.0 (1.83) 7.80 (.63) 4.70 (2.0) 6.40 (1.35) 5.20 (2.7) 3.50 (2.37) 
TD MA 2.90 (2.23) 7.40 (.97) 5.30 (2.58) 5.90 (1.10) 5.20 (2.7) 2.30 (1.83) 
Overall 
Total 
2.80 (1.77) 7.23 (1.41) 4.57 (2.11) 6.07 (1.39) 4.63 (2.34) 2.70 (1.99) 
 
5.8.2.3     Emotion x Alignment 
A 3 x 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was conducted for emotion x condition (aligned 
versus misaligned), with group as between subjects factor. Mean number of 
combinations of responses are reported in Table 5.17. A main effect of emotion was 
found as reported above, F (2, 54) = 10.54, p<.01. A main effect of alignment was also 
evident, F (1, 27) = 12.25, p<.01 whereby overall more correct responses were given to 
misaligned faces (p<.01). A main effect of group was also noted, F (2, 27) =7.51, p<01. 
A significant three-way interaction was found between alignment, emotion and group, F 
(4, 54) = 5.74, p<.01, as is depicted in Figure 5.7. 
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Table 5.17: Mean correct responses for combinations of face emotion and condition in the ASD group and TD matches (standard deviations in 
parentheses; Maximum score=8) 
 Happy 
Aligned 
Happy 
Misaligned 
Angry 
Aligned 
Angry 
Misaligned 
Scared 
Aligned 
Scared 
Misaligned 
ASD 4.50 (1.18) 2.70 (1.25) 3.90 (1.60) 4.20 (1.14) 2.70 (1.42) 3.50 (2.12) 
TD CA 4.60 (.70) 6.20 (1.0) 5.0 (2.06) 6.10 (.99) 4.0 (1.49) 4.70 (1.42) 
TD MA 4.20 (1.03) 6.10 (2.13) 5.50 (1.51) 5.70 (1.83) 3.60 (1.71) 3.90 (2.23) 
Overall 
Total 
4.43 (.97) 5.0 (2.23) 4.80 (1.81) 5.33 (1.56) 3.43 (1.59) 4.03 (1.96) 
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Paired samples t-tests were conducted on each group separately to compare the number 
of correct reponses for aligned versus misaligned faces for each emotion. The difference 
driving the three-way interaction was found to be for responses to happy faces only 
(after Bonferonni corrections): Individuals with ASD gave significantly more correct 
responses for aligned versus misaligned happy faces, t (9) = 3.67, p<.01 whilst TD CA 
peers gave significantly more correct responses for happy misaligned versus aligned 
faces, t (9) = 6.0, p<.01. In the TD MA group, a borderline difference was found, 
favouring misaligned happy faces, t (9) = 3.14, p=.07. No significant differences were 
found between aligned and misaligned faces for any other emotions in any of the 
groups. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Percentages of correct responses for combinations of emotion x alignment 
in the ASD group and TD matches 
 
5.8.3 WS with TD comparisons 
5.8.3.1     Half x Alignment 
A 2 x 2 x 3 (half x condition x group) mixed design ANOVA was run. A significant 
main effect of half, (F (1, 39) =33.73, p<.01) was found with an interaction with group, 
F (2, 39) =4.93, p<.01. Statistical confirmation of this was revealed in two mixed design 
ANOVAs with top and bottom halves entered separately, where a main effect of group 
was only seen in the top half trials, F (2, 39) =11.66, p<.01, in which the TD CA group 
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with WS. Bottom half trials, F (2,41)=2.39, p=.11. Mean number of correct responses 
for these combinations of factors are given in Table 5.18. 
 
Table 5.18: Mean correct responses for combinations of face half and condition in the 
WS group and TD matches (standard deviations in parentheses; Maximum score=12) 
 Top Aligned Top 
Misaligned 
Bottom 
Aligned 
Bottom 
Misaligned 
WS 3.0 (1.66) 4.71 (2.16) 6.57 (1.56) 8.29 (1.90) 
TD CA 6.21 (2.91) 8.79 (2.55) 8.0 (2.18) 8/36 (1.74) 
TD MA 4.21 (1.76) 5.14 (2.83) 6.36 (1.65) 7.64 (2.24) 
Overall Total 4.48 (2.52) 6.21 (3.08) 6.98 (1.92) 8.10 (1.95) 
 
A main effect was also found for condition, without any interaction with group (p>.05), 
F (1, 39) =29.02, p<.01, with participants overall giving more correct responses to 
misaligned than aligned images (p<.01). A main effect of group was also shown, F (2, 
39) =11.88, p<.01. A Games-Howell posthoc analysis showed this main effect to be 
driven by significantly better performance (p<.01) in the CA group than both those with 
WS and MA matches. As Figures 5.8 and 5.9 indicate, individuals with WS performed 
at around chance level (33%) for top and aligned face halves; this was a very similar 
finding to that noted in the ASD group. 
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Figure 5.8: Correct responses by stimulus half for WS participants and TD matches in 
Experiment 3b. 
 
Figure 5.9: Correct responses by condition for WS participants and TD matches in 
Experiment 3b. 
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5.8.3.2     Emotion x Half 
The mean correct responses for each combination of factors are reported in Table 5.19. 
A 3 x 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA (emotion x half x group) found a main effect of 
emotion, F (2, 78) =29.95, p=<.01. The main effect of emotion was caused by 
significantly fewer correct responses to scared faces over all groups than for either other 
emotion (p<.01) with no significant interaction being found between emotion and group 
(p>.05). A main effect of face half was also found, F (1, 39)=27.83, p<.01 with a 
significant interaction with group (F (2, 39) = 3.77, p<.05), as outlined above. A main 
effect of group was observed, F (2, 39) =8.96, p<.01. A significant interaction between 
half and emotion was noted, F (2, 78) =64.50, p<.01. Paired samples t-tests revealed this 
interaction to be driven by a significant difference (t (41) =10.36, p<.01) between top 
and bottom halves of only happy faces; no significant differences (p>.05) were found 
for face halves for either other emotion. 
 
Table 5.19: Mean correct responses for combinations of face emotion and half in the 
WS group and TD matches (standard deviations in parentheses; Maximum score=8) 
 Happy Top Happy 
Bottom 
Angry Top Angry 
Bottom 
Scared 
Top 
Scared 
Bottom 
WS 2.29 (.91) 6.36 (1.08) 3.93 (1.9) 6.29 (1.20) 2.79 (1.25) 3.07 (2.09) 
TD CA 4.0 (1.80) 7.86 (.36) 5.57 (1.87) 5.50 (1.65) 5.43 (2.14) 3.0 (2.18) 
TD MA 1.93 (1.82) 6.86 (1.17) 4.64 (2.24) 4.93 (2.50) 2.79 (2.67) 2.21 (2.23) 
Overall Total 2.74 (1.78) 7.02 (1.12) 4.71 (2.08) 5.57 (1.90) 3.67 (2.41) 2.76 (2.15) 
 
5.8.3.3     Emotion x Alignment 
A 3 x 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was conducted for emotion x condition (aligned 
versus misaligned), with group as between subjects factor. A main effect of emotion 
was found (F (2, 78) =23.46, p<.01), as detailed above. There was no sigtnificant 
interaction between emotion and group. A main effect of condition was observed, F (1, 
39) =8.96, p<.01 as well as a main effect of group overall, F (2, 39) = 13.37, p<.01; 
further, a significant interaction between all three factors was observed, F (4, 78) = 6.88, 
p<.01.  
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Table 5.20: Mean correct responses for combinations of face emotion and condition in the WS group and TD matches (standard deviations in 
parentheses; Maximum score=8) 
 Happy 
Aligned 
Happy 
Misaligned 
Angry 
Aligned 
Angry 
Misaligned 
Scared 
Aligned 
Scared 
Misaligned 
WS 4.36 (.84) 3.07 (.92) 4.50 (1.70) 3.79 (.80) 2.29 (1.44) 3.43 (1.34) 
TD CA 4.93 (1.44) 6.93 (1.07) 5.07 (1.9) 6.0 (1.36) 4.21 (1.93) 4.21 (2.23) 
TD MA 3.71 (1.20) 5.07 (1.69) 4.71 (1.44) 4.86 (1.70) 2.14 (1.70) 2.86 (2.57) 
Overall 
Total 
4.33 (1.26) 5.02 (2.02) 4.76 (1.67) 4.88 (1.60) 2.88 (1.92) 3.50 (2.13) 
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In order to pull apart the three-way interaction, paired samples t-tests were conducted on 
each group separately to compare the number of correct reponses for aligned versus 
misaligned faces for each emotion. Significant differences (p<.05) between aligned and 
misaligned faces (after Bonferonni corrections) were only found in any of the groups for 
happy faces. In the WS group, there were more correct responses given to aligned 
versus misaligned happy faces, t (13) = 3.23, p<.01. However, in both TD CA and MA 
groups, this pattern was reversed, with more correct responses for misaligned happy 
faces, respectively, t ( 13) = 1.04, p<.01 and t (13) = 3.80, p<.01. Worthy of note, as can 
be seen in Figure 5.10, is the fact that individuals in the CA TD group gave exactly the 
same mean number of correct responses to aligned and misaligned scared faces. 
 
Figure 5.10: Percentages of correct responses for combinations of emotion x alignment 
in the WS group and TD matches 
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5.8.4 Summary of Results: Experiment 3 
5.8.4.1     Experiment 3a 
When labelling the emotions of isolated face parts, (eyes versus mouths), no particularly 
distinctive patterns emerged between any of the groups. Amongst the TD population, 
the oldest group of children outperformed the younger groups and participants gave 
fewer correct responses to scared expressions than happy or angry, but this was the 
same in all age groups. No differences were found between accuracy for eye versus 
mouth cues. The same patterns emerged in the ASD analysis, although there was a 
(non-significant) trend towards those with ASD being poorer in deducing emotions 
from mouth versus eye cues. In the WS cohort, all participant groups gave more correct 
responses to those images containing mouths versus eyes but no differences in 
performance between emotions were apparent. Therefore, from Experiment 3a, there is 
no evidence to suggest that individuals in the clinical groups were more attentive to 
mouth cues relative to TD peers or that any one emotion differentiated performance.  
 
5.8.4.2     Experiment 3b 
Three questions were explored: Would there be any interactions in accuracy for a 
particular face half depending on alignment? Would different emotions be interpreted 
more or less accurately depending on their alignment? And would accuracy for 
emotions vary depending on the half attended to? In all cases, would the patterns be the 
same or different between clinical groups and their TD peers? 
The interplay between alignment and face half was not significant in any comparisons, 
whereby all participants had better accuracy when faces were misaligned, regardless of 
which half of the face they were asked to attend to. All participants were also overall 
better in identifying emotions from the bottom halves of faces. Whilst this pattern held 
true in the clinical comparisons, it was observed that individuals with ASD performed 
less accurately than their TD peers, with accuracy for the top halves of faces and aligned 
presentations being at only chance level (approximately 33%) in the ASD group; CA 
matches in the WS cohort outperformed those with WS (and TD MA peers) for only the 
top halves of faces.  Individuals with WS were also at chance level for aligned and top 
presentations of faces. 
In terms of an interaction between the emotion presented and face half presented, 
amongst all TD groups (with the exception of those aged 9 years 1 month to 11 years 11 
months) performance was better for the bottom halves of happy faces compared to the 
tops. No differences between face half accuracy emerged for any other emotion. In the 9 
years 1 month to 11 years 11 months group, however, it was for the scared emotion 
where a difference emerged, in which the top halves of faces were more accurately 
identified versus bottoms. In both the ASD and WS comparisons, the same pattern 
emerged in that all participants were overall better in recognising emotions from the 
bottom halves of faces, with the difference between top and bottom presentations being 
most pronounced when identifying ‘happy’.  
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When examining the effect of alignment on accuracy for emotions amongst TD 
participants, the same trend was seen in all age groups in that accuracy was higher for 
misaligned (versus aligned) happy faces, and alignment did not affect accuracy for 
angry or scared emotions. There were no different patterns depending on age-group, and 
the oldest group gave more accurate responses than the two youngest groups. Whilst 
this does not provide evidence for the superiority of anger in the TD population, as 
hypothesised, it does suggest an interplay between emotion and processing strategy. 
In the ASD comparison with typical controls, the only difference to emerge between 
aligned and misaligned faces was amongst those participants with ASD, whereby these 
individuals were more accurate on aligned than misaligned happy faces. This same 
profile was seen in individuals with WS, whilst TD matches tended to be more accurate 
in labelling misaligned happy faces. This finding is interesting as it suggests something 
specific about happy faces in both ASD and WS that facilitates a less holistic style of 
processing. 
 
5.9 Discussion 
5.9.1 Experiment 2 
The Emotion task was designed to establish whether those with WS and ASD 
would be able to piece together the configurations of non-face images to deduce an 
emotion. Further, to explore whether different emotions might result in emotion specific 
patterns of performance between the groups. In fact, the same trends emerged in that 
those with ASD, WS and their TD matches, all showed significantly reduced 
performance for line and fruit images versus human and animal faces. This may suggest 
that even those in the oldest TD group did not piece together ambiguous features to 
deduce an emotion, in the same way that they did real face cues: All groups may have 
relied more on individual features to label the emotions, which were not sufficient to do 
so with great accuracy in the case of line and fruit images. De Wit et al. (2008) have 
also noted comparable trends in performance between those with ASD and their peers. 
The question remains as to whether comparable performance is underpinned by 
comparable process. 
The observation that both individuals with WS and ASD did not perform as accurately 
as their peers when labelling the emotions of human faces is particularly striking, given 
the divergent everyday approach behaviours between these two groups ( Dodd et al., 
2010) It was expected that the human face might buffer against difficulties in emotion 
recognition in the WS group and this was evidently not found to be the case. It must 
therefore be that some, perhaps more cognitive, factors are at play in driving differences 
between the social exchange behaviours seen in WS and ASD; indeed, that basic 
emotion identification alone might underpin broader social exchange profiles is highly 
unlikely. The issue of what other factors might play a role in an understanding of social 
contexts will be explored in Chapter 6. 
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 In terms of performance for emotions, differences did emerge between the groups, with 
fewer correct responses being given to happy and surprised faces in both the WS and 
ASD groups relative to their peers.  It was expected, based on the findings of Santos et 
al. (2010) that those with WS might show detrimental performance to angry, rather than 
happy faces, but this was not shown to be the case. Farran et al. (2011) have argued that 
there may be some interplay between the type of stimuli presented and the emotions 
depicted; unfortunately, this was not explored in Experiment 2 but would be a worthy 
topic of future research. 
No clear improvement with age overall was found, possibly due to the fact that accuracy 
was approaching ceiling; in all groups, the poorest performance was for surprised 
images. The fact that very few notable differences were found between image types or 
emotions that might pull apart the clinical groups may have been a product of task 
design: Having a forced choice may have promoted ceiling effects and also given rise to 
the utilisation of specific face cues that could not be established through this type of 
design. Experiment 3 was therefore intended to pull apart this type of interaction 
between emotion and cue use. Future eye tracking studies would also be informative in 
exploring precisely which facial cues might be attended to in which emotions.  
The reduced accuracy found amongst all participants for surprised images in 
Experiment 2 is consistent with the work of Baron-Cohen et al.(1993), who have shown 
that, especially amongst individuals with ASD, surprise and happiness are very easily 
confused and mislabelled. Analysis of specific eror types was not conducted in the 
present study, given the limited number of items; in future, considering the type of 
errors made in mislabelling emotions would be very informative. These types of errors 
were considered, however, in Experiments 4 and 5 (See Chapter 6). Kret et al. (2011) 
have suggested that it is the salience of an emotion that determines the level of 
processing and subsequent attention to it. They have also proposed that the animacy of a 
face is an important factor affecting the type of processing used. If it is the configural 
arrangements of faces, rather than the emotional content, that trigger amygdala 
activation, examining the interactions between image type and emotion in the present 
study would have been most informative: Is emotion recognition comparatively 
accurate across one specific form of presentation? To what extent might the configural 
arrangement affect emotion recognition?  Or is it more an issue of cue use? These 
questions were addressed in Experiment 3. 
 
5.9.2 Experiment 3 
Experiments 3a and 3b were designed to highlight possible differences in 
accuracy for specific emotions, processing style, cue use, and the interplay between 
them. This is an important issue given the complexity of emotions: If one can pinpoint 
where those with neurodevelopmental disorders might be utilising information 
differently, it may be possible to better understand the ways in which they process 
emotions from faces. Experiment 3a  revealed a surprisingly uniform pattern, however, 
both across typical age-groups and in clinical participants compared to their peers: No 
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differences in accuracy emerged between comparison groups, and performance for 
images depicting scared face parts was generally poorer than that for happy or angry. 
Also worthy of note was the fact that both individuals with ASD and WS gave fewer 
(although not to the point of significance) correct responses for isolated cues depicting 
happy emotions. This was not predicted in the case of WS, as Farran et al. (2011) have 
suggested individuals with WS are better at accurately detecting happiness. However, 
perhaps this is only true when provided with whole face information.  
The only differentiating pattern in Experiment 3a was in the WS cohort, where all 
participants performed better on mouth versus eye cues. Given the propensity of those 
with WS to focus on the eye regions of faces (Riby & Back, 2009), this is an interesting 
finding, as it may indicate that attention to eye cues does not necessarily equate to 
accurate utilisation of the information available from those cues in this group, given the 
lack of any clear differences in performance between emotions for isolated eye/mouth 
cues. Riby et al. (2009) have noted very different profiles between those with ASD and 
WS as to which cues are utilised the most in tasks involving configural processing of 
faces, examining the interplay between task demands and accuracy for using specific 
cues. Therefore Experiment 3b aimed to examine the way in which face configurations 
might underpin the accurate identification of specific emotions. 
Experiment 3b (the composite task) was designed to further pull apart the ways in 
which accuracy for emotion cues might depend upon the face region being attended to. 
The premise behind the composite paradigm is that, if holistic processing occurs, the 
misalignment of incongruent face halves will result in better performance than those 
that are aligned. This was, indeed, overall found to be the case in all participant groups. 
This is a somewhat surprising finding given the evidence reviewed in Chapter 3 
suggesting difficulties in the piecing together of configurations in individuals with ASD 
and WS. However, the fact that all participant groups also performed better overall 
when asked to attend to the bottom halves of stimuli may suggest that, even in typical 
development, alternate processing strategies are at play: Whilst it is plausible to find an 
advantage of one half over the other in misaligned conditions, this advantage should 
disappear on images where the faces are believed to be processed holistically (the 
aligned condition), therefore it was predicted that an interaction between face half and 
alignment would have been found in TD groups. This was not the case. This may 
suggest a particular importance of cues from the bottom halves of faces that underpin 
the appraisal of emotions from faces.  Blais et al. (2012) have shown the importance of 
mouth cues in interpreting emotions in their work. 
It is worthy of note that no clear age interactions were found in any analyses across the 
TD age groups. Overall, the oldest group performed better than their younger peers in 
Experiment 3a, and accuracy for emotions overall in Experiment 3b was found to be 
significantly different between the groups at each end of the age range (the two 
youngest compared to two oldest) but not between neighbouring age groups. This may 
be suggestive of more of a ‘peaks and plateaus’ pattern of development.  
 Whilst individuals in the clinical groups did not appear to have any difficulties, relative 
to peers, in interpreting emotions from isolated face parts, their overall performance was 
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reduced compared to TD matches on Experiment 3b, suggestive of a configural 
processing problem. Individuals with both ASD and WS were only at chance level 
(approximately 33%) in identifying the emotions from the top halves of faces and 
aligned faces; those with ASD were significantly less accurate overall than both CA and 
MA TD peers. Individuals with WS were poorer than CA peers for the top halves of 
faces.  This difference between individuals with ASD and WS relative to peers may be 
suggestive of a different type of cue use between individuals with these 
neurodevelopmental disorders. Riby and Back (2009) have shown that eye cues are 
particularly important for individuals with WS to accurately interpret emotions and 
Riby and Hancock (2008) have shown heightened attention to the eye region in WS; 
this is difficult to reconcile with the findings of Experiment 3b, as poorer performance 
for the top halves of misaligned faces would suggest less accuracy in effectively using 
eye cues. In the aligned condition, it might suggest more distraction from the lower face 
region, which would not be expected in WS.  
One final interesting finding to emerge from Experiment 3b was the fact that both 
participants with ASD and WS were more accurate in identifying emotions from 
aligned happy faces whilst TD matches gave more correct responses to happy faces that 
were misaligned. No differences between the advantage of misalignment were seen for 
other emotions in any of the groups, suggesting something specific about ‘happy’ and 
the way in which it is processed. Finding an explanation as to why aligning incongruent 
face parts would facilitate better recognition of ‘happy’ in those with ASD and WS is 
very difficult. It might have been that accuracy for misaligned happy faces was poor if 
individuals had certain difficulties with particular cues depending on alignment, but no 
interaction between face half and alignment was found in those with WS or ASD, 
therefore this doesn’t appear to be a plausible reason. It might be that misaligning happy 
face halves is more beneficial for those who are typically developing because they make 
better use of individual cues than do those with ASD and WS; individuals with ASD did 
show a (non-significant) trend towards being poorer in recognising isolated mouths 
compared to peers, for example. However, this still would not explain why an 
advantage was shown for aligned happy faces in the groups with neurodevelopmental 
disorders. 
The fact that both Experiments 2 and 3 were comprised of forward-facing, direct gaze 
images may have buffered against some of the ways in which faces of different stances 
might be processed in real life. Lobmaier et al. (2008) have previously shown that 
expressions of emotion were more rapidly recognised depending on gaze direction, with 
averted gaze facilitating recognition of fear and sadness and direct gaze facilitating 
happy and angry expressions, although Haxby et al. (2000) along with Bruce and Young 
(1986) have argued the case for the dissociability of these different aspects of face 
information. Lobmaier et al. (2008) have further explored whether this relationship 
between emotion and gaze is reciprocal: Will a face depicting a certain emotion affect 
where the viewer would perceive the gaze to be directed? They found that significantly 
more ‘looking at me’ responses were made to happy faces than for any other emotion, 
with anger being the second most facilitative of a ‘looking at me’ response, and no 
difference between fear and neutral expressions. Lobmaier et al.(2008) posit these 
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findings as evidence for a ‘self-positivity bias’ in which we generally like to think that 
people looking at us must be happy. Indeed, this idea that emotional expression can 
mediate perception of gaze direction could explain some of the fundamental social 
interaction atypicalities in WS and ASD and is worth further exploration in future 
studies. 
Another limitation of Experiments 2 and 3 is the inconsistency of emotions tested 
between the two tasks. Whilst the choice of emotions used in Experiment 2 was due to 
the constrains of designing emotionally expressive faces using fruit items, this meant 
that scared was not included. A direct comparison of performance between Experiments 
2 and 3 may have been informative. For example, there were no interactions in 
Experiment 3b in which different levels of accuracy were evident for any specific 
emotions between the clinical groups and their TD peers, but Experiment 2 found both 
those with WS and ASD to be poorer than TD peers in identifying surprised faces. 
Featurally, the configurations of scared and surprised are very similar therefore these 
differences relative to TD peers may have been driven more by the different meanings 
taken from these emotions. The inclusion of both in each experiment may have 
answered to this question. Similarly, due to the constrains of image design, it was not 
possible to include enough items to conduct a full three-way analysis between emotion 
type, alignment condition and face half in Experiment 3. This would be a more robust 
method in future studies of fully separating out the interactions between the different 
aspects of face information.  
 
5.10 Summary of Chapter 5 
 The most prominent finding to arise from Experiment 2 is how similarly those 
with ASD and WS perform relative to their TD peers in that performance was better for 
real versus non-real faces, with a reduction in accuracy for surprise. In Experiment 3b, 
the same profiles were apparent towards utilising mouth cues, performing more 
accurately when attending to the bottom regions of faces; misalignment advantages on a 
composite task were evident in all participant groups. However, when analysing 
accuracy for, and the interplay with, emotions some differences did begin to emerge, 
suggesting possible divergent strategies in utilising specific cues, depending on the 
emotion presented. Specifically, differences were apparent for ‘happy’. This issue of 
attention to and utilisation of cues, dependent on specific emotions, will be further 
explored in Experiment 4. 
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Chapter 6: Attribution and Understanding of Cues 
6.1 Overview 
Experiments 1-3 have outlined the fact that whilst those with ASD and WS are 
not as accurate or as likely to deduce social information or emotions from faces and 
face-like images as do TD peers of the same CA, they do appear to employ similar 
strategies to those that TD peers are using, with no clear differences observed as to 
different strategies used between those with WS and ASD. The divide between clinical 
groups and typical matches appears to be more driven by the type of cues that are being 
utilised in these populations. Experiments 4 and 5 will therefore examine this further: Is 
there a difference between how those with WS and ASD utilise face and object cues? 
Do those with WS and ASD show differences relative to peers in how they understand 
and interpret these types of cues? And how different do these profiles (relative to peers) 
appear compared to one another across the neurodevelopmental groups? Further, in 
what ways (social or physical) will individuals in the different groups make attributions 
about ambiguous stimuli? Experiments 4 and 5 were designed to answer these 
questions. 
 
6.1.1 Experiment 4: Introduction 
 The focus of the present chapter is on the utilisation and attribution of cues 
within social (containing images of people) versus non-social stimuli. The behavioural 
profiles of those with ASD and WS suggest that there may be a general lack of interest 
in (for ASD), compared to propensity towards (for WS), social situations in everyday 
life; it is therefore important to examine what specific cues might facilitate these 
patterns of behaviour. Is it the case that individuals with WS and ASD typically make 
use and attributions of different cues in different ways to that seen amongst TD peers? 
And might these profiles (relative to peers) be different in each neurodevelopmental 
group?  Might it be, for example, that the emotional content of a face is what draws or 
disengages those with WS and ASD, in a different way than it does with TD peers? Or 
is it that the non-social aspects of a scene determine the different ways in which that 
information is used, with different profiles relative to peers seen in ASD and WS 
groups? Further, what tendencies do individuals with WS and ASD have when asked to 
put an ambiguous situation into a social or physical context?  In exploring potential 
differences between individuals with ASD and WS relative to TD CA and MA peers at 
the level of utilisation and attribution, it may be possible to pull apart differences 
between the two groups that have not appeared thus far at the purely social-perceptual 
level. This is important in order to pinpoint what underlying factors might be driving the 
very different social approach behaviours seen in individuals with these disorders. 
The question of what cues are useful to individuals with ASD and WS, as well as what 
draws their attention, is one that has not been explored in a comparative study thus far. 
The purpose of Experiment 4 is therefore to examine these questions: How do social 
versus non-social cues facilitate the understanding of social versus non-social scenes? 
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Do these cues support or distract in certain contexts, depending on emotional content?  
Experiment 4 partly replicates a paradigm devised  by Da Fonseca et al.(2009). They 
compared 19 HF children with autism (mean age 12 years 8 months) to MA matched 
controls in a task where they were shown social scenes in which a face or object was 
masked out. Participants were required to choose, from three cartoon-like response 
options, the missing object. 
 It was found that overall, those with ASD were poorer in choosing the correct answer, 
despite being matched on MA and no correlations being found between IQ and task 
performance. Both groups were better in choosing the correct missing object than face, 
with those in the ASD group being comparable to TDs on this measure. When 
participants were required to find the correct missing facial expression, however, those 
with ASD showed a detriment in performance compared to controls. When examining 
performance across the age range (7-18 years), improvements with age were found in 
both groups. 
Da Fonseca et al.(2009) cite their findings as evidence that individuals with ASD are 
able to use global context to identify missing objects in a scene but find the 
identification of missing facial expressions more problematic. It therefore seems that 
those with ASD struggle to use emotional cues to deduce how another person is feeling; 
this suggests a problem in the more social-cognitive (theory of mind) than social-
perceptual domain. However, Da Fonseca et al.(2009) did not balance the object and 
face trials, in that the missing object trials only ever depicted a person with a neutral 
face, missing any possible interplay between emotional expressions and use of object 
cues. All scenes also contained a person; perhaps a different pattern of results might 
emerge for purely non-social scenes.   
Using the same experimental paradigm and the same sets of images, Santos, Randon, 
Milne, Démonet and Deruelle (2008) have repeated this study with WS participants 
(mean age 17 years, 2 months) and, very interestingly, found precisely the opposite 
pattern of results: That individuals with WS were comparable to both CA and MA 
(mean age 9 years, 7 months) TD controls on the emotion condition but showed poorer 
performance to both groups in correctly choosing the missing object. Santos et al. 
(2008) therefore concluded that there must be something about the social significance of 
emotions that boosts the ability of WS participants to make accurate judgements, above 
and beyond the cues that objects can afford. This apparent split between those with WS 
and ASD is an intriguing one that highlights the issue of what meaning different cues 
might have in the two groups and how they may be utilised. Experiment 4 set out to 
examine the complex combination of emotion cues and social content in identifying the 
missing object or face within social and non-social scenes. 
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6.1.2 Attention to Faces 
 The early work of  Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, and Morton (1991) has shown 
that new born infants have a tendency to orient towards human faces versus non-face 
configurations. This work has been seminal in driving a research literature focused on 
the idea that humans have an ‘innate’ tendency towards faces. Would faces presented in 
Experiment 4 therefore be found to distract participants from attending to other relevant 
information? How might individuals with WS and ASD differ from TD peers as to the 
types of cues that might affect performance, and would these profiles look different 
between the two disorders? 
Remington, Campbell and Swettenham(2012) reiterate the idea that, in typically 
developing children, an attentional bias for faces is evident. They therefore questioned 
whether the same attentional bias would be seen for individuals with autism. The 
premise of Remington et al.’s (2012) research was based on perceptual load theory: 
When the attentional demands of a central task are high, attentional resources do not 
tend to be given to distractor items. However, this does not tend to be the case when the 
distractor items are faces. Therefore, would this also be found amongst those with 
ASD? 
Remington et al. (2012) devised a paradigm in which adults (n=16) with ASD (mean 
age 23 years 8 months) matched to TD controls (mean age 26 years, 8 months) based on 
NVIQ were asked to identify the sex of a target name that was presented within an array 
of 1, 3 or 5 distractor non-words (See Figure 6.1). Distractor faces were presented to 
either be congruent or incongruent with the sex of the target name. It was hypothesised 
that, for TD individuals, the incongruent faces would cause more distraction, evidenced 
by slower reaction times (RT). This was found to be the case, regardless of the set size 
of distractor non-words. However, in the ASD group, RTs were only increased when 
the perceptual load of the central task was low (1 or 3 items), suggesting that 
individuals with ASD did not show the characteristic pattern of prioritising attention to 
faces over the demands of a perceptually demanding central task. One may question, 
however, whether the discrepancy between the groups on this task was due to a lack of 
attention to faces in the ASD group or simply an inability to efficiently handle higher 
task demands. 
 In order to ascertain whether this effect was specific to face distractors, the same 
paradigm was used whereby participants were asked to state whether a target word was 
a string or wind instrument, presented with a congruent or incongruent image of an 
instrument. Both TDs and those with ASD failed to show heightened RTs in the more 
demanding task condition (3 or 5 items), indicating that faces do have a unique hold 
over attention in those who are typically developing, not seen in individuals with ASD. 
Whilst this additional experiment does suggest a difference in the utility of faces in 
drawing attention, it fails to address the question of whether those with ASD struggle to 
process more complex arrays of information.  
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Figure 6.1: Example of a ‘high’ incongruent perceptual load item in the Remington et 
al. (2012) study 
 
Riby, Brown, Jones and Hanley (2012) have also shown a lack of attention to faces 
when presented as distractor items: Within their cohort of 28 children diagnosed with 
ASD (mean age 12 years, 11 months), matched on NVIQ to TD controls (mean age 10 
years, 4 months), they found that those with ASD were not slowed by the presence of a 
neutral distractor face when asked to detect the presence/absence of a butterfly in a 
scene, relative to when distractors were only objects. In the TD group, the RTs for 
responses when the face was present were significantly slower. Interestingly, those in 
the ASD group who were the least affected by the presence of a face tended to also have 
lower levels of functioning (assessed by teachers using the Childhood Autism Rating 
Scale (CARS), Schopler, Rechler & Renner.,1988).  Riby et al. (2012) posit their 
findings as strong evidence for the over-riding effect of faces on attentional resources in 
the TD population, given that the presence of faces in this design did not serve any 
purpose in identifying the target item.  
Whilst the work of  Riby et al. (2012) does, like Remington et al. (2012) suggest that 
faces do not hold the same ‘pull’ in ASD that they do in TD children, it is important to 
question whether perhaps the underlying processes are not concerned with a lack of 
attention to faces, but an inability to disengage from objects. In the Riby et al. (2012) 
study, those with ASD took longer overall than TDs to respond to the conditions in 
which no face was presented, suggesting that they struggle to process the central array 
as quickly as TDs. This may be due to a ‘pull’ of objects akin to that seen for faces in 
the TD cohort. Riby and Hancock (2008) have also shown in their eye tracking study 
using a passive looking task that children with ASD spend less time looking at faces and 
tend to focus more on objects in the periphery of a social scene. Whether or not this 
shows an indifference to faces or a propensity towards objects has yet to be confirmed. 
The inappropriate allocation of attentional resources could also be the cause of the 
tendency for those with WS to overly attend to faces. Lense, Key, and Dykens(2011), 
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have explored this possibility using an attentional blink paradigm. This design is based 
on the consistently noted finding that TD individuals are poor in detecting second 
targets when they are presented in close proximity to a first; this is believed to be due to 
the allocation of attentional resources to the first target, that therefore detracts from the 
second. The attentional blink paradigm provides a useful means of pulling apart 
attention and disengagement: The magnitude of the attentional blink effect (AB), 
determined by the decrease in accuracy between targets 1 and 2, is a measure of 
attentional allocation; the duration of the AB, measured by the time it takes to switch 
from target 1 to 2, can be used to deduce disengagement. 
Lense et al. (2011) recruited 14 adults with WS (mean age 28 years, 4 months) matched 
to TD controls (mean age 26 years, 2 months) on an AB paradigm task using letters of 
the alphabet as targets. Their analysis revealed that both groups were comparable in 
terms of the detriment of attention to target 2 (attentional allocation) but those with WS 
displayed longer durations between targets 1 and 2 compared to TD controls, suggestive 
of problems with disengagement. This suggests that individuals with WS may have 
trouble re-aligning attention from one item to the next, even when the stimuli are not 
faces. It could be the case that the typical pattern seen in those with WS to over-attend 
to faces is driven by a more general inability to disengage attention. 
 Riby et al. (2011) have also shown in their set of experiments that it is when required to 
disengage from faces that individuals with WS can be differentiated from TD peers. 
Across four experiments examining attention to, distraction of and bias towards faces 
(versus objects), Riby et al. (2011) showed that individuals with WS (mean age 13 
years) were no more likely than TD peers to be drawn to an upright face amongst arrays 
of inverted faces, but did show faster responses to targets when cued by faces versus 
objects, as was also seen amongst TD peers. However, on a priming task in which faces 
and objects were presented incongruently to the primed target, individuals with WS 
were significantly slower to disengage from faces versus objects; a pattern that was not 
seen in either MA or CA TD groups. Riby et al. (2011) therefore tentatively suggest that 
the social behaviours seen in WS may be driven by difficulties in switching attention 
from faces once it has been allocated.  
The evidence reviewed here suggests that those with ASD do not show the same 
attentional prioritising for face stimuli seen in the typically developing population. 
Amongst those with WS, the problems may lie more in disengaging attention from 
certain stimuli. It is therefore important to examine what particular cues might hold the 
greatest utility and meaning in these groups. 
 
6.1.3 Attentional Preference for Faces versus Objects 
It may be the case that individuals with ASD fail to be drawn to faces (or overly 
attend to objects) because of relative strengths and difficulties in using such cues. 
Kuusikko-Gauffin et al.(2011) tested 45 high functioning children with autism (mean 
age 11 years, 6 months) and their parents, along with a control sample of CA matched 
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TD children and their parents on the object recognition and face memory tasks on a 
standardised battery of tasks designed for neurological assessment (NEPSY). The 
purpose of their study was to examine possible age effects, as well as heritability trends, 
within the two groups, although the age range of the children only varied from 10 to 
13.5 years and no comparisons were made between children and adults. Despite this 
limited age range, Kuusikko-Gauffin et al.(2011) did find that those with ASD were 
significantly less accurate than the TD group on the face memory tasks, but this 
difference disappeared amongst the oldest participants. Further, those with ASD were 
more accurate than controls on the object identity task. A similar pattern of results was 
also found among the parents of those children, suggesting that autistic type traits may 
run in families and therefore there may be some degree of heritability as to the types of 
everyday cues that hold meaning for individuals with autism. Whether such parental 
influence is genetically or environmentally based is a matter of future debate. 
Whilst the findings of Kuusikko-Gauffin et al.(2011) suggest that individuals with ASD 
tend to perform better when presented with objects versus faces, the nature of the task 
may be pivotal to this finding. The object recognition task, for example, consisted of 
pixelated images, therefore it might be that this was advantageous for individuals 
known to favour a more feature-based processing style. The face task was focused on 
memory mechanisms as it required participants to recognise faces that they had 
previously been exposed to; any memory difficulties within the sample recruited to this 
study would therefore have underpinned this discrepancy, rather than a difficulty with 
faces per se. It is therefore important to directly compare face and object stimuli using a 
paradigm whereby all other factors are held constant.  
McCleery, Akshoomoff, Dobkins, and Carver(2009) have previously offered 
neurological evidence to suggest that there may be neural underpinnings for object 
preference in individuals with ASD. They examined twenty 10 month olds who had an 
older sibling with a diagnosis of autism (at-risk group) compared to twenty infants of 
the same age without any history of ASD in the family (low-risk group) in an ERP 
study comparing faces and objects. The infants were shown images of 
familiar/unfamiliar faces and familiar/unfamiliar toys whilst being monitored for 
electrical brain activity. The results showed that there were faster ERP responses to 
faces versus objects in the low risk group at the amplitude P400, contrasted with faster 
responses to objects versus faces in the high risk group (evidenced by peaks in the 
N290). Furthermore, a hemispheric asymmetry was seen in the low risk group across 
the categories that was not apparent amongst the high risk infants. 
Given the fact that these infants were categorised as at risk of autism, rather than having 
had any formal diagnosis, it is not possible to state that the differences between the 
groups are responsible for the behavioural phenotype in ASDs. However, the fact that 
differences were found purely by virtue of having a relative with a diagnosis, is striking. 
It may be worth considering, however, that having an older sibling with the behavioural 
traits seen in ASD might shape younger infants’ preferences towards faces. If a sibling 
is reluctant to make eye contact and engage in play, it will inevitably have some impact 
on the way that the younger sibling responds to and interacts with others. Karmiloff-
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Smith (1997) has long been an advocate of the importance of the interplay between 
genes and environment in shaping neural mechanisms; it could be that this example is a 
case in point for the ways in which this interaction occurs. 
The literature reviewed thus far suggests that those with ASD may have the neural 
underpinnings to support atypical preferences to objects rather than faces. No studies to 
date have explored this pattern in those with WS although it may be the case that 
individuals with WS have difficulties in disengaging from faces versus objects. It is 
therefore worth considering if there are any specific aspects of the face itself that may 
capture and hold the attention of those with WS, or prove problematic for those with 
ASD. 
 
6.1.4 Experiment 4: Summary and Aims 
In summary, the literature suggests that individuals with ASD do not give the 
same attentional priority to faces as do those in the TD population; whilst individuals 
with WS do appear to show similar attentional biases as their TD peers, they may have 
more difficulties in disengaging from faces versus objects. Further, objects may hold 
heightened facilitation for individuals with ASD. Regarding the use of cues in 
understanding social and non-social scenes, very little research has been carried out 
directly comparing individuals in the two neurodevelopmental groups, or examining the 
interplay between the type of cues available and accuracy in the understanding of social 
versus non-social scenes. Experiment 4 was designed to explore such interactions. 
Would the presence of certain cues facilitate or be detrimental to accuracy in 
understanding social and non-social scenes in order to deduce a missing face or object?  
Experiment 4 was comprised of 36 images of everyday scenes containing no 
social content (no people), a neutrally expressive person giving an instrumental gesture, 
or emotionally expressive people. An object or face was masked out and participants 
were asked to choose from 5 options what item was missing. Error types were analysed 
according to whether participants incorrectly chose the wrong category of response (a 
face when the correct item was an object, for example [Distractor errors]) or their 
choosing an incorrect response option within the correct category (such as a sad face 
when the correct answer was a happy face [Understanding errors]). 
 
6.2 Experiment 4: Hypotheses and Predictions 
6.2.1 Typical Development 
 Attention for emotional faces will be prioritised in TD groups. This will be 
evidenced by heightened accuracy in conditions requiring identification of missing 
emotions compared to objects. The presence of additional emotional cues in a scene will 
facilitate more accurate emotion identification but will result in poorer performance for 
object identification. There will a higher proportion of distractor than understanding 
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errors made (See section 6.3.4 for an explanation of terms) and a higher proportion of 
these errors will be in incorrectly choosing a face rather than an object. 
 
6.2.2 ASD and TD Comparisons 
 Individuals with ASD will provide more correct responses to missing objects 
versus faces. No interaction will be observed between condition and accuracy, given 
that individuals with ASD are not found to be typically distracted by neutral or 
emotionally expressive faces.  Unlike TD peers, individuals with ASD will make a 
higher proportion of understanding versus distractor errors for face items only. 
Individuals with ASD are also predicted to make more understanding errors than both 
CA and MA peers. No differences are expected to be found between the proportion of 
face versus object distractor error types. 
  
6.2.3 WS and TD Comparisons 
 It is hypothesised that individuals with WS will show a lack of disengagement 
from faces. This will be evidenced by a reduction in accuracy in identifying missing 
faces when additional emotional cues are present compared to TD controls. 
Performance in identifying missing objects will also be reduced relative to TD controls 
and significantly fewer correct responses will be given to missing objects versus faces 
in the WS group. The proportion of distractor versus understanding errors will be 
comparable within the WS group, with a higher proportion within distractor error types 
towards incorrectly choosing faces over objects. 
 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants 
 Those participants who took part in Experiment 3 were recruited to take part in 
Experiment 4 (See section 5.6.1) with the addition of five individuals with ASD who 
had declined taking part in Experiment 3 and one child with WS. Therefore, an 
additional 11 TD were also tested. Age and NVIQ data for all participants are outlined 
in Table 6.1. The ages of the final ASD participant group (n=15) ranged from 6 years 5 
months to 16 years 6 months, with a mean of 11 years 2 months. NVIQ scores on the 
Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) ranged from 12 to 34 (Maximum 
score=36), with a mean of 25. The final WS cohort (n=15) had an age range from 8 
years to 17 years 5 months; mean age 12 years 6 months. NVIQ scores ranged from 9 to 
31 (out of 36) with a mean of 17.  
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Table 6.1: Age and MA demographics for TD matches to ASD and WS groups for 
Experiment 4 
 Chronological Age RCPM Raw Score  
ASD (n=15) Range                         Mean Range                        Mean 
CA Matches* 6.10-16.2                    11.3 (3.3) 21-36                          31 (4.23) 
MA Matches 4.3-15.9                      8.5 (2.9) 12-32                          25 (5.82) 
WS (n=15)   
CA Matches* 7.10-17.3                     12.3 (3.4) 23-36                          31 (4.22) 
MA Matches 4.1-14.4                        6.1 (3.2) 9-31                            17 (6.64) 
*Due to recruitment issues, one CA match was missing for each clinical comparison 
  
Independent samples t-tests were conducted in order to ensure that there were no 
significant differences in age and NVIQ between clinical groups and their CA and MA 
matches, respectively. There were no significant differences found between the mean 
ages of those in the ASD cohort compared to their CA matches (t (27) =.09, p=.93) or 
between those with WS and their CA matches: t (27) = .22, p=.83. Similarly, no 
significant differences were found for the NVIQ scores of those in the ASD and WS 
clinical groups and their MA matches (t (28) =.12, p=.90 and t (28) =.00, p=1.0, 
respectively). 
Within the ASD cohort, there were 10 males and five females; in the WS cohort there 
were seven females and eight males. Due to this imbalance between the sexes, an 
independent samples t-test was conducted to compare total scores on this task between 
male and female participants over the TD group. No significant differences were found, 
t (59) = .73, p=.47, therefore sex was not considered further in the analysis. TD groups 
and sex data were exactly the same as outlined in Experiment 3, as being a suitable 
match for a clinical participant was not a criterion for a TD participant to be entered into 
the TD groups analysis. 
 
6.3.2 Materials and Design 
Experiment 4 was comprised of 36 trials depicting everyday scenes taken from 
web-based image searches, all presented in PowerPoint with one scene per slide. All of 
the scenes were designed to be situations with which the participants would be familiar; 
for example, a child being told off by a teacher at school, a scene of a playground, etc. 
Further examples of the types of scenes presented are documented in Appendix A. 
Scenes were chosen and categorised according to three criteria: No social content (only 
object cues present), neutral content (an expressionless person was present, making an 
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instrumental gesture) and emotional content (a person was present in the scene with a 
clear emotional expression). Figures 6.2 and 6.3 provide examples of these images. 
Images were piloted on 20 TD adults in order to establish agreement as to which 
emotions (or neutral expressions) were depicted. Only those images in which 85% 
agreement was reached were included in the final experiment. 
In each scene, either an object or a face was masked out with a white oval shape 
containing a red question mark; in half of the scenes the missing item was an object, and 
in the other half it was a face. Within these 18 scenes for each missing image type, there 
were six of each condition (as detailed above).  
Five response options were presented beneath each scene: On items where the correct 
choice was a face, three faces depicting different emotional expressions (one of which 
was the correct response) were presented, along with two distractor objects. On items 
where the correct response was an object, three objects (one of which was correct) were 
presented, alongside two distractor faces (see Figures 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, respectively). The 
response options were cartoon-like depictions, in order to prevent participants 
attempting to match exact features. The order of presentation of response options and 
which specific items were used was randomised across all the trials. ‘Correct responses’ 
for each item were deduced by consensus (of 85%) through the pilot study. Any items 
in which participants did not reach 85% agreement were removed and replaced with an 
alternative response option, piloted again until 85% agreement was reached.  
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Figure 6.2: Examples of missing object images across conditions (no cues; neutral cues; emotion cues) in Experiment 4 
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Figure 6.3: Examples of missing face images across conditions (no cues; neutral cues; emotion cues) in Experiment 4
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6.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were told that they were going to “be a Detective” and would be 
asked to find the missing item from each scene presented. It was explained to 
participants that they would see many scenes, one at a time, and must look carefully to 
work out what was missing. They were informed that they would be presented with five 
possible options underneath each scene “which will not look exactly the same” but that 
they should pick the one that would best fit. Participants were told that the correct 
choice would either be a face or an object, and that they should use the ‘clues’ in the 
scene to work out the correct answer. 
The experiment began as soon as the experimenter clicked onto the first slide. 
Participants were asked ‘What’s missing?’ and this question was also presented above 
each scene on every slide. As soon as the participant gave their response (either by 
stating the corresponding letter of their response choice, by pointing or by giving a 
‘don’t know’ response), the experimenter moved onto the next scene.  
 
6.3.4 Data Analysis 
Each of the 36 items were coded as either correct or incorrect. Data were then 
analysed using mixed design ANOVAs with separate variables entered (See Results 
section). The variables of interest were: The number of faces versus objects correct and 
the number within each condition correct.  
Error types were also analysed according to whether they were due to understanding 
(choosing the correct response type but not correct answer, such as choosing a sad face 
when the answer was a happy face) or distractors (choosing the wrong response type, 
such as choosing a face when the answer should have been an object). Within the 
distractor error category, the number of faces versus objects incorrectly chosen was also 
analysed: Face errors were those in which a face was incorrectly chosen when the 
correct choice was an object, and vice versa for objects. 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 TD Groups 
6.4.1.1     Response types: Accuracy 
A 2 x 4 ANOVA (missing item type x age-group) was run for total correct responses. A 
main effect of missing item type was found (F (1, 57) =61.78, p<.01) whereby, overall, 
participants gave more correct responses to objects versus faces.  Table 6.2 outlines the 
mean number of correct responses for missing item type (and condition) across TD 
groups. A main effect of age-group was also found, F (1, 57) =33.45, p<.01, 
underpinned by a significant difference in performance between the youngest group and 
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the older three groups overall (p<.01). No significant interaction was found between 
missing item type and age-group (p>.05). 
 
Table 6.2: Mean number of correct responses for missing item type (Maximum=18) and 
condition (Maximum=12) across TD age groups in Experiment 4 (Standard deviations 
in parentheses) 
 Missing       
item type 
  Condition  
 Face Object No social Neutral Emotion 
Up to 6.6 
years (n=16) 
8.38 (3.10) 11.38 (4.08) 6.31 (2.6) 6.94 (2.44) 6.13 (2.19) 
6.6-9.0 (n=13) 14.62 
(2.22) 
16.54 (1.51) 10.15 (1.35) 9.77 (1.64) 10.46 (1.45) 
9.1-11.11 
(n=13) 
14.08 
(2.63) 
17.23 (.93) 10.23 (1.01) 10.08 (1.12) 10.08 (1.75) 
12 years and 
above (n=19) 
15.58(1.54) 16.89 (1.15) 10.89 (.99) 10.0 (1.0) 10.74 (1.10) 
Total 13.16 
(3.75) 
15.44 (3.35) 9.39 (2.47) 9.16 (2.09) 9.33 (3.52) 
 
In order to examine the possible interaction between missing item type and the cues 
available in the scene, a 3 x 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted (Condition (no social 
cues/neutral expression/emotional expression) x missing item type x age-group). No 
significant main effect of condition was found but there was a main effect of missing 
item type, F (1, 57) =102.80, p<.01, as can be seen in Table 6.2. No significant 
interaction between condition and age-group was evident (p>.05) and no significant 
interaction between condition and missing item type was found (p>.05). Therefore, 
regardless of the content of cues within the scene, participants across all age groups 
gave more correct responses when the missing item was an object. There was a main 
effect of age, F (3, 57)=32.36, p<.01in which the youngest children gave significantly 
fewer correct responses overall than all other age groups. 
  
6.4.1.2     Response errors 
Two one-way ANOVAs were conducted for understanding and distractor error types 
separately to compare age groups. A main effect of group was found for both distractor 
and understanding error types, F (3, 60) =12.65, p<.01 and F (3, 60) =36.37, p<.01, 
respectively. The mean numbers of each error type are reported in Table 6.3. Games-
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Howell posthoc comparisons indicated that, for both understanding and distractor error 
types, the youngest group gave significantly more of each error type than the older three 
groups (p<.01). Figure 6.4 depicts how, when considering the error types made as a 
percentage of the total number of errors, all participants made a higher percentage of 
understanding errors. 
 
Table 6.3: Mean numbers of error type (distractor versus understanding, Maximum 
number=36) across TD age groups in Experiment 4 (Standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 Distractor Errors Understanding errors 
Up to 6.6 years 5.0 (3.86) 11.25 (3.99) 
6.6-9.0 .77 (1.30) 4.08 (2.22) 
9.1-11.11 .92 (1.19) 3.77 (2.09) 
12+ years and above 1.05 (1.35) 2.47 (1.68) 
Total 2.0 (2.86) 5.39 (4.41) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Distractor and Understanding errors as a percentage of total number of 
errors for TD age-groups on the Masking task 
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Within the distractor error types, two one-way ANOVAs were carried out to compare 
the number of face versus object distractor errors made in each age-group (See data 
analysis section for an explanation of terms). A main effect of age-group was found for 
face distractor errors (F (3, 61) =10.66, p<.01) as well as for object distractor errors (F 
(3, 61) = 5.44, p<.01). For face distractor errors, individuals in the youngest group made 
significantly more of this error type than the oldest group (p<.05) as well as those aged 
6.6-9 years and those aged 9.1-11.11 years (p<.01). For distractor object errors, 
individuals in the youngest group gave significantly more of this type of error than the 
oldest group and those aged 6.6-9 years (p<.05) but no differences were found between 
the youngest group and those aged 9.1-11.11 years.  
Figure 6.5 shows the percentages of each type of face/object distractor error as a 
function of the total number of distractor errors made. It is clear that all age-groups 
(with the exception of those aged 9.1-11.11 years) tended to make a higher percentage 
of distractor face than object errors, whereby faces were incorrectly chosen as the 
missing item when it should have been an object. 
 
Figure 6.5: Face and object distractor errors as a percentage of total number of 
distractor errors made, across TD groups in Experiment 4 
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6.4.2 Results: ASD with TD Comparisons 
6.4.2.1     Response types: Accuracy 
A 2 x 3 ANOVA (missing item type x participant group) was run on the number of 
correct responses. A main effect of missing item type was found (F (1, 41) =48.20, 
p<.01) whereby, overall, participants gave more correct responses to objects versus 
faces, as is indicated in Table 6.4. A main effect of group was found, F (1, 41) =6.61, 
p<.05, which a Bonferroni posthoc analysis revealed to be due to those with ASD 
making significantly more errors overall than their CA matches (p<.05). Individuals 
with ASD did not give significantly fewer correct responses for either face or emotion 
relative to MA peers (p=.93). No significant interaction between missing item type and 
participant group was observed (p>.05). 
 
Table 6.4: Mean number of correct responses for missing item type (Maximum=18) and 
condition (Maximum=12) in the ASD group and TD matches in Experiment 4 (Standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
 Missing       
item type 
  Condition  
 Face Object No social Neutral Emotion 
ASD 
(n=15) 
9.73 (4.06) 13.47 (3.98) 8.2 (2.81) 7.60 (2.59) 7.07 (2.52) 
TD CA 
(n=14) 
14.64 (3.05) 17.07 (.83) 10.57 (1.22) 10.07 (1.14) 10.21 (1.48) 
TD MA 
(n=15) 
12.93 (4.0) 15.3 (3.43) 9.13 (2.62) 9.13 (2.70) 9.53 (2.42) 
Total 12.39 (4.20) 15.30 (3.43) 9.27 (2.49) 8.91 (2.49) 8.91 (2.55) 
 
The effect of condition on responses to item type was analysed in a mixed 3 x 2 x 3 
ANOVA (condition x item type x group). Over all conditions, the same trends emerged 
in that those with ASD performed significantly worse than CA matches only (F (2, 41) 
=6.06, p<.05) and performance for objects was better, with a significant main effect, F 
(1, 41) =77.11, p<.01.No significant main effect of condition was found or any 
significant interactions between either factor and group (p>.05). No significant 
interaction between condition and missing item type was found (p>.05). 
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6.4.2.2     Response errors 
Two one-way ANOVAs were conducted with distractor and understanding error types 
entered separately as variables, with group as the between subjects factor. A main effect 
of group was found for both distractor and understanding errors (F (2, 43) =3.51, p<.05 
and F (2, 43) =7.42, p<.01, respectively. Mean number of incorrect responses for each 
error type are given in Table 6.5. In both cases, Games-Howell posthoc comparisons 
found those individuals with ASD to make significantly more errors than their CA (but 
not MA) matches (p<.01), as is indicated in Figure 6.6.  
 
Table 6.5: Mean numbers of error type (distractor versus understanding, maximum 
number=36) in the ASD group and TD matches in Experiment 4 (Standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 Distractor Errors Understanding errors 
ASD 4.53 (4.60) 8.27 (4.06) 
TD CA 1.0 (1.30) 3.29 (2.40) 
TD MA 2.40 (4.0) 5.20 (3.80) 
Total 2.68 (3.83) 5.64 (4.01) 
 
  
  
Figure 6.6: Error types made as a percentage of total number errors, in the ASD group 
and TD matches in Experiment 4 
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Analysis of distractor error types was run in two separate one-way ANOVAs to 
compare the number of face versus object distractor errors made in each group (See data 
analysis section for an explanation of terms). No significant differences were found 
between any of the groups for the number of distractor object errors found (p>.05). A 
borderline significant main effect of group was found for distractor face errors, F (2, 43) 
= 2.85, p=.07. As Figure 6.7 shows, a relatively lower percentage of object errors were 
made (choosing an object where the correct response was a face) in all groups. 
Figure 6.7: Face and object distractor errors as a percentage of total number of 
distractor errors made, in the ASD group and TD matches in Experiment 4 
 
6.4.3 Results: WS with TD Comparisons 
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A 2 x 3 ANOVA (missing item type x participant group) was run on the number of 
correct responses. A main effect of missing item type was found, F (1, 41) =39.47, 
p<.01 Participants gave more correct responses to objects versus faces, as indicated in 
Table 6.6. A main effect of group was additionally found, F (2, 41) =16.17, p<.01, 
without any significant interaction with missing item type.  Bonferroni posthoc analysis 
showed this to be due to participants in the TD CA group performing significantly 
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matches (p=.87). 
  
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Distractor Face Distractor Object
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l d
is
tr
ac
to
r 
e
rr
o
rs
Error type
ASD
ASD CA Matches
ASD MA Matches
   
170 
 
 
Table 6.6: Mean number of correct responses for missing item type (Maximum=18) and 
condition (Maximum=12) in the WS group and TD matches in Experiment 4 (Standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
 Missing       
item type 
  Condition  
 Face Object No social Neutral Emotion 
WS 
(n=15) 
9.07 (4.17) 12.53 (3.09) 7.40 (2.44) 6.27 (2.19) 7.60 (2.26) 
TD CA 
(n=14) 
14.86 (1.29) 16.71 (1.27) 10.29 (1.07) 9.79 (.98) 10.57 (1.28) 
TD MA 
(n=15) 
8.53 (3.72) 11.80 (4.33) 6.73 (3.17) 6.93 (2.43) 6.27 (2.53) 
Total 10.73 (4.34) 13.61 (3.79) 8.09 (2.82) 7.61 (2.47) 8.09 (2.75) 
 
A mixed design ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of condition and 
missing item type (and the possible interplay between them) on response accuracy. 
Overall the same pattern as with the face versus object analysis emerged in that a main 
effect of missing item type was still observed, across all conditions ( F (1, 41)=57.18, 
p<.01), as was a main effect of group (F (2, 41)=15.29, p<.01). No main effect for 
condition was found, or any significant interaction between condition and group, 
although this was approaching significance, F (4, 82) =2.27, p=.068. There was no 
significant interaction between condition and missing item type.  
 
6.4.3.2     Response errors 
Two one-way ANOVAs were conducted for understanding and distractor error types 
separately, with group as between subjects factor. For both distractor and understanding 
error types, main effects of group were found, F (2, 43) =7.07, p<.01 and F (2, 43) = 
14.93, p<.01, respectively. As is outlined in Table 6.7, Games-Howell comparisons 
showed that the TD CA group made significantly fewer of both types of error compared 
to the TD MA and those with WS. No significant differences for the number of either 
error type made were found between WS and TD MA matches (p=.80 and p=.26 for 
distractor and understanding errors, respectively). Figure 6.8 depicts how all 
participants clearly made a higher percentage of understanding errors as a function of 
the total number of errors made. 
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Table 6.7: Mean numbers of error type (distractor versus understanding, maximum 
number=36) in the WS group and TD matches in Experiment 4 (Standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 Distractor Errors Understanding errors 
WS 5.93 (5.0) 8.47 (4.0) 
TD CA .86 (1.29) 3.57 (1.70) 
TD MA 4.87 (4.0) 10.80 (4.92) 
Total 3.95 (4.32) 7.70 (4.65) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Error types made as a percentage of total number errors, in the WS group 
and TD matches in Experiment 4 
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of distractor errors made, all groups showed a strikingly similar profile with no 
noticeable differences in the percentage of each distractor type made. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Face and object distractor errors as a percentage of total number of 
distractor errors made, in the WS group and TD matches in Experiment 4 
 
6.4.4 Summary of Results 
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When analysing the types of distractors on which errors were made, within the 
youngest TD group the difference between the percentages of face and object errors 
made as a function of the total number of distractor type errors was more pronounced 
than in the older groups. There was very little difference between the proportions of 
face and object error types amongst WS or ASD participants. 
Taken together, the findings of Experiment 4 suggest that faces and objects do not 
facilitate or distract from performance in different ways in WS and ASD, with profiles 
being similar to those seen in TD MA matches. The types of cue available in social and 
non-social scenes did not afford any particular advantages for any participants who took 
part in this experiment. Therefore the question remains as to what does drive the 
disparate social profiles of those with WS and ASD. Experiment 5 aims to examine 
these factors. 
 
6.5 Experiment 5: Introduction 
 In order to understand the ways in which individuals with WS and ASD do or do 
not make sense of social situations, both compared to each other and to typically 
developing peers, it is essential to try and deduce which social-cognitive factors might 
be involved: What information do people with these disorders extract from complex 
scenes involving interactions and how do they attribute this? Most importantly, do 
individuals with WS and ASD show different profiles from one another as to how 
information is extracted and used, and how do these profiles differ to those in the TD 
population?  Experiment 5 used a revised version of the social attribution task paradigm 
(SAT) to examine the social or physical attributions that individuals with ASD and WS 
might make (relative to TD peers) in response to ambiguous animations of moving 
shapes.  
 
6.5.1 Social Attribution in Typical Development 
  The classic SAT was devised by Heider and Simmel (1944) in which shapes 
were depicted to ‘chase and bump’ one another around a scene. In this paradigm, 
participants’ narratives are typically analysed using a detailed system of indices in order 
to pull apart the types of detail that they form attributions about, such as use of mental 
state terms, pertinence of exchanges, physical descriptions, etc. The Heider and Simmel 
(1944) animation has been used across a multitude of studies with TD children and 
adults, with the consistent finding that individuals tend to give social labels to the 
motion of the shapes (See Figure 6.10). Hu, Chan and McAlonan (2010) recruited a 
large sample of TD children (n=154) aged between 6-13 years (mean age=9.88 years) to 
examine changes in performance on the SAT across developmental age. In addition to 
the classic SAT, they also developed a revised version in which animals were depicted 
rather than moving shapes in order to eliminate the possibility that younger children 
simply might not comprehend the demands of the task when faced with such ambiguous 
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stimuli. Participants also completed a standardised battery of executive functioning (EF) 
tasks. 
To summarise the findings of  Hu et al. (2010), a floor effect was observed in the 
youngest group (6-9 year olds) whereby they failed to provide appropriate social 
narratives on either the SAT or revised task, with very reduced use of mental state 
terms. Significant improvements with age were, however, noted on the revised version 
across the age-groups. Children aged up to 7 years tended to use significantly more 
physical terms than the other age-groups; those aged 8-10 years did show some 
evidence of considering social intent, whilst an indication of a broader social 
understanding of the interactions was not evident until children reached 11 years of age. 
No relationship was found in any of the groups between EF performance and 
performance on either experimental task; interestingly, girls overall performed better 
than boys. This may be of importance given the higher incidence of autism amongst 
males, perhaps offering support for Baron-Cohen's (2002) male brain theory of autism. 
The fact that younger children have been found to use fewer mental state terms and 
more physical ones tallies with the possibility that those in ASD and WS are ‘stuck’ at 
this lower developmental level of social understanding. As the findings of Experiment 4 
in the present research indicated, individuals with both WS and ASD were overall as 
accurate as MA but not CA peers in piecing together both social and non-social scenes 
to deduce missing objects and faces.  This is suggestive of delays rather than deficits 
and it may be proposed that while, in typical development, children progress from a 
focus on physical descriptions to piecing together interactions in a more social way, 
those with ASD and WS may be slower to make this jump.  
 
 
Figure 6.10: A still of part of the Heider and Simmel (1944) animation 
  
6.5.2 Social Attribution in autism 
 Klin(2000) has led the way in examining the social and non-social attributions 
that individuals with ASD make when presented with ambiguous scenes. His standpoint 
has been that theory of mind deficits alone cannot account for the full behavioural 
profile seen in ASD; he argues that the classic theory of mind tasks are often explicit 
and dichotomous in nature and could be scaffolded by verbal skills in high functioning 
individuals, therefore it is important to look at more ecologically valid measures of 
social cognition.  
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The issue of the role of language in theory of mind has been explored by Colle, Baron-
Cohen and Hill (2007), who have argued the importance of developing non-verbal 
measures of assessing theory of mind to eradicate possible confounds of language 
ability in a disorder with an extremely heterogeneous language profile. In their study, 
they recruited 12 individuals with ASD (mean age 8 years 1 month) matched on MA to 
typical controls (mean age 4 years 6 months) as well as a specific language impairment 
(SLI )cohort. Participants were given a false belief task designed not to require any 
verbal ability: In a training phase, a ‘hider’ would place a sweet in one of two boxes, 
unseen by the participant, and a ‘communicator’ would correctly point out to the 
participant where the sweet was hidden. In the test phase, participants would see the 
‘hider’ switch the sweet whilst the ‘communicator’ was absent; the participant was then 
asked which box they thought the ‘communicator’ would point to upon their return. 
True belief was also assessed in which both participants and the ‘communicator’ saw 
the sweet being switched and participants were asked where the ‘communicator’ would 
point. This was to ensure that participants would not simply assume that the 
‘communicator’ was deliberately misleading them every time. 
Colle et al. (2007) found that individuals with autism gave significantly fewer correct 
responses to the false belief question than SLI or TD controls but were comparable on 
the true belief measure. Those with an SLI and TD controls had far fewer difficulties 
with the false belief task compared to those with ASD, with the young children in the 
TD group performing above chance level and those in the SLI group getting 
approximately 80% of false belief questions correct, compared to only around 15% in 
the ASD group. Colle, Baron-Cohen & Hill therefore claim that false belief 
understanding is a deficit specific to autism and cannot be underpinned by language 
ability, therefore claims by Klin (2000) that fewer deficits might be seen in higher 
functioning individuals may not be due to their language abilities. Klin (2000), 
however, has argued that theory of mind is not the only problematic area in the 
manifestation of autism, and it is essential to look more broadly at what other social-
cognitive skills might underpin social exchange.  
Klin (2000) examined 40 HF adults with autism/Asperger’s, matching them on both CA 
and VIQ to 20 TD controls. Participants were initially shown the original Heider and 
Simmel (1944) animation (an example is shown in Figure 6.10) and were asked to 
provide a narrative of what they saw. Importantly, all participants had been shown to 
pass a second order false belief task. Following this, the animation was re-played, 
broken down into six segments to reduce memory demands and to enable the 
participants to provide more detailed narratives of each section. The experimenter then 
provided their own narrative so that questions about the content of the scene could be 
explicitly asked. Responses were scored using a complex system of indices to assess 
aspects such as the use of mental state terms, pertinence and salience of the scene, and 
understanding of personalities, etc. 
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Klin’s (2000) results indicated that those with HF ASD and Asperger’s syndrome were 
comparable and showing a different pattern of attributions to TD controls, despite being 
matched on both verbal and developmental age. Those in the clinical groups were less 
likely to use mental state terms and tended to label items that were deemed to be 
pertinent to the scene, as non-pertinent. They also failed to grasp the social salience of 
potentially social cues. Compared with TD participants, individuals in the 
ASD/Asperger’s groups generally provided significantly shorter narratives which were 
often found to be irrelevant, providing details about things that were in no way linked to 
the movements depicted in the scene. Klin (2000) suggests that this is indicative of a 
lack of awareness of the social implications of movements. The use of explicit questions 
about the scenes did marginally boost performance in the ASD group but was of no 
advantage amongst TD participants, who provided pertinent and appropriate narratives 
overall.  
Based on his study, Klin (2000) concludes that those with ASD show difficulties in 
integrating social information to make attributions about social intent and exchange. 
Individuals may attempt to scaffold gaps in their understanding by referring to terms 
and narratives that they are familiar with, which may prove not to be pertinent to the 
reality of the situation. For example, they may show a tendency towards using more 
physical terms and descriptions. This could suggest that one of the key problems in 
ASD is not in not having a theory of mind, but in knowing when and how to utilise it. 
In a follow-up to Klin’s (2000) work, Klin and Jones(2006) set out to further explore 
the use of physical versus social attributions in those with ASD. Forty high functioning 
adolescents (mean age 13 years) with ASD were matched to TD adults (mean age 21.8 
years), as in the previous study, and were asked to perform the same task using the same 
format as that used in Klin’s (2000) previous research. Additionally, participants were 
presented with another animation featuring shapes moving in a manner that was deemed 
to be representative of a rocket taking off and orbiting the moon; this was designed to 
elicit the use of purely physical terms. Klin and Jones (2006) argued that, if one of the 
underlying problems in ASD is difficulty in perceptually piecing together components 
of a scene, performance on both tasks would be equivalent, and below that of the TD 
cohort. 
Analysis of the types of responses given by those with ASD, using the same indices as 
used by Klin (2000), revealed that those with ASD were equally as likely as TDs to use 
pertinent physical terms to describe the physical animation. Differences only emerged 
on the social animation, in which those with ASD consistently made the same types of 
error as Klin (2000) had previously shown. The authors therefore concluded that those 
with ASD do not struggle to gauge the significance of social interactions due to any 
difficulties in global processing, but must have a deficit specific to social 
understanding. Given that those with ASD were found to give relatively more physical 
terms to the social animation, it is worth considering whether physical movements and 
objects might hold some heightened salience within this group; this could have been 
why performance was improved in the physical animation condition, and would fit with 
the neurological evidence offered by McCleery et al. (2009). 
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Other researchers to question the atypical ways in which individuals with ASD attribute 
ambiguous situations are Abell, Happé, & Frith (2000). They have argued that the 
Heider and Simmel (1944) animations, given their highly ambiguous nature, may not 
allow for the use of mental state terms in populations who might struggle to understand 
more abstract concepts. They therefore devised the ‘triangles playing tricks’ (TPT) task 
in order to provide more opportunity for those with ASD to use more social terms. The 
TPT task was comprised of three conditions in which animations of moving shapes 
were shown and were initially introduced to participants as being either ‘animations’, 
‘animals’ or ‘people’(Abell et al., 2000). In line with these ‘characters’ the animations 
were designed to depict random movement, goal-directed (GD) actions or exchanges 
requiring a theory of mind (ToM). Forty-five participants were recruited to the study, 
comprising three groups of ASD, those with a learning disorder (LD), and TD controls 
(mean age 8.6 years) matched on VIQ. The ASD and LD groups were of approximately 
the same CA (~13 years). Participants were shown four different versions of each of the 
GD and ToM animations and two of the random condition and were asked to provide 
narratives of what happened. Their responses were scored for accuracy (how closely 
they matched a group of TD adults) and categorised as to whether they used action, 
interaction or mentalising terms. 
Results showed that, overall, there were no differences between the ASD group and TD 
matches in terms of accuracy, with all groups performing better in the GD than ToM 
conditions. All groups tended to provide action descriptions for the random condition 
and interaction terms for the GD condition. The ASD group became distinguishable, 
however, from both those with LDs and the TD matches in terms of the number of 
inappropriate interaction descriptions provided for the random animations. Those with 
ASD did give a comparable number of mental state terms on the ToM condition, but 
these proved to be less appropriate than those given by either other group. Specifically, 
36% of the mentalising statements provided by those with ASD were inappropriate, 
compared to  approximately 10% in both other groups. This indicates a specific 
difficulty in accurately judging social interactions in ASD, regardless of mental age. 
The findings of Abell et al. (2000) indicate that the biggest difficulty in ASD appears to 
be in accurately taking appropriate information from ambiguous scenes in order to 
deduce relevant social content. Even given the reduced demand to spontaneously label 
shapes by being introduced to the stimuli as ‘people’, those with ASD were unable to 
provide appropriate mental state terms. However, this design in itself could be 
problematic: Perhaps, when told that the stimuli were people, those with ASD felt 
‘forced’ to provide more social narratives, without having the social understanding to 
support these. Experiment 5 addressed this issue by focusing on purely spontaneous 
(un-cued) responses to ambiguous animations. 
Bal et al.(2013) have recently explored the development of social attributions across age 
in an ASD population. They used the TPT (Abell et al., 2000) to examine spontaneous 
attributions to moving shapes  by omitting the cueing aspect of the task. Forty-one HF 
individuals with ASD were matched on CA and IQ to TD controls ranging in age from 
7-17 years (mean ages in both groups=10.5 years). Participants were asked to provide 
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narratives to the same TPT animations as used in the  Abell et al. (2000) study and their 
responses were coded for appropriateness and intentionality. Bal et al. (2013) found 
that, in the GD and ToM conditions, those with ASD overall gave significantly fewer 
appropriate terms indicating intentionality. Accuracy was poor in the ASD group and 
they showed further inappropriate use of mental state terms. Correlations between age 
and performance were found in both groups for GD and random animations but not for 
the ToM condition in those with ASD, indicating a deficit in this domain that does not 
improve with age. It therefore may be the case that the comparable levels of accuracy 
found in the research by Abell et al. (2000) were being masked by the cueing of 
‘characters’ and individuals with ASD do struggle to form appropriate mental state 
attributions, regardless of age. 
 
6.5.3 Social Attribution in Williams syndrome 
How do individuals with WS make spontaneous social attributions? Santos and 
Deruelle (2009) have shown that individuals with WS have a problem in piecing 
together information from visual scenes in order to derive social meaning. They tested 
19 individuals diagnosed with WS, ranging from age 7-26 years (mean age 14.4 years), 
compared to MA matched controls (mean age 8 years, 2 months) on a task designed to 
assess the attribution of intentions to others (Santos & Deruelle, 2009). The 
experimental trials consisted of either, a verbal (three sentences) or a visual (three 
comic-strip style images) depiction of a scenario, and participants were asked to choose 
from one of three possible answers what happened next. All of these experimental 
scenarios involved human intentions (See Figure 6.11 for an example). In the control 
condition, the scenarios involved physical causality rather than any human intentions 
(Figure 6.12).  
It was found that the only difference in accuracy between the two groups was in the 
visual experimental condition: Those with WS were significantly poorer in stating the 
correct answer for visually presented scenarios in which a human intention needed to be 
derived. Santos and Deruelle (2009) cite this as evidence for a specific ToM deficit in 
purely the visual domain in WS. 
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Figure 6.11: Example of an attribution of intentions comic strip (Correct response=2). 
(Santos & Deruelle, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Example of a Physical attribution of intentions comic strip (Correct 
response=2). (Santos & Deruelle, 2009). 
 
Interpreting the findings of the Santos and Deruelle (2009) study is less clear-cut: The 
fact that individuals with WS performed better for verbally presented scenarios may be 
suggestive of a buffering effect of language, in that verbally explained scenarios are 
easier to understand, or it may be that they were not able to fully process visually 
presented scenes because of problems in global processing. However, if this was the 
case, a modality difference should also have been found in the control condition. 
Alternatively, it may be possible that the presence of a person in the experimental trials 
distracted those with WS from attending to the rest of the scene and therefore being able 
to deduce the social intentions. Or it may be that they do lack the more social cognitive 
theory of mind when interpreting such scenes. It should also be noted that the physical 
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causality condition did contain scenarios that may be attributed to social intentions as 
well. For example, a baby dragging a lamp from a table (See Figure 6.12).  Eye-tracking 
data of this experiment would be useful for teasing apart these possibilities. 
Van der Fluit, Gaffrey, & Klein-Tasman (2012) have addressed the question of what 
underpins social understanding in their examination of 24 children (aged 8-15 years; 
mean age 12 years, 5 months) diagnosed with WS. Their research question has focused 
on the issue of how real-life social behaviours in WS might be underpinned by 
problematic strategies in making social attributions. In order to answer this question, 
they administered the classic SAT task (Heider & Simmel, 1944) to their participants 
but with the addition of an ‘improvement’ index: A measure calculated by looking at 
the difference in performance between prompted and unprompted narratives. Data was 
also obtained from parents on the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) and 
Social Reciprocity Scales (SRS), two standardised questionnaires aimed to assess the 
everyday social functioning of children. 
Van der Fluit et al. (2012) found that the poorest performance was on the ToM and 
pertinence indices, similar to what Klin (2000) found to be the case in ASD. However, 
there was no correlation between these two indices in the case of WS, perhaps 
suggesting different underlying mechanisms to that seen in the ASD group?  Also 
unlike trends seen within ASD cohorts (Bal et al., 2013), improvements with age were 
found on the indices of salience, ToM and problem-solving. Significant negative 
correlations were noted between aspects of the SCQ/SRS and ToM indices on the SAT, 
suggesting that real-life measures of social exchange might indeed be underpinned by 
difficulties in making mental state attributions to social interactions. Of interest is the 
fact that 35% of  individuals scored above the cut-off for a diagnosis of ASD on the 
SCQ; this may point to the fact that autistic traits emerge as a consequence of an 
inability to make appropriate mental state attributions. However, it might also be that 
the SCQ fails to differentiate between the direction of atypicalities measured, as it 
operates using a scoring system in which traits are quantified (using yes/no responses) 
but not classified (no differentiation between reduced or excessive approaches to other 
children, for example). 
Analysis of the improvement index in the Van der Fluit et al.(2012) study revealed that 
21% of participants showed increased performance when provided with narratives; 
these participants were those who also had higher IQ. Whilst these relationships should 
be explored in a TD population to form a comparison as to how typical or specific to 
WS this profile is, these findings do suggest that problems in making social attributions 
might underlie the social behaviours seen in WS, and that the greatest difficulty is when 
these individuals have to use their own initiative to deduce social content. Those at the 
higher functioning end of the scale may benefit from social prompts by others; this has 
also been found to be the case in ASD (Abell et al., 2000).  
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6.5.4 Summary of Literature 
 The overview of research outlined here paints a picture of possible atypicality in 
the domain of ToM, specifically amongst individuals with ASD. Research focused on 
those with WS is much sparser and illuminates the need to examine further the social 
attributions that individuals with WS make in the present experiment. The evidence 
outlined above suggests that individuals in these neurodevelopmental groups can be 
supported in making social attributions, depending on the explicitness of the task 
demands; this may suggest that, whilst they do not spontaneously form social 
attributions, an understanding of social interactions can be built. Heterogeneous 
language and functioning abilities may also play a role in the success of support 
strategies. Experiment 5 was designed to examine the spontaneous attributions that 
individuals with WS and ASD (compared to their TD peers) would make to ambiguous 
animations and, further, what understanding they would derive from the social and 
physical interactions depicted. 
 
6.5.5 Experiment 5: Summary and Aims 
The Animation task was designed to examine the spontaneous attributions that 
those in the clinical groups, relative to their TD peers, would make towards ambiguous 
moving shapes. Based on Abell et al.'s (2000) TPT task, two types of animation were 
shown, to depict physical or social motion, and responses were coded both for accuracy 
and content. As in the classic SAT task, a narrative was provided after participants gave 
their initial responses, in order to elicit understanding of the animations.  The aim was 
therefore to establish whether the behavioural tendency of those with WS and ASD to 
respectively seek out and show indifference to social interactions would be underpinned 
by similar tendencies in interpreting ambiguous scenes. 
 
6.6 Experiment 5: Hypotheses and Predictions 
6.6.1 Typical development 
 Age will be predictive of the types of social attributions that individuals make. 
Specifically, it is predicted that younger children will use more physical terms than 
older groups, and will be less likely to focus on social interactions, as suggested by the 
work of Bal et al. (2013). Accuracy will improve with age overall, for both social and 
physical animations. 
6.6.2 ASD and TD Comparisons 
 Based on the findings of Klin and Jones (2006) those with ASD will make 
significantly fewer social than physical attributions to animations compared to TD 
peers. They will make a higher proportion of mislabelling errors in providing physical 
labels to social animations than vice versa. As Klin and Jones (2006) noted, accuracy 
will be comparable to both MA and CA TD matches. 
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6.6.3 WS and TD Comparisons 
 Those with WS will make significantly fewer and less accurate social 
attributions than CA matches, as evidenced by Van der Fluit et al. (2012). It is expected 
that performance in both conditions will be in line with IQ (MA matches), as it was 
observed in the Van der Fluit et al. (2012) study that IQ and performance correlated in 
both TD and WS groups. No differences will be seen between social and physical 
mislabelling errors, as indicated by Experiment 4 and a lack of propensity towards 
social cues. 
 
6.7 Method 
6.7.1 Participants 
 The same participants as took part in Experiment 4 were recruited to this task 
(See section 6.3.1). However, three of those participants in the ASD group, and one 
from the WS group did not wish to take part or were not able to complete the task. 
Therefore a total of 12 ASD and 14 WS participants comprised the final sample. Data 
for the TD matches is outlined in Table 6.8. The ages of the final ASD participant group 
ranged from 6 years 5 months to 16 years 3 months, with a mean of 11 years 2 months. 
NVIQ scores (tested using the RCPM) ranged from 12 to 34 (Maximum score 36), with 
a mean of 25. The final WS cohort had an age range from 8 years to 17 years 5 months; 
mean age 12 years 4 months. NVIQ scores ranged from 9 to 31 with a mean of 18.  
 
Table 6.8: Age and RCPM data for TD matches for both clinical groups in Experiment 
5 (the AT task) (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Chronological Age RCPM Raw Score  
ASD (n=12) Range                         Mean Range                        Mean 
CA Matches* 6.1-15.11                  11.4 (3.1) 21-36                          31 (4.55) 
MA Matches 4.3-9.6                      7.11 (2.5) 12-32                          25 (6.43) 
WS (n=14)   
CA Matches* 7.10-17.3                     12.1 (3.4) 23-36                          31 (4.22) 
MA Matches 4.10-14.4                       6.3 (3.3) 9-31                            17 (6.86) 
*Due to recruitment issues, one CA match was missing for each clinical comparison 
 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to ensure that there were no significant 
differences between age and NVIQ between clinical groups and their CA and MA 
matches, respectively. There were no significant differences between the mean ages of 
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those in the ASD cohort compared to their CA matches (t (21) = .14, p=.89) or between 
those with WS and their CA matches: t (25) = .26, p=.80. Similarly, no significant 
differences were found for the NVIQ scores of those in the ASD group and their MA 
matches (t (22) =.15, p=.88) or for the WS cohort and their MA matches: t (26) =.03, 
p=.98. 
Within the ASD cohort, there were seven males and five females; in the WS cohort 
there were six females and eight males. An independent samples t-test was conducted to 
compare total accuracy scores on this task between male and female participants over 
the TD group to ensure that sex was not a confound; no significant differences were 
found, t (59) =.23, p=.82. TD groups and gender data were the same as outlined in 
Experiments 3 and 4. 
 
6.7.1.1     Verbal IQ 
Due to the verbal nature of Experiment 5, all participants were asked to complete the 
verbal form (VIQ) of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children, version IV ([WISC] 
Wechsler., 2003) This is a standardised battery of tests designed to assess both verbal 
and performance IQ; for the present experiment, only those tasks designed to produce a 
verbal IQ measure were administered. The similarities task is comprised of a maximum 
of 23 items whereby the participant is asked to state how two items are related (such as 
milk and water are both drinks), and a vocabulary task (36 items), in which participants 
are asked to define words, increasing in difficulty (for example ‘what is a thief’?). 
Participants are stopped once they have made five consecutive errors, deriving a total 
verbal score based on the sum of both tasks. On both tasks, some of the items can 
receive a score of 2, depending on the detail of the answer. Therefore the total 
maximum scores are 44 and 68, respectively. 
Five participants were under the lower age limit for the WISC, therefore completed the 
Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence, third edition ([WPPSI] 
Wechsler., 2002), which is comprised of the same two tasks but consisting of age 
appropriate items. The scores are deduced in the same way and are designed to be 
equivalent to the WISC scales. 
In the ASD group, two participants did not wish to take part in the WISC therefore data 
was available for 10 participants. The mean VIQ for this group was 28 (out of a 
maximum possible of 112) (standard deviation 4.65). Data was available for all WS 
participants, either from testing as part of the current experiment or from previous 
research within the last 2 years: Mean 50 (standard deviation 5.04). Across the whole 
TD group, eleven participants declined or were unable to complete the WISC, giving a 
total of 50 participants, with a mean score of 46 (standard deviation 2.84).  
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6.7.2 Materials and Design 
Experiment 5 consisted of eight short animations comprised of moving coloured 
shapes. Figure 6.13 depicts an example of one social and one physical scene. The 
animations were devised and presented in PowerPoint and the mean duration was 3.90 
seconds (standard error 0.41 seconds).  
For each animation, either physical or social interactions (four of each condition) were 
elicited by creating movement of shapes that might be suggestive of purely physical or 
social exchanges. For example, animation 1 was designed to represent a cat chasing a 
bird, whilst animation 8 mimicked the motion of a flower growing. All animations were 
piloted on a sample of 39 TD adults to deduce consistency of responses and to gauge a 
measure of ‘accuracy’ (see data analysis section). 85% agreement in the types of 
responses that participants gave was noted for all animations, therefore it was not 
necessary to make any changes to the animations. 
At the end of each animation, participants were presented with an on-screen multiple 
choice question (MCQ) asking ‘What happens’? Three possible response options were 
provided, one of which was always in contradiction to the social content of the scene or 
physically impossible. These were designed to probe into whether or not participants 
had understood the social or physical content of the animation. Examples of one social 
and one physical MCQ are given in Figure 6.14. The variables of interest in this 
experiment were therefore what types of response participants gave to the scenes; the 
focus and accuracy (relative to TD adults in the pilot study) of their description; what 
types of error they made, and accuracy on the MCQs. 
 
 
Figure 6.13: Screenshot of social (A) and physical (B) animations in Experiment 5
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Figure 6.14: Examples of MCQs for social (A) and physical (B) animations 
 
6.7.3 Procedure 
 Participants were instructed that they were going to be shown some clips of 
moving shapes and that they should watch very carefully. They were told that they 
would be asked to ‘say what they saw’ at the end of the clips and that there were no 
right or wrong answers. They were informed that they would then hear a story about 
what they had seen that was the experimenter’s own version, so that they could ‘talk a 
little bit about what might happen next’. Participants were shown each clip once, unless 
it was clear that they were not paying attention, in which case the clip would be 
repeated for a second time.  
Once participants had given their explanation of what happened in the scene (responses 
were recorded on a Sony Digital audio recorder for coding after the testing session), the 
experimenter gave their version of the story. Refer to Appendix A for the scripts for 
each animation. Participants were then presented with the MCQ screen, which the 
experimenter also read aloud, and were asked to choose the option that was the ‘most 
likely to happen’. Once the participant gave their response (or stated that they did not 
know), the next animation was played. All participants saw the animations in the same 
order, which was originally randomised. 
At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to complete the verbal 
measures on the WISC/WPPSI. These were administered to each participant 
individually and varied in duration, dependent on the participant’s ability, from 
approximately 3 to 10 minutes. 
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6.7.4 Data Analysis 
For each animation, word for word responses were transcribed and then coded 
into one of four categories: Physical/Emotion/Social Label/Social Interaction. These 
categories were devised based on the types of responses noted during the pilot phase of 
the experiment. Physical responses were those that were entirely absent of any social 
descriptions and focused purely on physical movements, descriptions of shapes, or 
attaching object labels. A response was categorised as ‘emotion’ if any emotional labels 
were given. Social labels were classed as the identification of a shape as a social being, 
such as an animal or person, without any reference to social exchange; this type of 
response was categorised under the social interaction category. Whilst comparisons of 
all response types were examined, only physical versus social interaction responses are 
reported in the Results section, as this was the comparison of interest and mirrors those 
variables of interest examined in Experiment 6. Ten percent of the responses for each 
group were re-coded by an additional experimenter, blind to the membership of each 
participant or the hypothesis of the experiment and 86.7% reliability was reached. The 
total number of responses for each category were then totalled and divided by 8 to give 
a percentage.  
Accuracy was examined by comparing the content of each participant’s response to 
those responses gathered during the pilot phase. Responses that in no way matched the 
typical answer were given a score of 0; those that included all of the key terms 
consistently used in the TD pilot were scored 2; partially matching responses received a 
score of 1. This measure was also re-coded by a second experimenter and reliability was 
found to be 92.67%. Further, the types of errors that participants made were calculated 
by adding up the number of times that they gave only physical terms to social scenes 
(MisSocial) and the number of times that they gave a social response (emotion or social 
label/interaction) to physical animations (MisPhysical). Accuracy on the MCQs was 
established by scoring the answers as correct or incorrect for each animation. 
An initial bivariate Spearman’s correlation was run between the z-scores of the data 
obtained from the WISC/WPPSI and total accuracy scores. As significant differences 
were found on VIQ scores between individuals with WS and their MA matches (t (25) = 
2.86, p<.01) and those with ASD and their CA matches (t (15) = 2.74, p<.05), it was 
necessary to establish whether there were any relationships between verbal ability and 
task performance in Experiment 5. Whilst, overall, a significant correlation was found 
across all TD participants [r (50) =.66, p<.01], this significant correlation was not seen 
when groups were looked at individually: No significant correlations were found 
between the two measures in the ASD or WS groups, nor within the separate matched 
groups (with the exception of the TD MA group matched to those with ASD) or groups 
broken down by age. Table 6.9 provides correlation values for each group separately. 
Although a significant correlation was found in the ASD matched TD MA group, as no 
significant difference was found between the VIQ scores of individuals with ASD 
relative to their MA matches [t (18) = 1.82, p=.09] and given the lack of any significant 
correlations in any of the other groups, it was not deemed necessary to factor out VIQ as 
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a confound in subsequent analyses. Further discussion of this issue will be raised in the 
discussion section. 
 
Table 6.9: Correlation coefficients and significance values between VIQ and task 
accuracy for all participant groups in Experiment 5 (* denotes significance, p<.05) 
 Correlation (ρ) Sig value 
Up to 6.6 years  .23 .45 
6.6-8.11 -.20 .51 
9.1-11.11 .14 .66 
12+  -.18 .58 
ASD .48 .17 
TD CA Matches .50 .25 
TD MA Matches .68 .03* 
WS -.18 .55 
TD CA Matches .01 .98 
TD MA Matches .42 .15 
 
6.8 Results  
6.8.1 TD Groups 
6.8.1.1     Response types 
The mean number of each response type given in response to animations 
[Physical/Emotion/Social label/Social Interaction] (Maximum possible =8) are outlined 
in Table 6.10.  Analyses were conducted for scores for tendencies towards giving 
physical versus social interaction response types (See Data analysis section). A mixed 
design ANOVA was conducted using a 2 x 4 design (response type (physical/social 
interaction) x age group). No significant main effects (p>.05) were found for response 
type or age group and no significant interaction was found between these two factors 
(p>.05).  
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Table 6.10: Mean number of each response type (Maximum number=8) across TD age 
groups in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Physical 
terms only 
Emotion 
terms 
Social labels Social 
interaction 
terms 
Up to 6.6 years 
(n=16) 
4.44 (1.32) .00 (.00) .81 (.83) 2.75 (1.73) 
6.6-8.11(n=13) 3.62 (1.19) .38 (.51) .38 (.65) 3.54 (1.20) 
9.1-11.11(n=13) 4.0 (1.35) .31 (.48) .23 (.44) 3.46 (1.13) 
12 and years and 
above (n=19) 
3.42 (1.12) .74 (.87) .26 (.45) 3.53 (1.22) 
Total 3.85 (1.28) .38 (.64) .43 (.64) 3.31 (1.36) 
 
6.8.1.2     Accuracy  
In addition to exploring the types of response that participants gave, their accuracy for 
social versus physical animations was also examined in a 2 x 4 (animation type x age-
group) ANOVA. A main effect was found for animation type, F (1, 57) =9.16, p<.05, 
whereby participants were overall significantly more accurate on social than physical 
animations. This is evident in Table 6.11. No interaction with age-group was found 
(p>.05), although there was an overall main effect of age (F (3, 57) =12.14, p<.01) in 
which the youngest group gave significantly fewer accurate responses overall than all 
groups other than those aged 9 years 1 month to 11 years 11 months.  
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Table 6.11: Mean accuracy score (Maximum possible=8) for physical and social 
animations across TD age groups in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Physical 
accuracy score 
Social accuracy 
score 
Up to 6.6 years 4.38 (1.36) 4.25 (2.11) 
6.6-8.11 5.85 (1.07) 6.77 (1.09) 
9.1-11.11 5.31 (2.06) 6.38 (2.29) 
12 years and 
above 
6.37 (1.34) 7.47 (1.26) 
Total 5.51 (1.64) 6.25 (2.12) 
 
6.8.1.3     Errors 
Two separate one way ANOVAS were conducted on each type of error made 
(MisPhysical and MisSocial-See Data analysis section for an explanation of terms) to 
compare possible differences between age groups. No significant differences were 
found between the age groups for MisPhysical errors. For MisSocial errors, a main 
effect of age group was found, F (3, 60) = 4.49, p<.01, whereby individuals in the 
youngest group made significantly more of this error type than those in the oldest group 
(p<.01). Table 6.12 provides the mean numbers of each type of error made. No other 
differences were found between the groups. 
 
Table 6.12: Mean number of mislabelling errors (Maximum possible=4) in TD age 
groups in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 MisPhysical MisPhysical % MisSocial MisSocial % 
Up to 6.6 years .56 (.81) 35.90 1.0 (.82) 64.10 
6.6-9.0 .77 (.93) 66.96 .38 (.65) 33.04 
9.1-11.11 .46 (.66) 50 .46 (.97) 50 
12 years and 
above 
.68 (.95) 86.08 .11 (.46) 13.92 
Total .62 (.84)  .48 (.79)  
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As Table 6.12 indicates, it was only the youngest group who made proportionally more 
MisSocial errors.  
 
6.8.1.4     MCQs 
In order to assess understanding of the physical versus social relationships depicted in 
the scenes, as illuminated by narration by the experimenter, a 2 x 4 (MCQ scores for 
physical/social scenes x age-group) ANOVA was conducted.  As is evident from Figure 
6.16, there was a main effect of age (F (3, 57) =28.57, p<.01) whereby those in the 
youngest group gave significantly fewer correct responses than all other groups. No 
main effect of animation category or any significant interaction between this and age-
group was found (p>.05).  
  
 
 
Figure 6.15: Percentages (Out of 4) correct on the MCQs for physical and social 
animation categories, across TD age groups in Experiment 5 
 
6.8.2 Results: ASD with TD Comparisons 
6.8.2.1     Response types 
The mean number of responses for each response type categorised are outlined in Table 
6.13. A 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was run to examine the number of physical versus 
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social interaction response types between the ASD group and their TD matches. No 
significant main effect of response type or group was found (p>.05) with no significant 
interaction between these factors (p>.05). 
 
Table 6.13: Mean number of each response type (Maximum number=8) in the ASD 
group and TD matches in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Physical 
terms 
only 
Emotion 
terms 
Social labels Social interaction 
terms 
ASD (n=12) 4.50 (1.83) .25 (.62) .50 (.67) 2.67 (1.61) 
TD CA (n=11) 3.45 (1.64) .45 (.69) .35 (.51) 3.73 (1.56) 
TD MA (n=12) 3.42 (1.17) .17 (.39) .58 (.90) 3.75 (1.86) 
Total 3.80 (1.61) .29 (.57) .49 (.70) 3.37 (1.72) 
  
6.8.2.2     Accuracy  
Accuracy for social versus physical animations were analysed in a mixed design 2 x 3 
(animation type x group) ANOVA. A main effect was found for condition, F (1, 32) 
=11.53, p<.05 with a borderline significant interaction with group (F (2, 32) =2.90, 
p=.07), but no significant main effect of group (p>.05).  Overall, and as is outlined in 
Table 6.14, pairwise comparisons revealed that all participants were more accurate 
(p<.05) on social versus physical animations, although this difference was greater in TD 
groups than seen in those with ASD.  
  Two separate one way ANOVAs were conducted for accuracy for physical and 
social animations separately in order to explore the borderline interaction with group. 
No significant group differences were found for physical animations (p>.05) but a 
significant main effect for group was found for social animations, F (2, 34) =4.69, 
p<.05. This was underpinned by individuals with ASD giving significantly less accurate 
responses than CA matches on this type of animation. No significant differences were 
found between the ASD group and MA matches. 
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Table 6.14: Mean accuracy score (Maximum possible=8) for physical and social 
animations in the ASD group and TD matches in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 Physical 
accuracy score 
Social 
accuracy 
score 
ASD 4.50 (1.78) 4.58 (1.44) 
TD CA 5.0 (2.15) 6.91 (2.07) 
TD MA 5.08 (1.56) 6.25 (2.09) 
Total 4.86 (1.80) 5.89 (2.08) 
 
6.8.2.3     Errors 
Two separate one way ANOVAS were conducted on each type of error made 
(MisPhysical and MisSocial). No significant main effect of group was found for 
MisPhysical errors (p>.05). However, a significant main effect of group was observed 
for the number of MisSocial labelling errors made, F (2, 34) =5.59, p<.01, whereby 
individuals with ASD made more errors than their MA TD matches. No significant 
differences were found between those with ASD and their CA peers, or between those 
in the TD CA and MA groups.  
 
Table 6.15: Mean number of mislabelling errors (Maximum possible =4) in the ASD 
group and TD matches in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 MisPhysical MisSocial 
ASD .58 (1.17) 1.17 (.94) 
TD CA .82 (1.17) .27 (.91) 
TD MA .92 (1.08) .33 (.49) 
Total .77 (1.11) .60 (.88) 
 
Figure 6.17 demonstrates how, in the ASD group, a higher proportion of errors were 
made in which participants labelled a social scene with a physical label, compared to 
making MisPhysical errors. This pattern was reversed in TD groups. As a proportion of 
the total number of mislabelling errors made, those with ASD showed a higher 
percentage of MisSocial errors than TD peers, compared to fewer MisPhysical.  
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Figure 6.16: Percentages of each type of mislabelling error made 
(MisPhysical/MisSocial) as a percentage of the total number of mislabelling errors 
made in the ASD group and TD matches in Experiment 5 
 
6.8.2.4     MCQs 
A mixed design ANOVA to compare correct MCQ responses to physical versus social 
animations was conducted, with group as a between subjects factor. A main effect of 
group was found, F (2, 32) =6.41, p<.05. A Games-Howell posthoc analysis found this 
to be due to those with ASD giving significantly fewer correct responses overall than 
either group of TD matches, as can be seen in Figure 6.18.  No significant main effect of 
animation category or significant interaction (p>.05) between the two factors was found. 
 
Figure 6.17: Percentages (Out of 4) correct on the MCQs for physical and social 
animation categories in the ASD group and TD matches in Experiment 5 
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6.8.3 Results: WS with TD Comparisons 
6.8.3.1     Response types 
Table 6.16 provides data on the mean number of each type of response in the WS group 
and TD peers. Response types were analysed in a 2 x 3 (response type x group) mixed 
design ANOVA, which revealed a main effect of response type (F (1, 38) =119.05, 
p<.01) whereby participants overall gave more physical than social interaction 
responses. A main effect of group was found (F (2, 38) = 3.77, p<.05), driven by 
individuals in the TD CA group giving more of both types of response than MA peers 
(p<.05) and those with WS (p<.05). No significant differences were found between the 
WS group and TD MA peers (p=.96). No significant interaction was found between 
group and response type (p>.05). 
 
  
Table 6.16: Mean number of each response type (Maximum number=8) in the WS 
group and TD matches in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Physical 
terms only 
Emotion 
terms 
Social 
labels 
Social interaction 
terms 
WS (n=14) 4.86 (1.61) .36 (.63) .43 (.51) 2.5 (1.29) 
TD CA (n=13) 4.0 (1.29) .54 (.66) .31 (.48) 3.15 (.99) 
TD MA (n=14) 4.71 (1.73) .00 (.00) .79 (.80) 2.36 (1.34) 
Total 4.52 (1.54) .29 (.56) .51 (.64) 2.66 (1.24) 
 
6.8.3.2     Accuracy  
The accuracy of responses to physical versus social animations was analysed in a mixed 
design 2 x 3 ANOVA (animation category x group). The only main effect found was for 
group (F (2, 38) =7.80, p<.01) whereby those in the TD CA group performed 
significantly more accurately overall than all other participants, as is outlined in Table 
6.17. No significant main effect of condition or significant interaction between 
condition and group was found (p>.05). 
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Table 6.17: Mean accuracy score (Maximum possible=8) for physical and social 
animations in the WS group and TD matches in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 Physical 
accuracy score 
Social 
accuracy 
score 
WS 4.86 (1.61) 4.86 (2.25) 
TD CA 6.15 (1.07) 7.08 (1.71) 
TD MA 4.71 (1.73) 4.07 (2.17) 
Total 5.22 (1.61) 5.29 (2.38) 
 
 
6.8.3.3     Errors 
Two separate one way ANOVAS were conducted on each type of error made 
(MisPhysical and MisSocial). No significant main effect of group was found for 
MisPhysical or MisSocial errors (p=.28; p=.31, respectively).  As is evident in Table 
6.18, groups were comparable as to how many of each error type were made.  
 
Table 6.18: Mean number of mislabelling errors (Maximum possible =4) in the WS 
group and TD matches in Experiment 5 (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 MisPhysical MisSocial 
WS .14 (.36) .86 (1.03) 
TD CA .46 (.66) .46 (.88) 
TD MA .29 (.47) 1.0 (.88) 
Total .29 (.51) .78 (.94) 
 
Figure 6.19 demonstrates how, in the WS group as well as with their TD MA matches, a 
higher proportion of MisSocial errors were made than MisPhysical. This difference was 
greater amongst those with WS, however. Those in the TD CA group showed less 
proportional differences between the number of each error type made, with a slight 
tendency towards giving a higher percentage of MisPhysical errors. 
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Figure 6.18: Percentages of each type of mislabelling error made 
(MisPhysical/MisSocial) as a percentage of the total number of mislabelling errors 
made in the WS group and TD matches in Experiment 5 
 
6.8.3.4     MCQs 
Correct responses to the MCQs for each animation category were analysed in a mixed 
design ANOVA, with group as a between subjects factor. No significant differences 
were found between correct responses to the MCQs for physical and social animations 
(p>.05). A main effect of group was found (F (2, 38) =7.32, p<.05) whereby those in the 
TD CA group were found to give significantly more correct responses overall than 
either other group (Figure 6.20). No significant interaction (p>.05) was found between 
animation type and group. 
 
 
Figure 6.19: Percentages (Out of 4) correct on the MCQs for physical and social 
animation categories in the WS group and TD matches 
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6.8.4 Summary of Results 
 Experiment 5 was designed to explore whether those with WS and ASD would 
be more likely to give different social and/or physical attributions to ambiguous moving 
shapes, relative to their TD peers. No differentiating patterns were found between those 
with ASD and WS (relative to TD peers) as to how many physical versus social 
interaction responses were given. Overall, in the WS comparison, all participants 
including TD peers, provided more physical than social descriptions. Differences 
between the response types were not found in the comparison of age groups or in the 
ASD analysis. Very few emotion or social labels were given by any individuals overall. 
Within the TD group, participants were overall more accurate in giving appropriate 
social than physical responses; the youngest group had overall lower accuracy scores 
compared to those aged 6.6-9.0 and those aged over 12 years, but no differences were 
found between the youngest group and those aged 9 years to 11.11, perhaps suggesting 
that age is not an underlying factor. In the ASD comparison, an interesting trend 
towards a significant interaction emerged in which individuals with ASD were 
comparable to TD peers on accuracy for physical animations, but had lower accuracy 
scores than TD CA matches for social animations. In the WS group, individuals had 
lower accuracy scores than CA TD matches for both physical and social animations. 
This may suggest that, in ASD, the physical nature of a scene may elicit better 
understanding of interactions. 
When analysing error types across TD age groups, differences only emerged for 
MisSocial errors, in which those in the youngest group made more of this type of error 
than those aged 12 years and above. When examining the proportion of each type of 
mislabelling error, those in the youngest group were more likely to mislabel a social 
animation with a physical label than vice versa. Individuals with ASD made 
significantly more MisSocial errors than TD MA peers, although it is difficult to draw 
conclusions from this finding given there were no significant differences between those 
in the TD CA and MA groups. Proportionally, individuals with ASD had a far higher 
percentage of total errors for this error type than they did in making MisPhysical errors. 
Interestingly, the opposite pattern was seen amongst TD groups. No differences were 
noted between those with WS and TD peers as to how many of each error type were 
made; bigger proportional differences were, however, seen whereby individuals with 
WS showed more likelihood of mislabelling a social scene as physical than vice versa, 
relative to TD CA peers. 
Analysis of correct responses to MCQs for physical versus social scenes did not reveal 
any significant differences between the animation types in any of the groups. However, 
the youngest group performed significantly less accurately than older groups in the age 
analysis; both those with ASD and WS were also unable to perform as accurately as 
their CA peers, and MA peers in the case of those with ASD. This may suggest an 
overall development with age in understanding exchanges and interactions, regardless 
of social or physical content, and a possible deficit in those with ASD. 
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6.9 Discussion 
In order to build up a full picture of the ways in which individuals with WS and 
ASD attend to, utilise and attribute social and non-social cues, the findings of 
Experiments 4 and 5 will be considered in tandem. To broadly summarise Experiment 
4, there were no striking factors in any of the analyses that appeared to differentiate the 
two clinical groups from one another, or from their MA peers: Participants showed 
evidence of being more accurate in identifying missing objects versus faces overall; no 
evidence of any interplay with the types of cues present in a scene suggestive of 
heightened allocation of attention to faces was observed in any of the groups. All 
participants showed a higher percentage of errors in choosing the correct within-
category item, demonstrating more of an understanding problem rather than choosing 
the wrong category altogether. Of those errors that were made in which participants did 
choose the wrong category, no notable proportional differences were observed in 
individuals with ASD or WS suggestive of a tendency towards choosing one category 
type over another. The prediction that individuals with WS would be more prone to 
choosing faces when the correct choice was an object was not borne out. 
 In Experiment 5, differences were only found between the number of physical 
versus social interaction terms given in the analysis in which individuals with WS were 
compared to TD peers; in all groups in this analysis, there were significantly more 
physical descriptions of the animations given, with overall fewer physical or social 
descriptions being given by those with WS relative to CA peers. Differences between 
the response types or groups did not emerge in any of the TD age or ASD comparison 
analyses. 
 In terms of accuracy of responses (how closely participants’ descriptions matched those 
of a TD adult cohort), a divide was found in the TD analysis whereby the youngest 
group overall were less accurate than all older children. A borderline interaction was 
observed in the ASD comparison in which individuals with ASD were comparable to 
TD peers for physical animations but only at an MA level of accuracy for social 
animations, suggesting, as predicted, a facilitation of more physical cues in 
understanding ambiguous scenes. Individuals with WS performed at a level comparable 
to MA (but not CA) matches for both physical and social animations. In terms of error 
types, as a proportion of all the errors made, TD individuals in the youngest group were 
more likely to mislabel social scenes as physical. Individuals with ASD also showed a 
higher percentage of MisSocial errors than their MA peers with a proportionally far 
higher tendency towards making MisSocial errors than was seen in either other TD 
group, in which the pattern was towards making a higher percentage of MisPhysical 
errors. Individuals with WS made a comparable number of each error type compared to 
TD peers but also showed a proportionally higher number of MisSocial errors; this goes 
against the prediction that individuals with WS would make more human attributions to 
ambiguous stimuli. 
It was on the MCQs that the clearest divides between the clinical groups and their TD 
peers emerged, with individuals with ASD giving significantly fewer correct responses 
compared to both CA and MA peers for both social and physical animations; those with 
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WS performed at MA level. No differences were found for MCQ accuracy between 
social and physical scenes in any of the groups. 
 
6.9.1 Experiment 4 
 The findings of Experiment 4 are partially in line with the work of Da Fonseca 
et al.(2009) in that participants overall were more accurate in identifying missing 
objects than faces. Further, age effects were also found in that the youngest group made 
more errors than older TD children, suggesting a development in social understanding 
with age. However, Da Fonseca et al.’s (2009) key finding had been the different 
patterns of result between those with ASD and their TD peers, and it was hypothesised 
in the present experiment that individuals in the TD population would be better in 
identifying missing faces. This was not found to be the case. It was the case that CA TD 
matches did give significantly more correct responses to missing faces than individuals 
with ASD, but this was also true for missing objects.  
 It could be that better performance for missing objects was driven by fewer subtle 
differences between the item options in Experiment 4. Missing items for the object 
condition were typically from different categories, and it was therefore possible to make 
a judgement based on broader, categorical terms. In the faces condition, subtle 
differences between emotions needed to be appraised in order to form a decision. The 
fact that all participants were found to make more understanding versus distractor errors 
supports the possibility that within category judgements were driving poorer 
performance in the faces condition. This issue of class membership is one that should be 
controlled for in any future replication. Lacroix et al. (2009)did observe in their study 
that individuals with WS were poorer in making judgements when stimuli depicted 
happy faces; no analysis in the present experiment was provided for differences in 
performance between the emotions depicted, but it is possible that this may have 
revealed some differentiating trends between clinical and TD groups.  
 Experiment 4 aimed to build on the Da Fonseca et al. (2009) study by also examining 
interactions with the types of emotional or neutral cues available in social and non-
social scenes. It was predicted that an interaction between accuracy for missing item 
type and the cues present in the scene would be found in the WS group, given their 
difficulties in disengaging from faces; this was not found to be the case. No interactions 
between cue condition and missing item type were found in any analyses. Santos et al. 
(2008) found in their comparison of WS individuals to TD controls on the same task as 
later employed by Da Fonseca et al. (2009) with ASD children, that those with WS were 
better in identifying missing faces versus objects; the prediction that this finding would 
be replicated in the present study was not borne out. However, that individuals with WS 
made proportionally more understanding than distractor errors suggests that their lower 
performance relative to CA TD peers might not be concerned with being ‘stuck’ on 
faces, but in making sense of their emotional meaning. The same pattern was found 
amongst individuals with ASD, perhaps suggesting that, in both disorders, it is an 
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understanding of the information available in social and non-social scenes that poses a 
problem rather than difficulties in attending to (ASD) or disengaging from (WS) faces. 
The lack of any interaction between cue and missing item type amongst individuals with 
ASD does stand in line with Riby, Brown, Jones and Hanley (2012b) who have shown 
that individuals with ASD are not distracted by neutral faces. Remington et al.(2012) 
have also shown that individuals with ASD are not distracted by faces, regardless of the 
perceptual load of a central task. It is worth considering that Experiment 4 did not 
control for the perceptual load of central scenes, nor the proximity of target items to 
peripheral cues and therefore it may be that the pattern of results shown was being 
modulated in some way by different demands from one scene to the next. Given 
Remington et al.'s (2012) findings that the set size of central arrays determined the 
extent to which those with ASD would devote attentional resources to peripheral 
stimuli, this might be something worth examining in future; although the same pattern 
of results was found amongst the TD cohort in the present experiment, the underlying 
causes may have been different. 
Experiment 4 points to the possibility that any problems in accurately identifying 
missing objects and facial expressions stem from difficulties in understanding rather 
than being distracted by faces, in all participant groups. This goes against the hypothesis 
that TD individuals would have their attention ‘grabbed’ and sustained by faces over 
objects. It also stands in contrast to the work of Lense et al.(2011) and Remington et al. 
(2012) who have shown in WS and ASD respectively that a lack of attention to and 
problems in disengaging from faces are notable underlying deficits in these disorders. It 
may, however, be that some interplay between the emotions depicted and accuracy, or 
in the nature of the objects used as response options, determined the ways in which 
individuals utilised and made sense of the cues. Examination of these factors with eye-
tracking data to assess patterns of attention would illuminate this issue further. 
 
6.9.2 Experiment 5 
It was predicted that different patterns would emerge within the different groups 
in that younger TD children would show a tendency towards making more physical 
attributions to ambiguous scenes, as would those with ASD relative to TD peers of both 
MA and CA. Conversely, it was predicted that individuals with WS would make more 
social attributions to scenes relative to peers, regardless of whether they were designed 
to depict physical or social interactions. This was not, however, found to be the case; in 
fact, it was only in the WS comparison that any differences in response types emerged, 
with all groups providing more physical descriptions of scenes. This points to the 
possibility that individuals with WS struggle to deduce and describe social interactions 
in the same way as TD peers. This similarity with individuals with ASD was not 
predicted but, given the overlap in SCQ scores between those with WS and ASD in the 
present study (See Appendix C), it is perhaps not surprising that participants in the two 
groups behave similarly on these social tasks. Indeed, Van der Fluit et al. (2012) noted 
in their study that 35% of WS participants met the SCQ criteria for a diagnosis of 
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autism. Worthy of note is the fact that participants in all groups provided very few 
emotion labels or labels in which they described social aspects of the scene (such as 
labelling a combination of shapes as a person, for example), perhaps suggesting that the 
animacy of the scenes naturally elicited responses revolving around the interactions, be 
they physical or more social. Examples of participant responses are outlined in 
Appendix B. 
Regarding the accuracy of participant responses, a very interesting borderline 
interaction emerged in which individuals with ASD were less accurate for social 
animations only compared to CA peers. In the WS group, accuracy was reduced relative 
to peers for both physical and social animations. This points to the possibility that, in 
ASD specifically, individuals have difficulty in forming appropriate attributions about 
the social interactions of a scene. Abell et al. (2000) observed in their TPT that children 
with ASD were as accurate in providing descriptions of the animations as TD matches, 
but purely physical versus social descriptions were not directly compared in that study. 
Van der Fluit et al. (2012) noted in their study examining individuals with WS on the 
SAT that they provided fewer terms indicative of using a theory of mind; it may 
therefore be the case that a lack of such terms also underpinned the similar performance 
between physical and social animations in Experiment 5.  Whilst the studies outlined in 
section 6.5.2 all provided detailed analysis of responses to animations, the coding 
systems used focused on appropriateness and pertinence of descriptions, rather than an 
analysis of the content of the terms given. Experiment 5 did this in order to pull apart 
possible divides in the types of information that individuals might focus on.   
Although statistical analysis was not conducted on all four response types categorised, it 
was noted that overall all participants gave fewer emotion and social labels than 
physical or social interaction terms. This suggests that both individuals with ASD and 
WS as well as TDs find it difficult to deduce an emotion from ambiguous scenes and do 
not necessarily need to label the ‘characters’ depicted in order to comment on social 
interactions that take place. This stands in line with Experiment 1, in which fewer 
emotion terms were given overall in response to the more ambiguous stimuli but 
participants would not necessarily need to label an item as a ‘face’ in order to provide 
an emotion. It may be the case that divides may have been more likely to emerge 
between the groups had appropriateness (versus accuracy or type) of response been 
examined: Experiment 6 focussed on the relationship between descriptions of emotion 
and their appropriateness to context.   
Klin (2000) has argued that individuals with autism tend to overuse physical terms as a 
compensatory strategy for making sense of ambiguous situations. This was found to be 
the case in Experiment 5 in which individuals with ASD made more MisSocial errors 
than MA TD participants and proportionally more MisSocial versus MisPhysical errors. 
Individuals with WS, by comparison, did not significantly differ to TD matches as to 
how many of each error type they made. This suggests that there is a tendency amongst 
those with ASD to use the blanket type strategy, suggested by Klin (2000) in defaulting 
to concrete physical descriptions in cases of uncertainty. This stands in line with the 
findings of Experiment 1 in that individuals with ASD talk more about the practical 
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functions of objects compared to peers. Interestingly, no clear age effects were found 
regarding error types, with  only the youngest group making proportionally more 
MisSocial errors; it is therefore difficult to deduce whether the specific pattern seen in 
ASD is due to deficit or delay. 
One particular area of weakness for both individuals with WS and ASD in Experiment 5 
was in correctly answering MCQs to test understanding of the animations. Both Abell 
et al. (2000) and Van der Fluit et al. (2012) observed in their studies that cueing 
participants as to the content of the depicted scenes improved task accuracy. Despite 
participants in experiment 5 being provided with clear narratives as to the exchanges 
and interactions happening in the animations, those in the clinical groups were 
significantly poorer than TD peers (MAs as well as CAs in the case of those with ASD) 
in making sense of those narratives to correctly answer MCQs. This is striking given the 
fact that individuals in the clinical groups gave similar descriptions and terms to those 
seen in TD adults. It therefore appears as though the key difficulty for both individuals 
with WS and ASD is in forming an understanding of interactions, both social and non-
social. Aspects of this will therefore be examined in Experiment 6. 
  
6.10 Summary of Chapter 6 
The question of specifically what attracts and has meaning to those with WS and ASD 
has yet to be deduced; individuals with WS and ASD respectively did not show any 
heightened or reduced utilisation of faces in Experiment 4, nor any specific patterns of 
cue use that might define their social behaviours. All participants tended to over-use 
physical terms to describe ambiguous animations in Experiment 5 and participants in 
the WS and ASD cohorts were also poorer than TD controls in correctly answering 
MCQs about the exchanges that were depicted in both social and physical scenes on this 
task, perhaps suggesting a more general understanding problem. One differentiating 
profile to emerge, apparently specific to individuals with ASD, was their reduced 
accuracy for making attributions to social scenes and a propensity towards mislabelling 
social animations as physical. It may therefore be that, in ASD, one area of particular 
difficulty is in forming an understanding of social interactions, in which the default 
strategy is to misattribute exchanges with more physical descriptions. 
One question that has not thus far been explored is what comprehension do individuals 
with ASD and WS have of broader social contexts? Could it be that difficulties in 
social-cognitive understanding might be one part of a combination of factors that 
underpin the distinct behavioural profiles seen in ASD and WS? The Social Cognition 
task (Experiment 6) was designed to explore this. 
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Chapter 7: Theory of Mind and Social Understanding   
7.1 Introduction 
 The focus of this chapter will be on the domain of higher level social-cognitive 
processing: What cognitive judgements do individuals make about socially relevant 
information and how do they map these judgements onto formulating emotional 
understanding of real-life situations? Whilst understanding of the basic emotions 
(happy/sad/angry/surprised/fear/disgust) can be deduced from facial expressions alone, 
it is the appraisal and understanding of these emotions that comprises social cognition; 
similarly, complex mental state terms (such as guilt or bewilderment) require 
considerably more cognitive appraisal. Experiment 6 (the Social Cognition task) was 
designed to examine the types of social inferences that individuals would make from 
positive and negative displays. 
Thus far (Chapters 4-6), possible differences between social-perceptual versus social-
cognitive processes have been explored in typical development, ASD and WS, 
specifically looking at the utility of faces versus objects and the different meanings that 
emotions might afford. This chapter will explore further dissociations within the social-
cognitive domain, focussing on the relationship between emotion understanding and the 
ability to infer information, and how this might be different in ASD and WS, relative to 
TD controls. 
 
7.1.1 Social Cognition in Typical Development 
 Experiments 1-5 suggest that individuals with the neurodevelopmental disorders 
ASD and WS largely process information from faces in the same way as their TD peers 
at the perceptual level; the question therefore remains as to what does drive the 
differences seen in everyday social behaviours between these groups? By exploring the 
typical processes that underpin social cognition, such as the ability to draw social 
inferences and motivations towards understanding social situations, one might draw 
comparisons as to where areas of delay or deficit might fall within neurodevelopmental 
groups. 
False belief is the ability to understand that the knowledge another individual possesses 
is inaccurate, based on new knowledge one has themselves. False belief paradigms have 
long been used as a method of tapping into the theory of mind (ToM) abilities of 
individuals: The classic task asks individuals to answer questions about what another 
person is thinking/what knowledge they have. This tests the ability of individuals to put 
aside their own internal knowledge and take the perspective of another, based on 
sources of external information. Baillargeon, Scott and He (2010), in their review of 
studies examining false-belief understanding in infants, suggest that an awareness of the 
beliefs of another person can be developed as young as two years of age. They argue the 
case that the ‘classic’ experimental design in testing false beliefs, whereby direct 
questions are asked to participants as to what knowledge another person might have, 
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taps into a more complex system of understanding that does not develop until 4-5 years. 
This highlights the importance of using appropriate and accessible methodologies when 
attempting to explore these more social-cognitive processes.  
Baillargeon et al. (2010) have proposed a ‘response account’ of theory of mind: In order 
to fully comprehend and accurately judge the actions of another person, we must firstly 
represent their beliefs, select an appropriate response, and then inhibit other responses 
that pertain to our own knowledge rather than that of the other person. Employing 
methodologies that simply tap into the first part of this system has shown that infants as 
young as two years are able to at least represent the false beliefs of another, whilst they 
struggle on more classic tasks requiring all three components. Interestingly, very little 
research has been carried out to examine the simpler concept of the beliefs, rather than 
false beliefs, of another. Experiment 6 attempts to explore the ways in which individuals 
with ASD, WS and their TD peers may represent the thoughts and feelings of another 
person. Specifically, use of an open ended question in Experiment 6, asking participants 
why a protagonist would be looking at a specific display, allows for a more fine-tuned 
analysis of the level at which individuals draw social inferences. 
Thirion-Marissiaux  and Nader-Grosbois (2008) have examined understanding of the 
beliefs of others in terms of emotional cause and consequence; they have proposed that 
there are different sub-components to social cognition and that understanding of causes 
versus consequences of emotions may involve quite different processes and streams of 
development. Thirion-Marissiaux  and Nader-Grosbois (2008) specifically suggest that 
ToM is concerned with the understanding of causes whereas comprehension of the 
consequences of emotions underpins real-life social functioning and the ways in which 
individuals respond to social situations. This theory adds weight to the argument that 
the relationships between these components might operate differently in 
neurodevelopmental disorders than they do in typical development. For example, it 
could be that individuals with ASD and/or WS struggle to form links between deducing 
the cause of an emotion and comprehending what emotion might be felt in a certain 
social situation.  
In their examination of these different processes, using a script-based paradigm in 
which participants were read a social scenario and were asked to choose either a 
resulting scene or a causal facial expression, Thirion-Marissiaux  and Nader-Grosbois 
(2008) found no differences in typically developing individuals (mean age 4.1 years) 
between measures, perhaps suggesting an interplay between these components in typical 
development in young infants. Given that performance on both measures positively 
correlated with performance on a standardised ToM task, this may be indicative of the 
importance of both emotion and social understanding in developing a full awareness of 
the actions and intentions of others. 
The link between real-life social behaviour and understanding and utility of social cues 
is one that is directly relevant when considering the profiles of individuals with ASD 
and WS. Is there a relationship, for example, between an individual’s social drive to 
interact with others and their ability to decipher social signals? Pickett, Gardner and 
Knowles (2004a) have proposed that, in typically developing individuals a ‘Social 
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Monitoring System’ (SMS) becomes activated when belonging needs are not being met, 
for example, if an individual feels ‘left out’ from social interactions. This system 
enables us to pay heightened attention to both positive and negative social cues and 
therefore adjust behaviour accordingly in order to “navigate the social environment” 
(Pickett et al. (2004a), p.1096). Pickett et al. (2004a) have examined the relationship 
between belonging needs and accuracy for interpretation of social cues in a cohort of 98 
TD adults. They manipulated social exclusion by informing participants that they would 
have to work alone on a task either due to there being an unequal number of participants 
(non-social condition) or because nobody else chose them to work with (social 
exclusion condition). They then asked participants to complete a questionnaire assessing 
their need to integrate with others and tested them on a task exploring accuracy in 
identifying facial emotions and vocal affect.  
Pickett et al. (2004a) found that there was a clear positive association between 
belonging needs and performance accuracy on the experimental tasks; further, that 
participants in the social exclusion condition reported higher belonging needs on the 
questionnaire. Pickett et al. (2004a) conclude that it is therefore the case that, in a 
typical adult population, internal states of social integration motivate attendance to and 
accurate use of social cues. Examination of the development of this relationship across 
childhood as well as into adulthood would better inform understanding of the link 
between one’s own social drive and an ability to interpret emotions in others. 
 
7.1.2 Social Cognition in Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
The fact that Pickett et al. (2004a) posit the SMS as being akin to any 
homeostatic system, triggered when a set threshold is reached, is also of interest to the 
clinical field: Might the ‘belonging’ needs of individuals with WS be much higher than 
in ASD? Anecdotally, individuals with WS are reported to excessively seek out social 
contact, perhaps suggesting a heightened need to belong. Biologically and conversely, 
Stavropoulos and Carver (2013) have shown that reduced oxytocin levels in individuals 
with ASD correlate with the social motivation to approach others. Most importantly, 
social motivation has also been shown to mediate accuracy in following and 
understanding joint attention (Stavropoulos & Carver, 2013), therefore there may be a 
strong link between social motivation and social cognition in both ASD and WS. If 
there is a link between one’s understanding of social cues and one’s own drive to 
integrate socially, this may go a long way to explaining the atypical profiles of those 
with WS and ASD. Given the hyper-sociable profile of individuals with WS, it would 
be expected that they would make more emotional inferences from socially relevant 
scenes. 
A lack of appropriate social interactions in both WS and ASD points to the fact that 
individuals with these disorders are either not motivated to respond to others in typical 
ways, or may struggle to understand how they are meant to respond. The SMS theory, 
outlined above, helpfully suggests that these two components of social exchange may 
well be related. It is therefore important to explore both aspects in individuals with ASD 
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and WS, in which the social approach behaviours appear to be so different.  For 
example, might it be that there is a divide between social drive and social cognition in 
ASD? It may be that the motivation to approach others, found to be heightened in WS 
(Frigerio et al., 2006) is reciprocally linked to a poorer understanding  of social 
situations. Experiment 6 was designed to test participants’ understanding of the 
motivations of others to attend to socially relevant scenes, as well as their understanding 
of appropriate emotional responses to different social motivations. As the focus of 
Experiment 6 was on the understanding of another’s social drive and emotions, rather 
than a direct examination of the participants’ own social motivations, the following 
literature is on the social understanding aspect of social cognition. 
 
7.1.3 Social Cognition in autism 
In order to understand the beliefs and desires of another, one must make 
inferences based on the social cues available. Le Sourn-Bissaoui, Caillies, Gierski  and 
Motte (2009) have explored the relationship between ToM abilities and inferencing 
skills in participants with Asperger’s syndrome, compared to TD controls. This link is 
an important one to examine given that an understanding of social situations must 
require some appraisal of why other people behave as they do. Specifically, Le Sourn-
Bissaoui et al. (2009) wanted to examine possible differences between pragmatic versus 
semantic inference-drawing and their relationship to ToM: Semantic inferences being 
deduced from the verbal context of a situation whilst pragmatic inferences were based 
on an understanding of another’s actions. 
Participants with Asperger’s syndrome (mean age 16.1 years) were found to perform 
consistently below the level of TD controls matched on CA and VIQ on all measures. 
All participants were less accurate in drawing inferences pragmatically, such as 
understanding that a character handing their car keys to another person suggests lending 
them the car. This difference in performance between pragmatic and semantic 
understanding was more pronounced in the Asperger’s group. Le Sourn-Bissaoui et 
al.(2009) cite this as evidence for the fact that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome, 
especially, find it difficult to form links between social concepts to infer meanings. The 
fact that this was a largely verbal task, conducted with a cohort on the autism spectrum 
diagnosed on the basis of high verbal ability, may have masked some of the true 
differences in performance between TD individuals and other individuals found to be 
lower on the spectrum.  Indeed, Sivaratnam, Cornish, Gray, Howlin and Rinehart (2012) 
have shown in their study of ASD children (aged 4-8 years) matched to age and IQ TD 
controls that clear differences do emerge in terms of accuracy in intention-
understanding. Their participants were given a comic-strip style task, therefore 
removing the verbal component, and were asked to choose which pictures were an 
appropriate ending to a presented story. Two subscales were designed to measure 
understanding of intent and understanding of emotions. They found that individuals 
with ASD did perform significantly less accurately than typical matches on the intention 
understanding component, although no differences emerged in the understanding of 
emotions. Given the much younger age range of children in the Sivaratnam et al. (2012) 
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study, and their diagnoses of core autism with poorer verbal functioning than 
individuals in the Le Sourn-Bissaoui et al. (2009) research,  these findings may suggest 
that there is little development in social understanding from 4 years into adolescence, 
regardless of the severity of autistic traits. 
 Experiment 6 aims to build on understanding of social intentions by exploring the ways 
in which participants with WS and ASD can infer beliefs from visual cues without any 
verbal context. This is important because of the range of verbal functioning seen within 
and between individuals with ASD and WS, therefore it is important to remove this 
component so that it is not masking or confounding the underlying understanding of 
socially relevant information. Experiment 6 will attempt to address the divide between 
intent and emotion understanding by adding a dimension in which, based on inferences 
taken from visual cues, participants are asked to deduce the emotional state of a person; 
examining the mapping of inferences onto attributions about the mental state of another. 
Li, Kelley, Evans and Lee (2011) have shown that individuals with ASD (mean age 8.3 
years) are able to show an awareness of the knowledge of another, by telling as many 
white lies and lies for deceit as verbal-MA matched TD peers (mean age 7.3 years). 
Whilst individuals with ASD struggled to maintain deceitful lies (as to whether or not 
they had looked at a hidden toy), they were able to acknowledge that they could initially 
tell the lie and not be found out. Interestingly, no relationship was found amongst the 
ASD children between their lie-telling ability and performance on a false belief task. 
This may point to the possibility that lie-telling could be a learned response or, in the 
case of white lies, confounded with difficulties with ‘liking’. Anecdotally, parental 
reports have suggested that some children with an ASD struggle with the concept of 
‘favourites’ and do not often refer to ‘liking’ particular items. In typical development, 
neurological differences between wanting and liking have been shown (Berridge, 
Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009), therefore it could be the case that these mechanisms are 
confounded or damaged in different ways in ASD and WS. Understanding of one’s own 
wants and likes is essential in order to extend a ToM to considering the desires of 
another, therefore problems in this domain might explain some of the difficulties 
individuals with WS and ASD face. Experiment 6 allows for consideration of this 
understanding of what another person may want by providing both positive and 
negative cues typically associated with fears or desires. 
Incidences of alexithymia have been reported in individuals with ASD (Hill, Berthoz, & 
Frith, 2004), where they show a lacking awareness of their own internal states and 
feelings. Research (Szatmari et al., 2008) has also shown that the parents of children 
with autism report a higher prevalence of alexithymia than is seen in the typical 
population, and that children displaying high incidences of repetitive behaviours tended 
to have fathers who scored high on the alexithymia scale (Toronto Alexithymia Scale) 
.Therefore it may be that the white lie task tapped more into difficulties in this domain 
rather than a genuine understanding of social conventions. However, clear difficulties in 
interpreting subtle aspects of social exchanges, such as the use of irony, have been 
found in individuals with ASD.  
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Wang, Lee, Sigman and Dapretto (2006) examined understanding of irony in 18 
children with high functioning ASD (mean age 11.9 years) matched on CA and MA to 
TD controls. Whilst individuals with ASD performed above chance level on the tasks, 
they were significantly less accurate than TD matches, and showed greater neural 
activation relative to TD peers in the inferior frontal gyrus; Wang et al. (2006) claim 
this as being suggestive of more effortful processing in understanding irony, 
underpinning poorer accuracy. Given that a ToM is necessary in order to fully 
comprehend irony (knowing that another person does not mean what they say), this 
adds weight to the argument that individuals with ASD may not accurately put 
themselves into the mindset of another when interpreting socially relevant information. 
 
7.1.4 Social Cognition in Williams syndrome 
It could be the case that individuals with ASD are poor in forming social 
inferences, and this governs their atypical social behaviours. Conversely, if as Pickett et 
al. (2004a) suggest, there is a relationship between social drive and understanding of 
social situations, one might expect that the hyper-sociability seen in WS results in better 
accuracy for interpreting socially relevant information. Van der Fluit et al. (2012) have 
shown in their examination of 24 children (mean age 12.5 years) with WS that there is a 
link between the ability to interpret ambiguous social scenes and an individual’s own 
social responses. Participants in their study were asked to complete a standard SAT task 
(See 6.5.1) and parents filled out measures of social communication and social 
reciprocity using the SCQ and SRS. A significant relationship was found in which 
descriptions on the SAT that were more in line with those given by TD children tended 
to correlate with higher scores in appropriate social reciprocity. This suggests that there 
is a reciprocal link between the understanding of social cues and one’s ability to 
appropriately respond to them in WS. 
Understanding of social signals has been explored by Sullivan, Winner and Tager-
Flusberg (2011) in their examination of  the ability of individuals with WS to 
understand jokes versus lies. Sixteen adolescents with WS (mean age 12.3 years) were 
given short verbal anecdotes that ended with the protagonist providing an untruth either 
as a deliberate lie, or as a joke. Participants were asked to state which it was, and 
provide an explanation of why. It was found that participants were unable to 
differentiate between the two, defaulting to ‘lie’ as a blanket response. Further, when 
the types of justifications that individuals gave were examined, individuals with WS 
gave far more explanations comparing the joke/lie to reality rather than any mental state 
explanation or responses suggesting an understanding of the protagonist’s viewpoint. 
This suggests that individuals with WS struggle to take on board the perspective of 
another person when making decisions about social scenarios. 
Haas and Reiss (2012) offer a review of the WS profile and focus on the fact that, both 
behaviourally and in neurological terms, individuals with this disorder appear to 
demonstrate an extreme willingness towards engaging and pleasing others. This seems 
to work in parallel with a reduced fear response and heightened arousal towards positive 
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emotional faces, with consistent reports of poor ToM abilities. This suggests that the 
link between a need for social approval and appropriate decoding of social cues might 
be damaged in this population. Haas and Reiss (2012) have noted that, in TD children, 
brain connectivity between brain regions associated with perception and cognition 
develops gradually across time, therefore it may be that a lack of connectivity in WS 
results in relatively spared domains at the expense of those that are severely impaired.  
Sparaci, Stefanini, Marotta, Vicari and Rizzolatti (2012) have made the suggestion that 
attempting to examine the understanding of complex social intentions in a group with 
such low levels of intellectual functioning as seen in WS is somewhat 
counterproductive in pinpointing the root of their problems. They suggest that it is more 
fruitful to explore, instead, understanding of motor intentions as a starting point for 
pulling apart the possible deficits underpinning a broader social understanding in this 
group. Sparaci et al. (2012) highlight the importance of examining understanding of 
motor intentions given that a wealth of literature points to the neurological relationship 
between one’s own actions and the actions of others. In WS, motor movements are 
typically impaired therefore might it be that comprehending the motor actions of 
another is also deficient and how might this generalise to more social-cognitive 
constructs such as emotion understanding?  
Sparaci et al. (2012) designed a task in which WS participants (matched to two separate 
cohorts of TD children on CA and MA, mean ages approximately 13 and 6.5 years, 
respectively) were asked to state whether an image of an everyday object was being 
‘touched’ or ‘grasped’ by a human hand and to explain why. Two conditions were 
devised so that participants were presented with and without contextual cues within the 
scene. Individuals with WS performed more accurately on the ‘why’ than ‘what’ 
measures. Specifically, they were comparable to MA matches on the why task but were 
not able to match the performance of CA controls on either measure. The presence of 
contextual cues boosted performance on the why task in all participant groups. 
The findings of Sparaci et al.’s (2012) experiments point to a possible divide in WS 
between being able to describe and interpret motor actions. This may offer support for a 
mirror neuron system in which performing motor actions is also impaired in WS; the 
next step is to explore whether this is specific to motor intentions. Experiment 6 aims to 
extend this work by examining ‘what’ and ‘why’ responses to broader social responses 
in individuals with both ASD and WS. 
 
7.1.5 Summary of Research 
 Understanding the intentions of others is a crucial aspect of everyday social 
functioning that requires an awareness of both social and non-social cues, an ability to 
infer meaning from them, and a relationship between comprehending one’s own 
emotional state in relation to that of others. In typical development, systems are in place 
so that each of these components work together, developing across time and with social 
experience. In WS and ASD, aspects of this system may interact differently, making it 
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difficult for individuals with these disorders to make sense of new situations. The 
question of precisely which aspects are affected, and to what extent they are explained 
by delay versus deficit, has yet to be answered. 
 
7.1.6 Experiment 6: Summary and Aims 
Given that, based on the experiments discussed thus far, the social-perceptual 
processes and abilities within those with WS and ASD do not appear to differ in any 
significant way from one another or from typical development, it is necessary to 
examine more social-cognitive constructs. This is necessary in order to pinpoint why the 
social behaviours seen in ASD and WS manifest so differently. Evidently, in real-life 
daily social exchanges, the behavioural profiles of individuals with ASD and WS seem 
to vary greatly but neither group shows appropriate social behaviours and there are 
definite overlaps (Lincoln et al., 2007) between these disorders in their use of social 
gestures and reciprocal chat; a preliminary investigation of the types of conversation 
that individuals with these disorders have is briefly discussed in section 8.7. It is 
important to establish in what ways possible overlaps or divides in social-cognition 
might be driving these behaviours. 
Experiment 6 was comprised of 8 displays in which a neutral face in the centre of the 
screen was shown to be attending to 1 of four positively or negatively valenced socially 
relevant images. Participants were asked to state which image was being attended to, 
why it was being attended to, and how that person would feel. Responses were coded 
under four possible categories: A solely basic description, reference to liking/not liking, 
use of an emotion term, or taking the perspective of that person. In doing so, experiment 
6 aimed to examine social-cognitive understanding of socially relevant scenes: What 
types of inference will individuals make about why a person is attending to a certain 
display and what understanding of emotion will individuals have? 
 
7.2 Experiment 6: Hypotheses and Predictions  
Whilst a wealth of studies have examined understanding of false beliefs, none 
have explored the types of explanations that individuals with ASD and WS will give in 
making sense of another person’s motivations for attending to socially relevant displays. 
Similarly, no studies to date have examined the ways in which an understanding of 
emotions might map onto this. 
  
 
 
 
 
   
211 
 
 
7.2.1 Typical Development 
 There will be an increase in the number of perspective (versus physical) terms 
used with age. Older participants will be more accurate in appropriately stating an 
emotion in line with the explanation given for why an image is being looked at. 
 
7.2.2 ASD and TD Comparisons 
 Individuals with ASD will provide fewer perspective taking terms for attendance 
to an image than both CA and MA TD matches; they will be comparable (Sivaratnam et 
al.,2012) in deducing emotions appropriate to explanations, compared to TD peers. 
 
7.2.3 WS and TD Comparisons 
 Individuals with WS will provide significantly fewer perspective terms relative 
to CA but not MA peers (Sullivan et al. 2003). Individuals with WS will also be 
significantly less accurate in choosing appropriate emotions, relative to CA peers. 
 
7.3 Method 
7.3.1 Participants 
 The same participants as took part in Experiment 1 were recruited to take part in 
the Social Cognition task (See section 4.3.1); two children with ASD and one with WS 
declined participation giving a final cohort of 16 ASD and 13 WS participants. Age and 
NVIQ data for their TD matches is outlined in table 7.1.  The ages of the ASD 
participant group ranged from 8 years 10 months to 14 years 9 months, with a mean of 
11 years 11 months. NVIQ scores (assessed using the RCPM) ranged from 9 to 33 
(maximum score=36), with a mean of 27. The WS cohort had an age range from 6 
years, 9 months to 16 years 4 months; mean age 11 years 7 months. NVIQ scores 
ranged from 8 to 21 (maximum score= 36) with a mean of 15. Within the ASD cohort, 
there were 14 males and two females; in the WS cohort there were seven males and six 
females. 
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Table 7.1: Age and RCPM data for TD matches for both clinical groups in Experiment 
6 
 Chronological Age RCPM Raw Score  
ASD (16) Range                         Mean Range                        Mean 
CA Matches* 8.0-15.0                    11.2 (2.5) 24-36                          31 (3.65) 
MA Matches 4.5-13.11                      9.5 (2.8) 10-35                          27 (6.16) 
WS (13)   
CA Matches 6.8-16.6                     11.8 (3.2) 22-36                          30 (3.45) 
MA Matches 3.7-6.7                       4.8 (0.9) 9-22                            16 (4.23) 
*Due to recruitment difficulties, one CA match was missing. 
 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted in order to ensure that there were no 
significant differences between age and NVIQ between clinical groups and their CA and 
MA matches, respectively. There were no significant differences found between the 
mean ages of those in the ASD cohort compared to their CA matches (t (29) = .10, 
p=.92) or between those with WS and their CA matches, t (24) = .01, p=1.0. Similarly, 
no significant differences were found for the NVIQ scores of those in the ASD and WS 
clinical groups and their MA matches (t (30) =.20, p=.84 and t (24) =.44, p=.66, 
respectively). 
 
7.3.1.1     TD age 
Data from the 57 participants who were assigned as matches for the clinical groups was 
also analysed by age-group. Participant details for these groups are outlined in table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Age and RCPM data for TD groups split by age in Experiment 6 
    Chronological Age 
Range              Mean 
  RCPM Raw Score 
Range             Mean 
Up to 6 years (n=13) 3.7-5.9          4.6 (0.7) 9-22             15 (4.19) 
6.0-8.5(n=12) 6.7-8.4          7.5 (0.6) 21-32             27 (3.94) 
8.6-11.5 (n=15) 8.8-11.4          9.8 (0.11) 21-35           29 (3.84) 
11.6 and above (n=17) 11.6-16.6      13.6 (1.5) 28-36           32 (2.85) 
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7.3.1.2     TD Gender 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare total scores on gaze following, 
response type and appropriate emotion (See data analysis section for a description of 
terms) between male (n=26) and female (n=31) participants over the TD group; no 
significant differences (p>.05) were found on any of these measures. The mean age for 
males was 9 years 11 months, and for females was 8 years 7 months. The mean scores 
on the RCPM (maximum score=36) were 27 for males and 25 for females. Given the 
similar NVIQ matches (t (61)=1.51, p=.14) and no significant differences in task 
performance, sex was not considered further for analysis. 
 
7.3.2 Materials and Design 
Experiment 6 consisted of eight displays, presented in PowerPoint, depicting a 
neutral face in the centre of the screen looking at an image presented in one of the four 
corners of the screen. Figure 7.1 provides an example of one of the displays. All images 
were non-social in that they contained no people; images were chosen to depict positive 
and negative scenes in order to elicit a range of emotional responses. Four positive and 
four negative images were used, randomised across each display so that different 
images appeared in different combinations and positions. These were balanced such that 
there were always two positive and two negative images in each display and each image 
was the ‘looked at’ item once only. All images were cropped to be the same size (400 x 
300 pixels). Each participant was shown the displays in the same order to control for 
any possible cueing effects that different images might have. See Appendix A for a full 
list of the images used. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Screenshot of one of the scenes on the Social Cognition task
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7.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were told that they were going to see one display on the screen at a 
time and would be asked, initially, to state where the girl in the centre of the screen was 
looking. They were told that they would be asked to briefly describe “what is in the 
picture she is looking at”. Once participants had given their answer to this first scene, 
they were given feedback as to what the scene actually depicted, either by the 
experimenter stating “That’s right, I think it’s X as well” or with a correction such as 
“She’s looking at this one. What is supposed to be shown here is... Do you see that 
here?” Once the participant had been provided with feedback, the experimenter then 
asked “Can you tell me why you think she’s looking at that?” Following this, 
participants were asked “And how do you think that makes her feel?” Participant 
responses were audio recorded using a Sony digital recorder and coded after the testing 
session. 
 
7.3.4 Data Analysis 
 Initial responses to which stimulus was being looked at were coded as either 
correct or incorrect. Types of response were coded into four categories: A physical term 
(such as the flower is colourful); use of a preference term (referring to ‘liking’ 
something); an emotion term, or taking the perspective of another (“she wants to go 
there because it reminds her of a time when she was on holiday”). See Appendix B for 
some illustrative examples. For each response given by a participant, physical terms 
were only scored as 1 if they failed to provide any other type of response. Therefore, 
this category represented those participants who only gave physical terms. For the other 
categories, a participant would receive a score of 1 for any of the response types they 
provided. For example, if a participant stated “The girl is excited because she loves 
cake”, this would be coded for both preference and emotion. This allowed for an 
exploration of what percentage of the time (over the 8 displays), each participant would 
use each type of term. This differed from the type of analysis of categories used in 
Experiment 5 as Experiment 6 was designed as an exploratory task to examine the types 
of response that individuals would give; Experiment 5, conversely, was theoretically 
driven. Ten percent of each participant group’s responses were second-rated by an 
additional experimenter, blind to the hypothesis of the experiment or participant cohort. 
Reliability was found to be 85% for the entire sample, across all groups.  
The appropriateness of the emotion participants gave in response to the question “how 
does she feel?” were scored as correct or incorrect based on their explanation of why the 
item was being looked at.  For example, if a participant stated that “she is looking at the 
flower because it’s pretty” and then gave her emotion as being happy, this would be 
considered a consistent response, whereas an emotion term of angry would be scored as 
incorrect. This was deemed to be the most reliable method of deducing accuracy, given 
the wide range of responses that participants could give. Scores for emotion 
appropriateness were also double-coded at a reliability level of 92%. Separate univariate 
ANOVAs were run to compare groups for gaze following and gaze appropriateness. 
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Mixed design ANOVAs were conducted to compare the number of physical versus 
perspective terms given to items; as with Experiment 5, whilst mean numbers of 
responses were reported for preference and emotion terms (social labels and emotion 
terms in the case of Experiment 5), these were not considered to be informative to be 
included in the main analyses. In comparing physical to perspective taking in the 
present experiment, parallels could be drawn with physical versus interaction terms 
used in Experiment 5. Mixed design ANOVAs were also conducted in order to examine 
the interplay between image type (positive versus negative) and the type of response 
given, with group as between subjects factor. 
Mixed design ANOVAs were conducted in each cohort (TD age groups, ASD 
comparisons and WS comparisons) to analyse whether there would be any interaction 
between positive versus negative images presented and the types of response 
(physical/perspective) that participants would give. No significant interactions (p>.05, 
F<1) were found between response type and image category in any of the cohorts. It 
was therefore not deemed necessary to examine responses to positive versus negative 
images separately. 
 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1  TD Groups 
7.4.1.1     Correct Responses: Gaze following 
A univariate ANOVA did not find any significant differences between age-groups in 
terms of correct responses for gaze following, F (3,57)=1.43, p=.24. Virtually all 
participants performed at ceiling on this measure, as is evident in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Mean number of correct responses to following gaze in Experiment 6, across 
TD age groups (Maximum score=8; standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Mean number correct 
Up to 6 years (n=13) 7.38 (1.12) 
6-8.5 (n=12) 8.0 (0) 
8.6-11.5 (n=15) 7.87 (.52) 
11.6 and above (n=17) 7.65 (1.0) 
Total 7.72 (.82) 
 
7.4.1.2     Gaze Understanding: Reasons for gaze 
The mean number of each of the four response types given when participants were 
asked to explain why an image was looked at are reported in Table 7.4. Because answers 
could be categorised in more than one way and were therefore not independent, a mixed 
design ANOVA was only run to compare tendencies towards giving a physical only 
versus perspective taking response (See data analysis section). 
 
   
216 
 
 
Table 7.4: Mean numbers of each response type in Experiment 6, across TD age groups 
(Maximum number=8)  
 Physical 
terms 
Preference 
terms 
Emotion 
terms 
Perspective 
taking 
Up to 6 years 3.0 (2.71) 2.77 (2.28) .85 (.90) 1.31 (1.44) 
6-8.5 3.67 (2.39) .92 (1.17) 1.25 (.87) 2.75 (2.01) 
8.6-11.5 2.47 (1.60) 1.47 (1.55) 2.20 (1.15) 2.27 (1.53) 
11.6 and above 1.94 (1.71) .65 (.70) 1.67 (1.22) 2.79 (2.14) 
Total 2.68 (2.14) 1.40 (1.67) 1.67 (1.22) 2.69 (2.14) 
 
As is outlined in section 7.3.4, only physical and perspective terms were considered as 
these were the types of responses that best represented the contrast between a tendency 
towards describing exchanges without any social inferences versus demonstrating an 
understanding of social exchanges.  A mixed design ANOVA comparing physical only 
versus perspective terms (response type x age group) did not find any significant main 
effect of response type (p=.86); there was, however, a main effect of age group (F (3, 
53)=6.43, p<.01) and a significant interaction between response type and age group, F 
(3, 53)=3.89, p<.01, as is evident in Figure 7.2. Univariate ANOVAs were conducted on 
each response type separately to examine this interaction further. No significant 
differences were found between the age groups for the number of physical terms given 
(p=.17). For perspective terms, the oldest group gave significantly more of this response 
type than those aged under 6 years, as well as those aged 8.6-11.5 years, F (3, 56)=7.68, 
p<.01. 
 
Figure 7.2: Mean percentages of physical versus perspective terms given in Experiment 
6, across TD age groups (Maximum number of responses=8) 
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7.4.1.3     Gaze Understanding: Appropriate Emotion 
A univariate ANOVA was conducted to examine differences between the number of 
correct responses that each age-group gave when providing an emotion appropriate to 
their gaze understanding response. As is evident in Figure 7.3, no significant differences 
were found between the groups overall, F (3, 57)=2.30, p=.09, although there was a 
marginal tendency towards higher accuracy in the older groups.  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Percentages correct for the appropriate emotion measure for TD age 
groups in Experiment 6 
 
7.4.2 Results: ASD with TD Comparisons 
7.4.2.1     Correct Responses: Gaze following 
 A univariate ANOVA to compare performance for the gaze following measure, with 
group as a between subjects factor, showed no significant differences between the 
groups, F (2,47)=.80, p=.46. Mean number of correct responses are reported in Table 
7.5. Worthy of note is the fact that individuals with ASD made no errors in correctly 
identifying the correct image4.  
 
 
                                                          
4 It is acknowledged that an ANOVA is not the most suitable method of analysis to use in this 
case due to a lack of variance. However, given its robustness in identifying potential 
interactions, it was deemed appropriate for this particular analysis. 
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Table 7.5: Mean number of correct responses to following gaze in Experiment 6, in the 
ASD group and TD matches (Maximum score=8; standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Mean number correct 
ASD (n=16) 8.0 (0) 
TD CA (n=15) 7.67 (1.05) 
TD MA (n=16) 7.81 (.75) 
Total 7.83 (.73) 
 
 
7.4.2.2     Gaze Understanding: Reasons for gaze 
The mean number of responses for each type of term used are given in Table 7.6. A 
mixed design ANOVA was conducted (response type [physical/perspective] x group). 
There was no significant main effect of response type ( F (1, 44)=.58, p=.45) or group, F 
(2,44)=2.39, p=.10. However, a significant interaction between the two factors was 
found, F (2, 44)=5.92, p<.01. 
 
Table 7.6: Mean numbers of each response type in Experiment 6, in the ASD group and 
TD matches (Maximum number=8)  
 Physical terms Preference terms Emotion terms Perspective taking 
ASD 3.44 (2.0) 1.38 (1.71) 1.19 (.99) 1.50 (1.2) 
TD CA 1.93 (1.99) .93 (1.58) 1.13 (1.06) 4.53 (2.70) 
TD MA 2.44 (1.97) 1.50 (1.75) 1.38 (1.15) 3.0 (2.45) 
Total 2.62 (2.04) 1.28 (1.66) 1.23 (1.05) 2.98 (2.48) 
 
Univariate ANOVAs were conducted for physical and perspective response types 
separately in order to explore the interaction between response type and group. No 
significant differences were found between the groups for the number of physical only 
terms given (p=.11). For perspective terms, a main effect of group was found, F (2, 
46)=7.40, p<.01, in which individuals with ASD gave significantly fewer of this type of 
response than their CA (but not MA; p=.09) matches. Figure 7.4 depicts this interaction. 
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Figure 7.4: Mean percentages of physical versus perspective terms given in Experiment 
6, in the ASD group and TD matches (Maximum number of responses=8) 
 
7.4.2.3     Gaze Understanding: Appropriate Emotion 
 A univariate ANOVA for appropriate emotion, comparing groups, found no 
significant differences, although there was a trend for individuals with ASD giving a 
lower percentage of correct responses than  their TD peers, F (2, 47)=2.66, p=.08. The 
mean percentage of correct responses for individuals with ASD was 69.5% compared to 
85%  and 82% for CA and MA TD matches, respectively. 
 
7.4.3 Results: WS with TD Comparisons 
7.4.3.1     Correct Responses: Gaze following 
 A univariate ANOVA to compare performance for the gaze following measure, with 
group as a between subjects factor, showed no significant differences between the 
groups, F (2,39)=1.55, p=.23; Table 7.7 provides the mean number of correct responses 
for each group. 
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Table 7.7: Mean number of correct responses to following gaze in Experiment 6, in the 
WS group and TD matches (Maximum score=8; standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Mean number correct 
WS (n=13) 7.15 (1.21) 
TD CA (n=13) 7.77 (.60) 
TD MA (n=13) 7.62 (.87) 
Total 7.51 (.94) 
 
 
7.4.3.2     Gaze Understanding: Reasons for gaze 
The mean numbers of responses for each type of term used are given in Table 7.8. A 
mixed design ANOVA was conducted (response type (physical/perspective) x group). 
No significant main effects were found for response type (p=.14); group (p=.10) or the 
interaction between factors (p=.17).  
Table 7.8: Mean numbers of each response type in Experiment 6, in the WS group and 
TD matches (Maximum number=8)  
 Physical terms Preference terms Emotion terms Perspective taking 
WS 2.92 (1.55) 1.0 (.71) 1.85 (1.21) 1.46 (1.56) 
TD CA 2.54 (2.37) .92 (.95) 2.38 (1.45) 3.21 (1.88) 
TD MA 3.23 (2.56) 2.38 (2.10) .92 (.96) 1.46 (1.51) 
Total 2.90 (2.16) 1.44 (1.52) 1.72 (1.32) 2.05 (1.82) 
  
7.4.3.3     Gaze Understanding: Appropriate emotion 
A univariate ANOVA for appropriate emotion, comparing groups, found a significant 
difference between them, F (2, 39)=6.71, p<.01. Individuals with WS were significantly 
less accurate than their TD CA but not MA peers (p<.01; p=.10, respectively). 
Percentages of correct responses in the WS group were only at 51% compared to 72.1% 
and 82.7% for MA and CA matches, respectively. 
 
7.4.4 Summary of Results 
No participant groups had any difficulties in following gaze to the item being 
attended to, or in describing what was in the image presented. Performance on this 
measure was at ceiling. In terms of the types of explanation given as to why the image 
was being looked at, differences only emerged between the TD age groups for the 
number of perspective taking (versus physical) terms given, in which older children 
gave more of this type of term than the youngest group or those aged 8.6-11.11 years, as 
hypothesised. In the ASD analysis, differences also emerged for the number of 
perspective taking terms (but not physical) terms given, whereby individuals with ASD 
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gave significantly fewer than CA but not MA peers. No differences were found between 
groups or response types overall in the WS analysis. 
Accuracy for stating an emotion appropriate to the explanation given was found to be 
comparable between the age-groups, with individuals with ASD being worse (although 
not significantly so) than TD peers; this was a somewhat surprising finding, given the 
expectation that individuals with ASD would show significantly poorer social 
understanding of displays. However, those with WS did perform significantly less 
accurately than their TD CA peers on this measure. 
Taken together, the findings of Experiment 6 suggest an atypicality, unique to those 
with WS, in mapping emotions onto a socially relevant context. Individuals with ASD 
also show less likelihood of taking the perspective of another (relative to CA peers) 
when making sense of a socially relevant display whilst individuals with WS did not 
differ significantly from CA or MA peers as to how often they gave perspective terms. 
This may be suggestive of a tendency to using but not understanding such terms in 
individuals with WS. 
 
7.5 Discussion 
 The findings of Experiment 6 point to a possible divide between interpretation 
of the social drive of another and the mapping of appropriate emotions onto this, in WS 
and ASD. The aspect of social-cognition in which difficulties are shown is different in 
the two groups: Individuals with WS used comparable numbers of perspective-taking 
terms compared to TD peers of both the same CA and MA but were significantly less 
accurate than TD CA peers when providing appropriate emotions. Conversely, 
individuals with ASD gave significantly fewer perspective taking terms than CA TD 
peers but did not give significantly fewer accurate descriptions of appropriate emotions. 
This may therefore suggest difficulties in different components of social cognition 
between the two groups. 
The initial part of Experiment 6 asked participants to follow gaze of the person at the 
centre of the scene to state which image was being attended to; performance in all 
groups was at ceiling on this measure. The fact that performance was approaching or at 
ceiling goes some way to supporting Baillargeon et al.'s (2010) assertion that task 
methodology can largely determine the apparent performance of younger children. They 
noted that a spontaneous task design would place fewer demands on the need to 
simultaneously represent and suppress different belief systems; the present study did, 
indeed, utilise a spontaneous task design in which participants as young as 4 years were 
able to perform with high accuracy. The fact that performance was near ceiling verified 
that subsequent analyses of interpretations of the images were based on accurate 
original classifications. Lobmaier et al. (2008), for example, have shown that 
judgements about gaze direction can be influenced by the emotional expression of a 
face; were an expressive face introduced into Experiment 6, it might have teased out 
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some of these subtle differences between the types of cue that individuals in the clinical 
groups attend to when following gaze. 
Only in the WS group did performance on ability to accurately deduce an emotion based 
on social understanding drop significantly below that of TD CA (but not MA) peers. 
Baillargeon et al.’s (2010) response account theory may go some way to explaining this 
finding: It may be the case that individuals with WS have difficulties with the third 
component of social cognition, the aspect in which they are required to inhibit their own 
emotional states to deduce how another person might be feeling. Indeed, the fact that 
individuals with WS provided more emotion terms than their MA TD peers when 
explaining social intent suggests a propensity for focussing on emotions, perhaps based 
on their own internal states. No direct measure of this was taken in Experiment 6 and a 
future design should incorporate asking participants how they feel in response to the 
images, in order to establish whether this appears to be where the divide occurs.  
The fact that individuals with ASD were able to deduce appropriate emotions almost as 
accurately as their TD peers is in line with the work of Sivaratnam et al. (2011), who 
have shown comparable levels of performance between ASD children and TD matches 
on a non-verbal comic strip task. In their study a divide was found between the ability to 
deduce emotions and evidence of understanding of intent; whilst accuracy per se was 
not measured in Experiment 6 in terms of the explanations that participants gave about 
why an image was being attended to, it was also found that individuals with ASD gave 
significantly fewer perspective taking terms than their TD CA peers. Within the age 
analysis, it was found that the oldest children used more perspective terms, suggesting 
that these more social-cognitive aspects of social understanding are a product of age and 
social experience. This lends itself to the possibility that individuals with ASD therefore 
struggle to make these higher level inferences because of a diminished social experience 
in everyday life. Individuals with WS, who display hyper-sociable traits, did not differ 
from either CA or MA peers as to how many perspective terms they gave, again 
highlighting the important link between social experience and the understanding of 
another’s social intent (Van der Fluit et al., 2012). However, the number of participants 
recruited to Experiment 6 was not large enough to conduct an analysis of the 
relationships between understanding the mind of another and understanding emotions. 
For example, might it be the case that those individuals who were more likely to take on 
the perspective of another were more accurate in providing appropriate emotions? It 
would be fruitful to examine this link in a larger sample in future studies, given the 
heterogeneity seen in ASD and WS. 
The role of the type of image presented (positive versus negative) was examined in the 
present study and was not found to interact significantly with the type of response given 
by any participants, in line with the findings of  Pickett et al. (2004a). It should be noted 
that Experiment 6 did not attempt to ascertain, as Pickett et al. (2004a) have done, 
whether or not there are relationships between the internal need to belong of individuals 
and their attendance and understanding of social cues. Haas and Reiss (2012) have 
noted a heightened need for social engagement in individuals with WS, but no direct or 
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standardised measure of this was taken in the present experiment; this would be an 
informative additional measure to take in a future experiment. 
Thirion-Marissiaux and Nader-Grosbois (2008) have suggested that there are two 
components to social cognition, pertaining to an understanding of causes and 
consequence; it might be that an understanding of cause relates more to emotions and 
comes later in development, whereas understanding of liking is sufficient to explain 
somebody’s actions. Whilst no statistical analyses were conducted on all of the different 
response types in Experiment 6, due to the dependence of responses, examination of the 
mean numbers of each response category revealed some interesting patterns: The 
youngest group of children gave more preference (liking/not liking) terms than the other 
TD age-groups, and individuals with ASD gave a similar number of preference terms to 
their MA matches, whereas individuals with WS gave fewer. This might suggest that 
young children refer to ‘liking’ terms as this is the ‘consequence’ type of social 
understanding that develops earlier, according to Thirion-Marissiaux and Nader-
Grosbois (2008). Individuals with ASD are therefore perhaps delayed in this 
development, whereas individuals with WS have a more developed social 
understanding. In further support of this, it was found that  individuals with WS gave 
more emotion terms than MA TD peers, perhaps being indicative of the second 
component of social understanding proposed by Thirion-Marissiaux and Nader-
Grosbois (2008). 
Sparaci et al. (2012) have noted a divide amongst WS individuals between the ability to 
explain what is happening compared to why. No differences were found between any 
groups in any of the analyses for the number of solely physical terms given. This 
suggests that individuals with both WS and ASD do not default to focussing on the 
material properties of socially relevant scenes when drawing inferences, above and 
beyond their TD peers. Sparaci et al.’s (2012) research was focussed on motor actions, 
however, whereas Experiment 6 was aimed at drawing out more social-cognitive 
aspects; this does suggest, however, that the divide between ‘what’ and ‘why’ may not 
be as apparent in the non-motor domain. 
 
7.6 Summary of Chapter 7 
 In conclusion, Experiment 6 begins to highlight a possible divide between the 
social understanding seen in those with WS and ASD: Whilst individuals with ASD 
were not significantly less accurate than TD peers in providing appropriate emotions, 
they tended to use fewer perspective taking terms in explaining the drive of another 
person; conversely, individuals with WS did not differ significantly from TD peers in 
the number of these terms used but did show difficulties in providing appropriate 
emotions relative to TD CA peers. 
Together, these results begin to suggest that difficulties in social exchange in WS may 
be driven by a propensity towards talking about the social intentions (and emotions) of 
another, unsupported by an understanding of them; in ASD, the problem may lie more 
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in an inability to take on the perspective of another. In both cases, there appears to be a 
dissociation between interpreting and understanding socially relevant information.  
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Chapter 8: Summary, Limitations and Future Directions 
   
8.1 Summary of experiments 
 The overarching purpose of the present research was to answer the question of 
what meanings faces and other socially relevant information have to individuals with 
ASD and WS. In what ways might the very different social behaviours seen in these 
neurodevelopmental disorders be underpinned by different profiles in the types of 
interpretation, understanding and attribution that individuals make of socially relevant 
contexts, and how might these compare to typically developing peers? Experiments 1-3 
were designed to examine the role of perceptual features in the ways in which 
individuals with ASD, WS and their TD (MA and CA matched) peers would process 
and accurately deduce emotions from faces. Experiments 4-6 were developed in order to 
examine the attribution and understanding of emotions from socially relevant scenes. 
The following sections provide a summary of the main findings of each experiment, 
with interpretations and an evaluation of how possible limitations might have affected 
results.  
 
8.1.1 Experiment 1: Summary 
 The ‘What Is It’ (Wii) task was designed as a preliminary exploration of how 
individuals would spontaneously interpret both real images of faces and ambiguous 
face-like configurations. Participants were shown images of human and animal faces as 
well as images comprised of items of fruit and schematic configurations, and were 
asked ‘what is it’? Images of objects were also included to reduce practice/boredom 
effects. Human and animal faces were used in order to examine the possible specificity 
of the human face in eliciting emotional processing (Tong et al., 2000); fruit and line 
images were included in order to separate out attention to specific features versus the 
tendency towards piecing together parts into a whole. Participants’ responses were 
coded as to whether they initially referred to a face or an emotion when presented with 
the ambiguous images; further, if they would describe facial features, emotions, or give 
explanations for an emotion in response to all four image categories. 
When examining initial responses to the question ‘what is it?, individuals with ASD and 
WS generally gave comparable numbers of ‘face’ responses to line and fruit images as 
did their TD peers, and in no groups were differences found between the number of 
‘face’ responses given to line versus fruit images. All participants gave significantly 
fewer emotion term responses to fruit images compared to line images; individuals with 
ASD and WS used this type of term significantly less often than TD CA peers for both 
image types. That individuals were comparable to TD MA peers might suggest more of 
a delay than deficit although it is worth noting that the youngest TD group (<6 years) 
did not give any emotion terms to fruit images. 
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 That individuals in the neurodevelopmental groups did spontaneously describe the line 
images as a ‘face’, and did not do this significantly less than those in TD groups, points 
to the fact that individuals with ASD and WS are able to piece together parts to form a 
whole. The tendency to do this less than peers when labelling emotions for fruit faces 
suggests that individual features might hold their attention more in cases of uncertainty. 
Carey and Diamond (1977) have proposed a switch from using features to a configural 
style of processing at around 8 years of age; there is ongoing debate (Mondloch et al., 
2002) as to precisely when this switch might occur. An insignificant main effect of age 
for the number of ‘face’ responses given in Experiment 1 suggests that the ability to 
piece together parts into a whole might be developed as young as 6 years old; further, 
the fact that different aspects of a face might be used differently in different situations 
and by different groups is a compelling idea. Might it be, for example, that individuals 
with ASD and WS default to using individual cues when the demands of a 
task/everyday situation are more complex? Annaz et al. (2009) have shown that 
individuals with ASD and WS tend to use a more feature-by-feature processing style, 
but perhaps this might depend on the exact task design?  
An examination of response types to all four image categories revealed some interesting 
differences between the groups: TD individuals of all ages, as well as individuals with 
ASD, tended to provide more facial feature descriptions in response to human faces 
versus fruit or animal, although individuals with ASD provided significantly fewer of 
this response type overall compared to either CA or MA peers. Tager-Flusberg et al., 
(2003) have shown that individuals in neurodevelopmental groups often show the same 
patterns of performance but with reduced accuracy. Whilst Experiment 1 did not 
directly examine accuracy for identifying emotions, fewer responses overall may 
provide a loose measure of ability to make interpretations about images. 
 In the WS group, a significant interaction emerged in which individuals with WS did 
not significantly differ from TD peers as to how many facial feature responses they gave 
to real-face images, but gave significantly less than both TD CA and MA matches in 
response to line and fruit images. This divide between the image types in eliciting more 
descriptions of facial features in WS suggests either a more feature-based processing 
style (Annaz et al., 2009) or that there is something more salient about real faces that 
facilitate more descriptions of facial features. Golarai et al. (2010) have shown that the 
FFA in individuals with WS is double the size of typical controls, and hyperactivation is 
seen in response to human faces specifically. This may underpin a heightened 
behavioural response to real faces as well, although differences were not found in 
Experiment 1 between human and animal faces. 
Standing in contrast to the possible facilitation of the human face for individuals with 
WS, the number of emotion terms given fell significantly below that of TD CA peers for 
both human and fruit faces. The youngest group of TD children provided very few 
emotion terms to human faces, suggesting that individuals with WS are in line with this, 
being indicative of a possible developmental delay. The fact that the human face failed 
to elicit many emotion terms but generally gave rise to more descriptions of facial 
features might suggest a dissociation between perceptual and more cognitive appraisals 
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of the human face, in both early typical development (under 6 years) as well as WS and 
ASD (where patterns were also the same as seen in TD peers, but with fewer overall 
responses).  
Overall, few explanations for emotions were given in any of the groups; interestingly, in 
the ASD group and their TD peers, more of this type of response was given for animal 
versus fruit faces; this pattern was found for human versus fruit faces in the WS group 
and their TD peers. It may be the case that the role of experience played a part in this 
pattern of results, and that individuals in the ASD group (and TD peers) had more 
experience with pets, possibly drawing on their own experiences to infer and explain 
emotions depicted in Experiment 1. Schultz (2005) has suggested that experience plays 
a role in shaping neurology; no measure of this was taken in the present experiment but 
this would be an important detail to examine in future research. 
Object images were included in Experiment 1 in order to reduce practice effects and 
prevent participants from defaulting to ‘it’s a face’ as a response. An interesting finding 
emerged, however, in that the youngest children and those in the ASD group provided 
significantly fewer descriptions of the features than did their peers, and gave 
significantly more descriptions of the functions of objects. The importance of the 
subjective experience of everyday cues and stimuli in shaping our understanding of 
them must not be underestimated; it might be that individuals with ASD are 
developmentally delayed in that it is the utility of an object that affords the most 
meaning.  
 
8.1.2 Experiment 2: Summary 
The Emotion task (ET) was comprised of the same image categories used in 
Experiment 1, to examine accuracy in interpreting emotions from real and non-face 
stimuli. Participants were presented with 16 images (4 of each category) depicting four 
of each emotion (happy/sad/angry/surprised) and were asked to choose (from a choice 
of 3 emotions) which emotion was depicted. All participants were very accurate on this 
task with scores at or approaching ceiling, therefore the reliability of these results was 
treated with some caution.  
The same patterns emerged in all participant groups whereby accuracy was overall 
poorer for line and fruit (compared to human and animal) images. Individuals with ASD 
and WS were significantly poorer than their CA-matched TD peers  in accurately 
identifying emotions from human faces; in the WS comparison, accuracy also fell below 
that of even MA peers. Skwerer et al. (2006) have previously shown that individuals 
with WS are less accurate than TD peers in identifying emotions from faces, and that 
the animacy or more ‘real’ nature of a face does not buffer against this. However, they 
also found that a third of their sample were comparable to CA matched peers, therefore 
it could be that an examination within the WS group in the present study might also 
have revealed different patterns in performance. That individuals with WS were less 
accurate in identifying emotions from human faces in Experiment 2 is, however, in line 
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with the findings of Experiment 1 in which spontaneous descriptions of emotion were 
also reduced for human faces relative to peers.  
Non-parametric analysis of the data also revealed that individuals with WS and ASD 
were less accurate in identifying happy and surprised images, relative to both CA and 
MA TD peers. Baron-Cohen et al. (1993) have shown that individuals with ASD have a 
particular deficit in recognising surprise in others, therefore the findings of Experiment 
2 are in line with this. However, it was expected based on Farran et al.’s (2011) 
examination of response times for identifying emotions, that individuals with both ASD 
and WS would show an advantage for happy faces, and that TD peers might be more 
accurate in identifying anger. However, accuracy and response speed may not 
necessarily be related and the two different methodologies employed between the 
present study and that of Farran et al. (2011) might explain the different pattern of 
results. 
 
8.1.3 Experiments 1 and 2: Limitations 
 Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to work together to explore the different 
ways in which individuals with ASD and WS, relative to TD peers, would piece 
together the parts of real and schematic faces to form interpretations and accurately 
deduce emotions. Whilst Experiment 1 was designed as a preliminary analysis of the 
spontaneous responses participants would give, and some evidence of global processing 
emerged given that participants would initially state that ambiguous images (both line 
and fruit) were a ‘face’, no systematic manipulation of specific configurations was 
employed in the present experimental design. Baudouin et al. (2010) have shown that 
sensitivity to spacing changes develops with age in TD children, therefore the lack of 
any consistent manipulation of spacing changes in Experiments 1 and 2 might have 
been a confound, masking possible differences between the groups. Experiment 3 was 
designed to be a more robust examination of processing styles employed by 
participants, based on a classic composite face paradigm (Young, Hellawell & Hay, 
1987). 
 Whilst emotion accuracy was examined in Experiment 2, it might also have been 
informative to look at the interplay between accuracy and response type in Experiment 
1 additionally. This would have been especially useful given the ceiling effects seen in 
Experiment 2, presumably as a result of using a multiple-choice design. It would also 
have been useful to have examined interactions between the category of image 
presented and the emotion depicted in Experiment 2; a replication in future might 
digitally create images so that emotions could be consistently depicted across all image 
categories to allow for an exploration of this.  
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8.2 Experiment 3: Summary 
 Experiment 3 was devised of two parts: Experiment 3a involved participants 
identifying emotions (Happy/scared/angry) from isolated eye and mouth cues; 
Experiment 3b employed a classic composite paradigm (Young, Hellawell & Hay, 
1987) in order to examine evidence of holistic processing amongst the participant 
groups, as well as exploring the possible interplay between upper and lower face cues 
with emotion.  
In Experiment 3a, participants were presented with images of either eyes or mouths and 
asked to identify (from a choice of 3) the emotion depicted. All participants were 
poorest in identifying scared as an emotion, regardless of the format of presentation. 
Across TD age groups, no differences were found in accuracy in identifying emotions 
from eye versus mouth cues. However, in the WS analyses, individuals with WS and 
their TD peers all gave significantly more correct responses to mouth versus eye cues. 
There was a borderline tendency towards less accurate performance for mouth cues in 
the ASD group. Given the very limited number of participants in this group (n=10), 
these results must be treated with caution. 
The lack of any clear differences in facilitation of eyes versus mouth cues between the 
neurodevelopmental groups and their TD peers goes against previous research by 
Behrmann et al. (2006b) and Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2010) who have shown 
reduced attention to the eyes in individuals with ASD. Further, Lacroix et al. (2009) 
have shown that performance for isolated eye cues was better amongst individuals with 
WS than that of mouths, again going against the findings of the present experiment. 
However, Back et al. (2009) have shown that freezing the information available from 
mouth cues is as detrimental to individuals with WS as making eye cues unavailable, 
therefore the exact type of stimuli used might be a factor. 
In Experiment 3b, participants were asked to identify (from a choice of 
happy/scared/angry) the emotions of either the top or bottom halves of faces, presented 
in aligned and misaligned formats. Better accuracy for misaligned faces is taken to be 
evidence of holistic processing (Young, Hellawell & Hay, 1987) In all participant 
groups, accuracy was highest for misaligned faces overall, and also for faces in which 
the emotion of the bottom halves were being identified. Given that no heightened 
accuracy was observed across the TD groups in identifying emotions from isolated 
mouth (versus eye cues), this suggests different processes might be at play depending 
on whether or not other face information is available. However, in the WS group, 
accuracy for mouth cues was significantly better than for eye cues in Experiment 3a, 
and this was in line with the finding that accuracy was at only chance level (~33%) 
when identifying emotions from the top halves of faces in Experiment 3b. Perhaps then, 
in WS uniquely, the same types of strategies are employed when presented with isolated 
face parts and whole faces? 
Individuals with both ASD and WS were only able to give accurate responses at chance 
level for aligned presentations of images in Experiment 3b, perhaps suggesting that they 
do employ a holistic style of processing that is more negatively affected by the 
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alignment of face parts than seen in the TD groups.  One particularly interesting finding 
to emerge was that individuals with both WS and ASD were more accurate in 
identifying happiness from aligned versus misaligned presentations of faces; in TD 
groups, the opposite pattern was seen, in which accuracy was higher for misaligned 
happy faces. It is very difficult to reconcile this finding with any previous literature; 
eye-tracking data would be informative in elucidating patterns of attention in pulling 
apart why the amalgamation of two conflicting face halves would result in better 
accuracy for depictions of happiness. This pattern was not more pronounced when 
identifying emotions from top or bottom halves of faces, therefore it cannot be 
explained by any particular type of cue use. Given that, in Experiment 2, accuracy for 
identifying ‘happy’ was reduced relative to peers in the WS and ASD groups, it might 
be possible that this emotion specifically is processed atypically. This is worth further 
examination in future. 
 
8.2.1 Experiment 3: Limitations 
 The main limitation in Experiment 3b was the fact that a large number of ASD 
participants recruited to the study did not wish to take part, leaving a final sample of 
only 10 participants. Where borderline interactions were found, results might have been 
more robust given a larger sample size. Further, had more participants taken part, it 
might have been possible to explore subgroups of participants and possible within group 
differences that might have been underpinning some of the unexpected patterns of 
results.  
Whilst the inclusion of a robust paradigm such as that used in Experiment 3b was 
important for formally and systematically examining evidence of holistic processing in 
neurodevelopmental groups, it would have been useful to have included the same 
emotions as were depicted in Experiment 2, in order to draw links between underlying 
processes and behavioural performance. ‘Surprise’ was not included in Experiment 3, 
therefore it is not possible to state whether the lower accuracy for that emotion in 
Experiment 2 might be underpinned by a less holistic strategy.  However, given that the 
majority of participants were not the same individuals in these experiments, it would not 
be possible to draw direct comparisons, regardless of the uniformity of individual 
stimuli. 
 
8.2.2 Summary of Experiments 1-3 
 Experiments 1-3 point to the fact that individuals with both WS and ASD do use 
similar strategies when interpreting emotions from faces, but do so generally less 
accurately than TD CA peers. Some specific atypicalities emerged in which individuals 
in both neurodevelopmental groups appear to have difficulties in identifying happy and 
surprised images, perhaps underpinned by a more feature by feature style of processing. 
Whilst the role of experience (with animals and in using everyday items, for example) 
was not examined in the first set of experiments, suggestions emerged in which the role 
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of experience and the salience of particular stimuli might play an important role in the 
ability to accurately interpret and give social meaning to faces. Experiments 4-6 were 
designed to examine what attributions and understanding individuals derive from 
socially relevant information. 
 
8.3 Experiment 4: Summary 
 The Masking task was based on an experiment used by both Santos et al. (2008) 
and Da Fonseca et al. (2009) with WS and ASD participants, respectively. The purpose 
of these original experiments was to examine whether individuals in the 
neurodevelopmental groups would be able to accurately deduce what object or 
emotionally expressive face was missing from everyday scenes by using surrounding 
cues. Their findings showed opposite contrasting patterns between individuals with WS 
and ASD in that those with ASD were less accurate than TD peers in identifying the 
missing face but were as competent as peers when asked to find the missing objects; 
individuals with WS were poorer than peers in identifying the missing object, but were 
as capable in correctly choosing the missing face. Experiment 4 was therefore designed 
to replicate these findings, with the addition of examining the interplay of what types of 
surrounding cue were available in the scenes. 
Participants in Experiment 4 were presented with 36 everyday scenes in which either a 
face or object were masked out. A third of the scenes were non-social, in that they only 
contained objects or scenery and no people; one third had another person in the scene 
with a neutral expression, providing some type of instructional or descriptive gesture, 
whilst the remaining third contained a person with a clear facial expression that could be 
used to derive the missing item or face. Participants were presented with five cartoon 
response options and were asked ‘what’s missing’. A consistent finding across all 
participant groups was that accuracy was higher for identifying missing objects 
compared to faces, regardless of the types of cue available in the scene. Unlike what 
was found by Santos et al. (2008), this was also the case in the WS group. Accuracy 
was overall poorer for both faces and objects in the WS and ASD groups and over all 
conditions relative to CA but not MA peers. This therefore suggests that individuals in 
the neurodevelopmental groups find it difficult to use any types of cue to make 
inferences about missing content and show possible developmental delay in this area. 
It was expected, given the evidence that individuals with WS overly attend to faces and 
seem to get ‘stuck’ on them (Riby & Hancock, 2009; Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2009) that 
individuals with WS in the present study would be more likely to make errors in which 
they chose faces instead of objects as a response. This was not, however, found to be the 
case, with no notable differences found in the proportions of face versus object 
distractors chosen in any of the groups. However, overall, very few distractor error 
types were made, with all participant groups making a higher percentage of errors 
within a category (such as choosing the wrong emotional expression) than in choosing 
the wrong category altogether. The findings of Experiment 4 therefore failed to identify 
any possible differences between individuals with ASD and WS that might be 
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suggestive of the different facilitation of a face or divides between understanding of, 
versus attention to, particular cues. 
 
8.4 Experiment 5: Summary 
 The Animation task (AT) was based on an adaptation of the Heider and Simmel 
(1944) moving triangle animation, in which basic geometric shapes were created to 
depict possible physical (such as a flower growing) or social (the motions of two 
characters hugging, for example) movements; participants were asked to watch the 
animations carefully (four of each type) and provide a narration of what they had seen. 
Previous research (Klin, 2000; Abell et al., 2000) has suggested that individuals with 
ASD make far fewer social attributions about ambiguous moving scenes using this type 
of paradigm than TD peers, instead focussing on the physical descriptions of displays. 
Van der Fluit et al. (2012) have shown a similar profile amongst individuals with WS, 
in that they fail to provide as many descriptions as TD peers indicating social or 
perspective-taking type attributions. Previous research has, however employed slightly 
different scoring indices for coding the types of descriptions that participants provided, 
therefore Experiment 5 was designed to directly compare the type of spontaneous 
attributions that individuals would make to physical and social depictions comprised of 
ambiguous moving geometric shapes (See examples on CD 1). 
One prediction made in Experiment 5 was that individuals with ASD would provide 
more descriptions concerned with purely physical interactions, whereas individuals with 
WS would show a propensity towards providing more social descriptions of 
interactions. This was not, however, found to be the case: No differences were found 
between the number of physical versus social interaction terms used in the ASD 
analysis compared to TD peers, or across age groups in the TD analyses. In the WS 
comparisons with TD peers, all groups provided more physical versus social interaction 
descriptions. It was hypothesised that the hyper-sociable (Dodd et al., 2010) nature of 
individuals with WS might be underpinned by a tendency towards making excessive 
social attributions from scenarios, regardless of their social content; whilst this was not 
found to be the case, the findings of Experiment 5 are in line with what was found in 
Experiment 1, whereby individuals with WS gave comparable numbers of feature 
descriptions in response to real faces as did TD peers, but struggled to provide more 
complex (emotion) terms. It could be the case that individuals with WS did not use as 
many social interaction terms in Experiment 5 due to a lack of understanding, although 
not all of the same participants took part in these two experiments.  
The narratives provided by participants were coded for accuracy compared to an adult 
TD sample. Accuracy was not seen to clearly improve with age across the TD groups, 
and individuals with WS were less accurate than TD CA peers on both physical and 
social animations. A borderline significant interaction was found in the ASD group, in 
which individuals with ASD did not differ in accuracy scores for physical animations 
but were poorer in accurately narrating social animations. This points to the possibility, 
as Klin (2000) and Da Fonseca et al. (2009) also have done, that individuals with ASD 
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are better able to deduce meanings and accurately interpret physical scenes and objects, 
rather than those with more social content. However, individuals with ASD were 
significantly less accurate than both CA and MA TD peers in answering multiple choice 
questions about what might happen next in the animations (after being provided with a 
narrative by the experimenter) and this was the case for both physical and social 
displays. Therefore, despite more accurate narratives in line with TD adults for physical 
animations, an understanding  of what those interactions might depict was lacking in 
the ASD group. Individuals with WS performed at MA (but less accurately than TD 
CAs) level on this component of Experiment 5. Van der Fluit et al. (2012) found that 
providing narratives improved performance in their WS cohort, but individuals in the 
present study were only comparable to very young MA matches. 
An examination of the proportions of each type of error made (labelling a social 
animation with physical labels[MisSocial] or vice versa [MisPhysical]) revealed the 
same pattern in WS and ASD groups whereby participants with the neurodevelopmental 
disorders made a far higher percentage of MisSocial errors, whereas TD groups made a 
higher proportion of MisPhysical errors. The underlying reasons for these similar 
profiles in WS and ASD might be different; for example, individuals with ASD were 
overall less accurate in providing narratives for social scenes, therefore perhaps the 
over-use of physical descriptions is a default strategy in cases of uncertainty. The profile 
is more difficult to explain in WS, in which no accuracy differences were found 
between social and physical animations. It may, again, come down to an understanding 
issue; the purpose of experiment 6 was to examine the link between  the attribution and 
understanding of emotions in socially relevant scenes. 
 
8.5 Experiment 6: Summary 
 The Social Cognition task (SC) was comprised of 8 socially relevant displays in 
which participants were asked to follow the gaze of a central character (depicting a 
neutral expression) to state what image she was attending to. All participants were able 
to do this without difficulty, performing at ceiling. Participants were then asked to 
explain why the image was being looked at (four images were positively valenced and 
four were negative, such as a sunny beach compared to a haunted house) and to state 
how the central character would therefore feel. To be in line with Experiment 5, the 
same types of responses were compared: Purely physical explanations versus those 
involving a more social element in which the perspective of the central character was 
verbalised. 
Whilst no differences were found between the TD age groups for the number of purely 
physical explanations given, individuals in the oldest group gave significantly more 
perspective-taking terms than those aged 8.6-11.11 or children aged under 6. 
Individuals with WS did not differ significantly from peers as to how many of either 
term type they gave, whereas those with ASD gave significantly fewer perspective-
taking terms than CA TD peers. Given that in Experiment 5, differences were not found 
between the numbers of physical versus social descriptions used relative to TD peers in 
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the ASD group, it is interesting to note that differences did emerge in Experiment 6. 
Given that different children were recruited to the two experiments, it is impossible to 
state whether this was due to within subject variability or concerned with some specific 
facet of the task demands. Kret et al. (2011) have noted how the animacy of socially 
relevant information might determine the processing strategies used and their efficacy, 
therefore it might be that individuals with ASD were less inclined to use perspective-
taking terms in Experiment 6, where no depictions of animate interactions were 
provided. 
When examining the appropriateness of the emotions given to the explanations for why 
a scene was being attended to, it was found that no age effects emerged within the TD 
analysis and individuals with ASD did not make significantly more errors than TD 
peers. In the WS group, however, individuals were not as accurate as TD CA 
individuals. That individuals with WS were using similar numbers of perspective-taking 
terms as TD peers but without mapping appropriate emotions onto these is particularly 
interesting, and points to a possible divide between interpreting and understanding 
socially relevant information.  
 
8.5.1 Experiments 4-6: Limitations and Summary 
 Due to the timing of recruitment, the participants who took part in Experiments 
4/5 and Experiment 6 were largely not the same individuals. A small subgroup of those 
with ASD, and a larger cohort of the WS individuals did take part in all 3 experiments, 
but these numbers were not sufficient to conduct any direct analyses comparing patterns 
of performance across the three tasks. This would have been particularly informative in 
teasing apart possible differences due to task demands versus underlying atypicalities 
seen in the groups that might persist across the different measures.  
In both Experiments 4 and 5, a more fine-tuned analysis of the error types and responses 
given might have better pulled apart differences that were predicted (but failed to) 
emerge between the WS and ASD groups, relative to TD peers. It was decided not to 
employ the detailed and complex scoring indices adopted by Klin (2000) in experiment 
5, as the focus of this experiment was on physical versus social descriptions; however, 
use of a more comprehensive scoring system would probably have better differentiated 
between the types of profiles seen in neurodevelopmental groups. Similarly, analysis of 
the types of emotion labelling errors that individuals were making in Experiment 4 
might have better revealed why individuals with WS did not show the ‘face’ advantage 
observed by Santos et al. (2008). Regarding Experiment 4, it is also worth considering 
that the cartoon-like depiction of response options might have affected performance; 
whilst Santos et al. (2008) also used this method of presentation in their study, Farran et 
al. (2011) have noted that there is an interplay between the emotions being depicted and 
the nature of the stimuli (schematic versus real faces) on accuracy in identifying 
emotions. This interplay was not explored in Experiment 4, and should be considered in 
future research. 
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One striking finding in Experiment 6 was the observation that all participants in the 
ASD group accurately identified the image being attended to on 100% of trials. This 
level of accuracy was not seen in any other groups. Given that part of the diagnostic 
criteria on the ADOS is poor joint attention, this is a somewhat surprising finding, 
although lab-based measures of gaze detection (Nation & Penny, 2008) have shown 
similar accuracy for gaze following in individuals with ASD. This highlights the 
importance of acknowledging differences between controlled, standardised measures of 
social perception compared to those seen in everyday behaviours. Whilst following gaze 
to one of four possible corners of a screen is not joint attention per se, it still suggests 
that individuals with ASD are able to attend both to a central character and then to the 
item that person is looking at. That they do this as accurately as TD peers is not under 
debate, based on the finding of Experiment 6; in future, it would be useful to examine 
whether they do this as rapidly, taking a measure of response times. Further, eye-
tracking techniques would also be helpful in examining precisely which cues in socially 
relevant scenes individuals with WS and ASD attend to when devising their 
explanations. Riby and Hancock (2009) examined one component of this in their study 
comparing the ‘hotspots’ of individuals with WS and ASD when attending to social 
scenes, but the relationship between where  an individual is attending and what use they 
make of that information has yet to be explored. 
To summarise Experiments 4-6, it does not appear to be the case that individuals with 
WS are overly distracted by faces versus objects, or that there is any particular 
facilitation of faces in aiding accuracy for identifying missing items in the WS group. 
All individuals in Experiment 4 were more likely to make errors suggesting difficulties 
in understanding both social and non-social scenes. This difficulty in understanding  
socially relevant information pervaded all three experiments in the WS group, with 
performance being less accurate than TD CA peers in providing accurate narratives in 
Experiment 5, and in providing appropriate emotions in Experiment 6. Individuals with 
ASD tended to show developmental delays for social animations exclusively in 
Experiment 5, and in using fewer perspective terms in Experiment 6. It therefore 
appears that a possible key difference between individuals with WS and ASD might be 
in the fact that those with ASD make fewer interpretations based on social terms and 
descriptions, and have more difficulty in making sense of social versus physical 
information, whereas individuals with WS do use socially complex terms but are 
lacking in a real understanding of them. 
Over 6 experiments examining various aspects of processing style, cue use, emotion 
specificity and the interpretation, attributions and understanding of faces and other 
socially relevant information, very few differences in the profiles of individuals with 
WS and ASD have emerged. Indeed, there are more similarities between those with 
ASD and WS than there are between these groups relative to TD peers. It is therefore 
important to examine why these overlaps might be occurring, in light of heterogeneity 
seen within the groups.  
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8.6 Heterogeneity and Overlaps in autism and Williams syndrome 
 Given the similar profiles seen on several of the experiments in the present 
research between those with ASD and WS, possible overlaps in everyday traits were 
examined in the neurodevelopmental groups. The Social and Communication 
questionnaire (SCQ) was used in order to formally measure the number of autistic type 
traits seen in WS. No significant differences were found (See Appendix C) on the total 
scores of individuals with WS compared to those with ASD; moreover, all individuals 
recruited to Experiments 1, 2 and 6 in the WS cohort for whom SCQ data was available 
had scores that were above the cut-off (scores above 12) indicating autism. This could 
suggest that some of the overlapping traits assessed on the SCQ might underlie the 
similar profiles seen in the present set of experiments. These findings should be treated 
with some level of caution, however, as the SCQ is designed whereby caregivers are 
asked to choose a yes/no response to questions such as “Does she/he show a normal 
range of facial expressions?”  In autism, a ‘no’ to this question might be because the 
child only ever shows one emotion, whereas in WS, it could be that the child shows a 
vast range of extreme emotions, therefore not picking up on these subtle but critical 
differences. Were a large number of participants recruited to the present research, it 
would have been useful to look at subsections of the SCQ and their possible correlation 
to specific tasks. 
Lincoln et al. (2007) have shown that there are definite overlaps in the autistic traits 
seen between individuals with WS and ASD, but this does depend on the particular 
domain of behaviour being explored; 55% of their WS sample met criteria on the 
ADOS for a PDD-NOS but only 10% met criteria when examining the purely social 
domain. This highlights how heterogeneous WS is, with certain areas of social function 
being more atypical than others. Little et al. (2013) have proposed that there might be 
subgroups of individuals with WS and this is a definite area worthy of future research; it 
would be interesting to examine subgroups of participants in Experiments 5 and 6, for 
example, to establish if individuals who were using social terms were the same 
individuals who better understood the emotions in the tasks.  
It was not possible to directly compare individuals with WS and ASD in the present 
research, given their significantly different NVIQ scores; individuals with WS had 
consistently lower scores than those in the ASD group. This also meant that TD MA 
matches for WS individuals were particularly young. This could be problematic given 
the wide age range (spanning 6.9-17.5, across all participants recruited) in the WS 
group. Recruiting more participants would have allowed for an analysis of subgroups of 
ages within the neurodevelopmental groups much like that carried out in the present 
study in the TD groups. Searcy et al. (2004) have, however, shown that there was no 
significant relationship between verbal IQ and age in a group of WS TD adults, 
therefore it may be the case that age is not as important in determining performance in 
individuals with WS. This is in line with the consistent finding across the majority of 
experiments in the present study that both individuals with ASD and WS did not differ 
significantly from TD MA peers.  
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VIQ scores in the present set of experiments were relatively higher (than NVIQ) and 
significantly exceeded those of individuals with ASD in comparisons conducted 
between participants recruited to Experiments 1, 2 and 6. Poorer verbal ability amongst 
the ASD group in Experiment 6 might have played some part in their using fewer 
perspective taking terms relative to peers; unfortunately, VIQ data was not available for 
TD participants on that experiment. This difference in VIQ between ASD and WS 
participants disappeared in those recruited to Experiments 3,4 and 5, however. This 
again demonstrates how different the verbal profiles within both ASD and WS can be; 
Jarrold et al. (2001)have demonstrated how VIQ determines performance in other 
domains across age in WS, whereas visuo-spatial abilities cannot be so reliably used to 
predict performance in other areas. This complex pattern of abilities within different 
domains and how they relate make it very difficult to deduce precisely which factors 
might underlie everyday social behaviours. 
The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) was used in the present set of 
experiments in order to ensure that only children who were not reported to have any 
‘atypical’ social or emotional behaviours were recruited into the TD comparison groups. 
SDQ data was also available for the majority of participants with WS (See Appendix C) 
therefore differences between the scores were examined for the WS group and their TD 
peers. Whilst it was expected that TD children would have significantly lower scores 
than individuals with WS, the degree of difference was considerably striking, with an 
average score of ~4 across all TD participants compared to an average score of 25 in the 
WS group. Scores ranged from 18-33 amongst WS participants, again suggesting a lot 
of individual differences between individuals within this population. Unfortunately, 
subdomain scores were not available for the group of WS participants and no data was 
available for individuals with ASD; a direct comparison of these would be particularly 
informative in future for highlighting possible subgroups within and between disorders. 
 
8.7 Conclusions and Future Directions 
It is clear that, even within the neurodevelopmental disorders ASD and WS, 
there is a great deal of variation in both verbal and non-verbal IQ, as well as in the types 
of social behaviours that individuals show. Future research must aim to recruit as wide a 
sample of participants as possible, in order to examine possible ‘clusters’ (Little et al. 
(2013) and subgroups that might better explain the particular social profiles seen in 
these disorders. It is also evident, based on the six experiments described here, that there 
are many overlaps between individuals with ASD and WS, with standardised measures 
such as the SCQ and ADOS (Lincoln et al., 2007)  picking up on autistic traits in 
individuals with WS. Pulling apart precisely in what ways these disorders are similar or 
different might be a fruitful, albeit challenging, avenue of future research. 
The primary aim of the current research was to answer the question of what meaning 
faces and other socially relevant information have to individuals with ASD and WS; the 
initial guiding hypothesis was that perhaps there was a neat distinction between the 
underlying causes of the apparently divergent social behaviours seen in ASD and WS, 
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such that the differences might be explained by difficulties in social-perception versus 
social-cognition. However, the consistent theme to emerge from the six experiments 
comprising this research was that individuals with ASD and WS have considerably 
more overlaps in their social profiles than they do distinctions: Both individuals with 
ASD and WS tend to attend to individual features in cases of uncertainty when 
processing information from ambiguous stimuli (Experiment 1) and are poorer than TD 
CA peers in accurately identifying emotions, especially surprise and happiness 
(Experiment 2). The interplay between emotions and the cues used was not robustly or 
systematically examined in the present set of experiments; a fine-tuned analysis of these 
complex relationships would make an informative future study. Similarly, none of the 
present experiments involved images exploring gaze; as an important part of joint 
attention, known to be atypical in individuals with ASD, future studies should examine 
the interplay between gaze direction and social understanding. 
Experiments 4-6 were designed to assess atypicalities in the social-cognitive domain: 
What inferences, attributions and understanding would individuals make from socially 
relevant information, and would faces facilitate or distract individuals in some way 
(Experiment 4)? The most prominent theme to emerge from these experiments was that 
individuals with ASD did not seem to use as many socially driven descriptions, with 
more focus and more accurate performance on physical scenes and information. 
Individuals with WS, conversely, did not show as many difficulties in using social terms 
but showed deficits in an understanding of emotions and social contexts. Given the 
heterogeneity seen in the participants recruited to these experiments, with a wide range 
of both non-verbal and verbal IQ scores and a broad range of atypical behaviours 
reported by parents/teachers, it may well be that within-group differences need further 
exploration.  
The role of experience in modulating both neurological development and the 
development of social behaviours is an increasingly important area of research. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1997) and Bachevalier and Loveland (2006) are strong proponents of 
the view that there is a complex and reciprocal relationship between everyday 
experiences and the development of specific social-cognitive domains. Preliminary 
findings in the present study (Experiments 1 and 6) point to the possibility that some of 
the differences seen between individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders and TD 
controls might be due to individual personal experiences. Future research should build 
on this concept by rigorously exploring the relationship between one’s own emotions 
and preferences compared to their understanding of another’s. Similarly, the utility and 
salience of particular cues and their facilitation in helping individuals to understand 
socially relevant information would be a worthy focus of future studies. A preliminary 
study (See Appendix D) conducted during the present research used guided 
conversations to explore the types of experiences and understanding of social situations 
that children with ASD and their TD peers would report. Topics of conversation were 
structured to be about the children’s hobbies, birthdays or a school trip, with prompted 
questions designed to elicit conversations; allowing children to talk about activities that 
they had experienced enabled an examination of the types of experiences and concepts 
that were most salient to them. A small sample (n=5) of conversations were also 
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conducted with individuals with WS. Whilst no formal analyses of the conversations 
has yet been conducted, brief examination of the types of descriptions that children in 
the different groups gave suggests that individuals with ASD talk less about interactions 
with peers and focus more on recalling concrete activities and objects; individuals with 
WS seem to give reports around who was involved in an interaction and how people 
felt, much in line with TD children. This is an area of future work that may be useful in 
exploring the role that personal experiences have in an understanding of social 
situations. 
 
8.8 Summary  
The present research suggests that individuals with WS and ASD, whilst being 
less accurate in interpreting emotions from faces, tend to use similar social-perceptual 
strategies; individuals with the neurodevelopmental disorders default more to using 
features only when presented with ambiguous information. In the social-cognitive 
domain, clearer differences begin to emerge between those with ASD and WS, with 
individuals in the former case appearing to make less social interpretations of socially 
relevant information, whilst individuals with WS show difficulties in social 
understanding. Future research must attempt to map these possible difficulties in 
interpreting and understanding social information onto everyday social behaviours, 
examining the ways in which personal experiences might mediate this link. Might it be, 
for example, that the cues that are salient to individuals with ASD and WS (i.e.: objects 
and emotions) can in some way be used to support their understanding of social 
information? Understanding precisely how the atypicalities seen in ASD and WS might 
be mediated by personal experiences and heterogeneity within these 
neurodevelopmental disorders could be the key to mapping these areas of difficulty onto 
the unique social profiles seen in these groups. Elucidating profiles of where the 
difficulties lie will allow for applied future research to explore ways in which the 
relative strengths seen in these disorders might be used to support an understanding of 
the social environment and give more socially relevant meaning to the question of 
‘What’s in a face’? 
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Appendix A 
The below sections provide examples of the various images used in experiments 1-6. 
All images used in Experiment 1 (What Is It task) 
Fruit images 
           
 
Line images 
           
 
Human images 
                
 
Animal images 
                
 
Object images 
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Examples of scenes used in Experiment 4 (Masking task) 
No social content 
 
 
Correct response: C 
 
 
 
Correct response: E 
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Neutral content 
 
Correct response: E 
 
 
 
Correct response: B 
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Emotional content 
 
Correct response: A 
 
 
Correct response: D 
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Scripts for narratives used in Experiment 5i 
Animation 1: 
A cat spots a bird flying up in the sky. The cat follows the bird and sees he lands on a 
tree. The cat jumps up to try to catch the bird but the bird flies away again. 
 
Animation 2: 
A glass ball is on the table and starts to roll off. It lands on the floor and breaks open 
and the items inside spill out. 
 
Animation 3: 
A big cloud is in the sky. It grows bigger and bigger and then it starts to rain. The rain 
makes a big puddle on the ground. 
 
Animation 4: 
A dog is sniffing along the ground. He smells something hidden under the tree so he 
digs to find what it is. He finds a bone and takes it away. 
 
Animation 5: 
The sun is shining and a flower starts to grow. Petals appear and the sun makes it grow 
more and more. 
 
Animation 6: 
A boy and girl wave at each other then run towards each other. They have a big hug. 
 
Animation 7: 
Two people are playing tennis. They hit the ball backwards and forwards until one of 
them cannot hit it back anymore. 
 
Animation 8: 
An aeroplane goes down the runway very fast and takes off up into the sky. It goes 
higher and higher. 
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Images used in experiment 6 (Social Cognition task) 
Positively valenced images 
      
 
         
 
Negatively valenced images 
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Appendix B 
Examples of narratives given in Experiment 5 (For animations 6, 7, 3 and 5) 
Williams syndrome participants 
Awww. That's so sweet. There were two friends playing and then they hold hands. 
 
He's got a tennis racket and he hit the ball to that one and he hit it down so that means 
he was cheating. 
 
There was a rose and a cloud and rain shot out. 
 
The sun shined and it made the tree grow, wheee. 
 
 
Autistic participants 
 
The triangle and the square both together. 
 
They're playing tennis. They were hitting it. 
 
It started to rain. The cloud's red. 
 
A plant, a flower growing and the sun come. 
 
 
Typical children 
 
A girl and a boy kissing. 
 
They're playing tennis, one of them hits it out and the other one drops the racquet 'coz 
he's sad. 
 
It was a sunny day with clouds in the sky then it suddenly started raining and there was 
a flood. 
 
Somebody's planted a flower seed and then the sun comes out and it starts growing. 
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Examples of reasons given for why an image is being looked at, in Experiment 6 
(For the lightening image and beach image) 
 
Williams syndrome participants 
 
Having a bad day. Doesn't have to go to school. 
She's afraid. 
Can't go outside coz it might hit her. 
Looks a bit scary to me. 
 
 
Because it's good. I love sailing. 
She might want to play in the sea. 
Making her sad. She won't be allowed to go on holiday. 
 
 
Autistic participants 
 
Coz it's all thundery. Scary and dangerous. 
It has light (makes a thunder sound). 
Might make her scared 
She's scared. She likes it. 
 
 
Might wanna go there 
It's a beautiful sea. 
She's so happy 
Might be looking at the blue sky 
 
 
Typical children 
 
Looking out her window to see if it's thundering 
A bit dangerous and she doesn't like how it feels. 
Colour and electric sparks. It’s so fast, it's capturing so she's looking while she can. 
Young children find it frightening but some people find it pretty. 
 
 
A lovely scene and she probably wants to live there. 
She might have been there with her family and it all looks calm and away from 
everything. She wants to play in the sea. 
Makes her relaxed and she wants to swim in that pool. 'I want to go there'. 
She'd rather go on holiday than do anything with the other pictures. It's more relaxing to 
go away than any of the other pictures. She might live in England where the weather is 
rubbish! 
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Appendix C 
 
Overlaps and differences between Williams syndrome (WS) and autism (ASD) 
In order to examine the within and between group heterogeneity amongst 
individuals with WS and ASD, various analyses were conducted on the standardised 
measures of behaviour and IQ. The following sections report the findings of these 
analyses and these are discussed in more detail in section 8.6. Participants who took part 
in experiments 1, 2 and 6 (labelled ‘study 1’) were not the same individuals as those 
who took part in experiments 3, 4 and 5 (‘study 2’), therefore the data has been grouped 
into these two halves. Whilst some participants declined taking part in some of the 
experiments, the below data is for all of those originally recruited to the tasks, in order 
to outline the fullest picture of the heterogeneity within groups. Of the individuals with 
ASD who took part in study 1, six individuals also took part in study 2. In the WS 
cohort, 9 individuals recruited to study 1 also took part in study 2. For detailed 
explanations of each measure, refer to the Method section of corresponding 
experiments. 
STUDY 1 
Age, Verbal IQ (VIQ) and Non-verbal IQ (NVIQ) 
Descriptive statistics for participant ages, NVIQ (maximum score=36, assessed 
using the RCPM) and VIQ (maximum score=112, assessed using the WISC III) are 
provided in table C.1. Data for this measure was available for 14 individuals with ASD 
and 8 with WS. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare the groups; no 
significant difference was found between the ages of the groups [t (30) =.01, p=.99]. 
Significant differences were, however, found between NVIQ [t (30) =6.57, p<.01] and 
VIQ scores: t (20) =6.39, p<.01. Whilst individuals with WS had lower scores on the 
NVIQ measure, they had significantly higher scores on the VIQ tasks. 
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Table C.1: Descriptive statistics for age, NVIQ and VIQ for the ASD and WS groups 
recruited to study 1 (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 CA RCPM Raw Score      WISC VIQ Score 
 Range             Mean Range              Mean Range                    Mean 
ASD 
(n=18) 
8.1-14.9          10.8 (2.3) 9-31                26.9 (6.0)  9-42                  27.21 (9.53) 
WS 
(n=14) 
6.9-16.5            10.10 (3.2) 8-21                14.93 (3.63)             37-74                57.13 (12.26) 
 
Social Communication Questionnaires (SCQ) 
 SCQ data was collected for all individuals with ASD and historical data was 
available for 13 individuals with WS. Higher SCQ scores are indicative of more autistic 
traits; a score of above 12 is used to indicate sufficient autistic symptomatology to meet 
diagnostic criteria. The SCQ was used in the present set of experiments as an inclusion 
criteria for selection to the ASD group, therefore the mean score in this group was 16.3 
(standard deviation 3.91). However, within the WS group, the mean score was not 
significantly different from those with ASD [t (29) =.40, p=.69], with a mean score of 
15.85 (standard deviation 2.41). In fact, scores in the WS group ranged from 13-22 
compared to 9-23 amongst those with ASD, meaning that every participant with a 
diagnosis of WS met the criteria for autism. 
 
Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) 
 The SDQ was administered as an inclusion measure for TD children: Those 
scoring above the cut-off for atypical behaviours (17 for parent-report and 16 for 
teacher-report) were excluded from participating in the present set of experiments. 
SDQs were not administered to individuals with ASD but historical SDQ data was 
available for 11 of the WS participants. Descriptive statistics for the WS group and their 
TD matches are provided in table C.2. Due to some teachers/parents declining to 
complete the questionnaires, data were missing for 4 of each of the TD CA and MA 
matches. 
 
   
250 
 
 
Table C.2: Descriptive statistics on SDQ scores for the WS group compared to TD 
matches recruited to study 1 (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 SDQ score 
 Range             Mean 
WS (n=11) 18-33               25.0 (5.14) 
TD CA (n=7) 0-5                     3.14 (2.11) 
TD MA (n=7) 1-13                    6.86 (4.10) 
 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare the WS participants to their TD 
MA and CA matches, separately. Levenes test of homogeneity of variance was 
significant for the TD CA comparison, therefore corrected t-values were used. Both 
comparisons were significant: t (16) =7.86, p<.01; t (14.34) =12.54, p<.01, respectively.  
 
STUDY 2 
Age, Verbal IQ (VIQ) and Non-verbal IQ (NVIQ) 
Descriptive statistics for participant ages, NVIQ (maximum score=36, assessed 
using the RCPM) and VIQ (maximum score=112, assessed using the WISC III) are 
provided in table C.3 Data for this measure was available for 12 individuals with ASD 
and 6 with WS. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare the groups; no 
significant difference was found between the ages of the groups [t (28) =.51, p=.29] or 
on their VIQ scores: t (16) =1.14, p=.27. A significant difference was found between 
NVIQ scores, in which participants with ASD had higher scores: t (28) =3.48, p<.01. 
Table C.3 Descriptive statistics for age, NVIQ and VIQ for the ASD and WS groups 
recruited to study 2 (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Chronological Age RCPM Raw Score      WISC VIQ Score 
 Range             Mean Range              Mean Range                    Mean 
ASD 
(n=15) 
6.5-16.6           11.2 
(3.3) 
12-34              25.13 (6.17) 10-57                26.83 (13.90) 
WS  
(n=15) 
8.0-17.5              12.6 
(3.4) 
9-31                17.27 (6.22)                12-57               35.67 (18.48) 
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Social Communication Questionnaires (SCQ) 
 SCQ data was missing for one participant with ASD and historical data was 
available for 14 individuals with WS. The mean SCQ score in the ASD group was 17.29 
(standard deviation 4.68), with scores ranging from 12-25. Within the WS group, the 
mean score was 14.79 (standard deviation 3.29), with scores ranging from 6-19. An 
independent samples t-test found there to be no significant differences between the SCQ 
scores of the two groups: t (26) =1.64, p=.11. 
 
Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) 
 SDQ data was available for 13 of the WS participants. Unfortunately, several of 
the teachers and parents of TD matches declined to fill out the questionnaire, therefore 
data was only available for five participants in the TD CA group and 11 in the TD MA 
group. Descriptive statistics are reported in table C.4. 
 
Table C.4: Descriptive statistics on SDQ scores for the WS group compared to TD 
matches recruited to study 2 (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 SDQ score 
 Range             Mean 
WS (n=13) 18-33              25.46 (5.55) 
TD CA (n=5) 2-4                    3.0 (1.0) 
TD MA (n=11) 0-7                    2.91 (2.91) 
 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare the WS participants to their TD 
MA and CA matches, separately. Levenes test of homogeneity of variance was 
significant for both comparisons therefore corrected t-values were used. Significant 
differences were found between SDQ scores of the WS and MA group: t (18.72) 
=12.73, p<.01, as well as the TD CA group: t (13.82) =14.02, p<.01. 
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Appendix D 
Drawing task  
Preliminary research gathered as part of another project was carried out with a small 
number (n=5) of participants from the Williams syndrome cohort, each matched on CA 
and MA to an ASD participant. The mean age of the WS individuals was 12 years, 9 
months and the mean NVIQ score was 21.  
Participants were asked to talk about their hobbies, a recent birthday party and a school 
trip in semi-structured conversations. These conversations were coded for whether the 
predominant response revolved around talking about relationships and/or interactions 
with others; things that the child had or had not liked; emotions, and descriptions of 
details/objects at the event. The mean numbers of each type of response are reported in 
table D.1, below.  
 
Table D1: Mean number of each response type (maximum number=3) on the drawing 
task (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Relationships Likes Emotions Descriptions 
WS 0.8 (0.44) 1 (1) 0 (0) 1.2 (1.10) 
ASD CA 0.5 (1) 0.75 (0.96) 0.25 (0.5) 1.25 (0.96) 
ASD MA 0.2 (0.45) 0.2 (0.45) 0 (0) 2.6 (0.55) 
 
Due to the small sample size and lack of power, no statistical analysis was conducted on 
the above data. However, in line with the findings of the main thesis that individuals 
with ASD focus more on physical descriptions of objects than on social elements, there 
was an increase in the number of times individuals with ASD gave purely descriptive 
accounts during conversations. This same pattern was seen, although to a lesser extent, 
in the WS group. Figures D.1-D.3 provide a pictorial representation of some of the key 
terms used by individuals with WS and ASD when asked to talk about each topic. 
Larger words represent more frequent use of that term. 
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Figure D.1: Wordles of the terms used by individuals with ASD (Top) and WS during 
conversations about a school trip. 
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Figure D.2: Wordles of the terms used by individuals with ASD (Top) and WS during 
conversations about hobbies 
 
 
Figure D.3: Wordles of the terms used by individuals with ASD (Top) and WS during 
conversations about a birthday 
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 Future research must further explore this type of conversational data as, given a larger 
sample, it might begin to reveal those aspects of social situations that have the most 
meaning and relevance to children with ASD and WS. 
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Appendix E 
Information Sheets for parents 
TD parents 
What meaning do faces have? Processing of emotions from faces. 
 
We would like to invite your child to take part in a research study. Please read this information 
sheet before deciding whether you would like them to take part. It will explain why the 
research is being done and what it will involve. If there is anything you are unclear about after 
you have read this information, please feel free to ask questions. I can be contacted by email 
or by phone using the contact details at the bottom of the sheet.   
Purpose of the study 
We are hoping to compare typically developing children like yours to those with Williams 
Syndrome and Autism: Neuro-developmental disorders that have specific patterns of 
behaviour. People with Williams syndrome tend to be attracted to faces and social interactions 
whereas those with Autism appear indifferent to forming social relationships. Recent research 
has suggested that there may be something about the meaning of faces that is represented 
differently for these two groups. In order to explore this, the current study will look at the 
ways in which typically developing children process emotions in faces so as to make 
comparisons with the developmentally atypical groups.  
Who are the researchers? 
 
Research will be carried out by Rachel Cole-Fletcher, based at the Institute of Neuroscience at 
the University of Newcastle. Rachel is currently conducting her PhD and this research will form 
the basis of her thesis. She will be supervised by Dr. Debbie Riby and Professor Vicki Bruce, 
both based in the Department of Psychology at the University of Newcastle. 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
Your child has been selected to be invited to take part in our study because they are 
developing normally and they are the same age and gender as one of the children who we are 
studying who has Williams Syndrome/Autism. This will help us to make sure our groups are 
matched on age so that any differences we may see in the children with Williams 
Syndrome/Autism are not related to age.  
What will the study involve?  
For your child, the study will involve:  
 Completing some standardised pen-and-paper tasks in order paint a profile of strengths 
and weaknesses. These should take no longer than 30 minutes in any one session. 
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 Viewing images of faces or face-like objects (see attached sheet titled ‘task images’) on a 
computer screen and being asked what they see or what emotion they think is shown. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part in the study? 
We hope that there will be many benefits of this research to the understanding of social 
interactions for all children as well as to families of children with Williams Syndrome and 
Autism in particular. The results may provide important information to help professionals in 
best supporting the needs of those children with Williams syndrome and Autism.  
What are the disadvantages of taking part in the study?  
We hope that there will be very few disadvantages of taking part in this study. One possible 
concern may be the time your child will be asked to give to the study for completing tasks. 
However, we will only work with your child for short durations and they will be able to take 
short breaks if required; this should ensure that disruption to their normal routines is kept to a 
minimum. 
Do I have to take part in the study? 
You do not have to take part in this study. Participation is on a voluntary basis. Should you 
decide not to take part this will not affect your child’s care, treatment or education. If you do 
take part, keep the information sheet and you will be asked to sign a consent form (see 
attached). You will receive a copy of the consent form to keep. Your consenting to take part in 
no way binds your child to participate and either you or they can withdraw without reason at 
any time. 
What will happen to the data? 
All information collected from your child will remain confidential. No names will be used 
throughout the project but all data will be coded with numbers to ensure each child remains 
anonymous.  
What will happen to the results? 
The results of this study will be written up in an information document for parents. A copy of 
this will be made available through your child’s school. It will not be possible to identify 
participants from this or any other document. We are aware that some parents may be very 
interested in their child’s individual results from the measures completed, however due to the 
research nature of the study, this information cannot be given on an individual basis. As this 
study is being undertaken as part of a research PhD, the results of this study will also be 
written up into a final thesis.   
Any further questions... 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. Please fill out the attached consent 
form if you are interested in your child taking part. Should you have any comments or queries, 
please do not hesitate to contact me using the contact details below.  
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Parents of children with ASD/WS 
What meaning do faces have? Processing of emotions from faces in children with Williams 
syndrome (WS) and Autism (ASD). 
We would like to invite your child to take part in a research study. Please read this information 
sheet before deciding whether you would like them to take part. It will explain why the 
research is being done and what it will involve. If there is anything you are unclear about after 
you have read this information, please feel free to ask questions. I can be contacted by email 
or by phone using the contact details at the bottom of the sheet.  
Purpose of the study 
Recent research has suggested that children with WS and ASD have problems processing 
information across different parts of faces. That is, they do not consider the distances or 
positions of features but instead focus on the features themselves. This inevitably has an 
impact on the ability of people with these disorders to appropriately interpret emotions from 
faces: This is an area consistently found to be a problem for people within these groups, the 
causes of which warrant further research. However, people with these disorders show very 
different behaviours in the way that they engage in social relationships, with WS populations 
favouring social interactions whilst those with ASD seem indifferent to them. Therefore it 
seems that some factors beyond face processing skills may be operating and this study aims to 
explore precisely what these factors could be. Is there something about the meaning of faces 
that is represented differently for the two groups? 
Who are the researchers? 
Research will be carried out by Rachel Cole-Fletcher, based at the Institute of Neuroscience at 
the University of Newcastle. Rachel is currently conducting her PhD and this research will form 
the basis of her thesis. She will be supervised by Dr. Debbie Riby and Professor Vicki Bruce, 
both based in the Department of Psychology at the University of Newcastle. 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
Families with a child with WS/ASD are being asked to take part in this study. One of the 
researchers, Dr. Debbie Riby, has close links with the Williams Syndrome Foundation (WSF) 
and various Autism groups and is involved in ongoing research with them. This project has 
identified families to take part who have expressed an interest in research through the 
WSF/North East Autism Society.  
What will the study involve?  
For your child, the study will involve:  
 Completing some standardised pen-and-paper tasks in order to paint a profile of strengths 
and weaknesses. These should take no longer than 30 minutes in any one session. 
 Viewing images of faces or face-like objects (see attached sheet titled ‘task images’) on a 
computer screen and being asked what they see or what emotion they think is shown. 
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What are the benefits of taking part in the study? 
As this is a preliminary research study, there will be no immediate benefits to participants. We 
are unable to give families individual feedback on their child’s performance. Our hope is that 
through studies like these, we will learn more about the characteristics of WS and ASD, 
including those which are not currently well-known. Through disseminating the results of 
these studies, we aim to increase understanding of WS and ASD among families and 
professionals, improving the experience for families and children with WS and ASD. We hope 
that ultimately, such research will provide important information to help in developing 
interventions for children with WS and ASD. 
What are the disadvantages of taking part in the study?  
We hope that there will be very few disadvantages of taking part in this study. One possible 
concern may be the time your child will be asked to give to the study for completing tasks. 
However, we will only work with your child for short durations and they will be able to take 
short breaks if required; this should ensure that disruption to their normal routines is kept to a 
minimum. 
Do I have to take part in the study? 
You do not have to take part in this study. Participation is on a voluntary basis. Should you 
decide not to take part this will not affect your child’s care, treatment or education. If you do 
take part, you may keep the information sheet and you will be asked to sign a consent form 
(see attached). You will receive a copy of the consent form to keep. Your consenting to take 
part in no way binds your child to participate and either you or they can withdraw without 
reason at any time. 
What will happen to the data? 
All information collected from your child will remain confidential. No names will be used 
throughout the project but all data will be coded with numbers to ensure each child remains 
anonymous.  
What will happen to the results? 
The results of this study will be written up in an information document for parents. A copy of 
this will be made available through your child’s school/posted directly to you. It will not be 
possible to identify participants from this or any other document. We are aware that some 
parents may be very interested in their child’s individual results from the measures completed, 
however due to the research nature of the study, this information cannot be given on an 
individual basis. As this study is being undertaken as part of a research PhD, the results of this 
study will also be written up into a final thesis.   
Any further questions... 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. Please fill out the attached consent 
form if you are interested in your child taking part. Should you have any comments or queries, 
please do not hesitate to contact me using the contact details below.  
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Information sheet for TD children 
What’s in a face?  
                                                                                                            
Who are we? 
My name is Rachel/Miss Fletcher (depending on school preference) and I am studying 
at the University of Newcastle. I am working with some other people who are very 
interested in (and know lots about) faces! 
Why are we writing to you?  
We would like you to take part in some games all about faces. When children like you 
look at a face, you are very good at seeing what that person might be feeling and you 
know how to respond to them. But, for some children, it isn’t so easy. Some children 
can find it hard to get much information from looking at faces and we are trying to 
work out why. To do this, we need to compare children who have problems 
understanding the meaning of faces to children your age so that we can see where the 
differences are. We hope that this will help us to come up with some different ways to 
help children communicate better when they look at a person’s face. 
 What will you have to do? 
We would like you to play some games that will involve you looking carefully at lots of 
different pictures on a computer screen. The pictures will be of different characters: 
Some animals, some people and some funny new creatures! As you look at the 
pictures, we will ask you some questions about what you can see. There are no right or 
wrong answers-we just want your thoughts and opinions about the characters. We will 
also ask you to do some quick tasks on paper, similar to the ones you do in the 
classroom. 
Do you have to do it? 
Definitely not! Even if you think you would like to take part at the beginning and then 
you change your mind and want to stop, that’s just fine! You can always say no at any 
time.  
And finally... 
It is up to you if you want to take part in playing our games. We hope that they will be 
fun for you and that you will enjoy working with us. We would like to say a big ‘thank 
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you’ now whether you decide to join in or not. If you have ANY questions, you can ask 
an adult to let us know and we can answer them for you. 
 
We hope to see you soon! 
 
Information sheet for WS/ASD participants 
What’s in a face?  
                                                                                                            
Who are we? 
My name is Rachel/Miss Fletcher (depending on school preference) and I am studying 
at the University of Newcastle. I am working with some other people who are very 
interested in (and know lots about) faces! 
Why are we writing to you?  
We would like you to take part in some games all about faces. We are very interested 
in what children like you see when they look at a face. Some children really love 
looking at faces, other children don’t like to look at them so much. Some children can 
find it hard to get much information from looking at faces and we are trying to work 
out why this might be. We hope that, by working together on these games, we can 
understand better how people are different. We can then come up with some 
different ways to help children communicate better when they look at a person’s face. 
What will you have to do? 
We would like you to play some games that will involve you looking carefully at lots of 
different pictures on a computer screen. The pictures will be of different characters: 
Some animals, some people and some funny new creatures! As you look at the 
pictures, we will ask you some questions about what you can see. There are no right or 
wrong answers - we just want your thoughts and opinions about the characters. We 
will also ask you to do some quick tasks on paper, similar to the ones you do in the 
classroom. 
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Do you have to do it? 
Definitely not! Even if you think you would like to take part at the beginning and then 
you change your mind and want to stop, that’s just fine! You can always say no at any 
time.  
And finally... 
It is up to you if you want to take part in playing our games. We hope that they will be 
fun for you and that you will enjoy working with us. We would like to say a big ‘thank 
you’ now whether you decide to join in or not. If you have ANY questions, you can ask 
an adult to let us know and we can answer them for you. 
We hope to see you soon! 
 
Consent form 
What meaning do faces have? Processing of emotions from faces. 
I have read the information sheet and/or have had the study explained to me. □ 
I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.    □ 
I give consent for my child to participate in this study.    □ 
I believe my child to be competent to give their own consent and he/she has read the 
information sheet and has signed the form below to indicate his/her consent.□ 
 I understand that I can change my mind at any time or my child can refuse to participate at 
any time, and that reasons for withdrawal do not need to be given. □ 
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Parent/Guardian name: ______________________________________________ 
Parent/Guardian signature: ___________________________________________ 
Child name: ______________________________________________________ 
Child signature: ___________________________________________________ 
Date of birth: ______________________________________________________ 
Date: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Ethical Approval Form 
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